REPCO

Seven countries from Central and Eastern Europe have been analysed in a sequence of IRI policy reports on foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) under the Beacon Project label which ended in September 2024. The seven countries are distinct cases which have been impacted by FIMI, yet they have a lot in common not least because all of them have been targeted by Russian malign actions to a degree or another, or instrumentalized to project FIMI toward “strategic enemies” (see the case of Macedonia which became the hub for FIMI against US in the 2016 presidential race).

 

The analysis in these reports stops three months before this review is written, thus it can be affirmed that they are up to date, but in some cases TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) change so fast that two or three months after the publishing of the reports the situation could look (even) radically different. Such is the case of the Romanian report which could not foresee the political, electoral and constitutional crisis which occurred in late November and was caused seemingly by a malign interference from both internal (primarily) and Russian sources. With all the above, we would suggest to any researcher, expert, analyst and informed reader to start their investigation and processing of the reports with the case of Ukraine, and not Romania then proceed further on with the Estonian report, then the ones on Poland, Romania, Czechia, Slovakia and end up with North Macedonia. Such a sequence would offer a perspective from the most intricate FIMI battleground, through the most secured to the least prepared ones.

 

The report on Ukraine is the most thoroughly written while following an analytical matrix imposed by IRI comprising and introduction into FIMI problematics regarding the national specifics, timeline of topic related events, institutional-legal and regulatory-prescriptive setting developed to tackle FIMI and the role of these institutions, evolution and dynamics of FIMI including topical narratives, outlook and recommendations. Basically all the seven reports include variations of this structure, obviously respecting the country specifics, as every country is unique in this regard, having adopted different approaches and timeframes to fighting this kind of threats, while some having lagged behind in terms of institutional layout development and social awareness about FIMI. Thus, while FIMI is a long term statement of intentions from hostile external actors it has not impacted equally strong all the seven countries, respectively there have been different perceptions about FIMI and institutional reactions to it.

 

Why should Ukraine serve as the starting report? Because if there is one country that stands out in this cycle of reports then it is Ukraine. Ukraine has been building an institutional framework to combat FIMI since 2014 when it was first attacked by Russia both kinetically and through active measures, having proved to become the spearhead on the European continent to fighting against Russian-originated and sponsored FIMI. In the case of Ukraine, FIMI went hand and hand with kinetic actions by Russia, not least the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, and later in a full-scale war starting in February 2022. Although inconsistencies exist between institutions with similar job descriptions, and the authors of the report point to the wanting coherence within the plethora of institutions and legislative norms, Ukraine has achieved a certain degree of synergy in this regard, enough to be presented as an example of efficient fight against Russian FIMI together with the kinetic fight. The report describing FIMI in Ukraine might very well represent the fight of tomorrow (3-5 years) in many if not all of the countries on the Eastern Flank.

 

One takeaway that singles out Ukraine as the agenda setter of the fight against FIMI on a global level is the idea of organizing an “Information Ramstein”. The idea about an “Information Ramstein” has not yet come to fruition, but the fact that it is an initiative launched by Ukraine, backed by a rich experience of fighting FIMI in the zero line, is not a random fact. The report does speak about the necessity to organize such a reunion with both an incumbent and preventative scope, one reason being FIMI originating against target countries first and foremost in Russia, and only occasionally or more rarely in China, Belarus or elsewhere.

 

The next in line of the IRI reports on FIMI would be Estonia and that would be for one reason: Estonia is a case of institutional efficiency and discipline. What singles out Estonia in this landscape is the early awareness about FIMI (at least since 2007, as a result of the Soviet Hero monument attack) and the media and information literacy program on a wide educational scale. Otherwise put, Estonia is the example to be inspired from in terms of education, both on the level of bureaucracy and population at large, and StratCom infrastructure. Estonia, as the report conveys, is an eloquent example in how strategic communication has to be organized throughout all the executive institutions. A quote from the report would be of use: “Each ministry and state agency in Estonia has at least one official who has undergone training in and is tasked with specific responsibilities pertaining to strategic communication within the purview of that organisation.”

 

Interestingly enough, Estonia has been fighting FIMI long before the term came into use even given the case of Ukraine, which was forced into a massive reform in order to combat FIMI once it felt it went hand in hand with the existential threat of a massive hot war. Estonia, while being also inspired by well-informed observation of the creeping then open invasion in Ukraine, came to the following key experience based conclusions: “The experience of Estonia demonstrates that three factors are indispensable for resilience against FIMI. Firstly, there must be the formulation and implementation of strategic communications in accordance with a robust national framework of structural documents. Secondly, an environment must be created that safeguards the autonomy of the media. Thirdly, public confidence in democratic processes and state institutions must be preserved.”

 

These takeaways, together with the institutional experience and eco-systemic resilience built by Ukraine, could serve as a guidance trio to check the descriptive content expressed in the rest of the reports. This brings us to the next report, on Poland. What is notable in this report is the equalling of FIMI to the long-time known term and category of “active measures”. Throughout the report one of the main threads is that Poland has developed resilience not so much and not exclusively due to the institutional and regulatory system as to the non-state sector. In other words, Poland does remind to a certain extent the Estonian case, due to its wide network of civic organizations, academia and public space in general. This implicitly drives at the social educational ecosystem which does not necessarily need a rigid regulatory framework to build resilience, but knowledge, access to it on a wide scale and vehicles for this knowledge to be spread. One could argue that there is also a supplementary factor, implied but not explicitly mentioned, that of identity which is telling about awareness of constant external threats. In other words, once there is high awareness about FIMI as a “Russian threat” on a wide scale, the Polish society acquires a way of its own to build resilience against this threat through media activism, civil society organizations, academia and not least state institutions. It goes without saying that the Polish case is not different from the Estonian and Ukrainian ones.

 

The remaining reports dwell on cases which could be interpreted as building insufficient resilience to combating FIMI. The report on Romania should be treated with a bit of scepticism for the simple reason that what happened in November and December 2024 around the presidential and parliamentary elections in Romania might be a case of FIMI only in appearance. We need much more structured investigations, yet for the time being we can speculate that the Romanian case might have been an inside job[1] - DIMI, that is Domestic Information Manipulation and Interference - which at a certain point had lost control over itself and became part of a FIMI operation. Although, clearly the structure of the report was dictated by the IRI matrix of analysis, the authors of the report on Romania should also seek the response to the question whether the nature of the Romanian ruling class could be a structural hindrance to the way the state functions and whether the institutional setting for combatting FIMI is an empty shell on the background of oligarchic capture. In other words, are the ubiquitous Romanian secret services (there are six such institutions in Romania) a structural factor which divert our attention from FIMI toward something that still does not have a widely accepted term and understanding overall.

 

Somewhat misleadingly, given the size and funding of the intelligence and security apparatus in Romania (approx. one per cent of GDP), the country should be a leader in combating FIMI and a bulwark in front of Russian active measures. However, as the authors point out, the main guiding document and institution - the Security Strategy of Romania, together with the Supreme Defence Council - have been behind a meta-narrative in the domain and/or a reactive instrument, and not a builder of policies to tackle FIMI per se. Another central institution to tackle FIMI has been the National Audio-Visual Council, which is indicative about a relatively narrow understanding of what FIMI may be, unlike in other countries in the IRI list, vide Ukraine, Estonia and Poland.

The remaining three reports (on Czechia, Slovakia and North Macedonia) could be lumped together in a subgroup from the point of view of a less resilient institutional setting for combating FIMI, at least strictly judging by the description of the regulatory system aiming FIMI. What is however notable are the references to the EU Digital Service Act and Cybersecurity Act as a guiding principle for developing institutions and regulations in this sense. It clearly specifies that efficiency in combating FIMI cannot achieve by being a stand-alone actor. As the report on Czechia cogently indicates, for actors with lesser institutional resources, the EU Digital Service Act is a mandatory umbrella against FIMI:

 

“At the international level, while the EU has established regulations such as the Digital Services Act and Cybersecurity Act, the coordination between member states is still lacking. FIMI, by nature, transcends borders, and yet national-level responses remain fragmented. The EU could improve mechanisms for the real-time exchange of intelligence on FIMI operations and foster closer cooperation between cybersecurity agencies, intelligence services, and private platforms. Without a robust system for data sharing, joint action, and mutual support, the effectiveness of EU-wide strategies remains limited.”

 

As the report on North Macedonia brightly suggests, civil society is the sector that compensates for weak institutional settings in combating FIMI. It should not be treated as a panacea, but it is a silver lining to the knowledge that the state institutions do not always react adequately or optimally to insidious manipulations meant to sow chaos within societies.

 

One possible conclusion from reading the seven IRI reports is that everyone has something to learn from the other. Fighting (most often Russian) FIMI is a process of permanent learning and relentless fight against renewed attempts to undermine social fabric and institutional resilience of the state. The report on Poland did mention that FIMI is just another way to point towards “active measures”, a term invented one century ago by the infamous Cheka. This is a very useful observation. Fighting against FIMI is not something new. During the Cold War, entire institutional ecosystems in the West were dedicated to fighting these types of threats. We just need to refresh, occasionally rebuild, and adapt many of those lessons learned to present reality of information society.

Last, but not least, the IRI reports may suggest a follow up effort to build a FIMI efficiency combating index. Evidently a much larger body of research is needed, bringing on board many other cases, including from countries that have accumulated experience in the first line of fighting FIMI. Examples include Moldova, Armenia, Georgia or much bigger actors like Germany. All of these countries have had to withstand intensive and extensive campaigns of FIMI operations, some (like Germany) having had this experience since the early stages of the Cold War.

 

This text is part of a special cooperation project between IRI and New Eastern Europe which aims to promote awareness of foreign information manipulation and interference in democratic societies.

 

Oktawian Milewski is a political scientist specialising in Central and East European studies. He is currently a Poland resident correspondent for Radio France Internationale, Romanian office.

[1] A recent investigation by the Snoop.ro portal suggests convincingly enough that what has happened in Romania in the last two months was not part of a FIMI campaign, but an inside job with the direct participation of people connected to Romanian secret services through the second biggest systemic party at the time, National Liberal Party (PNL). For more see: https://snoop.ro/anaf-a-descoperit-ca-pnl-a-platit-o-campanie-care-l-a-promovat-masiv-pe-calin-georgescu-pe-tiktok/