REPCO

IWONA REICHARDT: We are in Belgrade now, but we have just returned from Novi Sad. In both cities we have been seeing signs with red, bloody hands on the walls. This is the symbol of the protest movement that has been ongoing in Serbia for over a month now. Would you say that what we are seeing in Serbia now is a pre-revolutionary moment?

 

IVAN MILENKOVIĆ: I don't believe that this is such a moment, nor do I want that. There is a revolutionary potential indeed. This is a fight against dictatorship, but without new ideas.

 

NIKODEM SZCZYGŁOWSKI: When we were in Novi Sad, where the current protests started in November, we were told there that this is the beginning of the end of Aleksandar Vučić. Do you believe in that?

 

Ivan Milenković: No. I don't believe in that. I don't believe in such an opinion because I know that Vučić has absolute control over the public sphere in this country. All television stations with national frequencies are in his hands. All journals are in his hands. All institutions are in his hands. This includes culture houses, libraries and others. In other words, at the local level, the public space is fully controlled by his people. That is why if an end was to come it will be, I fear, a long and, possibly, bloody process.

 

Iwona Reichardt: But there is no doubt that there is anger in Serbia now. Who is angry and why?

 

Ivan Milenković: I am angry. Students are angry. Intellectuals are angry. But majority of people are confused. They are confused because there is no real public sphere. My mother for example, she lives 200 kilometres from Belgrade. She votes for Vučić. She has no knowledge about the alternatives. When I say that people are confused I am talking primarily about the middle class and poorer people. And when I say that they are confused I mean their feelings towards the world, towards Europe. They blame them for their problems, but they don’t blame Vučić.

 

Iwona Reichardt: Why not?

 

Ivan Milenković: Through his omnipresence in the media Vučić, like a charismatic leader, hypnotizing the masses. This is a direct consequence of his usurpation of the public sphere, that is state institutions. Vučić is some kind of a magician. He can hypnotize masses of people.

 

Nikodem Szczygłowski: What do you think are the biggest differences between Vučić's regime and other authoritarian regimes in Europe, let’s say Orbán's?

 

Ivan Milenković: In fact, I don't see large differences between these regimes, except maybe the fact that Vučić is not rational while Orbán is very rational. Plus, there is Milorad Dodik from Republika Srpska, which is a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He is terrible but also very rational. For example, in Serbia we only have two communities which are not under Vučić’s control. This shows a totalitarian mind. In fact, we can put all these guys together: Erdogan, Orbán, Vučić and Putin. I am saying this keeping in mind that while Erdogan and Putin are slaughterers, Vučić is (still) not. So there are some differences between them, but they are not very large. I know that in Poland you also had Kaczyński, and it was difficult for you, but Poland’s situation was nonetheless different. You had big cities in your hands.

 

Iwona Reichardt: Yes, but the mayor of Gdańsk was murdered during a public charity concert and this attack was determined to have been driven by hate speech. Maybe you have heard about it?

 

Ivan Milenković: I don’t recall it.

 

Iwona Reichardt: Hate speech was a big factor in this tragedy. But returning to Serbia; when we talk to Serbian colleagues, we hear a lot of frustration with the European Union and sense some tiredness with the integration process. Why are Serbians so frustrated with the EU? Does the reason for that kind of frustration come from Europe itself?

 

Ivan Milenković: I'm not sure. Here in Serbia, it is Vučić's propaganda that is against the European Union and this is widespread. Actually, let me tell you this: Vučić can speak like a European and he does this to please Europe’s ears. Here, on the other hand, he presents the EU as the enemy of the Serbian people. The propaganda portrays the bloc as being contrary to Serbian history and Serbian culture.

 

Nikodem Szczygłowski: It seems to me like the key word here is dignity.

 

Ivan Milenković: Yes. That’s it! It is this manipulated need for dignity. I am not sure if Europe is really to be held guilty for that situation. At the same time, I need to admit that I have an impression that Europe has lost interest in Serbia. For Vučić this is great news and a fantastic situation. There is no more pressure.

 

Iwona Reichardt: Is it because Europe is interested in Serbian lithium?

 

Ivan Milenković: Yes, that too and for us, the Serbian opposition, this is terrible.

 

Nikodem Szczygłowski: When we look at this, let’s call it the “global chessboard”, can you tell us where China is now with regards to Serbia? Has it replaced Russia?

Ivan Milenković: This is a very good question, because here in Serbia China is a huge topic. We have a lot of Chinese companies, as you know, but I'm not so sure whether the Chinese influence is indeed so big.

 

Iwona Reichardt: And what about Russia? What is Russia for Serbia today?

 

Nikodem Szczygłowski: We know about Russia’s image in Serbia. We see posters of Putin, as well as socks and T-shirts with Putin’s face being sold in Belgrade. At the same time, we are aware of the fact that more and more Russians have been living in Serbia now. They don't speak Serbian nor want to learn Serbian. Is this new experience with Russian migration eye-opening for Serbs? In other words: maybe Russia is no longer the idealized Russia that they have been taught about for a long time?

 

Ivan Milenković: The relationship between Serbia and Russia is very complicated. It is complicated because of a certain tradition, but also because of politics. Particularly now. Without any doubt, there are Russian influences in Serbia. On the other hand, I have an impression, maybe it is only me, that the relationship between Vučić and Putin is very superficial. Or maybe not superficial, but limited to what I would call a “power game”. Of course, Serbian people love Russia, even if this feeling is very abstract. But now when we have many Russians, here in Belgrade especially but also in cities such as Novi Sad, and they include the anti-Putin Russians, the situation is different. Prices of apartments and services are rising, “brotherly Serbian people” is ripping off their “Russian brothers” at every step. But Serbs are not getting much out of this new migration wave. Financially, especially. That is why I would say that the relationship between Serbia and Russia can be strong, but largely historically speaking.

 

Nikodem Szczygłowski: But also this relationship has always been platonic.

 

Ivan Milenković: Yes. And keep in mind that the money that we get from Russia: it's nothing. The biggest economic success of the two governments, Russian and Serbian, is the trade of apples. (Russian gas as well.)

 

Nikodem Szczygłowski: Miljenko Jergović, a Croatian writer of Bosnian origin, told me once that Croatia had won the war, and became a victim of this victory.

 

Ivan Milenković: Very true.

 

Nikodem Szczygłowski: Considering this perspective, how do you then explain Serbia, which sees itself as a victim of the 1999 raid?

 

Ivan Milenković: Well, I think that Serbs suffer from some kind of eternal victim syndrome.

 

Nikodem Szczgygłowski: A victim of whom?

 

Ivan Milenković: A victim of God, of evil, of bloody Europeans, Croats, evil, destiny... Serbs don't recognize defeats. We are victims. In the rankings of victimhood, the first place is taken by the Jews but Serbs are also very high on the list. With the difference being that Jews were true victims. Croats also adopted that syndrome: They are Serbian victims even tho they won the war and exiled Serbs from Croatia (they clearly don’t feel well with themselves). That is simply a discourse of self-victimization so they can justify their bullshit and crimes. That is why Jergović’s observation is very correct.

 

Nikodem Szczgygłowski: Just please clarify this a little bit.

 

Ivan Milenković: I'm talking about the war that started in 1999. Nobody talks about what had happened before 1999, when Serbs, in Yugoslav wars, stood out in committing crimes.

 

Nikodem Szczgygłowski: In that case can we expect that, for example in your life, Serbs have heard about what actually happened in Vukovar or in Srebrenica from different sides?

 

Ivan Milenković: At the moment, with Vučić's regime in power, and remember that Vučić was very active in that war, there is no Serbian guilt. This process of self-enlightenment will not start as long as he is Serbia’s leader. But I know that during the period of the first Serbian Republic, which was the 12-year period between Milošević and Vučić, we were openly talking about Serbian crimes. At that time of the republic, we revealed the truth about Serbian crimes in Kosovo, in Croatia, in Bosnia and that was a chance for Serbs. We have a very strong anti-war discourse, but we have had no chance to make it visible to the wider public. For example, during Milošević’s regime there was an organisation there is an organization called “The Second Serbia”, which has not reconciled itself with crimes committed by Milošević’s police and military in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. It does not accept the crimes that had been committed in name of Serbia. With the coming of Vučić to power this process stopped. And now we are seeing strong revisionism regarding our history. Just like in Russia. So what is the answer that people get when they ask about the atrocities? They are told that these people, the victims, killed themselves. There was no war. There is no history being told about the killings done by the Serbs. There is no such narrative. (Didn’t Kaczyński try to do the same with Polish history during WWII?) Instead, it is suggested that victims of Serbian nationalism just killed themselves, they committed collective suicide, or something like that. Of course, ridiculous but effective. It is true that now in Serbia history begins in 1999, with the “evil” aggression of NATO against the country. “Evil” because Serbs are (of course) never guilty of anything. From the historical perspective, this is absolutely terrible. The damage that such rhetoric brings to our society is huge. But it’s like that. In the official version, Milosević’s period simply did not exist.

 

Nikodem Szczygłowski: One more question regarding the perception of the wars in former Yugoslavia. How does Serbia see the following three wars: the ten-day war in Slovenia; the war in Croatia; and the war in Bosnia?

 

Ivan Milenković: In the last five years, I have not heard any serious discussion about this topic on national TV that is under Vucić's control. I believe that people have forgotten about the war in Slovenia. Since it lasted only ten days, it seems like nothing for them. When it comes to Bosnia, people are told that these were the so-called “evil Muslims”, while Croatia is presented as our traditional enemy in the form of the Ustasha (Ustaše). This group is the traditional enemy of Serbian nationalists to be precise.

 

Nikodem Szczygłowski: I understand that in your view they are the same: Ustasha and Chetniks.

 

Ivan Milenković: Yes. It's two sides of the same coin. They are the same. There is absolutely no difference between these two groups of nationalists. And on both sides there were war criminals. That's the truth. Vučić too was a member of the Serbian nationalists. He has the honorary title of a Chetnik. The Chetniks were special forces during the First World War and in the Second World War they became a legal entity collaborators of Nazis and killers in the name of the nation. But Chetniks weren’t a unique movement. This is what makes them a bit different from the Ustasha, who were soldiers, because Croatia was a state after all. Yes, it was a satellite of the Third Reich, but it was a state nonetheless. Serbia, on the other hand, was occupied. That is why the Chetniks were an informal group. But, essentially there was no difference between them. During Milosević’s time we had a big attempt to revise the history and to present them as good guys. we may not have had any official discourse about the Chetniks, but at the same time we had neo-Chetnik units in Croatia and Bosnia. Those were units of killers and sadist. This was part of organized action by the regime. Milošević’s regime didn't have anything against them. On the contrary.

 

Nikodem Szczygłowski: I remember when I was in Belgrade in April this year. I saw a lot of nationalistic graffiti on walls – particularly dedicated to the war criminal Ratko Mladić. I would like to know if you think it was an organized action by the regime to show society how many radicals are out there.

 

Ivan Milenković: Yes, that is exactly the aim of the regime. This action that you are talking about was not carried out by the state, but for sure it was done with Vučić’s permission. It was done with the silent permission of the regime. Its aim was indeed to show that there are worse options than Vučić, who at the end of the day is not as radical as some people who are out there.

 

Iwona Reichardt: Let’s now have a bit of a dream and imagine Serbia without Vučić. What would it look like? Do people dream like that?

 

Ivan Milenković: I don't believe that the majority of people have some kind of a projection or an idea of what will happen after Vučić. This is because of the really big confusion that exists among the public. From the point of view of an intellectual, for example, and I'm talking in my name only, maybe in the name of a group of intellectuals, we would like to see a second Serbian Republic.

 

Iwona Reichardt: And what would that second Serbian Republic look like?

 

Ivan Milenković: Well, it would have the separation, or division, of powers, a free public sphere, and mediation mechanisms between people in power and the population at large. That's the idea. However, it's only an intellectual idea and a wish. Our struggle will be long, I am afraid.

 

Iwona Reichardt: Do you think after Vučić Serbia will institute some kind of lustration?

 

Ivan Milenković: No, we did not have any lustration after the Milosević regime so I don’t believe we will have any after Vucić. On the other hand, I would ask why lustration? I know about historical examples of lustration, for example in South Africa, but in my view what we really need is to introduce the rule of law. And we need to change laws. The laws that are in force now don't work. In fact, Vučić's regime has violated all the laws, including the Constitution. That is why we need to bring back the rule of law.

 

Iwona Reichardt: I know the topic of lustration is controversial. I understand why. But I also as a political scientist know that statistically the autocrats come back more often than they don’t, especially if you do not eradicate the remnants of the old regime. That is why I would like to ask you how in your view the second Serbian Republic, when it becomes a reality, could protect itself from a future anti-democratic threat?

 

Ivan Milenković: I understand your question, but I can only repeat: more than lustration I believe that utilization of existing laws could help. In that case there wouldn’t be enough prison space for members of Vučić’s regime that broke all imaginable human and gods laws. You are asking me the most difficult question.

 

Iwona Reichardt: I'm sorry.

 

Ivan Milenković: No, don’t be sorry. It is a real and important question but don’t expect me to have the answer because this problem is 2,500 years old. Aristotle dealt with it, so did Machiavelli. Hobbes and Kant as well. That is why I do not have an answer that would be different from what they wrote. Except on the topic of corruption, maybe. If it is a mechanism to establish a new republic, then it can be even okay. I am not a moralist. I understand that politics has its own rules and laws. And sometimes you need to negotiate with criminals. That is why, if it is necessary, we will talk with devil criminals.

 

Nikodem Szczgygłowski: I would like to refer to the Slovenian writer, Drago Jančar, who in his essay titled Remembering Yugoslavia, which he wrote in 1991 and which I recently translated into Polish, wrote what could happen when Yugoslavia started to fall apart. In this text – as well as in the text that he wrote recently titled The Archipelago of Yugoslavia – he envisioned that what would come about would indeed be this “archipelago of Yugoslavia”, which we can see today. Slovenia has gone very far, Croatia as well. In this essay, Jančar says that these countries are now like islands and that the former Yugoslavia has turned into an archipelago, where there is no communication between the states. Everyone lives on their own island.

 

Ivan Milenković: Drago Jančar has indeed found a great metaphor. He has found a very good illustration of what has taken place. But if you ask me how this is all seen from Serbia, I will tell you that there is no single answer. I can again answer this in my name only, or in the name of a group of intellectuals, that Slovenia played the best role in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. And of course, Slovenia is a small, stable republic. Even more, it is the only stable republic that had emerged from the break up. Croatia had the war in exchange for its independence. As Miljenko Jergović says, Croatia lost its peace because it lost the Serbs who lived in Croatia. That is terrible, that is bad for Croatia. Serbia, on the other hand, with Milošević as its head, did not recognize the historical moment. Instead, it discovered nationalism. And especially the idea of Greater Serbia. Naturally, in the 20th century nationalism was not the same thing as it was in the 18th century, when it was a universal movement and taking place in many parts of the European continent. In the 20th century, nationalism was a bloody ideology. And nationalism is still here. Serbia was and continues to be on the side of ideology that kills. In that sense, Serbia can be called the avant-garde of stupidity in the 20th and 21st centuries.

Nikodem Szczygłowski is a traveller, writer and reporter. He studied Mediterranean Archaeology at the University of Łódź and at CEMI in Prague. He is fluent in Lithuanian and Slovenian.

Iwona Reichardt is the deputy editor in chief of New Eastern Europe and a member of the board of the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe in Wrocław.

Ivan Milenković is philosopher and translator, contributor of the Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory in Belgrade. His research interests include contemporary French and political philosophy. He has published four books, about 40 texts in various professional periodicals and journals of theory and literature, and almost 400 hundred reviews, evaluations and reports for philosophical literature and fiction.

Public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the grant competition “Public Diplomacy 2024 – 2025 – the European dimension and countering disinformation”.

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the official positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.