Russia as the “weakest link” in the international order at the beginning and end of the 20th century? – a comparative analysis
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Lenin repeatedly described the tsarist empire as the “weakest link in the chain of imperialism”. The events of 1917 seemed to confirm this thesis. In February 1917, the tsarist monarchy was the first regime in Europe, as it existed then, to collapse under the challenges of the First World War. Eight months later, the “first” Russian democracy built on the ruins of the tsarist monarchy suffered a similar fate. In turn, the first totalitarian regime of modern times was built in its place. In August 1991, the Bolshevik annihilators of the “first” Russian democracy were disempowered themselves. Nevertheless, the Russian state that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet regime once again developed into the “weakest link” of the international order. The country returned to being a place to experiment with utopian ideals of all kinds. In this respect, one cannot avoid the impression that Russian history has, in certain respects, a cyclical character.
The erosion of the tsarist regime
In the second half of the 19th century, Russia was one of the European countries where social and political conflicts were intensifying at a rapid rate. This occurred despite the revolutionary reforms of Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881), which led, among other things, to the abolition of serfdom and the creation of independent courts. The polarization of society that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had predicted for the West occurred in Russia at the end of the 19th century. That is where the revolutionary centre of the continent shifted as a result. At that time, three conflicts that had already been largely resolved in the West came to a head in the tsarist empire. These were constitutional, labour and agrarian issues that deprived the tsarist autocracy of its social roots. The frightening emptiness that surrounded the government became apparent during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.
Instead of arousing national enthusiasm, the Russo-Japanese War caused a general uprising of the people against the existing system. The majority of the population was largely indifferent to the devastating defeats suffered by the Russian army. The revolutionary groups even noted these defeats with a certain satisfaction. Lenin declared in 1905 that it was not the Russian people but their greatest enemy – the tsarist government – that had been defeated in this war. With this extremely defeatist attitude, the leader of the Bolsheviks (a “party of a new type”) was by no means alone at the time.
Being completely isolated, the tsarist autocracy could not be maintained in its previous form. It had to ask society for cooperation. Thus, at the suggestion of the then Prime Minister Sergei Witte, the tsar's manifesto of October 17th 1905 was issued. In this document, the tsar promised his subjects basic rights and the convening of a parliament. This marked the end of unrestricted Russian autocracy. In April 1906, Russia received a constitution (“Basic Laws of the State”) – the first in its history.
The Russian historian Viktor Leontovich says that the constitution of 1905/06 was forced through by forces that were not interested in the constitution. Instead, their real aim was to consolidate the revolution. Regardless of this, following the liberal Russian politician Vasily Maklakov, the constitution gradually began to have an educational effect on both the government and the public.
However, all these developments primarily affected the Russian educated classes. The others hardly participated in them. They were scarcely interested in the political objectives of of the political elites. Thus, the Russian peasantry – the overwhelming majority of the population, even after the adoption of the constitution – was not interested in the establishment of the rule of law in Russia. This group was more concerned with the unresolved agrarian question. They dreamed of a complete expropriation from landowners, of a so-called “black redistribution”, and therefore did not want to recognize the principle of the inviolability of private property that the constitution guaranteed in Article 77.
The gulf between the Russian educated classes and those below them became particularly apparent after the outbreak of the First World War. Only loyalty to the tsar could motivate the Russian peasants to show exceptional endurance in the protracted conflict. However, this loyalty had been wavering since the turn of the century. The Russian lower classes – until then the most important pillar of the Russian autocracy – became its most dangerous opponent. More and more they began to transfer their hopes for the establishment of a socially just order from the tsar to revolutionary parties.
Just a few months after the start of the war (in December 1914), the Russian General Kuropatkin said that all of Russia had only one wish – peace.
The “National Renaissance” within the Russian educated classes
Kuropatkin's statement, however, primarily referred to the Russian lower classes, who bore the brunt of the war. The Russian educated classes, or at least many of their representatives, were in an entirely different mood at the time. After the outbreak of the war, except for the Bolsheviks and a few other radical left-wing groups, they were gripped by a nationalist euphoria that did not differ too much from the mood that accompanied the outbreak of the conflict in countries such as Germany, France or Great Britain. Considering the indifference with which the Russian public had accepted the devastating defeats of the tsarist army in the Russo-Japanese War just a decade earlier, the change of mood that had taken place in the country within a very short space of time is surprising. However, this national renaissance contributed little to the popularity of the Romanov dynasty among Russia's political class, as nationalist circles in Russia at the time suspected the tsarist family of not identifying sufficiently with the war. The fact that the tsarina's favourite, Grigory Rasputin, who was assassinated in December 1916, played such a prominent role in governing the country contributed particularly strongly to discrediting the tsarist family. At the end of 1916, the opposition's conflict with the regime reached its climax. The leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party, Pavel Milyukov, describing the incompetence of the government at the time, asked: “What is this? Stupidity or treason?”
Not only the liberals and socialists but also some conservative groups turned their backs on the government. Even some court circles were planning a palace revolution at the time. The erosion of trust in the tsar deprived the monarchy of its legitimizing foundations. At the time, Russia could indeed be described as the “weakest link” in the chain of belligerent powers.
Lenin's defeatism
The fact that the Paris Commune followed the collapse of the French army, and the Russian Revolution of 1905 followed the downfall of the Tsarist army, led Lenin to the conviction that a revolutionary party during an “imperialist” war should above all work towards bringing about the defeat of its own government. Thus, unlike Rosa Luxemburg and many other representatives of the left-wing Socialist International, for example, he did not see the outbreak of the First World War as a cause for despair or as an unprecedented tragedy. On the contrary, he saw this war as a tremendous opportunity to accelerate revolutionary processes, calling it the “greatest manager of world history”.
Lenin had nothing but contempt for the pacifists who wanted to end this war as quickly as possible. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, he wrote to his party friend Shlyapnikov, stating that “The era of the bayonet has begun. This means that one has to fight with this weapon.”
When Lenin formulated this idea, he had no bayonets of his own. He therefore had to cooperate with the forces that had them and were pursuing the same goal as him. This was namely the destruction of the tsarist army, with Russia's opponents in the war aiming for this above all. Lenin by no means saw this action as a betrayal of Russia. In his article on the national pride of the Russians, published in December 1914, he wrote: “The Russian Social-Democrats loved their fatherland like other Russians. But for this very reason they wished the tsarist regime a devastating defeat in every war. Helping to destroy the tsarist monarchy was the best service that any Russian patriot could render to his fatherland.”
Lenin saw the outbreak of the February Revolution of 1917 also as a result of the unusual destabilization of the tsarist monarchy by the war. This was of course seen as a confirmation of his tactics. In March 1917, he wrote:
“The revolutionary crisis was accelerated by a series of defeats inflicted on Russia and her allies... Those... who shouted and raved against “defeatism” are now faced with the fact that the defeat... of tsarism is historically connected with the beginning of the revolution.”
Lenin and the “Revolutionary Defence of the Fatherland”
After the fall of the tsar in February 1917, Lenin said in his “April Theses” that Russia was now “of all the belligerent countries, the freest country in the world”. Nevertheless, he continued his defeatist course unabatedly, this time against the “freest country in the world”. His cooperation with the German Reich reached its peak at this time. Lenin poured particular scorn on those political groups in Russia who believed that after the overthrow of the unpopular tsar, the Russian Revolution now had to be defended from external enemies. Lenin contemptuously referred to these groups as “revolutionary defenders of the fatherland” and said that they were the “(worst enemies) of the further development and success of the Russian Revolution”. To the war-weary Russian soldiers, who had been freed from the shackles of military discipline as a result of the revolution, Lenin made this very effective appeal: “End the imperialist war immediately.” The tsarist army, which numbered around nine million soldiers at the beginning of the February Revolution, was almost completely disbanded in the following months. However, Lenin's peace propaganda had nothing to do with pacifism. For Lenin's aim was by no means to end the world war, but to transform it into a worldwide revolutionary civil war that would eliminate the most important cause of all wars – the so-called “world capitalist system”. In Russia – the “weakest link in the imperialist chain” – with its weak bourgeoisie, the proletarian revolution conceived by Lenin was to triumph first. The spark of revolution was then to spread to the highly developed industrialized countries of the West. That was the plan. In Lenin's view, the most important prerequisite for the victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia was the destruction of the bourgeois state and all its institutions, not least the army. In his polemic with Karl Kautsky in 1918 (already after the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution), Lenin wrote the following: “No great revolution has ever succeeded without the “disorganization” of the army... For the army is the most ossified tool with which the old regime sustains itself, the firmest bulwark of bourgeois discipline.”
The erosion of the “second” Russian democracy
In August 1991, the Bolsheviks, having ruled Russia autocratically since the October Revolution, was disempowered. The Russian democrats, who had been relegated to the “dustbin of history” by the Bolsheviks in October 1917, returned to the political stage. Nothing seemed to stand in the way of Russia's return to Europe, something that the Russian democrats had dreamed of for years. Nevertheless, this triumph of the “second” Russian democracy did not last very long. The euphoric mood of August 1991 waned very quickly. Soon after came the shock of December 1991, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union viewed by many imperial-minded circles in Russia as a kind of apocalypse. This was followed by the trauma of January 1992, as economic shock therapy almost halved the population's standard of living. Not least because of all this, the term “democracy” was largely discredited in the eyes of many Russians. The journalist Leonid Radsikhovsky wrote in mid-1992 that “Democratic values were now experiencing an erosion similar to that of communist values in the past.” The term “democracy” was gradually becoming a dirty word. As a result, post-Soviet Russia, like the Weimar Republic at the time, was transformed into an “aggrieved great power” striving to restore its lost hegemonic position. Similar to the tsarist empire at the beginning of the 20th century, Russia once again became the “weakest link” in the European order.
The 1994 census showed that 46 per cent of the Russian population described the collapse of the USSR as a “catastrophe” or a “calamity”. At the time, many democratically minded Russian politicians also believed that the borders of the Russian Federation, created in 1991, were not final and that the entire post-Soviet area was a “vital sphere of interest” for the country.
For the most militant representatives of imperial revenge, however, the aforementioned quest to restore Russia's former greatness was far too modest a project. They regarded the West's victory in the Cold War as an unprecedented disgrace, which they wanted to undo with all the means at their disposal. Their aim was not to restore a balance in East–West relations but to completely defeat the western “globalists”. Like the right in the Weimar Republic, they demonized the values associated with the West. First and foremost, liberalism was attacked and described as a deadly enemy of the entire world outside the West. Liberalism was defined no differently by one of the most important representatives of the German Conservative Revolution, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, in 1923.
The magazine “Elementy” was founded in 1992 by the right-wing Russian publicist Alexander Dugin and served as the mouthpiece of these ideas. The magazine considered a compromise between the liberal advocates of the “mondialist” ideas and their opponents to be unthinkable. In the editorial of the seventh issue of the magazine (1996), one could read the following:
“Between them there is only enmity, hatred, the most brutal fight according to rules and without rules, the fight for destruction, to the last drop of blood... Who will have the last word? Finally it will be war, the “father of all things” that will decide.”
In another passage, Dugin referred to this conflict as the “final battle” and used this term in the original German (“Endkampf”). Dugin's tirades of hatred towards the Western “globalists” are certainly reminiscent of Lenin's invective against world financial capital. In Lenin's view, the conquest of “world capital” should enable a new just world order without wars and exploitation. For Dugin, the conquest of the West, or so-called “mondialism”, was the indispensable prerequisite for the creation of a patriarchal idyll on this planet. Neither Lenin nor Dugin considered the struggle for power in Russia to be an end in and of itself. Russia was merely to become a launch pad for the realization of ideas that went far beyond concepts that were specifically Russian.
Dugin and Putin
One of the most important concerns of Dugin, who, unlike Lenin, did not have a “new type of party”, was to convey his “ideology of the final struggle” to representatives of the political establishment in Russia. Especially after the establishment of Putin's “controlled democracy”, Dugin's extremist ideas began to influence internal Russian discourse more and more. It was then that Russia was transformed from the “weakest link” of the European order, as it was established at the end of the 20th century, into its radical adversary. Putin's demonization of the West, which became more and more evident, particularly after his speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, was very much in line with Dugin's intentions. The same could also be said of Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Putin’s adventurism ignored the entire international order. Dugin, however, was incensed that Putin took only Crimea at the time and did not annex the entire south-east of Ukraine. Anyway, shortly before the “turning point” on February 24th 2022, Dugin and Putin were already in the same boat. Immediately after the NATO debacle in Afghanistan in August 2021, Dugin published a pamphlet that can be seen as a kind of anticipation of the war against Ukraine. In the document, he talks of the looming “final battle of humanity against liberalism”. Lenin had announced a similar “final battle”, albeit against the “world capitalist system”, shortly after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia. Lenin's plans for world revolution were to suffer a total failure, as is well known. Dugin's vendetta against the so-called “collective West” will probably be no different. But what will be the price to be paid? We do not know, just like we do not know what impact Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election in November 2024 will have on Russia's future position in the international order. It seems that the cards have been reshuffled. The US could now, at least for the next four years, cease to be a factor in the global political order. This could give the emerging alliance of autocrats from Moscow to Beijing a unique opportunity to shape the international order according to their own ideas. But one thing must be borne in mind. The autocratic alliance is anything but stable, and this applies above all to Russian-Chinese relations. The fact that Putin has turned his country, which had supposedly “risen from its knees”, into a junior partner of Beijing irritates some imperial-minded circles in Russia. These irritations are likely to deepen if traditional rifts and tensions, which have accompanied Russian-Chinese relations for generations, resurface. The recently deceased Henry Kissinger predicted as much in one of his last interviews. He could be right here, as in some of his other prognoses. In that case, the Putin regime would once again have to rely primarily on its own resources in its conflict with the West, and these are certainly limited. In this context, I would like to recall the words of the Moscow historian Alexei Kiva, who said the following in 2018: “Russia's share of global GDP is 1.5-2 per cent, while that of the USA and the EU is 20 per cent each. Taking into consideration this imbalance of power, Russia cannot afford a prolonged confrontation with the West.” Kiva's words are reminiscent of those of the German Russia expert Boris Meissner, who described the balance of power between East and West in the mid-1980s as follows: “The Soviet Union's existing economic base is far too narrow to fully realize its claim to world power.”
Shortly afterwards, Perestroika began in the USSR. Will history repeat itself again this time?
This article is an extended version of a column that appeared in the online debate magazine “Die Kolumnisten" on November 11th 2024.
Translated by Eva Schulz-Jander
Leonid Luks is professor of history at the Catholic University Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Bavaria, Germany
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Eight months later, the “first” Russian democracy built on the ruins of the tsarist monarchy suffered a similar fate. In turn, the first totalitarian regime of modern times was built in its place. In August 1991, the Bolshevik&nbsp;<a href=\"https://www.collinsdictionary.com/de/worterbuch/englisch-thesaurus/annihilator\">annihilator</a>s<strong>&nbsp;</strong> of the “first” Russian democracy were disempowered themselves. Nevertheless, the Russian state that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet regime once again developed into the “weakest link” of the international order. The country returned to being a place to experiment with utopian ideals of all kinds. In this respect, one cannot avoid the impression that Russian history has, in certain respects, a cyclical character.</p>\n<p><strong>The erosion of the tsarist regime</strong></p>\n<p>In the second half of the 19th century, Russia was one of the European countries where social and political conflicts were intensifying at a rapid rate. This occurred despite the revolutionary reforms of Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881), which led, among other things, to the abolition of serfdom and the creation of independent courts. The polarization of society that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had predicted for the West occurred in Russia at the end of the 19th century. That is where the revolutionary centre of the continent shifted as a result. At that time, three conflicts that had already been largely resolved in the West came to a head in the tsarist empire. These were constitutional, labour and agrarian issues that deprived the tsarist autocracy of its social roots. The frightening emptiness that surrounded the government became apparent during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.</p>\n<p>Instead of arousing national enthusiasm, the Russo-Japanese War caused a general uprising of the people against the existing system. The majority of the population was largely indifferent to the devastating defeats suffered by the Russian army. The revolutionary groups even noted these defeats with a certain satisfaction. Lenin declared in 1905 that it was not the Russian people but their greatest enemy – the tsarist government – that had been defeated in this war. With this extremely defeatist attitude, the leader of the Bolsheviks (a “party of a new type”) was by no means alone at the time.</p>\n<p>Being completely isolated, the tsarist autocracy could not be maintained in its previous form. It had to ask society for cooperation. Thus, at the suggestion of the then Prime Minister Sergei Witte, the tsar's manifesto of October 17th 1905 was issued. In this document, the tsar promised his subjects basic rights and the convening of a parliament. This marked the end of unrestricted Russian autocracy. In April 1906, Russia received a constitution (“Basic Laws of the State”) – the first in its history.</p>\n<p>The Russian historian Viktor Leontovich says that the constitution of 1905/06 was forced through by forces that were not interested in the constitution. Instead, their real aim was to consolidate the revolution. Regardless of this, following the liberal Russian politician Vasily Maklakov, the constitution gradually began to have an educational effect on both the government and the public.</p>\n<p>However, all these developments primarily affected the Russian educated classes. The others hardly participated in them. They were scarcely interested in the political objectives of of the political elites. Thus, the Russian peasantry – the overwhelming majority of the population, even after the adoption of the constitution – was not interested in the establishment of the rule of law in Russia. This group was more concerned with the unresolved agrarian question. They dreamed of a complete expropriation from landowners, of a so-called “black redistribution”, and therefore did not want to recognize the principle of the inviolability of private property that the constitution guaranteed in Article 77.</p>\n<p>The gulf between the Russian educated classes and those below them became particularly apparent after the outbreak of the First World War. Only loyalty to the tsar could motivate the Russian peasants to show exceptional endurance in the protracted conflict. However, this loyalty had been wavering since the turn of the century. The Russian lower classes – until then the most important pillar of the Russian autocracy – became its most dangerous opponent. More and more they began to transfer their hopes for the establishment of a socially just order from the tsar to revolutionary parties.</p>\n<p>Just a few months after the start of the war (in December 1914), the Russian General Kuropatkin said that all of Russia had only one wish – peace.</p>\n<p><strong>The “National Renaissance” within the Russian educated classes</strong></p>\n<p>Kuropatkin's statement, however, primarily referred to the Russian lower classes, who bore the brunt of the war. The Russian educated classes, or at least many of their representatives, were in an entirely different mood at the time. After the outbreak of the war, except for the Bolsheviks and a few other radical left-wing groups, they were gripped by a nationalist euphoria that did not differ too much from the mood that accompanied the outbreak of the conflict in countries such as Germany, France or Great Britain. Considering the indifference with which the Russian public had accepted the devastating defeats of the tsarist army in the Russo-Japanese War just a decade earlier, the change of mood that had taken place in the country within a very short space of time is surprising. However, this national renaissance contributed little to the popularity of the Romanov dynasty among Russia's political class, as nationalist circles in Russia at the time suspected the tsarist family of not identifying sufficiently with the war. The fact that the tsarina's favourite, Grigory Rasputin, who was assassinated in December 1916, played such a prominent role in governing the country contributed particularly strongly to discrediting the tsarist family. At the end of 1916, the opposition's conflict with the regime reached its climax. The leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party, Pavel Milyukov, describing the incompetence of the government at the time, asked: “What is this? Stupidity or treason?”</p>\n<p>Not only the liberals and socialists but also some conservative groups turned their backs on the government. Even some court circles were planning a palace revolution at the time. The erosion of trust in the tsar deprived the monarchy of its legitimizing foundations. At the time, Russia could indeed be described as the “weakest link” in the chain of belligerent powers.</p>\n<p><strong>Lenin's defeatism</strong></p>\n<p>The fact that the Paris Commune followed the collapse of the French army, and the Russian Revolution of 1905 followed the downfall of the Tsarist army, led Lenin to the conviction that a revolutionary party during an “imperialist” war should above all work towards bringing about the defeat of its own government. Thus, unlike Rosa Luxemburg and many other representatives of the left-wing Socialist International, for example, he did not see the outbreak of the First World War as a cause for despair or as an unprecedented tragedy. On the contrary, he saw this war as a tremendous opportunity to accelerate revolutionary processes, calling it the “greatest manager of world history”.</p>\n<p>Lenin had nothing but contempt for the pacifists who wanted to end this war as quickly as possible. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, he wrote to his party friend Shlyapnikov, stating that “The era of the bayonet has begun. This means that one has to fight with this weapon.”</p>\n<p>When Lenin formulated this idea, he had no bayonets of his own. He therefore had to cooperate with the forces that had them and were pursuing the same goal as him. This was namely the destruction of the tsarist army, with Russia's opponents in the war aiming for this above all. Lenin by no means saw this action as a betrayal of Russia. In his article on the national pride of the Russians, published in December 1914, he wrote: “The Russian Social-Democrats loved their fatherland like other Russians. But for this very reason they wished the tsarist regime a devastating defeat in every war. Helping to destroy the tsarist monarchy was the best service that any Russian patriot could render to his fatherland.”</p>\n<p>Lenin saw the outbreak of the February Revolution of 1917 also as a result of the unusual destabilization of the tsarist monarchy by the war. This was of course seen as a confirmation of his tactics. In March 1917, he wrote:</p>\n<p>“The revolutionary crisis was accelerated by a series of defeats inflicted on Russia and her allies... Those... who shouted and raved against “defeatism” are now faced with the fact that the defeat... of tsarism is historically connected with the beginning of the revolution.”</p>\n<p><strong>Lenin and the “Revolutionary Defence of the Fatherland”</strong></p>\n<p>After the fall of the tsar in February 1917, Lenin said in his “April Theses” that Russia was now “of all the belligerent countries, the freest country in the world”. Nevertheless, he continued his defeatist course unabatedly, this time against the “freest country in the world”. His cooperation with the German Reich reached its peak at this time. Lenin poured particular scorn on those political groups in Russia who believed that after the overthrow of the unpopular tsar, the Russian Revolution now had to be defended from external enemies. Lenin contemptuously referred to these groups as “revolutionary defenders of the fatherland” and said that they were the “(worst enemies) of the further development and success of the Russian Revolution”. To the war-weary Russian soldiers, who had been freed from the shackles of military discipline as a result of the revolution, Lenin made this very effective appeal: “End the imperialist war immediately.” The tsarist army, which numbered around nine million soldiers at the beginning of the February Revolution, was almost completely disbanded in the following months. However, Lenin's peace propaganda had nothing to do with pacifism. For Lenin's aim was by no means to end the world war, but to transform it into a worldwide revolutionary civil war that would eliminate the most important cause of all wars – the so-called “world capitalist system”. In Russia – the “weakest link in the imperialist chain” – with its weak bourgeoisie, the proletarian revolution conceived by Lenin was to triumph first. The spark of revolution was then to spread to the highly developed industrialized countries of the West. That was the plan. In Lenin's view, the most important prerequisite for the victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia was the destruction of the bourgeois state and all its institutions, not least the army. In his polemic with Karl Kautsky in 1918 (already after the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution), Lenin wrote the following: “No great revolution has ever succeeded without the “disorganization” of the army... For the army is the most ossified tool with which the old regime sustains itself, the firmest bulwark of bourgeois discipline.”</p>\n<p><strong>The erosion of the “second” Russian democracy</strong></p>\n<p>In August 1991, the Bolsheviks, having ruled Russia autocratically since the October Revolution, was disempowered. The Russian democrats, who had been relegated to the “dustbin of history” by the Bolsheviks in October 1917, returned to the political stage.&nbsp; Nothing seemed to stand in the way of Russia's return to Europe, something that the Russian democrats had dreamed of for years. Nevertheless, this triumph of the “second” Russian democracy did not last very long. The euphoric mood of August 1991 waned very quickly. Soon after came the shock of December 1991, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union viewed by many imperial-minded circles in Russia as a kind of apocalypse. This was followed by the trauma of January 1992, as economic shock therapy almost halved the population's standard of living. Not least because of all this, the term “democracy” was largely discredited in the eyes of many Russians. The journalist Leonid Radsikhovsky wrote in mid-1992 that “Democratic values were now experiencing an erosion similar to that of communist values in the past.” The term “democracy” was gradually becoming a dirty word. As a result, post-Soviet Russia, like the Weimar Republic at the time, was transformed into an “aggrieved great power” striving to restore its lost hegemonic position. Similar to the tsarist empire at the beginning of the 20th century, Russia once again became the “weakest link” in the European order.</p>\n<p>The 1994 census showed that 46 per cent of the Russian population described the collapse of the USSR as a “catastrophe” or a “calamity”.&nbsp; At the time, many democratically minded Russian politicians also believed that the borders of the Russian Federation, created in 1991, were not final and that the entire post-Soviet area was a “vital sphere of interest” for the country.</p>\n<p>For the most militant representatives of imperial revenge, however, the aforementioned quest to restore Russia's former greatness was far too modest a project. They regarded the West's victory in the Cold War as an unprecedented disgrace, which they wanted to undo with all the means at their disposal. Their aim was not to restore a balance in East–West relations but to completely defeat the western “globalists”. Like the right in the Weimar Republic, they demonized the values associated with the West. First and foremost, liberalism was attacked and described as a deadly enemy of the entire world outside the West. Liberalism was defined no differently by one of the most important representatives of the German Conservative Revolution, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, in 1923.</p>\n<p>The magazine “Elementy” was founded in 1992 by the right-wing Russian publicist Alexander Dugin and served as the mouthpiece of these ideas. The magazine considered a compromise between the liberal advocates of the “mondialist” ideas and their opponents to be unthinkable. In the editorial of the seventh issue of the magazine (1996), one could read the following:</p>\n<p>“Between them there is only enmity, hatred, the most brutal fight according to rules and without rules, the fight for destruction, to the last drop of blood... Who will have the last word? Finally it will be war, the “father of all things” that will decide.”</p>\n<p>&nbsp;</p>\n<p>In another passage, Dugin referred to this conflict as the “final battle” and used this term in the original German (<em>“Endkampf”</em>). Dugin's tirades of hatred towards the Western “globalists” are certainly reminiscent of Lenin's invective against world financial capital. In Lenin's view, the conquest of “world capital” should enable a new just world order without wars and exploitation. For Dugin, the conquest of the West, or so-called “mondialism”, was the indispensable prerequisite for the creation of a patriarchal idyll on this planet. Neither Lenin nor Dugin considered the struggle for power in Russia to be an end in and of itself. Russia was merely to become a launch pad for the realization of ideas that went far beyond concepts that were specifically Russian.</p>\n<p>&nbsp;</p>\n<p><strong>Dugin and Putin</strong></p>\n<p>One of the most important concerns of Dugin, who, unlike Lenin, did not have a “new type of party”, was to convey his “ideology of the final struggle” to representatives of the political establishment in Russia. Especially after the establishment of Putin's “controlled democracy”, Dugin's extremist ideas began to influence internal Russian discourse more and more. It was then that Russia was transformed from the “weakest link” of the European order, as it was established at the end of the 20th century, into its radical adversary. Putin's demonization of the West, which became more and more evident, particularly after his speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, was very much in line with Dugin's intentions. The same could also be said of Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Putin’s adventurism ignored the entire international order. Dugin, however, was incensed that Putin took only Crimea at the time and did not annex the entire south-east of Ukraine. Anyway, shortly before the “turning point” on February 24th 2022, Dugin and Putin were already in the same boat. Immediately after the NATO debacle in Afghanistan in August 2021, Dugin published a pamphlet that can be seen as a kind of anticipation of the war against Ukraine. In the document, he talks of the looming “final battle of humanity against liberalism”.&nbsp; Lenin had announced a similar “final battle”, albeit against the “world capitalist system”, shortly after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia. Lenin's plans for world revolution were to suffer a total failure, as is well known. Dugin's vendetta against the so-called “collective West” will probably be no different. But what will be the price to be paid? We do not know, just like we do not know what impact Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election in November 2024 will have on Russia's future position in the international order. It seems that the cards have been reshuffled. The US could now, at least for the next four years, cease to be a factor in the global political order. This could give the emerging alliance of autocrats from Moscow to Beijing a unique opportunity to shape the international order according to their own ideas. But one thing must be borne in mind. The autocratic alliance is anything but stable, and this applies above all to Russian-Chinese relations. The fact that Putin has turned his country, which had supposedly “risen from its knees”, into a junior partner of Beijing irritates some imperial-minded circles in Russia. These irritations are likely to deepen if traditional rifts and tensions, which have accompanied Russian-Chinese relations for generations, resurface. The recently deceased Henry Kissinger predicted as much in one of his last interviews. He could be right here, as in some of his other prognoses. In that case, the Putin regime would once again have to rely primarily on its own resources in its conflict with the West, and these are certainly limited. In this context, I would like to recall the words of the Moscow historian Alexei Kiva, who said the following in 2018: “Russia's share of global GDP is 1.5-2 per cent, while that of the USA and the EU is 20 per cent each. Taking into consideration this imbalance of power, Russia cannot afford a prolonged confrontation with the West.” Kiva's words are reminiscent of those of the German Russia expert Boris Meissner, who described the balance of power between East and West in the mid-1980s as follows: “The Soviet Union's existing economic base is far too narrow to fully realize its claim to world power.”</p>\n<p>Shortly afterwards, Perestroika began in the USSR. Will history repeat itself again this time?</p>\n<p><em>This article is an extended version of a column that appeared in the online debate magazine “Die Kolumnisten\" on November 11th 2024.&nbsp; </em></p>\n<p><em>Translated by Eva Schulz-Jander</em></p>\n<p><strong>Leonid Luks</strong> is professor of history at the Catholic University Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Bavaria, Germany</p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">&nbsp;</span></p>\n" } }, key:"titleTranslations": { key:"bg": { key:"value": string:"Русия като „най-слабата връзка“ в международния ред в началото и края на 20-ти век? – сравнителен анализ", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"cs": { key:"value": string:"Rusko jako „nejslabší článek“ v mezinárodním pořádku na začátku a na konci 20. století? – komparativní analýza", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"de": { key:"value": string:"Russland als das „schwächste Glied“ in der internationalen Ordnung zu Beginn und am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts? – eine vergleichende Analyse", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"el": { key:"value": string:"Ρωσία ως ο “ασθενέστερος κρίκος” στην διεθνή τάξη στην αρχή και το τέλος του 20ού αιώνα; – μια συγκριτική ανάλυση", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"en": { key:"value": string:"Russia as the “weakest link” in the international order at the beginning and end of the 20th century? – a comparative analysis", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"es": { key:"value": string:"Rusia como el “eslabón más débil” en el orden internacional a principios y finales del siglo XX? – un análisis comparativo", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"fi": { key:"value": string:"Venäjä \"heikoimpana lenkkinä\" kansainvälisessä järjestyksessä 1900-luvun alussa ja lopussa? – vertaileva analyysi", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"fr": { key:"value": string:"La Russie comme le « maillon le plus faible » dans l'ordre international au début et à la fin du 20ème siècle ? – une analyse comparative", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"hr": { key:"value": string:"Rusija kao “najslabija karika” u međunarodnom poretku na početku i kraju 20. stoljeća? – komparativna analiza", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"hu": { key:"value": string:"Oroszország mint a “leggyengébb láncszem” a nemzetközi rendben a 20. század elején és végén? – egy összehasonlító elemzés", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"it": { key:"value": string:"Russia come il “collo più debole” nell'ordine internazionale all'inizio e alla fine del XX secolo? – un'analisi comparativa", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"nl": { key:"value": string:"Rusland als de “zwakste schakel” in de internationale orde aan het begin en het einde van de 20e eeuw? – een vergelijkende analyse", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"pl": { key:"value": string:"Rosja jako „najsłabsze ogniwo” w porządku międzynarodowym na początku i na końcu XX wieku? – analiza porównawcza", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"pt": { key:"value": string:"Rússia como o “elo mais fraco” na ordem internacional no início e no final do século XX? – uma análise comparativa", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"ro": { key:"value": string:"Rusia ca „veriga cea mai slabă” în ordinea internațională la începutul și sfârșitul secolului XX? – o analiză comparativă", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"ru": { key:"value": string:"Россия как «слабое звено» в международном порядке в начале и конце 20 века? – сравнительный анализ", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"sk": { key:"value": string:"Rusko ako „najslabší článok“ v medzinárodnom poriadku na začiatku a na konci 20. storočia? – porovnávacia analýza", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"sv": { key:"value": string:"Ryssland som den \"svagaste länken\" i den internationella ordningen i början och slutet av 1900-talet? – en jämförande analys", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"tr": { key:"value": string:"Rusya'nın 20. yüzyılın başında ve sonunda uluslararası düzende \"en zayıf halka\" olarak değerlendirilmesi? – karşılaştırmalı bir analiz", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"uk": { key:"value": string:"Росія як «найслабше ланка» в міжнародному порядку на початку та в кінці 20 століття? – порівняльний аналіз", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" } }, key:"subtitleTranslations": { key:"bg": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"cs": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"de": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"el": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"en": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"es": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"fi": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"fr": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"hr": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"hu": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"it": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"nl": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"pl": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"pt": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"ro": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"ru": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"sk": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"sv": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"tr": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"uk": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null } }, key:"summaryTranslations": { key:"bg": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"cs": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"de": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"el": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"en": { key:"value": string:"<i>There has been a lot of debate over whether or not recent Russian history has been somewhat cyclical in nature. Successive collapses in the 20th century offer potential insights into the Kremlin’s behaviour today.</i>", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"es": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"fi": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"fr": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"hr": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"hu": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"it": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"nl": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"pl": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"pt": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"ro": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"ru": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"sk": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"sv": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"tr": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"uk": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null } }, key:"contentTranslations": { key:"bg": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"cs": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"de": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"el": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"en": { key:"value": string:"<p>Lenin repeatedly described the tsarist empire as the “weakest link in the chain of imperialism”. The events of 1917 seemed to confirm this thesis. In February 1917, the tsarist monarchy was the first regime in Europe, as it existed then, to collapse under the challenges of the First World War. Eight months later, the “first” Russian democracy built on the ruins of the tsarist monarchy suffered a similar fate. In turn, the first totalitarian regime of modern times was built in its place. In August 1991, the Bolshevik <a href=\"https://www.collinsdictionary.com/de/worterbuch/englisch-thesaurus/annihilator\">annihilator</a>s<strong> </strong> of the “first” Russian democracy were disempowered themselves. Nevertheless, the Russian state that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet regime once again developed into the “weakest link” of the international order. The country returned to being a place to experiment with utopian ideals of all kinds. In this respect, one cannot avoid the impression that Russian history has, in certain respects, a cyclical character.</p>\n<p><strong>The erosion of the tsarist regime</strong></p>\n<p>In the second half of the 19th century, Russia was one of the European countries where social and political conflicts were intensifying at a rapid rate. This occurred despite the revolutionary reforms of Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881), which led, among other things, to the abolition of serfdom and the creation of independent courts. The polarization of society that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had predicted for the West occurred in Russia at the end of the 19th century. That is where the revolutionary centre of the continent shifted as a result. At that time, three conflicts that had already been largely resolved in the West came to a head in the tsarist empire. These were constitutional, labour and agrarian issues that deprived the tsarist autocracy of its social roots. The frightening emptiness that surrounded the government became apparent during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.</p>\n<p>Instead of arousing national enthusiasm, the Russo-Japanese War caused a general uprising of the people against the existing system. The majority of the population was largely indifferent to the devastating defeats suffered by the Russian army. The revolutionary groups even noted these defeats with a certain satisfaction. Lenin declared in 1905 that it was not the Russian people but their greatest enemy – the tsarist government – that had been defeated in this war. With this extremely defeatist attitude, the leader of the Bolsheviks (a “party of a new type”) was by no means alone at the time.</p>\n<p>Being completely isolated, the tsarist autocracy could not be maintained in its previous form. It had to ask society for cooperation. Thus, at the suggestion of the then Prime Minister Sergei Witte, the tsar's manifesto of October 17th 1905 was issued. In this document, the tsar promised his subjects basic rights and the convening of a parliament. This marked the end of unrestricted Russian autocracy. In April 1906, Russia received a constitution (“Basic Laws of the State”) – the first in its history.</p>\n<p>The Russian historian Viktor Leontovich says that the constitution of 1905/06 was forced through by forces that were not interested in the constitution. Instead, their real aim was to consolidate the revolution. Regardless of this, following the liberal Russian politician Vasily Maklakov, the constitution gradually began to have an educational effect on both the government and the public.</p>\n<p>However, all these developments primarily affected the Russian educated classes. The others hardly participated in them. They were scarcely interested in the political objectives of of the political elites. Thus, the Russian peasantry – the overwhelming majority of the population, even after the adoption of the constitution – was not interested in the establishment of the rule of law in Russia. This group was more concerned with the unresolved agrarian question. They dreamed of a complete expropriation from landowners, of a so-called “black redistribution”, and therefore did not want to recognize the principle of the inviolability of private property that the constitution guaranteed in Article 77.</p>\n<p>The gulf between the Russian educated classes and those below them became particularly apparent after the outbreak of the First World War. Only loyalty to the tsar could motivate the Russian peasants to show exceptional endurance in the protracted conflict. However, this loyalty had been wavering since the turn of the century. The Russian lower classes – until then the most important pillar of the Russian autocracy – became its most dangerous opponent. More and more they began to transfer their hopes for the establishment of a socially just order from the tsar to revolutionary parties.</p>\n<p>Just a few months after the start of the war (in December 1914), the Russian General Kuropatkin said that all of Russia had only one wish – peace.</p>\n<p><strong>The “National Renaissance” within the Russian educated classes</strong></p>\n<p>Kuropatkin's statement, however, primarily referred to the Russian lower classes, who bore the brunt of the war. The Russian educated classes, or at least many of their representatives, were in an entirely different mood at the time. After the outbreak of the war, except for the Bolsheviks and a few other radical left-wing groups, they were gripped by a nationalist euphoria that did not differ too much from the mood that accompanied the outbreak of the conflict in countries such as Germany, France or Great Britain. Considering the indifference with which the Russian public had accepted the devastating defeats of the tsarist army in the Russo-Japanese War just a decade earlier, the change of mood that had taken place in the country within a very short space of time is surprising. However, this national renaissance contributed little to the popularity of the Romanov dynasty among Russia's political class, as nationalist circles in Russia at the time suspected the tsarist family of not identifying sufficiently with the war. The fact that the tsarina's favourite, Grigory Rasputin, who was assassinated in December 1916, played such a prominent role in governing the country contributed particularly strongly to discrediting the tsarist family. At the end of 1916, the opposition's conflict with the regime reached its climax. The leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party, Pavel Milyukov, describing the incompetence of the government at the time, asked: “What is this? Stupidity or treason?”</p>\n<p>Not only the liberals and socialists but also some conservative groups turned their backs on the government. Even some court circles were planning a palace revolution at the time. The erosion of trust in the tsar deprived the monarchy of its legitimizing foundations. At the time, Russia could indeed be described as the “weakest link” in the chain of belligerent powers.</p>\n<p><strong>Lenin's defeatism</strong></p>\n<p>The fact that the Paris Commune followed the collapse of the French army, and the Russian Revolution of 1905 followed the downfall of the Tsarist army, led Lenin to the conviction that a revolutionary party during an “imperialist” war should above all work towards bringing about the defeat of its own government. Thus, unlike Rosa Luxemburg and many other representatives of the left-wing Socialist International, for example, he did not see the outbreak of the First World War as a cause for despair or as an unprecedented tragedy. On the contrary, he saw this war as a tremendous opportunity to accelerate revolutionary processes, calling it the “greatest manager of world history”.</p>\n<p>Lenin had nothing but contempt for the pacifists who wanted to end this war as quickly as possible. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, he wrote to his party friend Shlyapnikov, stating that “The era of the bayonet has begun. This means that one has to fight with this weapon.”</p>\n<p>When Lenin formulated this idea, he had no bayonets of his own. He therefore had to cooperate with the forces that had them and were pursuing the same goal as him. This was namely the destruction of the tsarist army, with Russia's opponents in the war aiming for this above all. Lenin by no means saw this action as a betrayal of Russia. In his article on the national pride of the Russians, published in December 1914, he wrote: “The Russian Social-Democrats loved their fatherland like other Russians. But for this very reason they wished the tsarist regime a devastating defeat in every war. Helping to destroy the tsarist monarchy was the best service that any Russian patriot could render to his fatherland.”</p>\n<p>Lenin saw the outbreak of the February Revolution of 1917 also as a result of the unusual destabilization of the tsarist monarchy by the war. This was of course seen as a confirmation of his tactics. In March 1917, he wrote:</p>\n<p>“The revolutionary crisis was accelerated by a series of defeats inflicted on Russia and her allies... Those... who shouted and raved against “defeatism” are now faced with the fact that the defeat... of tsarism is historically connected with the beginning of the revolution.”</p>\n<p><strong>Lenin and the “Revolutionary Defence of the Fatherland”</strong></p>\n<p>After the fall of the tsar in February 1917, Lenin said in his “April Theses” that Russia was now “of all the belligerent countries, the freest country in the world”. Nevertheless, he continued his defeatist course unabatedly, this time against the “freest country in the world”. His cooperation with the German Reich reached its peak at this time. Lenin poured particular scorn on those political groups in Russia who believed that after the overthrow of the unpopular tsar, the Russian Revolution now had to be defended from external enemies. Lenin contemptuously referred to these groups as “revolutionary defenders of the fatherland” and said that they were the “(worst enemies) of the further development and success of the Russian Revolution”. To the war-weary Russian soldiers, who had been freed from the shackles of military discipline as a result of the revolution, Lenin made this very effective appeal: “End the imperialist war immediately.” The tsarist army, which numbered around nine million soldiers at the beginning of the February Revolution, was almost completely disbanded in the following months. However, Lenin's peace propaganda had nothing to do with pacifism. For Lenin's aim was by no means to end the world war, but to transform it into a worldwide revolutionary civil war that would eliminate the most important cause of all wars – the so-called “world capitalist system”. In Russia – the “weakest link in the imperialist chain” – with its weak bourgeoisie, the proletarian revolution conceived by Lenin was to triumph first. The spark of revolution was then to spread to the highly developed industrialized countries of the West. That was the plan. In Lenin's view, the most important prerequisite for the victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia was the destruction of the bourgeois state and all its institutions, not least the army. In his polemic with Karl Kautsky in 1918 (already after the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution), Lenin wrote the following: “No great revolution has ever succeeded without the “disorganization” of the army... For the army is the most ossified tool with which the old regime sustains itself, the firmest bulwark of bourgeois discipline.”</p>\n<p><strong>The erosion of the “second” Russian democracy</strong></p>\n<p>In August 1991, the Bolsheviks, having ruled Russia autocratically since the October Revolution, was disempowered. The Russian democrats, who had been relegated to the “dustbin of history” by the Bolsheviks in October 1917, returned to the political stage. Nothing seemed to stand in the way of Russia's return to Europe, something that the Russian democrats had dreamed of for years. Nevertheless, this triumph of the “second” Russian democracy did not last very long. The euphoric mood of August 1991 waned very quickly. Soon after came the shock of December 1991, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union viewed by many imperial-minded circles in Russia as a kind of apocalypse. This was followed by the trauma of January 1992, as economic shock therapy almost halved the population's standard of living. Not least because of all this, the term “democracy” was largely discredited in the eyes of many Russians. The journalist Leonid Radsikhovsky wrote in mid-1992 that “Democratic values were now experiencing an erosion similar to that of communist values in the past.” The term “democracy” was gradually becoming a dirty word. As a result, post-Soviet Russia, like the Weimar Republic at the time, was transformed into an “aggrieved great power” striving to restore its lost hegemonic position. Similar to the tsarist empire at the beginning of the 20th century, Russia once again became the “weakest link” in the European order.</p>\n<p>The 1994 census showed that 46 per cent of the Russian population described the collapse of the USSR as a “catastrophe” or a “calamity”. At the time, many democratically minded Russian politicians also believed that the borders of the Russian Federation, created in 1991, were not final and that the entire post-Soviet area was a “vital sphere of interest” for the country.</p>\n<p>For the most militant representatives of imperial revenge, however, the aforementioned quest to restore Russia's former greatness was far too modest a project. They regarded the West's victory in the Cold War as an unprecedented disgrace, which they wanted to undo with all the means at their disposal. Their aim was not to restore a balance in East–West relations but to completely defeat the western “globalists”. Like the right in the Weimar Republic, they demonized the values associated with the West. First and foremost, liberalism was attacked and described as a deadly enemy of the entire world outside the West. Liberalism was defined no differently by one of the most important representatives of the German Conservative Revolution, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, in 1923.</p>\n<p>The magazine “Elementy” was founded in 1992 by the right-wing Russian publicist Alexander Dugin and served as the mouthpiece of these ideas. The magazine considered a compromise between the liberal advocates of the “mondialist” ideas and their opponents to be unthinkable. In the editorial of the seventh issue of the magazine (1996), one could read the following:</p>\n<p>“Between them there is only enmity, hatred, the most brutal fight according to rules and without rules, the fight for destruction, to the last drop of blood... Who will have the last word? Finally it will be war, the “father of all things” that will decide.”</p>\n<p> </p>\n<p>In another passage, Dugin referred to this conflict as the “final battle” and used this term in the original German (<em>“Endkampf”</em>). Dugin's tirades of hatred towards the Western “globalists” are certainly reminiscent of Lenin's invective against world financial capital. In Lenin's view, the conquest of “world capital” should enable a new just world order without wars and exploitation. For Dugin, the conquest of the West, or so-called “mondialism”, was the indispensable prerequisite for the creation of a patriarchal idyll on this planet. Neither Lenin nor Dugin considered the struggle for power in Russia to be an end in and of itself. Russia was merely to become a launch pad for the realization of ideas that went far beyond concepts that were specifically Russian.</p>\n<p> </p>\n<p><strong>Dugin and Putin</strong></p>\n<p>One of the most important concerns of Dugin, who, unlike Lenin, did not have a “new type of party”, was to convey his “ideology of the final struggle” to representatives of the political establishment in Russia. Especially after the establishment of Putin's “controlled democracy”, Dugin's extremist ideas began to influence internal Russian discourse more and more. It was then that Russia was transformed from the “weakest link” of the European order, as it was established at the end of the 20th century, into its radical adversary. Putin's demonization of the West, which became more and more evident, particularly after his speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, was very much in line with Dugin's intentions. The same could also be said of Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Putin’s adventurism ignored the entire international order. Dugin, however, was incensed that Putin took only Crimea at the time and did not annex the entire south-east of Ukraine. Anyway, shortly before the “turning point” on February 24th 2022, Dugin and Putin were already in the same boat. Immediately after the NATO debacle in Afghanistan in August 2021, Dugin published a pamphlet that can be seen as a kind of anticipation of the war against Ukraine. In the document, he talks of the looming “final battle of humanity against liberalism”. Lenin had announced a similar “final battle”, albeit against the “world capitalist system”, shortly after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia. Lenin's plans for world revolution were to suffer a total failure, as is well known. Dugin's vendetta against the so-called “collective West” will probably be no different. But what will be the price to be paid? We do not know, just like we do not know what impact Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election in November 2024 will have on Russia's future position in the international order. It seems that the cards have been reshuffled. The US could now, at least for the next four years, cease to be a factor in the global political order. This could give the emerging alliance of autocrats from Moscow to Beijing a unique opportunity to shape the international order according to their own ideas. But one thing must be borne in mind. The autocratic alliance is anything but stable, and this applies above all to Russian-Chinese relations. The fact that Putin has turned his country, which had supposedly “risen from its knees”, into a junior partner of Beijing irritates some imperial-minded circles in Russia. These irritations are likely to deepen if traditional rifts and tensions, which have accompanied Russian-Chinese relations for generations, resurface. The recently deceased Henry Kissinger predicted as much in one of his last interviews. He could be right here, as in some of his other prognoses. In that case, the Putin regime would once again have to rely primarily on its own resources in its conflict with the West, and these are certainly limited. In this context, I would like to recall the words of the Moscow historian Alexei Kiva, who said the following in 2018: “Russia's share of global GDP is 1.5-2 per cent, while that of the USA and the EU is 20 per cent each. Taking into consideration this imbalance of power, Russia cannot afford a prolonged confrontation with the West.” Kiva's words are reminiscent of those of the German Russia expert Boris Meissner, who described the balance of power between East and West in the mid-1980s as follows: “The Soviet Union's existing economic base is far too narrow to fully realize its claim to world power.”</p>\n<p>Shortly afterwards, Perestroika began in the USSR. Will history repeat itself again this time?</p>\n<p><em>This article is an extended version of a column that appeared in the online debate magazine “Die Kolumnisten\" on November 11th 2024. </em></p>\n<p><em>Translated by Eva Schulz-Jander</em></p>\n<p><strong>Leonid Luks</strong> is professor of history at the Catholic University Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Bavaria, Germany</p>\n<p><span> </span></p>\n", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18" }, key:"es": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"fi": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"fr": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"hr": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"hu": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"it": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"nl": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"pl": { key:"value": string:"", key:"engine": null:null }, key:"pt": { key:"value": string:"", 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key:"contentItemTranslations": { key:"nodes": [ { key:"title": string:"Russia come il “collo più debole” nell'ordine internazionale all'inizio e alla fine del XX secolo? – un'analisi comparativa", key:"uid": string:"1cc82e01-6ece-4051-8172-c284f18632fd", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Punti Critici:**\n\n1. **Natura Ciclica della Storia Russa**: L'articolo sostiene che la storia russa presenta un modello ciclico, in cui il paese emerge ripetutamente come il \"collo d'anatra\" nell'ordine internazionale, passando dall'autocrazia alla democrazia e viceversa, come si è visto dal crollo del regime zarista nel 1917 all'era post-sovietica.\n\n2. **Impatto della Guerra sulle Dinamiche Politiche**: La Prima Guerra Mondiale ha destabilizzato significativamente il regime zarista, portando a sentimenti rivoluzionari tra le classi inferiori, che hanno spostato la loro lealtà dalla monarchia ai partiti rivoluzionari, facilitando infine l'ascesa di Lenin e dei Bolscevichi.\n\n3. **Echi Contemporanei delle Ideologie Storiche**: L'articolo traccia paralleli tra le strategie rivoluzionarie di Lenin e le attuali ideologie di figure come Alexander Dugin, suggerendo che l'atteggiamento conflittuale della Russia moderna nei confronti dell'Occidente rifletta modelli storici di ricerca di ridefinire il proprio ruolo nell'ordine globale.\n\n**Teaser:**\nIn un'esplorazione avvincente della tumultuosa storia della Russia, l'articolo approfondisce la natura ciclica del suo paesaggio politico, dalla caduta del regime zarista nel 1917 all'era post-sovietica. Esamina come la Prima Guerra Mondiale abbia catalizzato il fervore rivoluzionario e il cambiamento di lealtà tra la popolazione. Inoltre, traccia paralleli intriganti tra le tattiche rivoluzionarie di Lenin e le ideologie contemporanee, sollevando interrogativi sulla posizione attuale della Russia nell'ordine globale e le implicazioni del suo atteggiamento conflittuale nei confronti dell'Occidente. Quali lezioni possono essere tratte da questa narrativa storica?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Esplora la natura ciclica della storia russa, dal crollo del regime zarista nel 1917 all'ascesa del totalitarismo e al recente risveglio delle ambizioni imperiali sotto Putin. Questa analisi approfondisce le battaglie ideologiche che plasmano il ruolo della Russia nell'ordine globale di oggi. Clicca per leggere di più!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.816", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"it", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Rusija kao “najslabija karika” u međunarodnom poretku na početku i kraju 20. stoljeća? – komparativna analiza", key:"uid": string:"1cca90b6-8730-4682-a2ef-de6dd791689b", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritične točke:**\n\n1. **Ciklična priroda ruske povijesti**: Članak tvrdi da ruska povijest pokazuje ciklični obrazac, gdje zemlja neprestano izlazi kao \"najslabija karika\" u međunarodnom poretku, prelazeći iz autokracije u demokraciju i obrnuto, što se može vidjeti od kolapsa carske vlasti 1917. do post-sovjetske ere.\n\n2. **Utjecaj rata na političku dinamiku**: Prvi svjetski rat značajno je destabilizirao carski režim, dovodeći do revolucionarnih osjećaja među nižim klasama, koje su preusmjerile svoju lojalnost s monarhije na revolucionarne stranke, što je na kraju olakšalo uspon Lenjina i boljševika.\n\n3. **Suvremene eho povijesnih ideologija**: Članak povlači paralele između Lenjinovih revolucionarnih strategija i suvremenih ideologija figura poput Aleksandra Dugina, sugerirajući da konfrontacijski stav moderne Rusije prema Zapadu odražava povijesne obrasce traženja redefiniranja svoje uloge u globalnom poretku.\n\n**Teaser:**\nU uvjerljivom istraživanju Ruske burne povijesti, članak se bavi cikličnom prirodom njezinog političkog krajolika, od pada carske vlasti 1917. do post-sovjetske ere. Istražuje kako je Prvi svjetski rat katalizator revolucionarnog žara i promjene lojalnosti među stanovništvom. Nadalje, povlači zanimljive paralele između Lenjinovih revolucionarnih taktika i suvremenih ideologija, postavljajući pitanja o trenutnoj poziciji Rusije u globalnom poretku i implikacijama njezinog konfrontacijskog stava prema Zapadu. Koje lekcije se mogu izvući iz ove povijesne naracije?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Istražite cikličnu prirodu ruske povijesti, od kolapsa carske vladavine 1917. do uspona totalitarizma i nedavnog ponovnog jačanja imperijalnih ambicija pod Putinom. Ova analiza istražuje ideološke bitke koje oblikuju ulogu Rusije u globalnom poretku danas. Kliknite za više informacija!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.534", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"hr", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Ryssland som den \"svagaste länken\" i den internationella ordningen i början och slutet av 1900-talet? – en jämförande analys", key:"uid": string:"2b8d6c3e-079e-4519-a216-72da0622ab63", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritiska punkter:**\n\n1. **Cyklistisk natur av rysk historia**: Artikeln hävdar att rysk historia uppvisar ett cyklistiskt mönster, där landet upprepade gånger framträder som den \"svagaste länken\" i den internationella ordningen, och övergår från autokrati till demokrati och tillbaka, som sett från det tsaristiska regimens kollaps 1917 till den post-sovjetiska eran.\n\n2. **Krigets påverkan på politiska dynamik**: Första världskriget destabiliserade avsevärt det tsaristiska regimet, vilket ledde till revolutionära känslor bland de lägre klasserna, som skiftade sin lojalitet från monarkin till revolutionära partier, vilket i slutändan underlättade Lenins och bolsjevikernas uppkomst.\n\n3. **Nutida ekon av historiska ideologier**: Artikeln drar paralleller mellan Lenins revolutionära strategier och de nuvarande ideologierna hos figurer som Alexander Dugin, vilket tyder på att det moderna Rysslands konfrontativa hållning gentemot väst speglar historiska mönster av att söka omdefiniera sin roll i den globala ordningen.\n\n**Teaser:**\nI en fängslande utforskning av Rysslands tumultartade historia, dyker artikeln ner i den cyklistiska naturen av dess politiska landskap, från fallet av det tsaristiska regimet 1917 till den post-sovjetiska eran. Den undersöker hur första världskriget katalyserade revolutionär iver och skiftet i lojaliteter bland befolkningen. Vidare drar den intressanta paralleller mellan Lenins revolutionära taktik och samtida ideologier, vilket väcker frågor om Rysslands nuvarande position i den globala ordningen och konsekvenserna av dess konfrontativa hållning gentemot väst. Vilka lärdomar kan dras från denna historiska berättelse?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Utforska den cykliska naturen av rysk historia, från tsarregimens kollaps 1917 till framväxten av totalitarism och den senaste återuppvaknandet av imperiala ambitioner under Putin. Denna analys fördjupar sig i de ideologiska strider som formar Rysslands roll i den globala ordningen idag. Klicka för att läsa mer!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:47.418", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"sv", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Rusko ako „najslabší článok“ v medzinárodnom poriadku na začiatku a na konci 20. storočia? – porovnávacia analýza", key:"uid": string:"34d17cb0-2855-4ce6-9098-66710348137a", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritické body:**\n\n1. **Cyklická povaha ruskej histórie**: Článok tvrdí, že ruská história vykazuje cyklický vzor, kde krajina opakovane vystupuje ako \"najslabší článok\" v medzinárodnom poriadku, prechádzajúc od autokracie k demokracii a späť, ako je vidieť od kolapsu cárskeho režimu v roku 1917 po post-sovietsku éru.\n\n2. **Dopad vojny na politickú dynamiku**: Prvá svetová vojna významne destabilizovala cársky režim, čo viedlo k revolučným pocitom medzi nižšími triedami, ktoré presunuli svoju lojalitu od monarchie k revolučným stranám, čo nakoniec uľahčilo vzostup Lenina a boľševikov.\n\n3. **Súčasné ozveny historických ideológií**: Článok nachádza paralely medzi Leninovými revolučnými stratégiami a súčasnými ideológiami postáv ako Alexander Dugin, naznačujúc, že konfrontačný postoj moderného Ruska voči Západu odráža historické vzory snaženia sa redefinovať svoju úlohu v globálnom poriadku.\n\n**Teaser:**\nV presvedčivej analýze búrlivej histórie Ruska sa článok zaoberá cyklickou povahou jeho politickej krajiny, od pádu cárskeho režimu v roku 1917 po post-sovietsku éru. Skúma, ako Prvá svetová vojna katalyzovala revolučný zápal a zmenu lojalít medzi obyvateľstvom. Navyše nachádza zaujímavé paralely medzi Leninovými revolučnými taktikami a súčasnými ideológiami, čím vyvoláva otázky o súčasnej pozícii Ruska v globálnom poriadku a dôsledkoch jeho konfrontačného postoja voči Západu. Aké ponaučenia môžeme z tejto historickej naratívy vyvodiť?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Preskúmajte cyklickú povahu ruskej histórie, od pádu cárskeho režimu v roku 1917 po vzostup totalitarizmu a nedávny návrat imperiálnych ambícií pod Putinom. Táto analýza sa zaoberá ideologickými bojmi, ktoré formujú úlohu Ruska v globálnom poriadku dnes. Kliknite a prečítajte si viac!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.632", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"sk", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Rusko jako „nejslabší článek“ v mezinárodním pořádku na začátku a na konci 20. století? – komparativní analýza", key:"uid": string:"4457a930-50ed-447c-ae64-e104e57f66e9", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritické body:**\n\n1. **Cyklická povaha ruské historie**: Článek tvrdí, že ruská historie vykazuje cyklický vzor, kdy se země opakovaně objevuje jako \"nejslabší článek\" v mezinárodním pořádku, přecházející od autokracie k demokracii a zpět, jak je vidět od kolapsu carského režimu v roce 1917 až po post-sovětskou éru.\n\n2. **Dopad války na politickou dynamiku**: První světová válka významně destabilizovala carský režim, což vedlo k revolučním náladám mezi nižšími třídami, které přesunuly svou loajalitu od monarchie k revolučním stranám, což nakonec usnadnilo vzestup Lenina a bolševiků.\n\n3. **Současné ozvěny historických ideologií**: Článek nachází paralely mezi Leninovými revolučními strategiemi a současnými ideologiemi postav jako Alexander Dugin, což naznačuje, že konfrontační postoj moderního Ruska vůči Západu odráží historické vzorce usilování o redefinici své role v globálním pořádku.\n\n**Teaser:**\nV přesvědčivém zkoumání bouřlivé historie Ruska se článek zabývá cyklickou povahou jeho politické krajiny, od pádu carského režimu v roce 1917 až po post-sovětskou éru. Zkoumá, jak První světová válka katalyzovala revoluční nadšení a posun loajalit mezi obyvatelstvem. Dále nachází zajímavé paralely mezi Leninovými revolučními taktikami a současnými ideologiemi, což vyvolává otázky o současné pozici Ruska v globálním pořádku a důsledcích jeho konfrontačního postoje vůči Západu. Jaké lekce lze vyvodit z tohoto historického vyprávění?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Prozkoumejte cyklickou povahu ruské historie, od pádu carského režimu v roce 1917 po vzestup totalitarismu a nedávné oživení imperiálních ambicí pod Putinem. Tato analýza se zabývá ideologickými boji, které formují roli Ruska v globálním pořádku dnes. Klikněte pro více informací!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.583", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"cs", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Rusia como el “eslabón más débil” en el orden internacional a principios y finales del siglo XX? – un análisis comparativo", key:"uid": string:"4bd555aa-b860-44aa-b668-1cf8a118aacf", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Puntos Críticos:**\n\n1. **Naturaleza Cíclica de la Historia Rusa**: El artículo argumenta que la historia rusa exhibe un patrón cíclico, donde el país emerge repetidamente como el \"eslabón más débil\" en el orden internacional, transitando de la autocracia a la democracia y viceversa, como se vio desde el colapso del régimen zarista en 1917 hasta la era postsoviética.\n\n2. **Impacto de la Guerra en la Dinámica Política**: La Primera Guerra Mundial desestabilizó significativamente el régimen zarista, llevando a sentimientos revolucionarios entre las clases bajas, que cambiaron su lealtad de la monarquía a los partidos revolucionarios, facilitando en última instancia el ascenso de Lenin y los bolcheviques.\n\n3. **Ecos Contemporáneos de las Ideologías Históricas**: El artículo traza paralelismos entre las estrategias revolucionarias de Lenin y las ideologías actuales de figuras como Alexander Dugin, sugiriendo que la postura confrontacional de la Rusia moderna hacia Occidente refleja patrones históricos de búsqueda de redefinir su papel en el orden global.\n\n**Teaser:**\nEn una exploración convincente de la tumultuosa historia de Rusia, el artículo profundiza en la naturaleza cíclica de su paisaje político, desde la caída del régimen zarista en 1917 hasta la era postsoviética. Examina cómo la Primera Guerra Mundial catalizó el fervor revolucionario y el cambio en las lealtades entre la población. Además, traza paralelismos intrigantes entre las tácticas revolucionarias de Lenin y las ideologías contemporáneas, planteando preguntas sobre la posición actual de Rusia en el orden global y las implicaciones de su postura confrontacional hacia Occidente. ¿Qué lecciones se pueden extraer de esta narrativa histórica?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Explora la naturaleza cíclica de la historia rusa, desde el colapso del régimen zarista en 1917 hasta el surgimiento del totalitarismo y el reciente resurgimiento de las ambiciones imperiales bajo Putin. Este análisis profundiza en las batallas ideológicas que están dando forma al papel de Rusia en el orden global actual. ¡Haz clic para leer más!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.914", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"es", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Rusya'nın 20. yüzyılın başında ve sonunda uluslararası düzende \"en zayıf halka\" olarak değerlendirilmesi? – karşılaştırmalı bir analiz", key:"uid": string:"6a26b4de-a071-439f-ba43-cf19b077add6", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritik Noktalar:**\n\n1. **Rus Tarihinin Döngüsel Doğası**: Makale, Rus tarihinin döngüsel bir desen sergilediğini, ülkenin uluslararası düzende tekrar tekrar \"en zayıf halka\" olarak ortaya çıktığını, 1917'deki çarlık rejiminin çöküşünden post-Sovyet dönemine kadar otokrasi ile demokrasi arasında geçiş yaptığını savunuyor.\n\n2. **Savaşın Politik Dinamikler Üzerindeki Etkisi**: Birinci Dünya Savaşı, çarlık rejimini önemli ölçüde istikrarsızlaştırdı ve alt sınıflar arasında devrimci duygulara yol açtı; bu da monarşiden devrimci partilere olan sadakatin kaymasına neden oldu ve nihayetinde Lenin ve Bolşeviklerin yükselişini kolaylaştırdı.\n\n3. **Tarihi İdeolojilerin Günümüzdeki Yankıları**: Makale, Lenin'in devrimci stratejileri ile Alexander Dugin gibi figürlerin güncel ideolojileri arasında paralellikler kurarak, modern Rusya'nın Batı'ya karşı çatışmacı tutumunun, küresel düzende rolünü yeniden tanımlama arayışının tarihi kalıplarını yansıttığını öne sürüyor.\n\n**Teaser:**\nRusya'nın çalkantılı tarihine dair etkileyici bir keşifte, makale, 1917'deki çarlık rejiminin çöküşünden post-Sovyet dönemine kadar olan politik manzaranın döngüsel doğasını inceliyor. Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın devrimci coşkuyu nasıl tetiklediğini ve halk arasında sadakatlerin nasıl değiştiğini araştırıyor. Ayrıca, Lenin'in devrimci taktikleri ile çağdaş ideolojiler arasında ilginç paralellikler kurarak, Rusya'nın küresel düzendeki mevcut konumu ve Batı'ya karşı çatışmacı tutumunun sonuçları hakkında sorular ortaya atıyor. Bu tarihi anlatımdan hangi dersler çıkarılabilir?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Rus tarihinin döngüsel doğasını keşfedin, 1917'de çarlık rejiminin çöküşünden totalitarizmin yükselişine ve Putin'in altında imparatorluk hırslarının son zamanlardaki yeniden canlanmasına kadar. Bu analiz, Rusya'nın günümüzdeki küresel düzendeki rolünü şekillendiren ideolojik savaşlara dalıyor. Daha fazla okumak için tıklayın!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:47.17", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"tr", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Росія як «найслабше ланка» в міжнародному порядку на початку та в кінці 20 століття? – порівняльний аналіз", key:"uid": string:"71017f08-6df9-4faa-8b0a-66561d4c5a45", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Критичні моменти:**\n\n1. **Циклічна природа російської історії**: Стаття стверджує, що російська історія демонструє циклічний характер, де країна неодноразово виступає як \"найслабше ланка\" в міжнародному порядку, переходячи від автократії до демократії і назад, як це видно з краху царського режиму в 1917 році до пострадянської ери.\n\n2. **Вплив війни на політичну динаміку**: Перша світова війна значно дестабілізувала царський режим, що призвело до революційних настроїв серед нижчих класів, які змінили свою лояльність від монархії до революційних партій, врешті-решт сприяючи підйому Леніна та більшовиків.\n\n3. **Сучасні відголоски історичних ідеологій**: Стаття проводить паралелі між революційними стратегіями Леніна та сучасними ідеологіями таких фігур, як Олександр Дугін, що свідчить про те, що конфронтаційна позиція сучасної Росії щодо Заходу відображає історичні патерни прагнення переосмислити свою роль у глобальному порядку.\n\n**Тізер:**\nУ захоплюючому дослідженні буремної історії Росії стаття занурюється в циклічну природу її політичного ландшафту, від падіння царського режиму в 1917 році до пострадянської ери. Вона аналізує, як Перша світова війна стала каталізатором революційного запалу та зміни лояльностей серед населення. Крім того, вона проводить цікаві паралелі між революційними тактиками Леніна та сучасними ідеологіями, піднімаючи питання про нинішню позицію Росії в глобальному порядку та наслідки її конфронтаційної позиції щодо Заходу. Які уроки можна винести з цього історичного наративу?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Досліджуйте циклічну природу російської історії, від падіння царського режиму в 1917 році до зростання тоталітаризму та нещодавнього відродження імперських амбіцій під керівництвом Путіна. Цей аналіз заглиблюється в ідеологічні битви, які формують роль Росії в глобальному порядку сьогодні. Натисніть, щоб дізнатися більше!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:47.067", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"uk", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Russia as the “weakest link” in the international order at the beginning and end of the 20th century? – a comparative analysis", key:"uid": string:"767458fa-5db5-40bf-89d8-c7a4052a5a3f", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Critical Points:**\n\n1. **Cyclical Nature of Russian History**: The article argues that Russian history exhibits a cyclical pattern, where the country repeatedly emerges as the \"weakest link\" in the international order, transitioning from autocracy to democracy and back, as seen from the tsarist regime's collapse in 1917 to the post-Soviet era.\n\n2. **Impact of War on Political Dynamics**: The First World War significantly destabilized the tsarist regime, leading to revolutionary sentiments among the lower classes, who shifted their loyalty from the monarchy to revolutionary parties, ultimately facilitating the rise of Lenin and the Bolsheviks.\n\n3. **Contemporary Echoes of Historical Ideologies**: The article draws parallels between Lenin's revolutionary strategies and the current ideologies of figures like Alexander Dugin, suggesting that modern Russia's confrontational stance towards the West reflects historical patterns of seeking to redefine its role in the global order.\n\n**Teaser:**\nIn a compelling exploration of Russia's tumultuous history, the article delves into the cyclical nature of its political landscape, from the fall of the tsarist regime in 1917 to the post-Soviet era. It examines how the First World War catalyzed revolutionary fervor and the shift in loyalties among the populace. Furthermore, it draws intriguing parallels between Lenin's revolutionary tactics and contemporary ideologies, raising questions about Russia's current position in the global order and the implications of its confrontational stance towards the West. What lessons can be gleaned from this historical narrative?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Explore the cyclical nature of Russian history, from the tsarist regime's collapse in 1917 to the rise of totalitarianism and the recent resurgence of imperial ambitions under Putin. This analysis delves into the ideological battles shaping Russia's role in the global order today. Click to read more!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.433", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"en", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Россия как «слабое звено» в международном порядке в начале и конце 20 века? – сравнительный анализ", key:"uid": string:"83154ac1-0025-4af6-a6e3-fac33a0cb5d9", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Критические моменты:**\n\n1. **Циклическая природа российской истории**: Статья утверждает, что российская история демонстрирует циклический характер, где страна неоднократно оказывается \"слабым звеном\" в международном порядке, переходя от автократии к демократии и обратно, как это видно на примереCollapse царского режима в 1917 году до постсоветской эпохи.\n\n2. **Влияние войны на политическую динамику**: Первая мировая война значительно дестабилизировала царский режим, что привело к революционным настроениям среди низших классов, которые изменили свою лояльность от монархии к революционным партиям, что в конечном итоге способствовало восхождению Ленина и большевиков.\n\n3. **Современные отголоски исторических идеологий**: Статья проводит параллели между революционными стратегиями Ленина и современными идеологиями таких фигур, как Александр Дугин, предполагая, что конфронтационная позиция современной России по отношению к Западу отражает исторические модели стремления переопределить свою роль в глобальном порядке.\n\n**Тизер:**\nВ увлекательном исследовании бурной истории России статья углубляется в циклическую природу ее политического ландшафта, от падения царского режима в 1917 году до постсоветской эпохи. Она рассматривает, как Первая мировая война катализировала революционный пыл и изменение лояльности среди населения. Более того, она проводит интересные параллели между революционными тактиками Ленина и современными идеологиями, поднимая вопросы о текущем положении России в глобальном порядке и последствиях ее конфронтационной позиции по отношению к Западу. Какие уроки можно извлечь из этого исторического повествования?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Изучите циклическую природу российской истории, начиная сCollapse царского режима в 1917 году до восхождения тоталитаризма и недавнего возрождения имперских амбиций под руководством Путина. Этот анализ углубляется в идеологические битвы, формирующие роль России в глобальном порядке сегодня. Нажмите, чтобы узнать больше!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:47.115", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"ru", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Русия като „най-слабата връзка“ в международния ред в началото и края на 20-ти век? – сравнителен анализ", key:"uid": string:"8782ff59-d347-49ec-926f-c426c59f34c1", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Критични точки:**\n\n1. **Цикличната природа на руската история**: Статията твърди, че руската история показва цикличен модел, при който страната многократно се появява като \"най-слабата връзка\" в международния ред, преминавайки от автокрация към демокрация и обратно, както се вижда от колапса на царския режим през 1917 г. до постсъветската ера.\n\n2. **Влиянието на войната върху политическите динамики**: Първата световна война значително дестабилизира царския режим, водейки до революционни настроения сред по-ниските класи, които прехвърлиха лоялността си от монархията към революционните партии, което в крайна сметка улесни възхода на Ленин и болшевиките.\n\n3. **Съвременни ехо на историческите идеологии**: Статията прави паралели между революционните стратегии на Ленин и съвременните идеологии на фигури като Александър Дугин, предполагаща, че конфронтационната позиция на съвременна Русия спрямо Запада отразява исторически модели на търсене на преопределяне на ролята си в глобалния ред.\n\n**Тийзър:**\nВ завладяващо изследване на бурната история на Русия, статията разглежда цикличната природа на политическия ландшафт, от падението на царския режим през 1917 г. до постсъветската ера. Тя изследва как Първата световна война катализира революционния ентусиазъм и промяната в лоялностите сред населението. Освен това, тя прави интригуващи паралели между революционните тактики на Ленин и съвременните идеологии, повдигайки въпроси относно настоящата позиция на Русия в глобалния ред и последствията от конфронтационната й позиция спрямо Запада. Какви уроци могат да се извлекат от тази историческа нарратива?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Изследвайте цикличната природа на руската история, отCollapse на царския режим през 1917 г. до възхода на тоталитаризма иRecent възраждане на имперските амбиции под Путин. Този анализ разглежда идеологическите битки, оформящи ролята на Русия в глобалния ред днес. Кликнете, за да прочетете повече!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:47.271", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"bg", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Venäjä \"heikoimpana lenkkinä\" kansainvälisessä järjestyksessä 1900-luvun alussa ja lopussa? – vertaileva analyysi", key:"uid": string:"8e2b987d-d324-4d1c-94ac-2bedabc30b61", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kriittiset Kohdat:**\n\n1. **Venäjän Historian Syklinen Luonne**: Artikkeli väittää, että Venäjän historiassa on syklinen kaava, jossa maa toistuvasti nousee \"heikoimmaksi lenkiksi\" kansainvälisessä järjestyksessä, siirtyen autokratiasta demokratiaan ja takaisin, kuten nähtiin tsaarin hallinnon romahtamisesta vuonna 1917 post-sovjettiin.\n\n2. **Sodan Vaikutus Poliittisiin Dynamiikkoihin**: Ensimmäinen maailmansota vakavasti horjutti tsaarin hallintoa, mikä johti vallankumouksellisiin tunteisiin alemmissa sosiaaliluokissa, jotka siirsivät uskollisuutensa monarkiasta vallankumouksellisiin puolueisiin, mikä lopulta helpotti Leninin ja bolshevikkien nousua.\n\n3. **Nykyajan Kaikuja Historiallisista Ideologioista**: Artikkeli piirtää yhtäläisyyksiä Leninin vallankumouksellisten strategioiden ja nykyisten ideologioiden, kuten Alexander Duginin, välillä, viitaten siihen, että modernin Venäjän vastakkainasettelu lännen kanssa heijastaa historiallisia kaavoja, joissa pyritään määrittelemään sen roolia globaalissa järjestyksessä.\n\n**Teaser:**\nVakuuttavassa tutkimuksessa Venäjän myrskyisestä historiasta artikkeli syventyy sen poliittisen maiseman sykliseen luonteeseen, tsaarin hallinnon romahtamisesta vuonna 1917 post-sovjettiin. Se tarkastelee, kuinka ensimmäinen maailmansota katalysoi vallankumouksellista intohimoa ja uskollisuuden siirtymistä kansan keskuudessa. Lisäksi se piirtää mielenkiintoisia yhtäläisyyksiä Leninin vallankumouksellisista taktiikoista ja nykyaikaisista ideologioista, herättäen kysymyksiä Venäjän nykyisestä asemasta globaalissa järjestyksessä ja sen vastakkainasettelun seurauksista lännen kanssa. Mitä opetuksia tästä historiallisesta kertomuksesta voidaan saada?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Tutki Venäjän historian syklisyyttä, tsaarinvallan romahduksesta vuonna 1917 totalitarismin nousuun ja Putinin alla tapahtuneeseen imperiaalisten kunnianhimojen uudelleenheräämiseen. Tämä analyysi syventyy ideologisiin taisteluihin, jotka muovaavat Venäjän roolia nykyisessä globaaliassa järjestyksessä. Klikkaa lukeaksesi lisää!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:47.317", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"fi", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"La Russie comme le « maillon le plus faible » dans l'ordre international au début et à la fin du 20ème siècle ? – une analyse comparative", key:"uid": string:"9225e070-0ab3-4ea9-8564-3221cec2f619", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Points Critiques :**\n\n1. **Nature Cyclique de l'Histoire Russe** : L'article soutient que l'histoire russe présente un schéma cyclique, où le pays émerge à plusieurs reprises comme le \"maillon le plus faible\" de l'ordre international, passant de l'autocratie à la démocratie et vice versa, comme on le voit depuis l'effondrement du régime tsariste en 1917 jusqu'à l'ère post-soviétique.\n\n2. **Impact de la Guerre sur les Dynamiques Politiques** : La Première Guerre mondiale a considérablement déstabilisé le régime tsariste, entraînant des sentiments révolutionnaires parmi les classes inférieures, qui ont déplacé leur loyauté de la monarchie vers les partis révolutionnaires, facilitant finalement l'ascension de Lénine et des bolcheviks.\n\n3. **Échos Contemporains des Idéologies Historiques** : L'article établit des parallèles entre les stratégies révolutionnaires de Lénine et les idéologies actuelles de figures comme Alexandre Douguine, suggérant que la position confrontante de la Russie moderne envers l'Occident reflète des schémas historiques de recherche de redéfinition de son rôle dans l'ordre mondial.\n\n**Teaser :** \nDans une exploration captivante de l'histoire tumultueuse de la Russie, l'article plonge dans la nature cyclique de son paysage politique, de la chute du régime tsariste en 1917 à l'ère post-soviétique. Il examine comment la Première Guerre mondiale a catalysé le fervent révolutionnaire et le changement de loyautés parmi la population. De plus, il établit des parallèles intrigants entre les tactiques révolutionnaires de Lénine et les idéologies contemporaines, soulevant des questions sur la position actuelle de la Russie dans l'ordre mondial et les implications de sa position confrontante envers l'Occident. Quelles leçons peut-on tirer de ce récit historique ?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Explorez la nature cyclique de l'histoire russe, de l'effondrement du régime tsariste en 1917 à l'essor du totalitarisme et à la récente résurgence des ambitions impériales sous Poutine. Cette analyse examine les batailles idéologiques qui façonnent le rôle de la Russie dans l'ordre mondial aujourd'hui. Cliquez pour en savoir plus !", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.681", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"fr", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Oroszország mint a “leggyengébb láncszem” a nemzetközi rendben a 20. század elején és végén? – egy összehasonlító elemzés", key:"uid": string:"9245bf3c-c21a-4f4e-8b0d-b8fc2686ed0e", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritikus Pontok:**\n\n1. **Orosz Történelem Ciklikus Természete**: A cikk azt állítja, hogy az orosz történelem ciklikus mintázatot mutat, ahol az ország ismételten a nemzetközi rend \"leggyengébb láncszemévé\" válik, autokráciából demokráciába és vissza, ahogyan azt a cári rendszer 1917-es összeomlásától a posztszovjet korszakig láthatjuk.\n\n2. **A Háború Hatása a Politikai Dinamikákra**: Az Első Világháború jelentősen destabilizálta a cári rendszert, forradalmi érzéseket keltve az alsóbb osztályok körében, akik hűségüket a monarchiától a forradalmi pártok felé fordították, végül elősegítve Lenin és a bolsevikok felemelkedését.\n\n3. **A Történelmi Ideológiák Kortárs Visszhangjai**: A cikk párhuzamokat von Lenin forradalmi stratégiái és olyan kortárs figurák, mint Alexander Dugin ideológiái között, sugallva, hogy a modern Oroszország Nyugattal szembeni konfrontatív álláspontja a globális rendben betöltött szerepének újradefiniálására irányuló történelmi mintázatokra reflektál.\n\n**Teaser:**\nOroszország viharos történelmének lenyűgöző feltárásában a cikk a politikai táj ciklikus természetébe merül el, a cári rendszer 1917-es bukásától a posztszovjet korszakig. Megvizsgálja, hogyan katalizálta az Első Világháború a forradalmi lázat és a lakosság hűségének eltolódását. Továbbá, érdekes párhuzamokat von Lenin forradalmi taktikái és a kortárs ideológiák között, kérdéseket vetve fel Oroszország jelenlegi helyzetéről a globális rendben és a Nyugattal szembeni konfrontatív álláspontjának következményeiről. Milyen tanulságokat vonhatunk le ebből a történelmi narratívából?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Fedezze fel az orosz történelem ciklikus természetét, a cári rendszer 1917-es összeomlásától a totalitarizmus felemelkedéséig és a közelmúltbeli birodalmi ambíciók újjáéledéséig Putyin alatt. Ez az elemzés azokat az ideológiai harcokat vizsgálja, amelyek formálják Oroszország szerepét a globális rendben ma. Kattintson a további olvasáshoz!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.767", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"hu", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Russland als das „schwächste Glied“ in der internationalen Ordnung zu Beginn und am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts? – eine vergleichende Analyse", key:"uid": string:"93d17e8b-c025-49e5-a510-242141364a4a", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritische Punkte:**\n\n1. **Zyklische Natur der russischen Geschichte**: Der Artikel argumentiert, dass die russische Geschichte ein zyklisches Muster aufweist, in dem das Land wiederholt als das \"schwächste Glied\" in der internationalen Ordnung auftaucht, indem es von Autokratie zu Demokratie und zurück wechselt, wie man am Zusammenbruch des zaristischen Regimes im Jahr 1917 bis zur postsowjetischen Ära sehen kann.\n\n2. **Auswirkungen des Krieges auf die politischen Dynamiken**: Der Erste Weltkrieg destabilisierte das zaristische Regime erheblich, was zu revolutionären Gefühlen unter den unteren Klassen führte, die ihre Loyalität von der Monarchie zu revolutionären Parteien verschoben, was letztendlich den Aufstieg von Lenin und den Bolschewiken erleichterte.\n\n3. **Zeitgenössische Echos historischer Ideologien**: Der Artikel zieht Parallelen zwischen Lenins revolutionären Strategien und den aktuellen Ideologien von Figuren wie Alexander Dugin und deutet darauf hin, dass die konfrontative Haltung des modernen Russlands gegenüber dem Westen historische Muster widerspiegelt, die darauf abzielen, seine Rolle in der globalen Ordnung neu zu definieren.\n\n**Teaser:**\nIn einer fesselnden Erkundung von Russlands tumultuöser Geschichte taucht der Artikel in die zyklische Natur seiner politischen Landschaft ein, vom Fall des zaristischen Regimes im Jahr 1917 bis zur postsowjetischen Ära. Er untersucht, wie der Erste Weltkrieg revolutionären Eifer und den Loyalitätswechsel unter der Bevölkerung katalysierte. Darüber hinaus zieht er faszinierende Parallelen zwischen Lenins revolutionären Taktiken und zeitgenössischen Ideologien und wirft Fragen über Russlands aktuelle Position in der globalen Ordnung und die Implikationen seiner konfrontativen Haltung gegenüber dem Westen auf. Welche Lehren können aus dieser historischen Erzählung gezogen werden?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Untersuchen Sie die zyklische Natur der russischen Geschichte, vom Zusammenbruch des Zarenregimes 1917 bis zum Aufstieg des Totalitarismus und der jüngsten Wiederbelebung imperialer Ambitionen unter Putin. Diese Analyse beleuchtet die ideologischen Kämpfe, die Russlands Rolle in der globalen Ordnung von heute prägen. Klicken Sie hier, um mehr zu lesen!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.482", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"de", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Rosja jako „najsłabsze ogniwo” w porządku międzynarodowym na początku i na końcu XX wieku? – analiza porównawcza", key:"uid": string:"9b8fff8d-4bf2-4c2e-85c9-42c74d190633", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Punkty krytyczne:**\n\n1. **Cykliczny charakter historii Rosji**: Artykuł argumentuje, że historia Rosji wykazuje cykliczny wzór, w którym kraj wielokrotnie staje się \"najsłabszym ogniwem\" w porządku międzynarodowym, przechodząc od autokracji do demokracji i z powrotem, co można zaobserwować od upadku reżimu carskiego w 1917 roku do ery post-sowieckiej.\n\n2. **Wpływ wojny na dynamikę polityczną**: I wojna światowa znacząco zdestabilizowała reżim carski, prowadząc do rewolucyjnych nastrojów wśród niższych klas, które przeniosły swoją lojalność z monarchii na partie rewolucyjne, co ostatecznie ułatwiło wzrost Lenina i bolszewików.\n\n3. **Współczesne echa historycznych ideologii**: Artykuł rysuje paralele między rewolucyjnymi strategiami Lenina a współczesnymi ideologiami postaci takich jak Aleksander Dugin, sugerując, że konfrontacyjna postawa współczesnej Rosji wobec Zachodu odzwierciedla historyczne wzorce dążenia do redefiniowania swojej roli w porządku globalnym.\n\n**Zajawka:**\nW przekonywującym badaniu burzliwej historii Rosji, artykuł zagłębia się w cykliczny charakter jej krajobrazu politycznego, od upadku reżimu carskiego w 1917 roku do ery post-sowieckiej. Analizuje, jak I wojna światowa zainicjowała rewolucyjny zapał i zmianę lojalności wśród ludności. Ponadto, rysuje intrygujące paralele między rewolucyjnymi taktykami Lenina a współczesnymi ideologiami, stawiając pytania o obecne miejsce Rosji w porządku globalnym i implikacje jej konfrontacyjnej postawy wobec Zachodu. Jakie lekcje można wyciągnąć z tej narracji historycznej?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Zbadaj cykliczny charakter historii Rosji, od upadku reżimu carskiego w 1917 roku do wzrostu totalitaryzmu i niedawnego odrodzenia imperialnych ambicji pod rządami Putina. Ta analiza zagłębia się w ideologiczne bitwy kształtujące rolę Rosji w dzisiejszym porządku globalnym. Kliknij, aby przeczytać więcej!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.866", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"pl", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Ρωσία ως ο “ασθενέστερος κρίκος” στην διεθνή τάξη στην αρχή και το τέλος του 20ού αιώνα; – μια συγκριτική ανάλυση", key:"uid": string:"a6ae2384-5246-48a8-aefd-be8dfae98470", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Κρίσιμα Σημεία:**\n\n1. **Κυκλική Φύση της Ρωσικής Ιστορίας**: Το άρθρο υποστηρίζει ότι η ρωσική ιστορία παρουσιάζει ένα κυκλικό μοτίβο, όπου η χώρα επανειλημμένα αναδύεται ως ο \"ασθενέστερος κρίκος\" στην διεθνή τάξη, μεταβαίνοντας από την αυταρχία στη δημοκρατία και πίσω, όπως φαίνεται από την κατάρρευση του τσαρικού καθεστώτος το 1917 μέχρι την μετασοβιετική εποχή.\n\n2. **Επίδραση του Πολέμου στις Πολιτικές Δυναμικές**: Ο Πρώτος Παγκόσμιος Πόλεμος αποσταθεροποίησε σημαντικά το τσαρικό καθεστώς, οδηγώντας σε επαναστατικά αισθήματα μεταξύ των κατώτερων τάξεων, οι οποίες μετέφεραν την πίστη τους από τη μοναρχία σε επαναστατικά κόμματα, διευκολύνοντας τελικά την άνοδο του Λένιν και των Μπολσεβίκων.\n\n3. **Σύγχρονοι Αντίκτυποι Ιστορικών Ιδεολογιών**: Το άρθρο σχετίζει τις επαναστατικές στρατηγικές του Λένιν με τις τρέχουσες ιδεολογίες προσώπων όπως ο Αλεξάντερ Ντούγκιν, υποδεικνύοντας ότι η συγκρουσιακή στάση της σύγχρονης Ρωσίας απέναντι στη Δύση αντικατοπτρίζει ιστορικά μοτίβα αναζήτησης επανακαθορισμού του ρόλου της στην παγκόσμια τάξη.\n\n**Τρέιλερ:**\nΣε μια συναρπαστική εξερεύνηση της ταραχώδους ιστορίας της Ρωσίας, το άρθρο εμβαθύνει στην κυκλική φύση του πολιτικού τοπίου της, από την πτώση του τσαρικού καθεστώτος το 1917 μέχρι την μετασοβιετική εποχή. Εξετάζει πώς ο Πρώτος Παγκόσμιος Πόλεμος καταλύει την επαναστατική φλόγα και την αλλαγή στις πιστότητες μεταξύ του πληθυσμού. Επιπλέον, σχετίζει ενδιαφέροντες παραλληλισμούς μεταξύ των επαναστατικών τακτικών του Λένιν και των σύγχρονων ιδεολογιών, εγείροντας ερωτήματα σχετικά με τη σημερινή θέση της Ρωσίας στην παγκόσμια τάξη και τις επιπτώσεις της συγκρουσιακής της στάσης απέναντι στη Δύση. Ποιες διδάξεις μπορούν να εξαχθούν από αυτήν την ιστορική αφήγηση;", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Εξερευνήστε τη κυκλική φύση της ρωσικής ιστορίας, από την κατάρρευση του τσαρικού καθεστώτος το 1917 μέχρι την άνοδο του ολοκληρωτισμού και την πρόσφατη αναζωογόνηση των αυτοκρατορικών φιλοδοξιών υπό τον Πούτιν. Αυτή η ανάλυση εμβαθύνει στις ιδεολογικές μάχες που διαμορφώνουν τον ρόλο της Ρωσίας στη παγκόσμια τάξη σήμερα. Κάντε κλικ για να διαβάσετε περισσότερα!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:47.371", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"el", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Rusija kao “najslabija karika” u međunarodnom poretku na početku i kraju 20. veka? – komparativna analiza", key:"uid": string:"befc8799-8f4f-4fd8-8d96-be6386f12a01", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritične tačke:**\n\n1. **Ciklična priroda ruske istorije**: Članak tvrdi da ruska istorija pokazuje ciklični obrazac, gde zemlja ponovo postaje \"najslabija karika\" u međunarodnom poretku, prelazeći iz autokratije u demokratiju i nazad, što se može videti od kolapsa carističkog režima 1917. do post-sovjetske ere.\n\n2. **Uticaj rata na političku dinamiku**: Prvi svetski rat značajno je destabilizovao caristički režim, dovodeći do revolucionarnih osećanja među nižim klasama, koje su preusmerile svoju lojalnost sa monarhije na revolucionarne partije, što je na kraju olakšalo uspon Lenjina i boljševika.\n\n3. **Savremeni odjeci istorijskih ideologija**: Članak povlači paralele između Lenjinovih revolucionarnih strategija i savremenih ideologija figura poput Aleksandra Dugina, sugerišući da konfrontacijski stav moderne Rusije prema Zapadu odražava istorijske obrasce traženja redefinisanja svoje uloge u globalnom poretku.\n\n**Teaser:**\nU zanimljivom istraživanju turbulentne istorije Rusije, članak se bavi cikličnom prirodom njenog političkog pejzaža, od pada carističkog režima 1917. do post-sovjetske ere. Istražuje kako je Prvi svetski rat katalizovao revolucionarnu strast i promenu lojalnosti među stanovništvom. Pored toga, povlači intrigantne paralele između Lenjinovih revolucionarnih taktika i savremenih ideologija, postavljajući pitanja o trenutnoj poziciji Rusije u globalnom poretku i implikacijama njenog konfrontacijskog stava prema Zapadu. Koje lekcije se mogu izvući iz ove istorijske naracije?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Istražite cikličnu prirodu ruske istorije, od kolapsa carske vlasti 1917. do uspona totalitarizma i nedavne obnove imperijalnih ambicija pod Putinom. Ova analiza se bavi ideološkim borbama koje oblikuju ulogu Rusije u globalnom poretku danas. Kliknite da pročitate više!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:47.514", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"sr", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Rusland als de “zwakste schakel” in de internationale orde aan het begin en het einde van de 20e eeuw? – een vergelijkende analyse", key:"uid": string:"d4f4737a-80e2-4f07-bfca-45d8bea6ae87", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Kritische Punten:**\n\n1. **Cyclische Aard van de Russische Geschiedenis**: Het artikel betoogt dat de Russische geschiedenis een cyclisch patroon vertoont, waarbij het land herhaaldelijk naar voren komt als de \"zwakste schakel\" in de internationale orde, overgaand van autocratie naar democratie en weer terug, zoals te zien is aan de ineenstorting van het tsaristische regime in 1917 tot het post-Sovjet tijdperk.\n\n2. **Impact van Oorlog op Politieke Dynamiek**: De Eerste Wereldoorlog destabiliseerde het tsaristische regime aanzienlijk, wat leidde tot revolutionaire gevoelens onder de lagere klassen, die hun loyaliteit van de monarchie naar revolutionaire partijen verschoof, wat uiteindelijk de opkomst van Lenin en de Bolsjewieken vergemakkelijkte.\n\n3. **Hedendaagse Echo's van Historische Ideologieën**: Het artikel trekt parallellen tussen Lenin's revolutionaire strategieën en de huidige ideologieën van figuren zoals Alexander Dugin, wat suggereert dat de confronterende houding van het moderne Rusland ten opzichte van het Westen historische patronen weerspiegelt van het zoeken naar een herdefiniëring van zijn rol in de wereldorde.\n\n**Teaser:**\nIn een boeiende verkenning van Rusland's tumultueuze geschiedenis, duikt het artikel in de cyclische aard van het politieke landschap, van de val van het tsaristische regime in 1917 tot het post-Sovjet tijdperk. Het onderzoekt hoe de Eerste Wereldoorlog revolutionaire geest aanwakkerde en de verschuiving in loyaliteiten onder de bevolking. Bovendien trekt het intrigerende parallellen tussen Lenin's revolutionaire tactieken en hedendaagse ideologieën, wat vragen oproept over Rusland's huidige positie in de wereldorde en de implicaties van zijn confronterende houding ten opzichte van het Westen. Welke lessen kunnen uit dit historische verhaal worden getrokken?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Verken de cyclische aard van de Russische geschiedenis, van de ineenstorting van het tsaristische regime in 1917 tot de opkomst van het totalitarisme en de recente heropleving van imperialistische ambities onder Poetin. Deze analyse gaat dieper in op de ideologische strijd die de rol van Rusland in de wereldorde van vandaag vormgeeft. Klik om meer te lezen!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:46.972", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"nl", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Rússia como o “elo mais fraco” na ordem internacional no início e no final do século XX? – uma análise comparativa", key:"uid": string:"e8986bf0-c798-4390-9967-eb97e76f3843", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Pontos Críticos:**\n\n1. **Natureza Cíclica da História Russa**: O artigo argumenta que a história russa exibe um padrão cíclico, onde o país repetidamente emerge como o \"elo mais fraco\" na ordem internacional, transitando de autocracia para democracia e vice-versa, como visto no colapso do regime czarista em 1917 até a era pós-soviética.\n\n2. **Impacto da Guerra nas Dinâmicas Políticas**: A Primeira Guerra Mundial desestabilizou significativamente o regime czarista, levando a sentimentos revolucionários entre as classes mais baixas, que mudaram sua lealdade da monarquia para partidos revolucionários, facilitando, em última instância, a ascensão de Lenin e dos bolcheviques.\n\n3. **Ecos Contemporâneos de Ideologias Históricas**: O artigo traça paralelos entre as estratégias revolucionárias de Lenin e as ideologias atuais de figuras como Alexander Dugin, sugerindo que a postura confrontacional da Rússia moderna em relação ao Ocidente reflete padrões históricos de busca por redefinir seu papel na ordem global.\n\n**Teaser:**\nEm uma exploração convincente da tumultuada história da Rússia, o artigo mergulha na natureza cíclica de sua paisagem política, desde a queda do regime czarista em 1917 até a era pós-soviética. Examina como a Primeira Guerra Mundial catalisou o fervor revolucionário e a mudança nas lealdades entre a população. Além disso, traça paralelos intrigantes entre as táticas revolucionárias de Lenin e as ideologias contemporâneas, levantando questões sobre a posição atual da Rússia na ordem global e as implicações de sua postura confrontacional em relação ao Ocidente. Que lições podem ser extraídas dessa narrativa histórica?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Explore a natureza cíclica da história russa, desde o colapso do regime tsarista em 1917 até a ascensão do totalitarismo e o recente ressurgimento das ambições imperiais sob Putin. Esta análise investiga as batalhas ideológicas que moldam o papel da Rússia na ordem global hoje. Clique para ler mais!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:47.019", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"pt", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" }, { key:"title": string:"Rusia ca „veriga cea mai slabă” în ordinea internațională la începutul și sfârșitul secolului XX? – o analiză comparativă", key:"uid": string:"ff7dc146-051b-4a45-9862-14e6b7816b31", key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"**Puncte Critice:**\n\n1. **Natura Ciclică a Istoriei Rusiei**: Articolul susține că istoria Rusiei prezintă un model ciclic, în care țara apare repetat ca \"linkul cel mai slab\" în ordinea internațională, trecând de la autocratie la democrație și înapoi, așa cum se vede din prăbușirea regimului țarist în 1917 până în era post-sovietică.\n\n2. **Impactul Războiului asupra Dinamicii Politice**: Primul Război Mondial a destabilizat semnificativ regimul țarist, conducând la sentimente revoluționare în rândul claselor inferioare, care și-au schimbat loialitatea de la monarhie la partidele revoluționare, facilitând în cele din urmă ascensiunea lui Lenin și a bolșevicilor.\n\n3. **Ecouri Contemporane ale Ideologiilor Istorice**: Articolul face paralele între strategiile revoluționare ale lui Lenin și ideologiile actuale ale unor figuri precum Alexander Dugin, sugerând că poziția confruntativă a Rusiei moderne față de Occident reflectă modele istorice de căutare a redefinirii rolului său în ordinea globală.\n\n**Teaser:**\nÎntr-o explorare captivantă a istoriei tumultoase a Rusiei, articolul analizează natura ciclică a peisajului său politic, de la căderea regimului țarist în 1917 până în era post-sovietică. Examinează modul în care Primul Război Mondial a catalizat fervoarea revoluționară și schimbarea loialităților în rândul populației. În plus, face paralele intrigante între tacticile revoluționare ale lui Lenin și ideologiile contemporane, ridicând întrebări despre poziția actuală a Rusiei în ordinea globală și implicațiile atitudinii sale confruntative față de Occident. Ce lecții pot fi extrase din această narațiune istorică?", key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Explorați natura ciclică a istoriei ruse, de la prăbușirea regimului țarist în 1917 până la ascensiunea totalitarismului și la recenta renaștere a ambițiilor imperiale sub Putin. Această analiză se aprofundează în bătăliile ideologice care conturează rolul Rusiei în ordinea globală de astăzi. Faceți clic pentru a citi mai mult!", key:"content": null:null, key:"contentCleaned": null:null, key:"contentItemUid": string:"eaywmktkq7gmars4vd7hydsu4os", key:"createdAt": string:"2025-02-17T07:24:47.221", key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18", key:"metadata": null:null, key:"revisionId": string:"vaywmkuexfkjqrrb5k45bhhshnm", key:"subtitle": null:null, key:"summary": null:null, key:"summaryCleaned": null:null, key:"targetLanguage": string:"ro", key:"updatedAt": null:null, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation" } ], key:"totalCount": number:21, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslationsConnection" }, key:"__typename": string:"ContentItem" }