REPCO

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    key:"title": {
        key:"en": {
            key:"value": string:"How Moscow and its allies are undermining the non-proliferation regime"
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    key:"subtitle": {
        key:"en": {
            key:"value": string:""
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    key:"summary": {
        key:"en": {
            key:"value": string:"<I>The Russo-Ukrainian War’s global repercussions increasingly subvert the foundations of the international nuclear order.</I>"
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    },
    key:"content": {
        key:"en": {
            key:"value": string:"<p>The start and course of the Russo-Ukrainian War since 2014 have been principally shaped by the fact that Russia has, and Ukraine does not have, weapons of mass destruction. Oddly, this war-enabling situation is legitimized, codified and preserved by one of the politically most important and, with 191 signatory states, most comprehensive multilateral agreements of modern international law. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows Russia, as an official nuclear-weapon state, to build and acquire atomic warheads. At the same time, the NPT explicitly forbids Ukraine, as an official non-nuclear-weapon state, to do the same. Ukraine’s non-nuclear allies – from Canada in the West to Japan in East – are similarly bound by the NPT, as well as conventions on chemical and biological weapons, to their statuses as purely conventional military powers.</p>\n<p>In its second article, the NPT postulates for all but five of its 191 signatory states, including Ukraine, that <a href=\"https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf\">“[e]ach non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”</a> The NPT thus prevented both Ukraine’s deterrence of, and defence against, the official nuclear-weapon state of Russia.</p>\n<p> </p>\n<p><strong>The 1994 Budapest Memorandum as an NPT appendix</strong></p>\n<p>Even more oddly, the emerging post-Soviet Ukrainian state possessed, in the early 1990s, the world’s third largest arsenal of nuclear warheads – an inheritance from the Soviet Union which broke up from August to December 1991. Immediately after Ukraine’s acquisition of independence, the number of its atomic arms was, for a brief period, larger than that of China, France and the United Kingdom’s weapons of mass destruction put together. Most Ukrainian and <a href=\"https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310601718_Was_Ukraines_Nuclear_Disarmament_a_Blunder\">many foreign observers now admit that it was naïve of Kyiv to get rid, in the mid-1990s, not only of most, but of all its nuclear material, technology and delivery systems</a>. At least, it was unwise to not demand in exchange a reliable protection mechanism like NATO membership or a mutual aid pact with the United States. Worse, many Ukrainian warheads, missiles, bombers, etc. were not destroyed in Ukraine, but transferred to – of all countries – Russia.</p>\n<p>Instead of an alliance that could protect it, Kyiv received, in exchange for its voluntary nuclear disarmament, a written security guarantee from Moscow promising, in the now infamous Budapest Memorandum, to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and integrity. At the last summit of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, before it transformed into the OSCE, in Hungary’s capital in December 1994, the Russian Federation (RF), United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) signed with Ukraine the fateful <a href=\"https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280401fbb\"> </a> The short document duplicated two similar memoranda which were especially designed for the post-Soviet holders of parts of the former USSR’s atomic arsenal – Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Being the so-called “depositary governments” of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Moscow, Washington and London became in 1994 and are still today the guarantors of the borders of these three former Russian colonies and Soviet republics.</p>\n<p>In their three Budapest Memoranda, the NPT’s depositary states assured Kyiv, Minsk and Almaty/Astana that they would neither pressure nor attack the three post-Soviet countries. That promise was given by the US, UK and RF in exchange for the agreement of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to get rid of all their military nuclear capabilities, and to enter the non-proliferation regime as properly non-nuclear-weapon states. China and France, as the other two official nuclear-weapon states under the NPT, issued separate governmental declarations also assuring Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan of respect for their borders. Recently, this story has been masterfully detailed by <a href=\"https://www.belfercenter.org/person/mariana-budjeryn\">Harvard’s nuclear historian Mariana Budjeryn</a> in her award-winning book <a href=\"https://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/12715/inheriting-bomb\"><em>Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine</em></a> (Johns Hopkins University Press 2022).</p>\n<p> </p>\n<p><strong>Security assurances or guarantees?</strong></p>\n<p>To be sure, the English-language titles of the three Budapest Memoranda speak only of “security assurances” from the NPT’s depositary governments for Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. This linguistic detail is sometimes taken to mean that the promises given by Washington, Moscow and London to Kyiv, Minsk and Almaty/Astana in 1994 were only semi-obligatory. Thus, the story goes, Russia’s manifest breach of its twenty-year old deal with Ukraine, when the Russian Federation annexed Crimea in 2014 along with many similar actions, is supposedly only a minor violation of some by now dated assurances and of the logic of the non-proliferation regime.</p>\n<p>Yet, the Memoranda’s official translations that are most relevant today – namely, the Russian- and Ukrainian-language versions of the document – are markedly different from the English original. The Budapest Memorandum’s Russian and Ukrainian headings speak of “guarantees of security”. In Russian this is <em>“o garantiiakh bezopasnosti”</em> and in Ukrainian <em>“pro harantii bezpeky”.</em> The Russian and Ukrainian translations of the phrase “on security assurances” in the English version of the Budapest Memorandum, i.e.<em> “o zavereniiakh bezopasnosti”</em> or<em> “pro zavirennia bezpeky”,</em> do not appear in the titles of the Memorandum’s Russian and Ukrainian versions.</p>\n<p>Washington and London thus indeed only “assured”, in Ukraine’s English-language version of the Budapest Memorandum, that they would not pressure or attack the post-Soviet country. In contrast, Moscow “guaranteed” Kyiv, in the document’s Russian and Ukrainian-language versions, the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine. The Russian word for guarantees, in the prepositional case, reads “<em>garantiiakh</em>” while the Ukrainian word for guarantees, in the accusative case, reads “<em>harantii</em>”. If written in Cyrillic letters, these two words look sufficiently similar to assert that Moscow fully understood, in December 1994, that it was giving Kyiv guarantees rather than mere assurances of security.</p>\n<p> </p>\n<p><strong>Russian NPT subversion before the war</strong></p>\n<p>Russia started violating the Budapest Memorandum and the NPT’s logic already before the beginning of its war against Ukraine and occupation of Crimea in February 2014. For instance, Russia tried to infringe upon Ukraine’s state territory and border in 2003 <a href=\"https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--2587--SE\">with a unilateral and eventually abortive infrastructure project approaching the Ukrainian island of Tuzla</a> in the Kerch Straits of the Black Sea. Ten years later, Moscow attempted to prevent Kyiv’s upcoming conclusion of an already initialed Association Agreement with the European Union. Throughout 2013, it exerted heavy economic as well as political pressure on Kyiv – a kind of behaviour explicitly forbidden by the <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum\">Budapest Memorandum</a>’s third article.</p>\n<p>It may also be worth reminding that Russia began already in the mid-1990s, long before Putin’s star in Russian politics started rising, to manifestly violate the logic of the non-proliferation regime in the post-Soviet space. Moscow did so with regard to another European successor state of the USSR, the Republic of Moldova, which did not receive a Budapest Memorandum but, like Ukraine, acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in 1994. In that year, <a href=\"https://neweasterneurope.eu/2024/08/05/could-an-istanbul-deal-have-brought-peace/\">Chisinau also signed an agreement with Moscow on the withdrawal of Russian troops from, and on the dissolution of, the Moscow-supported unrecognized “Transnistrian-Moldovan Republic”</a> in eastern Moldova. Thirty years later, neither of these obligations of the nuclear-weapon-state Russia vis-à-vis the non-nuclear-weapon state Moldova has been fulfilled.</p>\n<p>A similar story has, since the late 2000s, been ongoing in Georgia, which had also acceded, in 1994, to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. At the end of the five-day Russo-Georgian War of August 2008, Russia signed with Georgia a ceasefire agreement. The so-called “Sarkozy Plan” obliged Moscow to withdraw its troops from Georgia. Yet, <a href=\"https://neweasterneurope.eu/2024/08/05/could-an-istanbul-deal-have-brought-peace/\">Russia left, in violation of its 2008 promise, a large part of its regular forces on Georgian state territory</a>. Moreover, Moscow recognized two separatist regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” (i.e. Georgia’s Tskhinvali Region), as independent states – in obvious contradiction to the logic of the non-proliferation regime in which Russia and Georgia both officially participate.</p>\n<p>To be sure, the continuing infringement of the territorial integrity of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine is primarily determined by Russia’s larger conventional, rather than its high nuclear, military power. Yet, Moscow’s possession of atomic arms, as well as Chisinau, Tbilisi and Kyiv’s non-possession of WMDs, has been an important background factor in the Kremlin’s expansive behaviour for 30 years now. Without its large nuclear military capacity, Russia would have had to be far more cautious with its permanent deployment of conventional forces in countries where its troops are not wanted.</p>\n<p>Moreover, Moscow’s aggressive actions were – contrary to the Kremlin’s loud claims – only partly related to Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine’s international or/and internal affairs. Russian troops are stationed illegally on the territories of, on the one side, the official NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine as well as, on the other side, the officially neutral Republic of Moldova. The latter can, according to its still valid Constitution of 1994, neither enter NATO nor allow foreign troops on its land. The Russian occupations of Transnistria, Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” have continued independently of the geopolitical stance of Moldova and Georgia’s governments in the past or today. Whether the leaderships in Chisinau and Tbilisi have been communist or nationalist, and whether they have been friendly or adversarial towards Moscow, has had little effect on Russia’s illegal occupation of official Moldovan and Georgian state territory. That was and is in spite of these territories being covered by the NPT and numerous other security-related treaties to which Russia, Georgia and Moldova are parties.</p>\n<p>A similar story goes for Russia’s behaviour towards Ukraine. Many observers forget today that Moscow intensified its non-kinetic “hybrid” warfare against the Ukrainian state already before 2014 and started the military capture of Crimea as early as February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2014. During these periods of time, the Ukrainian state was headed by the loudly pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovych. The Moscow-friendly president of Ukraine was still in full power when Russia was exerting, throughout 2013, heavy economic as well as political pressure on Ukraine to not sign an Association Agreement with the EU. This was in spite of Moscow’s, as well as Washington and London’s, obligation in the Budapest Memorandum to <a href=\"https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf\">“[r]efrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind”</a>. Yanukovych was also still in office when Russia began, in February 2014, illegally occupying Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula – an action also forbidden by the Budapest Memorandum. Yanukovych left his presidential office, the city of Kyiv and eventually Ukraine for Russia only <em>after</em> Russian regular troops without insignia had started conquering south Ukrainian state territory by force.</p>\n<p> </p>\n<p><strong>How Moscow put the NPT on its head</strong></p>\n<p>Since February 2014, Russia has not only ever more ruthlessly attacked Ukraine by military and non-military means with regular and irregular forces. <a href=\"https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350343202_Damage_Control_The_Breach_of_the_Budapest_Memorandum_and_the_Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Regime\">Moscow has been also violating ever more unashamedly and demonstratively the security guarantees it gave to Kyiv in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.</a> Moscow’s actions have thereby been increasingly contradicting and even reversing the logic of the non-proliferation regime in place since 1970.</p>\n<p>The NPT is today, together with similar conventions on biological and chemical weapons, a central part of the post-1945 UN-based global security system. Apart from its written regulations, the NPT’s implicit function is that of upholding the borders of non-nuclear weapon states – especially so vis-à-vis the five officially nuclear-weapon states. In its introduction, the NPT is <a href=\"https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf\">“[r]ecalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, [those] States [that have signed or acceded to the treaty] must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations […].”</a> Circumscribing temporary possession of atomic arms to five countries that also happen to be permanent members of the UN Security Council (“the P5”), the NPT is tasked with reducing the risk of inter-state war in general, and the use of nuclear weapons as instruments of expansionist foreign political affairs in particular.</p>\n<p>As the legal successor to the USSR, a founder and depositary state of the NPT, and the explicit guarantor of the inviolability of Ukraine’s borders in the Budapest Memorandum, Russia has now put the purpose of the non-proliferation regime on its head. The NPT’s exception for the Russian possession of nuclear weapons has helped Moscow to conduct its expansionist and genocidal war against Ukraine. The NPT’s prohibition of the Ukrainian possession of nuclear weapons has also prevented Kyiv’s effective deterrence and defence against the Russian onslaught since 2014.</p>\n<p>The NPT enabled Moscow to threaten not only Ukraine but also its allies – especially the non-nuclear ones – with atomic annihilation and nuclear winter. This is especially true if they continue to assist the Ukrainian resistance against Russia’s unashamed territorial enlargement and continued terror against civilians. The NPT’s authorization of the Russian possession of nuclear weapons has had, in the past, and will have, in the foreseeable future, the effect of inhibiting military support for Ukraine from international law-abiding countries. This inhibition concerns both the provision to Ukraine with, and the permission to use, certain particularly effective conventional military technologies, such as Germany’s Taurus cruise missiles. It has also stopped the deployment of allied troops on Ukrainian territory, whether they are sent by NATO, the EU or an ad hoc coalition of Ukraine-friendly nation-states.</p>\n<p>If Kyiv had, in 2014, owned nuclear weapons, Russia would most probably not have attacked Ukraine and thereby risked an erasure, by a Ukrainian nuclear response, of entire Russian cities – as happened to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. If Moscow had, on the other hand, not possessed nuclear weapons in 2014, Ukraine’s western allies would most probably have come quickly to Kyiv’s help. A coalition of the willing would likely have liberated, in 2014-15, the illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula and occupied parts of the Donbas in the same way in which a US-led coalition, in 1991, liberated Kuwait that had been occupied and annexed by Iraq the year before. The rules established by the NPT have thus facilitated both the start of Russia’s territorial expansion and genocidal war in 2014, and the subsequent unwillingness of the international community to resolutely reverse Moscow’s initial land capture, prevent Russia’s further expansion, and forestall the ongoing genocide in Ukraine.</p>\n<p><strong> </strong></p>\n<p><strong>Conclusions and policy recommendations</strong></p>\n<p>The nuclear non-proliferation regime went into force in 1970. It has since drawn its legitimacy from being an encompassing agreement that helps to limit the emergence and escalation of wars, as well as prevent the use of nuclear weapons for expansionist aims. Yet, it is today generating rather different effects in connection with Russia’s annihilation war on, and capture of land from, the NPT signatory state Ukraine. Since 2023, these corrosive effects have been further aggravated by the increasingly direct involvement of North Korea, as a nuclear-weapon state outside the NPT and a non-signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Being forbidden by the NPT to have atomic arms, Ukraine is now being attacked by two countries that – more or less, legally – possess nuclear weapons.</p>\n<p>Moreover, Russia is assisted in its subversion of the non-proliferation regime, in one way or another, by additional signatory states of the NPT. The official nuclear-weapon state China and the – at least, for now – non-nuclear weapon state Iran are actively helping Russia in its war efforts via the provision of military, dual-use, or/and non-military help. <a href=\"https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303803650_The_Ukraine_Example_Nuclear_Disarmament_Doesn't_Pay\">China manifestly contradicts, with its support for Russia’s war</a>, its <a href=\"https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n94/500/44/pdf/n9450044.pdf\">“Statement of the Chinese Government on the security assurance to Ukraine issued on 4 December 1994”</a>. In this historic document deposited with the UN General Assembly, Beijing had assured Kyiv, in connection with Ukraine’s decision to become a non-nuclear-weapon state under the NPT and the signing of the Budapest Memorandum, that China <a href=\"https://voxukraine.org/en/how-the-chinese-government-and-french-conservatives-are-helping-russia-to-undermine-humanitys-non-proliferation-regime\">“fully understands the desire of Ukraine for security assurance. […] The Chinese government has constantly opposed the practice of exerting political, economic, or other pressure in international relations. It maintains that disputes and differences should be settled peacefully through consultations on an equal footing. […] China recognizes and respects the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine.”</a></p>\n<p>Belarus has signed its own Budapest Memorandum with the US, UK and Russian Federation in 1994. Nevertheless, Belarus allows Russia today to station and operate not only conventional troops but also nuclear weapons on its territory. Minsk thereby and in many other ways assists Moscow in its attack on Ukraine. The country also contributes to undermining the ideas behind the NPT and the Budapest Memoranda.</p>\n<p>Being, like North Korea, a nuclear-weapon state outside the NPT, India rhetorically supports Ukraine, unlike North Korea. Yet, India has become a major trading partner of Russia since 2022. New Delhi thus too indirectly contributes to the corrosion of international trust in the logic of non-proliferation.</p>\n<p>Obviously, the functioning and future of the NPT are closely linked to the course, results and repercussions of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Considering the clear relevance for humankind of a continuation of the non-proliferation regime, the following six policies can be recommended to actors interested in its defence:</p>\n<ol>\n<li>All signatory states of the NPT concerned about its preservation should provide the non-nuclear weapon state Ukraine with, as much as they can, military and non-military support, enabling Kyiv to achieve a convincing victory on the battlefield and the liberation of its territories currently illegally occupied by Russia.\n</li>\n<li>All signatory states of the NPT concerned about its preservation should demand from Moscow an immediate end to its threats of a nuclear escalation, as well as warn Russia and its allies that such an escalation would trigger a resolute military and non-military counter-reaction from them.\n</li>\n<li>All signatory states of the NPT concerned about its preservation should effectively sanction and publicly condemn the nuclear-weapon states Russia and North Korea as long as they continue waging an expansionist war on the territory of the non-nuclear-weapon state Ukraine. The same mechanism should apply with regard to Russia’s continued occupation of parts of the non-nuclear-weapon states Moldova and Georgia.\n</li>\n<li>All signatory states of the NPT concerned about its preservation should insist on a just peace for Ukraine, including the full restoration of its territorial integrity; full preservation of national sovereignty; full return of all prisoners of war and deported civilians including children; and full compensation for Ukraine’s destruction via Russian reparations.\n</li>\n<li>All non-governmental organizations, businesses and individuals favouring a continuation of the non-proliferation regime should support, with whatever means they have, Ukraine’s victory and recovery, as well as publicly oppose and sanction Russia and North Korea with all the instruments available to them.\n</li>\n<li>Washington and London have, as depositary governments of the 1968 NPT and as signatories of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, special responsibilities vis-à-vis Kyiv. The United States and United Kingdom should therefore offer Ukraine a transformation of their 30-year-old security assurances into a mutual aid pact. A tripartite, fully-fledged military alliance would protect Ukraine until it becomes a member of NATO, and also allow the international utilization of increasing Ukrainian war-related know-how and resources. All other signatory states of the NPT should be invited to join this trilateral defence treaty and to thereby contribute to upholding the logic of the non-proliferation regime.</li>\n</ol>\n<p><em>A shorter version of this article was published by “The National Interest,” in December 2024.</em></p>\n<p><strong>Dr. Andreas Umland</strong> is an analyst at the <a href=\"https://sceeus.se/en/\">Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies</a> (SCEEUS) of the <a href=\"https://www.ui.se/english/\">Swedish Institute of International Affairs</a> (UI).</p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> </span></p>\n"
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            key:"value": string:"Как Москва и нейните съюзници подкопават режима за неразпространение",
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            key:"value": string:"Jak Moskva a její spojenci podkopávají režim nešíření",
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            key:"value": string:"Πώς η Μόσχα και οι σύμμαχοί της υπονομεύουν το καθεστώς μη διάδοσης",
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            key:"value": string:"How Moscow and its allies are undermining the non-proliferation regime",
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            key:"value": string:"Kuinka Moskova ja sen liittolaiset heikentävät leviämisen estämisen järjestelmää",
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            key:"value": string:"Kako Moskva i njezini saveznici potkopavaju režim neširenja nuklearnog oružja",
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            key:"value": string:"Hoe Moskou en zijn bondgenoten het non-proliferatieregime ondermijnen",
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            key:"value": string:"Jak Moskwa i jej sojusznicy podważają reżim nierozprzestrzeniania broni",
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            key:"value": string:"<i>The Russo-Ukrainian War’s global repercussions increasingly subvert the foundations of the international nuclear order.</i>",
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            key:"value": string:"<p>The start and course of the Russo-Ukrainian War since 2014 have been principally shaped by the fact that Russia has, and Ukraine does not have, weapons of mass destruction. Oddly, this war-enabling situation is legitimized, codified and preserved by one of the politically most important and, with 191 signatory states, most comprehensive multilateral agreements of modern international law. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows Russia, as an official nuclear-weapon state, to build and acquire atomic warheads. At the same time, the NPT explicitly forbids Ukraine, as an official non-nuclear-weapon state, to do the same. Ukraine’s non-nuclear allies – from Canada in the West to Japan in East – are similarly bound by the NPT, as well as conventions on chemical and biological weapons, to their statuses as purely conventional military powers.</p>\n<p>In its second article, the NPT postulates for all but five of its 191 signatory states, including Ukraine, that <a href=\"https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf\">“[e]ach non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”</a> The NPT thus prevented both Ukraine’s deterrence of, and defence against, the official nuclear-weapon state of Russia.</p>\n<p> </p>\n<p><strong>The 1994 Budapest Memorandum as an NPT appendix</strong></p>\n<p>Even more oddly, the emerging post-Soviet Ukrainian state possessed, in the early 1990s, the world’s third largest arsenal of nuclear warheads – an inheritance from the Soviet Union which broke up from August to December 1991. Immediately after Ukraine’s acquisition of independence, the number of its atomic arms was, for a brief period, larger than that of China, France and the United Kingdom’s weapons of mass destruction put together. Most Ukrainian and <a href=\"https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310601718_Was_Ukraines_Nuclear_Disarmament_a_Blunder\">many foreign observers now admit that it was naïve of Kyiv to get rid, in the mid-1990s, not only of most, but of all its nuclear material, technology and delivery systems</a>. At least, it was unwise to not demand in exchange a reliable protection mechanism like NATO membership or a mutual aid pact with the United States. Worse, many Ukrainian warheads, missiles, bombers, etc. were not destroyed in Ukraine, but transferred to – of all countries – Russia.</p>\n<p>Instead of an alliance that could protect it, Kyiv received, in exchange for its voluntary nuclear disarmament, a written security guarantee from Moscow promising, in the now infamous Budapest Memorandum, to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and integrity. At the last summit of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, before it transformed into the OSCE, in Hungary’s capital in December 1994, the Russian Federation (RF), United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) signed with Ukraine the fateful <a href=\"https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280401fbb\"> </a> The short document duplicated two similar memoranda which were especially designed for the post-Soviet holders of parts of the former USSR’s atomic arsenal – Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Being the so-called “depositary governments” of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Moscow, Washington and London became in 1994 and are still today the guarantors of the borders of these three former Russian colonies and Soviet republics.</p>\n<p>In their three Budapest Memoranda, the NPT’s depositary states assured Kyiv, Minsk and Almaty/Astana that they would neither pressure nor attack the three post-Soviet countries. That promise was given by the US, UK and RF in exchange for the agreement of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to get rid of all their military nuclear capabilities, and to enter the non-proliferation regime as properly non-nuclear-weapon states. China and France, as the other two official nuclear-weapon states under the NPT, issued separate governmental declarations also assuring Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan of respect for their borders. Recently, this story has been masterfully detailed by <a href=\"https://www.belfercenter.org/person/mariana-budjeryn\">Harvard’s nuclear historian Mariana Budjeryn</a> in her award-winning book <a href=\"https://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/12715/inheriting-bomb\"><em>Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine</em></a> (Johns Hopkins University Press 2022).</p>\n<p> </p>\n<p><strong>Security assurances or guarantees?</strong></p>\n<p>To be sure, the English-language titles of the three Budapest Memoranda speak only of “security assurances” from the NPT’s depositary governments for Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. This linguistic detail is sometimes taken to mean that the promises given by Washington, Moscow and London to Kyiv, Minsk and Almaty/Astana in 1994 were only semi-obligatory. Thus, the story goes, Russia’s manifest breach of its twenty-year old deal with Ukraine, when the Russian Federation annexed Crimea in 2014 along with many similar actions, is supposedly only a minor violation of some by now dated assurances and of the logic of the non-proliferation regime.</p>\n<p>Yet, the Memoranda’s official translations that are most relevant today – namely, the Russian- and Ukrainian-language versions of the document – are markedly different from the English original. The Budapest Memorandum’s Russian and Ukrainian headings speak of “guarantees of security”. In Russian this is <em>“o garantiiakh bezopasnosti”</em> and in Ukrainian <em>“pro harantii bezpeky”.</em> The Russian and Ukrainian translations of the phrase “on security assurances” in the English version of the Budapest Memorandum, i.e.<em> “o zavereniiakh bezopasnosti”</em> or<em> “pro zavirennia bezpeky”,</em> do not appear in the titles of the Memorandum’s Russian and Ukrainian versions.</p>\n<p>Washington and London thus indeed only “assured”, in Ukraine’s English-language version of the Budapest Memorandum, that they would not pressure or attack the post-Soviet country. In contrast, Moscow “guaranteed” Kyiv, in the document’s Russian and Ukrainian-language versions, the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine. The Russian word for guarantees, in the prepositional case, reads “<em>garantiiakh</em>” while the Ukrainian word for guarantees, in the accusative case, reads “<em>harantii</em>”. If written in Cyrillic letters, these two words look sufficiently similar to assert that Moscow fully understood, in December 1994, that it was giving Kyiv guarantees rather than mere assurances of security.</p>\n<p> </p>\n<p><strong>Russian NPT subversion before the war</strong></p>\n<p>Russia started violating the Budapest Memorandum and the NPT’s logic already before the beginning of its war against Ukraine and occupation of Crimea in February 2014. For instance, Russia tried to infringe upon Ukraine’s state territory and border in 2003 <a href=\"https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--2587--SE\">with a unilateral and eventually abortive infrastructure project approaching the Ukrainian island of Tuzla</a> in the Kerch Straits of the Black Sea. Ten years later, Moscow attempted to prevent Kyiv’s upcoming conclusion of an already initialed Association Agreement with the European Union. Throughout 2013, it exerted heavy economic as well as political pressure on Kyiv – a kind of behaviour explicitly forbidden by the <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum\">Budapest Memorandum</a>’s third article.</p>\n<p>It may also be worth reminding that Russia began already in the mid-1990s, long before Putin’s star in Russian politics started rising, to manifestly violate the logic of the non-proliferation regime in the post-Soviet space. Moscow did so with regard to another European successor state of the USSR, the Republic of Moldova, which did not receive a Budapest Memorandum but, like Ukraine, acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in 1994. In that year, <a href=\"https://neweasterneurope.eu/2024/08/05/could-an-istanbul-deal-have-brought-peace/\">Chisinau also signed an agreement with Moscow on the withdrawal of Russian troops from, and on the dissolution of, the Moscow-supported unrecognized “Transnistrian-Moldovan Republic”</a> in eastern Moldova. Thirty years later, neither of these obligations of the nuclear-weapon-state Russia vis-à-vis the non-nuclear-weapon state Moldova has been fulfilled.</p>\n<p>A similar story has, since the late 2000s, been ongoing in Georgia, which had also acceded, in 1994, to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. At the end of the five-day Russo-Georgian War of August 2008, Russia signed with Georgia a ceasefire agreement. The so-called “Sarkozy Plan” obliged Moscow to withdraw its troops from Georgia. Yet, <a href=\"https://neweasterneurope.eu/2024/08/05/could-an-istanbul-deal-have-brought-peace/\">Russia left, in violation of its 2008 promise, a large part of its regular forces on Georgian state territory</a>. Moreover, Moscow recognized two separatist regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” (i.e. Georgia’s Tskhinvali Region), as independent states – in obvious contradiction to the logic of the non-proliferation regime in which Russia and Georgia both officially participate.</p>\n<p>To be sure, the continuing infringement of the territorial integrity of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine is primarily determined by Russia’s larger conventional, rather than its high nuclear, military power. Yet, Moscow’s possession of atomic arms, as well as Chisinau, Tbilisi and Kyiv’s non-possession of WMDs, has been an important background factor in the Kremlin’s expansive behaviour for 30 years now. Without its large nuclear military capacity, Russia would have had to be far more cautious with its permanent deployment of conventional forces in countries where its troops are not wanted.</p>\n<p>Moreover, Moscow’s aggressive actions were – contrary to the Kremlin’s loud claims – only partly related to Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine’s international or/and internal affairs. Russian troops are stationed illegally on the territories of, on the one side, the official NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine as well as, on the other side, the officially neutral Republic of Moldova. The latter can, according to its still valid Constitution of 1994, neither enter NATO nor allow foreign troops on its land. The Russian occupations of Transnistria, Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” have continued independently of the geopolitical stance of Moldova and Georgia’s governments in the past or today. Whether the leaderships in Chisinau and Tbilisi have been communist or nationalist, and whether they have been friendly or adversarial towards Moscow, has had little effect on Russia’s illegal occupation of official Moldovan and Georgian state territory. That was and is in spite of these territories being covered by the NPT and numerous other security-related treaties to which Russia, Georgia and Moldova are parties.</p>\n<p>A similar story goes for Russia’s behaviour towards Ukraine. Many observers forget today that Moscow intensified its non-kinetic “hybrid” warfare against the Ukrainian state already before 2014 and started the military capture of Crimea as early as February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2014. During these periods of time, the Ukrainian state was headed by the loudly pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovych. The Moscow-friendly president of Ukraine was still in full power when Russia was exerting, throughout 2013, heavy economic as well as political pressure on Ukraine to not sign an Association Agreement with the EU. This was in spite of Moscow’s, as well as Washington and London’s, obligation in the Budapest Memorandum to <a href=\"https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf\">“[r]efrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind”</a>. Yanukovych was also still in office when Russia began, in February 2014, illegally occupying Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula – an action also forbidden by the Budapest Memorandum. Yanukovych left his presidential office, the city of Kyiv and eventually Ukraine for Russia only <em>after</em> Russian regular troops without insignia had started conquering south Ukrainian state territory by force.</p>\n<p> </p>\n<p><strong>How Moscow put the NPT on its head</strong></p>\n<p>Since February 2014, Russia has not only ever more ruthlessly attacked Ukraine by military and non-military means with regular and irregular forces. <a href=\"https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350343202_Damage_Control_The_Breach_of_the_Budapest_Memorandum_and_the_Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Regime\">Moscow has been also violating ever more unashamedly and demonstratively the security guarantees it gave to Kyiv in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.</a> Moscow’s actions have thereby been increasingly contradicting and even reversing the logic of the non-proliferation regime in place since 1970.</p>\n<p>The NPT is today, together with similar conventions on biological and chemical weapons, a central part of the post-1945 UN-based global security system. Apart from its written regulations, the NPT’s implicit function is that of upholding the borders of non-nuclear weapon states – especially so vis-à-vis the five officially nuclear-weapon states. In its introduction, the NPT is <a href=\"https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf\">“[r]ecalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, [those] States [that have signed or acceded to the treaty] must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations […].”</a> Circumscribing temporary possession of atomic arms to five countries that also happen to be permanent members of the UN Security Council (“the P5”), the NPT is tasked with reducing the risk of inter-state war in general, and the use of nuclear weapons as instruments of expansionist foreign political affairs in particular.</p>\n<p>As the legal successor to the USSR, a founder and depositary state of the NPT, and the explicit guarantor of the inviolability of Ukraine’s borders in the Budapest Memorandum, Russia has now put the purpose of the non-proliferation regime on its head. The NPT’s exception for the Russian possession of nuclear weapons has helped Moscow to conduct its expansionist and genocidal war against Ukraine. The NPT’s prohibition of the Ukrainian possession of nuclear weapons has also prevented Kyiv’s effective deterrence and defence against the Russian onslaught since 2014.</p>\n<p>The NPT enabled Moscow to threaten not only Ukraine but also its allies – especially the non-nuclear ones – with atomic annihilation and nuclear winter. This is especially true if they continue to assist the Ukrainian resistance against Russia’s unashamed territorial enlargement and continued terror against civilians. The NPT’s authorization of the Russian possession of nuclear weapons has had, in the past, and will have, in the foreseeable future, the effect of inhibiting military support for Ukraine from international law-abiding countries. This inhibition concerns both the provision to Ukraine with, and the permission to use, certain particularly effective conventional military technologies, such as Germany’s Taurus cruise missiles. It has also stopped the deployment of allied troops on Ukrainian territory, whether they are sent by NATO, the EU or an ad hoc coalition of Ukraine-friendly nation-states.</p>\n<p>If Kyiv had, in 2014, owned nuclear weapons, Russia would most probably not have attacked Ukraine and thereby risked an erasure, by a Ukrainian nuclear response, of entire Russian cities – as happened to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. If Moscow had, on the other hand, not possessed nuclear weapons in 2014, Ukraine’s western allies would most probably have come quickly to Kyiv’s help. A coalition of the willing would likely have liberated, in 2014-15, the illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula and occupied parts of the Donbas in the same way in which a US-led coalition, in 1991, liberated Kuwait that had been occupied and annexed by Iraq the year before. The rules established by the NPT have thus facilitated both the start of Russia’s territorial expansion and genocidal war in 2014, and the subsequent unwillingness of the international community to resolutely reverse Moscow’s initial land capture, prevent Russia’s further expansion, and forestall the ongoing genocide in Ukraine.</p>\n<p><strong> </strong></p>\n<p><strong>Conclusions and policy recommendations</strong></p>\n<p>The nuclear non-proliferation regime went into force in 1970. It has since drawn its legitimacy from being an encompassing agreement that helps to limit the emergence and escalation of wars, as well as prevent the use of nuclear weapons for expansionist aims. Yet, it is today generating rather different effects in connection with Russia’s annihilation war on, and capture of land from, the NPT signatory state Ukraine. Since 2023, these corrosive effects have been further aggravated by the increasingly direct involvement of North Korea, as a nuclear-weapon state outside the NPT and a non-signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Being forbidden by the NPT to have atomic arms, Ukraine is now being attacked by two countries that – more or less, legally – possess nuclear weapons.</p>\n<p>Moreover, Russia is assisted in its subversion of the non-proliferation regime, in one way or another, by additional signatory states of the NPT. The official nuclear-weapon state China and the – at least, for now – non-nuclear weapon state Iran are actively helping Russia in its war efforts via the provision of military, dual-use, or/and non-military help. <a href=\"https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303803650_The_Ukraine_Example_Nuclear_Disarmament_Doesn't_Pay\">China manifestly contradicts, with its support for Russia’s war</a>, its <a href=\"https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n94/500/44/pdf/n9450044.pdf\">“Statement of the Chinese Government on the security assurance to Ukraine issued on 4 December 1994”</a>. In this historic document deposited with the UN General Assembly, Beijing had assured Kyiv, in connection with Ukraine’s decision to become a non-nuclear-weapon state under the NPT and the signing of the Budapest Memorandum, that China <a href=\"https://voxukraine.org/en/how-the-chinese-government-and-french-conservatives-are-helping-russia-to-undermine-humanitys-non-proliferation-regime\">“fully understands the desire of Ukraine for security assurance. […] The Chinese government has constantly opposed the practice of exerting political, economic, or other pressure in international relations. It maintains that disputes and differences should be settled peacefully through consultations on an equal footing. […] China recognizes and respects the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine.”</a></p>\n<p>Belarus has signed its own Budapest Memorandum with the US, UK and Russian Federation in 1994. Nevertheless, Belarus allows Russia today to station and operate not only conventional troops but also nuclear weapons on its territory. Minsk thereby and in many other ways assists Moscow in its attack on Ukraine. The country also contributes to undermining the ideas behind the NPT and the Budapest Memoranda.</p>\n<p>Being, like North Korea, a nuclear-weapon state outside the NPT, India rhetorically supports Ukraine, unlike North Korea. Yet, India has become a major trading partner of Russia since 2022. New Delhi thus too indirectly contributes to the corrosion of international trust in the logic of non-proliferation.</p>\n<p>Obviously, the functioning and future of the NPT are closely linked to the course, results and repercussions of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Considering the clear relevance for humankind of a continuation of the non-proliferation regime, the following six policies can be recommended to actors interested in its defence:</p>\n<ol>\n<li>All signatory states of the NPT concerned about its preservation should provide the non-nuclear weapon state Ukraine with, as much as they can, military and non-military support, enabling Kyiv to achieve a convincing victory on the battlefield and the liberation of its territories currently illegally occupied by Russia.\n</li>\n<li>All signatory states of the NPT concerned about its preservation should demand from Moscow an immediate end to its threats of a nuclear escalation, as well as warn Russia and its allies that such an escalation would trigger a resolute military and non-military counter-reaction from them.\n</li>\n<li>All signatory states of the NPT concerned about its preservation should effectively sanction and publicly condemn the nuclear-weapon states Russia and North Korea as long as they continue waging an expansionist war on the territory of the non-nuclear-weapon state Ukraine. The same mechanism should apply with regard to Russia’s continued occupation of parts of the non-nuclear-weapon states Moldova and Georgia.\n</li>\n<li>All signatory states of the NPT concerned about its preservation should insist on a just peace for Ukraine, including the full restoration of its territorial integrity; full preservation of national sovereignty; full return of all prisoners of war and deported civilians including children; and full compensation for Ukraine’s destruction via Russian reparations.\n</li>\n<li>All non-governmental organizations, businesses and individuals favouring a continuation of the non-proliferation regime should support, with whatever means they have, Ukraine’s victory and recovery, as well as publicly oppose and sanction Russia and North Korea with all the instruments available to them.\n</li>\n<li>Washington and London have, as depositary governments of the 1968 NPT and as signatories of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, special responsibilities vis-à-vis Kyiv. The United States and United Kingdom should therefore offer Ukraine a transformation of their 30-year-old security assurances into a mutual aid pact. A tripartite, fully-fledged military alliance would protect Ukraine until it becomes a member of NATO, and also allow the international utilization of increasing Ukrainian war-related know-how and resources. All other signatory states of the NPT should be invited to join this trilateral defence treaty and to thereby contribute to upholding the logic of the non-proliferation regime.</li>\n</ol>\n<p><em>A shorter version of this article was published by “The National Interest,” in December 2024.</em></p>\n<p><strong>Dr. Andreas Umland</strong> is an analyst at the <a href=\"https://sceeus.se/en/\">Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies</a> (SCEEUS) of the <a href=\"https://www.ui.se/english/\">Swedish Institute of International Affairs</a> (UI).</p>\n<p><span> </span></p>\n",
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                key:"title": string:"Jak Moskwa i jej sojusznicy podważają reżim nierozprzestrzeniania broni",
                key:"uid": string:"02ec2436-e3a6-404d-be75-9781c9d2b7cd",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Punkty krytyczne:**\n\n1. Wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska była znacząco wpływana przez różnice w zdolnościach nuklearnych, przy czym Rosja posiada broń nuklearną, podczas gdy Ukraina, związana Traktatem o Nierozprzestrzenianiu Broni Nuklearnej (NPT), jej nie ma, co ogranicza opcje odstraszania i obrony Ukrainy.\n   \n2. Memorandum budapeszteńskie z 1994 roku, które zapewniło Ukrainie gwarancje bezpieczeństwa od Rosji, USA i Wielkiej Brytanii w zamian za jej rozbrojenie nuklearne, zostało podważone przez agresywne działania Rosji, co rodzi pytania o skuteczność takich umów w zapewnieniu suwerenności państwowej.\n\n3. Ramy NPT paradoksalnie ułatwiły ekspansjonistyczne zachowanie Rosji, jednocześnie hamując wsparcie militarne dla Ukrainy ze strony jej sojuszników, co podkreśla potrzebę ponownej oceny międzynarodowych gwarancji bezpieczeństwa w świetle trwających konfliktów.\n\n**Zajawka:**\n\nW miarę jak wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska nadal się rozwija, wyraźny kontrast w zdolnościach nuklearnych między Rosją a Ukrainą rodzi kluczowe pytania dotyczące międzynarodowych ram bezpieczeństwa. Memorandum budapeszteńskie z 1994 roku, które obiecało Ukrainie ochronę w zamian za jej rozbrojenie nuklearne, zostało poddane w wątpliwość w obliczu trwających agresywnych działań Rosji. Artykuł ten zgłębia implikacje Traktatu o Nierozprzestrzenianiu Broni Nuklearnej oraz wyzwania, jakie stawia on przed obroną Ukrainy, badając, w jaki sposób same umowy mające na celu zapewnienie pokoju mogły nieumyślnie umożliwić konflikt. Odkryj złożoności tego kryzysu geopolitycznego i jego dalekosiężne konsekwencje.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Dynamika wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej jest głęboko wpływana przez Traktat o nierozprzestrzenieniu broni jądrowej, który przyznaje Rosji zdolności nuklearne, jednocześnie ograniczając Ukrainę. Ta nierównowaga kształtowała konflikt od 2014 roku, stawiając kluczowe pytania dotyczące gwarancji bezpieczeństwa oraz skuteczności międzynarodowych traktatów w zapobieganiu agresji. Dowiedz się więcej o tym złożonym problemie.",
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            {
                key:"title": string:"Comment Moscou et ses alliés sapent le régime de non-prolifération",
                key:"uid": string:"236c29b4-ea0f-470d-a278-f034ba37e4a4",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Points critiques :**\n\n1. La guerre russo-ukrainienne a été significativement influencée par la disparité des capacités nucléaires, la Russie possédant des armes nucléaires tandis que l'Ukraine, liée par le Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP), n'en possède pas, limitant les options de dissuasion et de défense de l'Ukraine.\n   \n2. Le mémorandum de Budapest de 1994, qui a fourni à l'Ukraine des garanties de sécurité de la part de la Russie, des États-Unis et du Royaume-Uni en échange de son désarmement nucléaire, a été sapé par les actions agressives de la Russie, soulevant des questions sur l'efficacité de tels accords pour garantir la souveraineté des États.\n\n3. Le cadre du TNP a paradoxalement facilité le comportement expansionniste de la Russie tout en inhibant le soutien militaire à l'Ukraine de la part de ses alliés, soulignant la nécessité d'une réévaluation des garanties de sécurité internationales à la lumière des conflits en cours.\n\n**Teaser :**\n\nAlors que la guerre russo-ukrainienne continue de se dérouler, le contraste frappant des capacités nucléaires entre la Russie et l'Ukraine soulève des questions critiques sur les cadres de sécurité internationale. Le mémorandum de Budapest de 1994, qui promettait à l'Ukraine une protection en échange de son désarmement nucléaire, a été remis en question alors que les actions agressives de la Russie persistent. Cet article examine les implications du Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires et les défis qu'il pose à la défense de l'Ukraine, explorant comment les accords destinés à garantir la paix ont peut-être involontairement permis le conflit. Découvrez les complexités de cette crise géopolitique et ses conséquences de grande portée.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Les dynamiques de la guerre russo-ukrainienne sont profondément influencées par le Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires, qui accorde à la Russie des capacités nucléaires tout en restreignant l'Ukraine. Ce déséquilibre a façonné le conflit depuis 2014, soulevant des questions critiques sur les garanties de sécurité et l'efficacité des traités internationaux pour prévenir l'agression. Découvrez-en plus sur cette question complexe.",
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            {
                key:"title": string:"Kuinka Moskova ja sen liittolaiset heikentävät leviämisen estämisen järjestelmää",
                key:"uid": string:"2456ec22-3d4d-4c91-85d0-1943ccde53af",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kriittiset kohdat:**\n\n1. Venäjän ja Ukrainan sota on saanut merkittävän vaikutuksen ydinaseiden erosta, Venäjällä on ydinaseita, kun taas Ukraina, joka on sitoutunut ydinaseiden leviämisen estämistä koskevaan sopimukseen (NPT), ei omista niitä, mikä rajoittaa Ukrainan pelote- ja puolustusvaihtoehtoja.\n   \n2. Vuoden 1994 Budapestin muistio, joka tarjosi Ukrainalle turvallisuustakuita Venäjältä, Yhdysvalloilta ja Yhdistyneeltä kuningaskunnalta ydinaseiden riisumista vastaan, on heikentynyt Venäjän aggressiivisten toimien myötä, mikä herättää kysymyksiä tällaisen sopimuksen tehokkuudesta valtion suvereniteetin varmistamisessa.\n\n3. NPT:n kehys on paradoksaalisesti helpottanut Venäjän laajentumishaluista käyttäytymistä samalla kun se on estänyt sotilaallista tukea Ukrainalle sen liittolaisilta, mikä korostaa kansainvälisten turvallisuustakuiden uudelleenarvioinnin tarvetta käynnissä olevien konfliktien valossa.\n\n**Esittely:**\n\nKun Venäjän ja Ukrainan sota jatkuu, ydinaseiden jyrkkä ero Venäjän ja Ukrainan välillä herättää kriittisiä kysymyksiä kansainvälisistä turvallisuuskehyksistä. Vuoden 1994 Budapestin muistio, joka lupasi Ukrainalle suojaa ydinaseiden riisumista vastaan, on kyseenalaistettu Venäjän aggressiivisten toimien jatkuessa. Tämä artikkeli syventyy ydinaseiden leviämisen estämistä koskevan sopimuksen vaikutuksiin ja niihin haasteisiin, joita se asettaa Ukrainan puolustukselle, tutkien kuinka juuri ne sopimukset, joiden tarkoituksena on varmistaa rauha, ovat saattaneet tahattomasti mahdollistaa konfliktin. Tutustu tämän geopoliittisen kriisin monimutkaisuuksiin ja sen kauaskantoisiin seurauksiin.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Venäjän ja Ukrainan sodan dynamiikkaan vaikuttaa syvästi ydinaseiden leviämisen estämistä koskeva sopimus, joka myöntää Venäjälle ydinasekykyjä samalla kun se rajoittaa Ukrainaa. Tämä epätasapaino on muovannut konfliktia vuodesta 2014 lähtien, herättäen kriittisiä kysymyksiä turvallisuustakuista ja kansainvälisten sopimusten tehokkuudesta aggressioiden estämisessä. Opi lisää tästä monimutkaisesta asiasta.",
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                key:"title": string:"Cum subminează Moscova și aliații săi regimul de neproliferare",
                key:"uid": string:"289a7661-4fd3-4b11-bf2a-b2da2695705a",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Puncte Critice:**\n\n1. Războiul ruso-ucrainean a fost semnificativ influențat de disparitatea în capabilitățile nucleare, Rusia având arme nucleare, în timp ce Ucraina, legată de Tratatul de Neproliferare Nucleară (TNP), nu are, limitând opțiunile de descurajare și apărare ale Ucrainei.\n   \n2. Memorandumul de la Budapesta din 1994, care a oferit Ucrainei asigurări de securitate din partea Rusiei, SUA și Regatului Unit în schimbul dezarmării sale nucleare, a fost subminat de acțiunile agresive ale Rusiei, ridicând întrebări cu privire la eficiența unor astfel de acorduri în asigurarea suveranității statului.\n\n3. Cadrele TNP au facilitat paradoxal comportamentul expansionist al Rusiei, în timp ce au inhibat sprijinul militar pentru Ucraina din partea aliaților săi, subliniind necesitatea unei reevaluări a garanțiilor de securitate internațională în lumina conflictelor în curs.\n\n**Teaser:**\n\nPe măsură ce războiul ruso-ucrainean continuă să se desfășoare, contrastul izbitor în capabilitățile nucleare între Rusia și Ucraina ridică întrebări critice despre cadrele de securitate internațională. Memorandumul de la Budapesta din 1994, care a promis Ucrainei protecție în schimbul dezarmării sale nucleare, a fost pus sub semnul întrebării pe măsură ce acțiunile agresive ale Rusiei persistă. Acest articol analizează implicațiile Tratatului de Neproliferare Nucleară și provocările pe care le prezintă pentru apărarea Ucrainei, explorând modul în care chiar acordurile menite să asigure pacea ar fi putut, fără intenție, să faciliteze conflictul. Descoperiți complexitățile acestei crize geopolitice și consecințele sale de amploare.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Dinamicile războiului ruso-ucrainean sunt profund influențate de Tratatul de Neproliferare Nucleară, care oferă Rusiei capacități nucleare în timp ce restricționează Ucraina. Această dezechilibru a modelat conflictul din 2014, ridicând întrebări critice despre garanțiile de securitate și eficiența tratatelor internaționale în prevenirea agresiunii. Descoperiți mai multe despre această problemă complexă.",
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            {
                key:"title": string:"Como Moscovo e seus aliados estão minando o regime de não proliferação",
                key:"uid": string:"31451808-b5df-40f6-863d-558ca9ce84f5",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Pontos Críticos:**\n\n1. A Guerra Russo-Ucraniana tem sido significativamente influenciada pela disparidade nas capacidades nucleares, com a Rússia possuindo armas nucleares enquanto a Ucrânia, vinculada ao Tratado de Não Proliferação Nuclear (TNP), não possui, limitando as opções de dissuasão e defesa da Ucrânia.\n   \n2. O Memorando de Budapeste de 1994, que forneceu à Ucrânia garantias de segurança da Rússia, dos EUA e do Reino Unido em troca de seu desarmamento nuclear, foi minado pelas ações agressivas da Rússia, levantando questões sobre a eficácia de tais acordos em garantir a soberania estatal.\n\n3. O quadro do TNP paradoxalmente facilitou o comportamento expansionista da Rússia enquanto inibia o apoio militar à Ucrânia de seus aliados, destacando a necessidade de uma reavaliação das garantias de segurança internacional à luz dos conflitos em andamento.\n\n**Teaser:**\n\nÀ medida que a Guerra Russo-Ucraniana continua a se desenrolar, o contraste acentuado nas capacidades nucleares entre a Rússia e a Ucrânia levanta questões críticas sobre os quadros de segurança internacional. O Memorando de Budapeste de 1994, que prometeu à Ucrânia proteção em troca de seu desarmamento nuclear, foi colocado em questão à medida que as ações agressivas da Rússia persistem. Este artigo explora as implicações do Tratado de Não Proliferação Nuclear e os desafios que ele impõe à defesa da Ucrânia, examinando como os próprios acordos destinados a garantir a paz podem ter inadvertidamente possibilitado o conflito. Descubra as complexidades desta crise geopolítica e suas consequências de longo alcance.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"A dinâmica da Guerra Russo-Ucraniana é profundamente influenciada pelo Tratado de Não Proliferação Nuclear, que concede à Rússia capacidades nucleares enquanto restringe a Ucrânia. Esse desequilíbrio moldou o conflito desde 2014, levantando questões críticas sobre garantias de segurança e a eficácia dos tratados internacionais em prevenir agressões. Descubra mais sobre essa questão complexa.",
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                key:"title": string:"Как Москва и нейните съюзници подкопават режима за неразпространение",
                key:"uid": string:"42c575b5-c89d-4bc9-b85e-090fc3bb432b",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Критични точки:**\n\n1. Русо-украинската война е била значително повлияна от разликата в ядрените способности, като Русия разполага с ядрени оръжия, докато Украйна, обвързана с Договора за неразпространение на ядреното оръжие (ДНЯО), не разполага с такива, което ограничава възможностите на Украйна за възпиране и защита.\n   \n2. Мемораундумът от Будапеща от 1994 г., който предостави на Украйна гаранции за сигурност от Русия, САЩ и Великобритания в замяна на ядрено разоръжаване, е бил подкопан от агресивните действия на Русия, повдигайки въпроси относно ефективността на такива споразумения за осигуряване на държавен суверенитет.\n\n3. Рамката на ДНЯО парадоксално е улеснила експанзионисткото поведение на Русия, докато е възпрепятствала военната подкрепа за Украйна от нейните съюзници, подчертавайки необходимостта от преоценка на международните гаранции за сигурност в светлината на текущите конфликти.\n\n**Тийзър:**\n\nДокато русо-украинската война продължава да се развива, рязката контрастност в ядрените способности между Русия и Украйна повдига критични въпроси относно международните рамки за сигурност. Мемораундумът от Будапеща от 1994 г., който обеща защита на Украйна в замяна на ядрено разоръжаване, е поставен под въпрос, тъй като агресивните действия на Русия продължават. Тази статия разглежда последиците от Договора за неразпространение на ядреното оръжие и предизвикателствата, които той поставя пред защитата на Украйна, изследвайки как самите споразумения, предназначени да осигурят мир, може би неволно са улеснили конфликта. Открийте сложността на тази геополитическа криза и нейните далечни последици.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Динамиката на Русо-украинската война е дълбоко повлияна от Договора за неразпространение на ядреното оръжие, който предоставя на Русия ядрени възможности, докато ограничава Украйна. Тази дисбаланс е оформил конфликта от 2014 г. насам, повдигайки критични въпроси относно гаранциите за сигурност и ефективността на международните договори за предотвратяване на агресия. Открийте повече за този сложен въпрос.",
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                key:"title": string:"Как Москва и её союзники подрывают режим нераспространения",
                key:"uid": string:"60cb68df-4d24-44f9-8c08-5985278829df",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Критические моменты:**\n\n1. Русско-украинская война была значительно обусловлена разницей в ядерных возможностях, при этом Россия обладает ядерным оружием, в то время как Украина, связанная Договором о нераспространении ядерного оружия (ДНЯО), не имеет такового, что ограничивает возможности Украины в области сдерживания и обороны.\n   \n2. Будапештский меморандум 1994 года, который предоставил Украине гарантии безопасности от России, США и Великобритании в обмен на ее ядерное разоружение, был подорван агрессивными действиями России, что ставит под сомнение эффективность таких соглашений в обеспечении суверенитета государств.\n\n3. Рамки ДНЯО парадоксальным образом способствовали экспансионистскому поведению России, одновременно препятствуя военной поддержке Украины со стороны ее союзников, что подчеркивает необходимость переоценки международных гарантий безопасности в свете текущих конфликтов.\n\n**Тизер:**\n\nПоскольку русско-украинская война продолжает развиваться, резкий контраст в ядерных возможностях между Россией и Украиной поднимает критические вопросы о международных рамках безопасности. Будапештский меморандум 1994 года, который обещал Украине защиту в обмен на ее ядерное разоружение, был поставлен под сомнение, поскольку агрессивные действия России продолжаются. Эта статья углубляется в последствия Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия и проблемы, которые он создает для обороны Украины, исследуя, как сами соглашения, призванные обеспечить мир, могли непреднамеренно способствовать конфликту. Узнайте о сложностях этого геополитического кризиса и его далеко идущих последствиях.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Динамика Русско-Украинской войны глубоко зависит от Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия, который предоставляет России ядерные возможности, ограничивая Украину. Этот дисбаланс формировал конфликт с 2014 года, поднимая критические вопросы о гарантиях безопасности и эффективности международных договоров в предотвращении агрессии. Узнайте больше об этой сложной проблеме.",
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            {
                key:"title": string:"Jak Moskva a její spojenci podkopávají režim nešíření",
                key:"uid": string:"94468d01-85b1-4a88-8eaa-b89d15fb9519",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritické body:**\n\n1. Ruskou-ukrajinská válka byla významně ovlivněna rozdílem v jaderných schopnostech, přičemž Rusko disponuje jadernými zbraněmi, zatímco Ukrajina, vázaná Smlouvou o nešíření jaderných zbraní (NPT), nikoli, což omezuje možnosti Ukrajiny v oblasti odstrašení a obrany.\n   \n2. Memorandum z Budapešti z roku 1994, které poskytlo Ukrajině bezpečnostní záruky od Ruska, USA a Velké Británie výměnou za její jaderné odzbrojení, bylo podkopáno agresivními akcemi Ruska, což vyvolává otázky o účinnosti takových dohod při zajišťování státní suverenity.\n\n3. Rámec NPT paradoxně usnadnil expanzionistické chování Ruska, zatímco bránil vojenské podpoře Ukrajiny od jejích spojenců, což zdůrazňuje potřebu přehodnocení mezinárodních bezpečnostních záruk v kontextu probíhajících konfliktů.\n\n**Teaser:**\n\nJak se ruskou-ukrajinská válka nadále vyvíjí, výrazný kontrast v jaderných schopnostech mezi Ruskem a Ukrajinou vyvolává zásadní otázky o mezinárodních bezpečnostních rámcích. Memorandum z Budapešti z roku 1994, které slíbilo Ukrajině ochranu výměnou za její jaderné odzbrojení, bylo zpochybněno, protože agresivní akce Ruska přetrvávají. Tento článek se zabývá důsledky Smlouvy o nešíření jaderných zbraní a výzvami, které představuje pro obranu Ukrajiny, a zkoumá, jak samotné dohody určené k zajištění míru mohly neúmyslně umožnit konflikt. Objevte složitosti této geopolitické krize a její dalekosáhlé důsledky.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Dynamika rusko-ukrajinské války je hluboce ovlivněna Smlouvou o nešíření jaderných zbraní, která poskytuje Rusku jaderné schopnosti, zatímco Ukrajině je omezuje. Tato nerovnováha formovala konflikt od roku 2014 a vyvolává zásadní otázky o bezpečnostních zárukách a účinnosti mezinárodních smluv při prevenci agrese. Objevte více o této složité záležitosti.",
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            {
                key:"title": string:"Як Москва та її союзники підривають режим нерозповсюдження",
                key:"uid": string:"9c7e4331-65f2-46d9-8b71-9581dc62cd36",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Критичні моменти:**\n\n1. Російсько-українська війна значно вплинула на розбіжність у ядерних можливостях, оскільки Росія має ядерну зброю, тоді як Україна, зобов'язана Договором про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї (ДНЯЗ), не має, що обмежує варіанти стримування та оборони України.\n   \n2. Будапештський меморандум 1994 року, який надав Україні гарантії безпеки від Росії, США та Великої Британії в обмін на її ядерне роззброєння, був підірваний агресивними діями Росії, що ставить під сумнів ефективність таких угод у забезпеченні державного суверенітету.\n\n3. Рамки ДНЯЗ парадоксально сприяли експансіоністській поведінці Росії, одночасно стримуючи військову підтримку для України з боку її союзників, підкреслюючи необхідність переоцінки міжнародних гарантій безпеки в умовах триваючих конфліктів.\n\n**Тізер:**\n\nОскільки російсько-українська війна продовжує розгортатися, різкий контраст у ядерних можливостях між Росією та Україною піднімає критичні питання щодо міжнародних безпекових рамок. Будапештський меморандум 1994 року, який обіцяв Україні захист в обмін на її ядерне роззброєння, став під питанням, оскільки агресивні дії Росії тривають. Ця стаття досліджує наслідки Договору про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї та виклики, які він ставить для оборони України, вивчаючи, як самі угоди, що мали на меті забезпечити мир, могли ненавмисно сприяти конфлікту. Відкрийте для себе складнощі цієї геополітичної кризи та її далекосяжні наслідки.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Динаміка Російсько-Української війни глибоко впливає на Договір про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї, який надає Росії ядерні можливості, обмежуючи Україну. Ця диспропорція формувала конфлікт з 2014 року, піднімаючи критичні питання щодо гарантій безпеки та ефективності міжнародних договорів у запобіганні агресії. Дізнайтеся більше про цю складну проблему.",
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            {
                key:"title": string:"Ako Moskva a jej spojenci podkopávajú režim nešírenia",
                key:"uid": string:"9d7d131e-0c13-4f38-ae44-6ffaa3ccc317",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritické body:**\n\n1. Ruskou-ukrajinská vojna bola významne ovplyvnená rozdielom v jadrových schopnostiach, pričom Rusko disponuje jadrovými zbraňami, zatiaľ čo Ukrajina, viazaná Zmluvou o nešírení jadrových zbraní (NPT), nie, čo obmedzuje možnosti Ukrajiny v oblasti odstrašovania a obrany.\n   \n2. Budapeštianska memoranda z roku 1994, ktorá poskytla Ukrajine bezpečnostné záruky od Ruska, USA a Veľkej Británie výmenou za jej jadrové odzbrojenie, bola podkopaná agresívnymi činmi Ruska, čo vyvoláva otázky o účinnosti takýchto dohôd pri zabezpečovaní štátnej suverenity.\n\n3. Rámec NPT paradoxne uľahčil expanzionistické správanie Ruska, zatiaľ čo obmedzil vojenskú podporu pre Ukrajinu od jej spojencov, čo zdôrazňuje potrebu prehodnotenia medzinárodných bezpečnostných záruk v súvislosti s prebiehajúcimi konfliktmi.\n\n**Teaser:**\n\nKeď sa ruskou-ukrajinská vojna naďalej vyvíja, výrazný kontrast v jadrových schopnostiach medzi Ruskom a Ukrajinou vyvoláva kritické otázky o medzinárodných bezpečnostných rámcoch. Budapeštianska memoranda z roku 1994, ktorá sľubovala Ukrajine ochranu výmenou za jej jadrové odzbrojenie, bola spochybnená, keďže agresívne činy Ruska pretrvávajú. Tento článok sa zaoberá dôsledkami Zmluvy o nešírení jadrových zbraní a výzvami, ktoré predstavuje pre obranu Ukrajiny, skúmaním toho, ako samotné dohody, ktoré mali zabezpečiť mier, mohli neúmyselne umožniť konflikt. Objavte zložitosti tejto geopolitickej krízy a jej ďalekosiahle dôsledky.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Dynamika rusko-ukrajinskej vojny je hlboko ovplyvnená Zmluvou o nešírení jadrových zbraní, ktorá poskytuje Rusku jadrové schopnosti, zatiaľ čo obmedzuje Ukrajinu. Tento nepomer formoval konflikt od roku 2014, čo vyvoláva kritické otázky o bezpečnostných zárukách a účinnosti medzinárodných zmlúv pri prevencii agresie. Zistite viac o tejto zložitej otázke.",
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            {
                key:"title": string:"Kako Moskva i njezini saveznici potkopavaju režim neširenja nuklearnog oružja",
                key:"uid": string:"9da00ee3-4d72-4379-88a5-2f8abc308dd2",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritične točke:**\n\n1. Rusko-ukrajinski rat značajno je pod utjecajem razlike u nuklearnim sposobnostima, pri čemu Rusija posjeduje nuklearno oružje dok Ukrajina, vezana Ugovorom o neširenju nuklearnog oružja (NPT), ne posjeduje, što ograničava mogućnosti odvraćanja i obrane Ukrajine.\n   \n2. Budimpeštanski memorandum iz 1994. godine, koji je Ukrajini pružio sigurnosne garancije od Rusije, SAD-a i Velike Britanije u zamjenu za njezino nuklearno razoružanje, potkopan je agresivnim djelovanjem Rusije, postavljajući pitanja o učinkovitosti takvih sporazuma u osiguravanju državnog suvereniteta.\n\n3. Okvir NPT-a paradoksalno je olakšao ekspanzionističko ponašanje Rusije dok je inhibirao vojnu podršku Ukrajini od strane njezinih saveznika, ističući potrebu za preispitivanjem međunarodnih sigurnosnih garancija u svjetlu tekućih sukoba.\n\n**Teaser:**\n\nDok se rusko-ukrajinski rat nastavlja razvijati, oštra razlika u nuklearnim sposobnostima između Rusije i Ukrajine postavlja kritična pitanja o međunarodnim sigurnosnim okvirima. Budimpeštanski memorandum iz 1994. godine, koji je Ukrajini obećao zaštitu u zamjenu za njezino nuklearno razoružanje, doveden je u pitanje dok agresivna djelovanja Rusije traju. Ovaj članak istražuje implikacije Ugovora o neširenju nuklearnog oružja i izazove koje on postavlja za obranu Ukrajine, istražujući kako su sami sporazumi koji su trebali osigurati mir možda nenamjerno omogućili sukob. Otkrijte složenosti ove geopolitičke krize i njezine dalekosežne posljedice.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Dinamika rusko-ukrajinskog rata duboko je pod utjecajem Ugovora o neširenju nuklearnog oružja, koji Rusiji daje nuklearne sposobnosti dok ograničava Ukrajinu. Ova neravnoteža oblikovala je sukob od 2014. godine, postavljajući ključna pitanja o sigurnosnim garancijama i učinkovitosti međunarodnih ugovora u sprječavanju agresije. Otkrijte više o ovom složenom pitanju.",
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            {
                key:"title": string:"Come Mosca e i suoi alleati stanno minando il regime di non proliferazione",
                key:"uid": string:"ac88e7b7-7c19-4321-912e-a54ad79899ff",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Punti Critici:**\n\n1. La guerra russo-ucraina è stata significativamente influenzata dalla disparità nelle capacità nucleari, con la Russia che possiede armi nucleari mentre l'Ucraina, vincolata dal Trattato di non proliferazione nucleare (NPT), non ne possiede, limitando le opzioni di deterrenza e difesa dell'Ucraina.\n   \n2. Il Memorandum di Budapest del 1994, che forniva all'Ucraina garanzie di sicurezza da parte della Russia, degli Stati Uniti e del Regno Unito in cambio del suo disarmo nucleare, è stato minato dalle azioni aggressive della Russia, sollevando interrogativi sull'efficacia di tali accordi nel garantire la sovranità statale.\n\n3. Il quadro del NPT ha paradossalmente facilitato il comportamento espansionista della Russia mentre inibiva il supporto militare per l'Ucraina da parte dei suoi alleati, evidenziando la necessità di una rivalutazione delle garanzie di sicurezza internazionale alla luce dei conflitti in corso.\n\n**Teaser:**\n\nMentre la guerra russo-ucraina continua a svilupparsi, il netto contrasto nelle capacità nucleari tra Russia e Ucraina solleva interrogativi critici sui quadri di sicurezza internazionale. Il Memorandum di Budapest del 1994, che prometteva all'Ucraina protezione in cambio del suo disarmo nucleare, è stato messo in discussione poiché le azioni aggressive della Russia persistono. Questo articolo esplora le implicazioni del Trattato di non proliferazione nucleare e le sfide che pone per la difesa dell'Ucraina, esaminando come gli stessi accordi destinati a garantire la pace possano aver inavvertitamente abilitato il conflitto. Scopri le complessità di questa crisi geopolitica e le sue conseguenze di vasta portata.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"La dinamica della guerra russo-ucraina è profondamente influenzata dal Trattato di non proliferazione nucleare, che concede alla Russia capacità nucleari mentre limita l'Ucraina. Questo squilibrio ha plasmato il conflitto dal 2014, sollevando domande critiche sulle garanzie di sicurezza e sull'efficacia dei trattati internazionali nel prevenire l'aggressione. Scopri di più su questa questione complessa.",
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                key:"metadata": null:null,
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            {
                key:"title": string:"Kako Moskva i njeni saveznici potkopavaju režim neširenja oružja",
                key:"uid": string:"b5ed2923-1774-49ad-8b72-064427cf6c79",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritične tačke:**\n\n1. Rusko-ukrajinski rat je značajno pogođen razlikom u nuklearnim sposobnostima, pri čemu Rusija poseduje nuklearno oružje dok Ukrajina, obavezana Ugovorom o neširenju nuklearnog oružja (NPT), ne poseduje, što ograničava mogućnosti odvraćanja i odbrane Ukrajine.\n   \n2. Budimpeštanski memorandum iz 1994. godine, koji je obezbedio Ukrajini bezbednosne garancije od Rusije, SAD-a i Velike Britanije u zamenu za njeno nuklearno razoružanje, je potkopan agresivnim delovanjem Rusije, postavljajući pitanja o efikasnosti takvih sporazuma u obezbeđivanju državnog suvereniteta.\n\n3. Okvir NPT-a je paradoksalno olakšao ekspanzionističko ponašanje Rusije dok je inhibirao vojnu podršku Ukrajini od strane njenih saveznika, ističući potrebu za preispitivanjem međunarodnih bezbednosnih garancija u svetlu tekućih sukoba.\n\n**Teaser:**\n\nDok se rusko-ukrajinski rat nastavlja, oštra razlika u nuklearnim sposobnostima između Rusije i Ukrajine postavlja kritična pitanja o međunarodnim bezbednosnim okvirima. Budimpeštanski memorandum iz 1994. godine, koji je obećao zaštitu Ukrajini u zamenu za njeno nuklearno razoružanje, je doveden u pitanje dok se agresivna delovanja Rusije nastavljaju. Ovaj članak istražuje implikacije Ugovora o neširenju nuklearnog oružja i izazove koje on postavlja za odbranu Ukrajine, istražujući kako su sami sporazumi koji su trebali da obezbede mir možda nenamerno omogućili sukob. Otkrijte složenosti ove geopolitičke krize i njene dalekosežne posledice.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Динамика Русо-украјинског рата дубоко је под утицајем Споразума о неширењу нуклеарног оружја, који Русији даје нуклеарне способности, док Украјини намеће ограничења. Овај дисбаланс обликује конфликт од 2014. године, постављајући критична питања о безбедносним гаранцијама и ефикасности међународних споразума у спречавању агресије. Откријте више о овом сложеном питању.",
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            {
                key:"title": string:"Πώς η Μόσχα και οι σύμμαχοί της υπονομεύουν το καθεστώς μη διάδοσης",
                key:"uid": string:"bd4fb55f-a9c4-4b50-88cb-0f032aa1d85e",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Κρίσιμα Σημεία:**\n\n1. Ο Ρωσο-Ουκρανικός Πόλεμος έχει επηρεαστεί σημαντικά από την ανισότητα στις πυρηνικές ικανότητες, με τη Ρωσία να διαθέτει πυρηνικά όπλα ενώ η Ουκρανία, δεσμευμένη από τη Συνθήκη για τη Μη Διάδοση των Πυρηνικών Όπλων (NPT), δεν διαθέτει, περιορίζοντας τις επιλογές αποτροπής και άμυνας της Ουκρανίας.\n   \n2. Το Μνημόνιο της Βουδαπέστης του 1994, το οποίο παρείχε στην Ουκρανία διασφαλίσεις ασφαλείας από τη Ρωσία, τις ΗΠΑ και το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο σε αντάλλαγμα για τον πυρηνικό της αφοπλισμό, έχει υπονομευθεί από τις επιθετικές ενέργειες της Ρωσίας, εγείροντας ερωτήματα σχετικά με την αποτελεσματικότητα τέτοιων συμφωνιών στην εξασφάλιση της κρατικής κυριαρχίας.\n\n3. Το πλαίσιο της NPT έχει παραδόξως διευκολύνει τη επεκτατική συμπεριφορά της Ρωσίας ενώ έχει αναστείλει τη στρατιωτική υποστήριξη προς την Ουκρανία από τους συμμάχους της, υπογραμμίζοντας την ανάγκη για επαναξιολόγηση των διεθνών εγγυήσεων ασφαλείας ενόψει των συνεχιζόμενων συγκρούσεων.\n\n**Δημοσίευση:**\n\nΚαθώς ο Ρωσο-Ουκρανικός Πόλεμος συνεχίζει να εξελίσσεται, η έντονη αντίθεση στις πυρηνικές ικανότητες μεταξύ Ρωσίας και Ουκρανίας εγείρει κρίσιμα ερωτήματα σχετικά με τα διεθνή πλαίσια ασφαλείας. Το Μνημόνιο της Βουδαπέστης του 1994, το οποίο υποσχέθηκε στην Ουκρανία προστασία σε αντάλλαγμα για τον πυρηνικό της αφοπλισμό, έχει τεθεί υπό αμφισβήτηση καθώς οι επιθετικές ενέργειες της Ρωσίας συνεχίζονται. Αυτό το άρθρο εξετάζει τις επιπτώσεις της Συνθήκης για τη Μη Διάδοση των Πυρηνικών Όπλων και τις προκλήσεις που θέτει για την άμυνα της Ουκρανίας, διερευνώντας πώς οι ίδιες οι συμφωνίες που προορίζονταν να εξασφαλίσουν την ειρήνη μπορεί να έχουν ακούσια διευκολύνει τη σύγκρουση. Ανακαλύψτε τις πολυπλοκότητες αυτής της γεωπολιτικής κρίσης και τις μακροχρόνιες συνέπειές της.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Ο δυναμισμός του Ρωσο-Ουκρανικού Πολέμου επηρεάζεται βαθιά από τη Συνθήκη για τη Μη Διάδοση των Πυρηνικών Όπλων, η οποία παρέχει στη Ρωσία πυρηνικές ικανότητες ενώ περιορίζει την Ουκρανία. Αυτή η ανισορροπία έχει διαμορφώσει τη σύγκρουση από το 2014, εγείροντας κρίσιμα ερωτήματα σχετικά με τις εγγυήσεις ασφάλειας και την αποτελεσματικότητα των διεθνών συνθηκών στην πρόληψη της επιθετικότητας. Ανακαλύψτε περισσότερα για αυτό το σύνθετο ζήτημα.",
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                key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:47.376",
                key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
                key:"metadata": null:null,
                key:"revisionId": string:"vaywgb5jhbtzqrtcjtzegr6xukk",
                key:"subtitle": null:null,
                key:"summary": null:null,
                key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
                key:"targetLanguage": string:"el",
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            },
            {
                key:"title": string:"Moskova ve müttefiklerinin yayılmayı önleme rejimini nasıl zayıflattığı",
                key:"uid": string:"c0184597-a753-4fbe-a4bb-ae53631ec783",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritik Noktalar:**\n\n1. Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı, Rusya'nın nükleer silahlara sahip olması ve Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasını Önleme Anlaşması (NPT) ile bağlı olan Ukrayna'nın nükleer silah bulundurmaması nedeniyle nükleer yetenekler arasındaki farktan önemli ölçüde etkilenmiştir; bu durum Ukrayna'nın caydırıcılık ve savunma seçeneklerini sınırlamaktadır.\n   \n2. 1994 Budapeşte Memorandumu, Ukrayna'nın nükleer silahsızlanması karşılığında Rusya, ABD ve Birleşik Krallık'tan güvenlik garantileri aldığı bir anlaşma olarak, Rusya'nın agresif eylemleriyle zayıflatılmıştır; bu durum, devlet egemenliğini sağlama konusundaki bu tür anlaşmaların etkinliği hakkında soru işaretleri doğurmaktadır.\n\n3. NPT'nin çerçevesi, Rusya'nın genişlemeci davranışlarını paradoksal bir şekilde kolaylaştırırken, müttefiklerinden Ukrayna'ya askeri destek sağlanmasını engellemiştir; bu durum, devam eden çatışmalar ışığında uluslararası güvenlik garantilerinin yeniden değerlendirilmesi gereğini vurgulamaktadır.\n\n**Tanıtım:**\n\nRusya-Ukrayna Savaşı devam ederken, Rusya ve Ukrayna arasındaki nükleer yeteneklerdeki keskin fark, uluslararası güvenlik çerçeveleri hakkında kritik sorular ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Ukrayna'nın nükleer silahsızlanması karşılığında koruma sözü veren 1994 Budapeşte Memorandumu, Rusya'nın agresif eylemleri sürdükçe sorgulanmaya başlanmıştır. Bu makale, Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasını Önleme Anlaşması'nın sonuçlarını ve Ukrayna'nın savunması için oluşturduğu zorlukları inceleyerek, barışı sağlamak amacıyla yapılan anlaşmaların nasıl istemeden çatışmayı kolaylaştırmış olabileceğini araştırmaktadır. Bu jeopolitik krizin karmaşıklıklarını ve geniş kapsamlı sonuçlarını keşfedin.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Russo-Ukrayna Savaşı'nın dinamikleri, Rusya'ya nükleer yetenekler tanırken Ukrayna'yı kısıtlayan Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasını Önleme Antlaşması'ndan derin bir şekilde etkilenmektedir. Bu dengesizlik, 2014'ten bu yana çatışmayı şekillendirmiştir ve güvenlik garantileri ile uluslararası antlaşmaların saldırganlığı önlemedeki etkinliği hakkında kritik sorular ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu karmaşık konu hakkında daha fazla bilgi edinin.",
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                key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:47.176",
                key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
                key:"metadata": null:null,
                key:"revisionId": string:"vaywgb5jhbtzqrtcjtzegr6xukk",
                key:"subtitle": null:null,
                key:"summary": null:null,
                key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
                key:"targetLanguage": string:"tr",
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            {
                key:"title": string:"How Moscow and its allies are undermining the non-proliferation regime",
                key:"uid": string:"c3e587b8-e5b1-48a7-b606-1dec3d38679c",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Critical Points:**\n\n1. The Russo-Ukrainian War has been significantly influenced by the disparity in nuclear capabilities, with Russia possessing nuclear weapons while Ukraine, bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), does not, limiting Ukraine's deterrence and defense options.\n   \n2. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which provided Ukraine with security assurances from Russia, the US, and the UK in exchange for its nuclear disarmament, has been undermined by Russia's aggressive actions, raising questions about the effectiveness of such agreements in ensuring state sovereignty.\n\n3. The NPT's framework has paradoxically facilitated Russia's expansionist behavior while inhibiting military support for Ukraine from its allies, highlighting the need for a reevaluation of international security guarantees in light of ongoing conflicts.\n\n**Teaser:**\n\nAs the Russo-Ukrainian War continues to unfold, the stark contrast in nuclear capabilities between Russia and Ukraine raises critical questions about international security frameworks. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which promised Ukraine protection in exchange for its nuclear disarmament, has been called into question as Russia's aggressive actions persist. This article delves into the implications of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the challenges it poses for Ukraine's defense, exploring how the very agreements meant to ensure peace may have inadvertently enabled conflict. Discover the complexities of this geopolitical crisis and its far-reaching consequences.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"The Russo-Ukrainian War's dynamics are deeply influenced by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which grants Russia nuclear capabilities while restricting Ukraine. This imbalance has shaped the conflict since 2014, raising critical questions about security guarantees and the effectiveness of international treaties in preventing aggression. Discover more about this complex issue.",
                key:"content": null:null,
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                key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywgb5jgzjxaruegogo5hgbjda",
                key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.438",
                key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
                key:"metadata": null:null,
                key:"revisionId": string:"vaywgb5jhbtzqrtcjtzegr6xukk",
                key:"subtitle": null:null,
                key:"summary": null:null,
                key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
                key:"targetLanguage": string:"en",
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            },
            {
                key:"title": string:"Hoe Moskou en zijn bondgenoten het non-proliferatieregime ondermijnen",
                key:"uid": string:"d95938ef-550e-44ad-a888-61304ad1ebdf",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritieke Punten:**\n\n1. De Russisch-Oekraïense Oorlog is aanzienlijk beïnvloed door de ongelijkheid in nucleaire capaciteiten, waarbij Rusland over nucleaire wapens beschikt terwijl Oekraïne, gebonden aan het Verdrag inzake de Non-Proliferatie van Kernwapens (NPT), dat niet doet, wat de afschrikkings- en defensiemogelijkheden van Oekraïne beperkt.\n   \n2. Het Boedapest Memorandum van 1994, dat Oekraïne beveiligingsgaranties bood van Rusland, de VS en het VK in ruil voor zijn nucleaire ontwapening, is ondermijnd door de agressieve acties van Rusland, wat vragen oproept over de effectiviteit van dergelijke overeenkomsten in het waarborgen van de staatssoevereiniteit.\n\n3. Het kader van de NPT heeft paradoxaal genoeg het expansionistische gedrag van Rusland gefaciliteerd terwijl het militaire steun voor Oekraïne van zijn bondgenoten heeft belemmerd, wat de noodzaak benadrukt voor een herbeoordeling van internationale veiligheidsgaranties in het licht van aanhoudende conflicten.\n\n**Teaser:**\n\nNaarmate de Russisch-Oekraïense Oorlog zich blijft ontvouwen, roept het scherpe contrast in nucleaire capaciteiten tussen Rusland en Oekraïne kritieke vragen op over internationale veiligheidskaders. Het Boedapest Memorandum van 1994, dat Oekraïne bescherming beloofde in ruil voor zijn nucleaire ontwapening, is ter discussie gesteld nu de agressieve acties van Rusland aanhouden. Dit artikel gaat in op de implicaties van het Verdrag inzake de Non-Proliferatie van Kernwapens en de uitdagingen die het voor de verdediging van Oekraïne met zich meebrengt, en verkent hoe de overeenkomsten die bedoeld zijn om vrede te waarborgen, mogelijk onbedoeld conflict hebben mogelijk gemaakt. Ontdek de complexiteit van deze geopolitieke crisis en de verstrekkende gevolgen ervan.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"De dynamiek van de Russisch-Oekraïense Oorlog wordt diep beïnvloed door het Verdrag inzake de niet-verspreiding van nucleaire wapens, dat Rusland nucleaire capaciteiten verleent terwijl het Oekraïne beperkt. Dit onevenwicht heeft het conflict sinds 2014 gevormd en roept kritische vragen op over veiligheidsgaranties en de effectiviteit van internationale verdragen in het voorkomen van agressie. Ontdek meer over dit complexe probleem.",
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                key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.978",
                key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
                key:"metadata": null:null,
                key:"revisionId": string:"vaywgb5jhbtzqrtcjtzegr6xukk",
                key:"subtitle": null:null,
                key:"summary": null:null,
                key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
                key:"targetLanguage": string:"nl",
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            },
            {
                key:"title": string:"Hogyan aláássák Moszkva és szövetségesei a nemzetközi fegyverzet-ellenőrzési rendszert",
                key:"uid": string:"edb49f36-1bcb-4d91-a172-80a4f1227d70",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritikus Pontok:**\n\n1. Az orosz-ukrán háborút jelentősen befolyásolta a nukleáris képességek közötti eltérés, mivel Oroszország nukleáris fegyverekkel rendelkezik, míg Ukrajna, amely a Nukleáris Fegyverek Nemzetközi Terjedésének Megakadályozásáról szóló Szerződés (NPT) hatálya alá tartozik, nem, ami korlátozza Ukrajna elrettentési és védelmi lehetőségeit.\n   \n2. Az 1994-es budapesti memorandum, amely biztonsági garanciákat nyújtott Ukrajnának Oroszországtól, az Egyesült Államoktól és az Egyesült Királyságtól a nukleáris leszerelésért cserébe, Oroszország agresszív lépései által alá lett ásva, felvetve a kérdést, hogy mennyire hatékonyak az ilyen megállapodások az állami szuverenitás biztosításában.\n\n3. Az NPT kerete paradox módon elősegítette Oroszország terjeszkedő magatartását, miközben gátolta Ukrajna katonai támogatását szövetségeseitől, hangsúlyozva a nemzetközi biztonsági garanciák újraértékelésének szükségességét a folyamatban lévő konfliktusok fényében.\n\n**Előzetes:**\n\nAhogy az orosz-ukrán háború továbbra is kibontakozik, az Oroszország és Ukrajna közötti nukleáris képességek éles ellentéte kritikus kérdéseket vet fel a nemzetközi biztonsági keretekkel kapcsolatban. Az 1994-es budapesti memorandum, amely védelmet ígért Ukrajnának a nukleáris leszerelésért cserébe, kérdésessé vált, mivel Oroszország agresszív lépései folytatódnak. Ez a cikk a Nukleáris Fegyverek Nemzetközi Terjedésének Megakadályozásáról szóló Szerződés következményeit és az Ukrajna védelmére gyakorolt kihívásait vizsgálja, feltárva, hogy a béke biztosítására szánt megállapodások hogyan engedhették meg a konfliktust. Fedezze fel ennek a geopolitikai válságnak a bonyolultságait és messzemenő következményeit.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"A Russo-ukrán háború dinamikáját mélyen befolyásolja a Nukleáris Fegyverek Elterjedésének Megakadályozásáról szóló Szerződés, amely Oroszország számára nukleáris képességeket biztosít, míg Ukrajnát korlátozza. Ez a kiegyensúlyozatlanság formálta a konfliktust 2014 óta, kritikus kérdéseket vetve fel a biztonsági garanciákról és a nemzetközi szerződések hatékonyságáról az agresszió megelőzésében. Fedezze fel ezt a komplex kérdést.",
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                key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.772",
                key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
                key:"metadata": null:null,
                key:"revisionId": string:"vaywgb5jhbtzqrtcjtzegr6xukk",
                key:"subtitle": null:null,
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                key:"targetLanguage": string:"hu",
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            {
                key:"title": string:"Hur Moskva och dess allierade undergräver icke-spridningsregimen",
                key:"uid": string:"f01860f6-ebef-45b8-b7ee-2185bbc746b1",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritiska punkter:**\n\n1. Det rysk-ukrainska kriget har påverkats av skillnaden i kärnvapenkapacitet, där Ryssland har kärnvapen medan Ukraina, som är bundet av icke-spridningsavtalet (NPT), inte har det, vilket begränsar Ukrainas avskräcknings- och försvarsalternativ.\n   \n2. Budapest-memorandumet från 1994, som gav Ukraina säkerhetsgarantier från Ryssland, USA och Storbritannien i utbyte mot dess kärnvapennedrustning, har underminerats av Rysslands aggressiva handlingar, vilket väcker frågor om effektiviteten av sådana avtal för att säkerställa statlig suveränitet.\n\n3. NPT:s ramverk har paradoxalt nog underlättat Rysslands expansionistiska beteende samtidigt som det har hindrat militärt stöd för Ukraina från dess allierade, vilket belyser behovet av en omvärdering av internationella säkerhetsgarantier med tanke på pågående konflikter.\n\n**Teaser:**\n\nNär det rysk-ukrainska kriget fortsätter att utvecklas, väcker den skarpa kontrasten i kärnvapenkapacitet mellan Ryssland och Ukraina kritiska frågor om internationella säkerhetsramverk. Budapest-memorandumet från 1994, som lovade Ukraina skydd i utbyte mot dess kärnvapennedrustning, har ifrågasatts i takt med att Rysslands aggressiva handlingar fortsätter. Denna artikel fördjupar sig i konsekvenserna av icke-spridningsavtalet och de utmaningar det innebär för Ukrainas försvar, och utforskar hur de avtal som var avsedda att säkerställa fred kan ha möjliggjort konflikt. Upptäck komplexiteten i denna geopolitiska kris och dess långtgående konsekvenser.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Dynamiken i det rysk-ukrainska kriget påverkas djupt av icke-spridningsavtalet för kärnvapen, som ger Ryssland kärnvapenkapaciteter samtidigt som det begränsar Ukraina. Denna obalans har format konflikten sedan 2014, vilket väcker viktiga frågor om säkerhetsgarantier och effektiviteten av internationella avtal för att förhindra aggression. Upptäck mer om denna komplexa fråga.",
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                key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:47.423",
                key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
                key:"metadata": null:null,
                key:"revisionId": string:"vaywgb5jhbtzqrtcjtzegr6xukk",
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                key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
                key:"targetLanguage": string:"sv",
                key:"updatedAt": null:null,
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            {
                key:"title": string:"Wie Moskau und seine Verbündeten das Nichtverbreitungsregime untergraben",
                key:"uid": string:"faedd089-b49b-4449-a83b-0e6d93e2f49d",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritische Punkte:**\n\n1. Der russisch-ukrainische Krieg wurde erheblich von der Diskrepanz in den nuklearen Fähigkeiten beeinflusst, wobei Russland über Atomwaffen verfügt, während die Ukraine, gebunden durch den Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen (NPT), dies nicht tut, was die Abschreckungs- und Verteidigungsoptionen der Ukraine einschränkt.\n   \n2. Das Budapester Memorandum von 1994, das der Ukraine Sicherheitsgarantien von Russland, den USA und dem Vereinigten Königreich im Austausch für ihre nukleare Abrüstung bot, wurde durch Russlands aggressive Handlungen untergraben, was Fragen zur Wirksamkeit solcher Vereinbarungen zur Sicherstellung der staatlichen Souveränität aufwirft.\n\n3. Der Rahmen des NPT hat paradoxerweise Russlands expansionistisches Verhalten erleichtert, während er militärische Unterstützung für die Ukraine von ihren Verbündeten behindert hat, was die Notwendigkeit einer Neubewertung internationaler Sicherheitsgarantien im Lichte laufender Konflikte hervorhebt.\n\n**Teaser:**\n\nWährend der russisch-ukrainische Krieg weiter entfaltet, wirft der krasse Gegensatz in den nuklearen Fähigkeiten zwischen Russland und der Ukraine kritische Fragen zu internationalen Sicherheitsrahmen auf. Das Budapester Memorandum von 1994, das der Ukraine Schutz im Austausch für ihre nukleare Abrüstung versprach, wird in Frage gestellt, da Russlands aggressive Handlungen anhalten. Dieser Artikel beleuchtet die Auswirkungen des Vertrags über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen und die Herausforderungen, die er für die Verteidigung der Ukraine darstellt, und untersucht, wie die Vereinbarungen, die eigentlich Frieden sichern sollten, unbeabsichtigt Konflikte ermöglicht haben könnten. Entdecken Sie die Komplexität dieser geopolitischen Krise und ihre weitreichenden Folgen.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Die Dynamik des Russisch-Ukrainischen Krieges wird tiefgreifend vom Atomwaffensperrvertrag beeinflusst, der Russland nukleare Fähigkeiten gewährt, während er die Ukraine einschränkt. Dieses Ungleichgewicht hat den Konflikt seit 2014 geprägt und wirft kritische Fragen zu Sicherheitsgarantien und der Wirksamkeit internationaler Verträge zur Verhinderung von Aggression auf. Erfahren Sie mehr über dieses komplexe Thema.",
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                key:"targetLanguage": string:"de",
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            {
                key:"title": string:"Cómo Moscú y sus aliados están socavando el régimen de no proliferación",
                key:"uid": string:"fb7adf29-d0a4-4a93-9eb9-8c45a24bd2bb",
                key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Puntos Críticos:**\n\n1. La Guerra Russo-Ucraniana ha sido significativamente influenciada por la disparidad en las capacidades nucleares, con Rusia poseyendo armas nucleares mientras que Ucrania, vinculada por el Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear (TNP), no las tiene, limitando las opciones de disuasión y defensa de Ucrania.\n   \n2. El Memorando de Budapest de 1994, que proporcionó a Ucrania garantías de seguridad de Rusia, EE. UU. y el Reino Unido a cambio de su desarme nuclear, ha sido socavado por las acciones agresivas de Rusia, planteando dudas sobre la efectividad de tales acuerdos para garantizar la soberanía estatal.\n\n3. El marco del TNP ha facilitado paradójicamente el comportamiento expansionista de Rusia mientras inhibe el apoyo militar a Ucrania por parte de sus aliados, destacando la necesidad de una reevaluación de las garantías de seguridad internacional a la luz de los conflictos en curso.\n\n**Teaser:**\n\nA medida que la Guerra Russo-Ucraniana continúa desarrollándose, el marcado contraste en las capacidades nucleares entre Rusia y Ucrania plantea preguntas críticas sobre los marcos de seguridad internacional. El Memorando de Budapest de 1994, que prometió a Ucrania protección a cambio de su desarme nuclear, ha sido puesto en duda a medida que persisten las acciones agresivas de Rusia. Este artículo profundiza en las implicaciones del Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear y los desafíos que plantea para la defensa de Ucrania, explorando cómo los mismos acuerdos destinados a garantizar la paz pueden haber habilitado inadvertidamente el conflicto. Descubre las complejidades de esta crisis geopolítica y sus consecuencias de gran alcance.",
                key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"La dinámica de la guerra ruso-ucraniana está profundamente influenciada por el Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear, que otorga a Rusia capacidades nucleares mientras restringe a Ucrania. Este desequilibrio ha moldeado el conflicto desde 2014, planteando preguntas críticas sobre las garantías de seguridad y la efectividad de los tratados internacionales para prevenir la agresión. Descubre más sobre este complejo problema.",
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