REPCO

AURELIUSZ M. PĘDZIWOL: Let’s start from Europe’s situation following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the context of the results of the presidential elections in the United States of America. Will Europe be left alone after Trump’s victory, or could it still count on a NATO with the US?

GERLINDE NIEHUS: I think that the dominating factor after Trump takes office will be unpredictability, as it is difficult to say what he will do. The political programme he presented during the campaign, and in the years prior, is very, very contradictory. It is not cohesive. When it comes to NATO we might not exactly be reassured if we take previous statements into account. Such as the ones that claim NATO is obsolete ...

But that was in his previous term...

Yes, in the first phase of his presidency. There was also an attempt to withdraw the US from NATO. He could now return to that path or move towards a NATO “a la carte”. After all, during his election campaign he stated that he would support only those countries that invest at least two per cent of their GDP in their own defence.

That isn’t too bad.

It could affect Germany, which could reach the NATO two per cent goal through some creative bookkeeping for the first time in 2024. But we can’t be sure it will remain so after 2027. Trump could return to this NATO “a la carte” or to this so-called “dormant NATO” which is being discussed in his circles. This is a scenario where the US withdraws from NATO to a large extent, retaining the nuclear umbrella and naval security. Europe would be left to fend for itself in anything else. None of these scenarios are good. Now there have been reports that he wants Allies to move to five per cent of GDP in investing in defence, as the condition for the US to stay engaged in NATO. But even Donald Trump himself probably doesn’t know what he will do in the end. 

The discussion about Europe taking more responsibility for its defence and that the EU should have a military dimension have been taking place independently of Trump.

That’s right. I think it is also a long-term US strategy. A persisting US orientation is clearly directed towards China and the Indo-Pacific, as it is there the main challenges will appear in coming decades. As a result, the US pressure on Europe to do more for its own security won’t diminish. For Europe, this means to rebuild the military capabilities that it has largely lost during three decades of reaping the putative “peace dividend” after the end of the Cold War. Europeans must continue to ramp up investments in defence, increase defence production, fill huge gaps in areas such as air and missile defence, and build combat capable land forces with the capabilities for their deployment - provided for decades largely by the US.

Does this mean the creation of a Euro-NATO? Maybe the rebirth of the Western European Union?

Turning back the clock doesn’t convince me. The Western European Union and the European Defence Community did not work out. I believe it is better to see where we are now and where we will be in the coming decades, and then pivot strategically.

There are two important issues for me. Firstly, what connects NATO and the EU is much more important than what divides them. Taking into consideration the broader strategic perspective, both institutions must stick together as strategic partners. Speaking of a “broader perspective” I mean not only an aggressive Russia, but also other threats like the cooperation between Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, known as the “Axis of Upheaval”, or in fact the raising coercion from China. This is most crucial – NATO and the EU must stay united. .

Secondly, another important issue is to find a formula for cooperation, one that maximises synergies between both organizations and is based on the respective core strengths of each of the institutions. In that perspective, NATO would remain the foundation for our collective defence and the forum for its implementation. That is how it is spelled out in different strategic documents of both the EU and NATO.

Drawing on its strengths, the EU could take a bigger role for example in cybersecurity or resilience and preparedness, which goes beyond the strict military sense, as it covers the civilian sector, preparing the population for conflict.

What are the EU’s advantages in comparison to NATO?

The EU has many important instruments. It can play an important role in strengthening the European defence industry and industrial policy. It can also play a key role when it comes to research and development that it could expand also in the realm of security and defence. Most importantly, the EU has a much larger budget than NATO. This is of significance when it comes to further enhance military mobility and the critical infrastructure needed for its implementation. For example, many roads or railways need to be refurbished so that they can be used for deploying troops if needed.

We should also work towards joint defence planning in Europe: NATO would take the lead in setting the capability targets and the standards and answer the question of what needs to be done. The EU, in turn, could lead on the question of how to do what needs to be done, using its growing tool kit. It would be a division of labour that would utilize the strengths of each institution in my opinion.

So it is not about a European army, but rather about building complementary positions of NATO and the EU?

Yes, it is about boosting synergies. I’m not too convinced about labels such as “European army”, as these divert our attention from what we should be doing. Every country has just one set of armed forces and can decide how and where to use these, be this under the NATO, EU or in fact UN umbrella. But it will remain the same armed forces. It is more important that armed forces are equipped and trained in a manner that they are combat credible and capable. This means there must be defence investments that enable this. We have many gaps and shortages in this area. 

What could European countries do if the US withdraws from NATO?

I believe it is a hypothetical…

But you have also described such a scenario.

In the event that Trump would aim to take the US out of NATO, there is still the question if the US Congress would support it. After all, this is a decision that the president cannot take by himself.

However, should the Americans really withdraw from the continent, the Europeans would face a dilemma as they currently aren’t able to provide for their own security. Around 67 per cent of NATO’s defence expenditures comes from the US. Until now this has proven indispensable for the defence of Europe.

The Europeans have a very, very long road ahead when it comes to rebuilding the military capabilities they had during the Cold War and which were dismantled over the last three decades. Recovering from this constant atrophy and erosion of military capabilities cannot be achieved within a year or two. We really need a long-term policy that will stay the course, and political leaders that have the will and abilities to explain all of this to the society. They must be able to sustain the policy and implement it.

This means that Europe would have to triple its defence spending?

In any event, Europeans must spend much more on defence. We have discussed the American expectations that European countries ought to do more for their own security and defence not only during the previous term of future president Trump, but also during the presidency of his predecessors. If you look at it from their perspective it becomes understandable. What do they see when they arrive in Europe? Wealthy countries where citizens can afford a high standard of living and long holidays. The Americans then ask themselves why they should pay for their security? Why won’t the Europeans do more themselves?

One of the leading figures in Europe is the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. Does the fact that she was defence minister in the past hold any significance?

I’m not sure. Her time in office was not without controversy. She also wasn’t among the so-called Spitzenkandidaten (main candidates) for the office of European Commission president. Back then she was a compromise candidate. But if we look at what she has been doing with regards to Ukraine we have to admit that the EU has achieved a lot. This includes the sanctions placed on Russia, even if they have a lot of holes and some member states don’t fully uphold them.

Like Hungary?

Yes, among others like Cyprus, Austria or Italy. The EU and von der Leyen have also done a lot for Ukraine when it comes to supplying funds for basic services such as health care, education, salaries and pensions. The EU financial support plays an immense role. NATO’s security umbrella enables member states to provide such assistance for Ukraine. The main function of the Alliance was and remains to safeguard the freedom and guarantee security for its members. Vladimir Putin naturally knows about this. This is why a direct military attack against a NATO member isn’t likely.

The country that supports Ukraine the most today is the US. Will Europe have to take over this role if this worst-case scenario came into fruition? Should Ukraine receive a fast-track membership prospect to NATO in light of this?

Yes, is the answer to both of these questions. However, there is a huge gap between the statement and its implementation. Firstly, Europeans have to invest more in their defence in the long run. This includes the defence industry. Ukraine has shown in many ways that Europe isn’t capable of providing enough ammunition because it has no capacity to produce it. This must now be rebuilt. Industry representatives want to know if they will have clients when they set the wheels in motion. After all these are large-scale investments. There is a need for long-term commitments so that the industry could ramp up production. The Europeans must do this both for basic components like ammunition and more complex weapons systems.

Does this include Ukraine?

This includes Ukraine, yes. Rheinmetall is an example as they have already set up a factory there. I would be happy if other European armament companies followed this lead. Your second question on Ukrainian membership in NATO...

… maybe it can be done according to the German model?

Exactly. Today NATO says that Ukraine’s future is in NATO and that the Alliance will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met. Personally, I believe that this time has arrived. Ukraine should be invited to start accession talks.

This is one of the first points of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s “Victory Plan”. I think he is absolutely right. Accession negotiations should begin as they would be a perfect signal for Ukraine that would strengthen its resilience and increase its motivation. It could be an even stronger signal for Putin, that we won’t be intimidated. I regret that we have politicians in many countries that pursue an “escalation avoidance approach. In my opinion, this is misguided and short-sighted.

Instead, we need a coherent Russia-containment strategy. We shouldn’t keep falling into the same trap. Putin respects strength and exploits weakness. If we hesitate or don’t have the courage to do this or that because we fear a potential escalation, it is in fact an invitation for Russia to continue escalating. This includes defining red lines for our own actions which have hampered our support to Ukraine over past years. Putin fosters fears, procrastination and cowardice, to use to his advantage wherever he can. We have to understand that this debate about escalation is actually a policy of appeasement. Concessions are an incentive for any aggressor to continue and intensify their aggression. They can see that they get away with it!

We need to depart from this thinking. It is another reason for why we should invite Ukraine to accession negotiations. After all, Germany was included in NATO as a divided country, with the border to the then GDR being treated as temporary. Perhaps we in Germany should remember this.

Can you envisage Ukraine as a full member of NATO before the end of the war? Before the occupied territories in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya, Kherson regions, as well as Crimea, are liberated?

I can. It would however need further investments in a militarily strong Ukraine and political courage on the part of Ukraine and its partners.

This conversation was held during the Freedom Games in Łódź.

Gerlinde Niehus is an independent security expert with 25 years of experience from different managerial positions at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Until recently she was responsible for NATO’s practical cooperation with partner countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and in the Western Balkans.

Aureliusz M. Pędziwol is a journalist with the Polish section of Deutsche Welle.

Public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the grant competition “Public Diplomacy 2024 – 2025 – the European dimension and countering disinformation”.

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the official positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.