REPCO

Lithuanian foreign policy has been dominated by two separate and distinct camps for some time: those driven by principles and values, and the rational pragmatists. Of course, there is a third camp whose supporters believe that Lithuania should return to the Russian sphere of influence. As of today, this third option makes up a third of the governing coalition.

Both the value-oriented and pragmatic camps agree on the country’s overall direction – Lithuania should follow the pro-western, pro-European and pro-democratic development path. Both support and positively view the country’s membership in the EU and NATO. What then is the difference between the supporters of values and the pragmatists?

The biggest differences appear when the discussion deals with the approaches to foreign policy and Lithuania’s position regarding geopolitical events. The value-based wing calls for active participation in the Eastern Partnership, opposition to anti-democratic moves in other parts of the world, and a strong position when it comes to China.

The pragmatists agree with many of these goals and the overall development direction. However, for several decades they have also called for Lithuania to opt for a more careful position. This means following the leadership of other countries and more calculations concerning risks and costs.

Perhaps the most significant example of the previous term was the issue of Taiwan. While the values supported by the conservatives and some liberals would lead to an open conflict with China, the other side was becoming tangibly anxious. The presidential administration was not against the idea of opening a representative office of Taiwan in Lithuania in the beginning. However, when Nausėda’s people began to gauge the possible reaction of the Chinese regime they gradually withdrew their support for such an idea. Later they would display a direct and open indignation at the callus (or arrogant) attitude of the government.

The difference between these two camps also became clearer following the events in Georgia. The “hawks” of the value-based grouping, led by Žygimantas Pavilionis, would call from their opposition position for active participation in expressing support for the ousted President Salome Zurabishvili and the protesters in Georgian society. On the other side, there is a desire to balance the support shown, taking into account the reactions of other partners.

Discussing his work as foreign minister, in an LRT interview, the former advisor to the president Kęstutis Budrys stressed that it is necessary to support Georgian aspirations to become a part of the European Union. He also said that the election results and the suppression of protests in Tbilisi are worrying, but that we should not interfere in the internal processes of other countries.

This statement would sound logical if we accept the premise that foreign policy and the relations it brings with it are not a direct continuation of internal politics. Domestic politics inevitably shapes foreign policy. In order to change that situation, there is usually a need to influence the internal politics of other countries. It is not without reason that great modern thinkers and historians such as Niall Ferguson and Stephen Kotkin underline that the biggest mistake the West made when faced by the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine was the weak attempts to act against authoritarian regimes within its own borders. Too little support is given to (not necessarily) democratic oppositions and too little appreciation is given to the possibility that domestic political processes can easily overthrow regimes that try to appear rock solid and indestructible. This chance was seen during the rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was halted only by the fact that he had no knowledge of how to proceed after he successfully led his Wagnerite goons towards Moscow.

This is a mistake that western countries continue to make in the area of the Eastern Partnership. While there is a practice of moderate non-intervention and condemnations, Russia, China and other anti-democratic states do everything in their power to influence elections and corrupt or pressure potential political leaders. This process is ongoing, with attempts also being made to influence election results within these western countries themselves.

The only way to save countries like Moldova and Georga from a Belarusian scenario is (or was) an active interference in their internal politics and the bold support of democratic leaders. This perspective raises many questions for this newfound position of rational pragmatism that is appearing in Lithuanian foreign policy and is seemingly growing in popularity. “We will not jump the gun,” “foreign policy will not be shaped by newspaper headlines” – this is how the president and his administration describe the new approach of Lithuanian foreign policy.

Such an attitude is not doomed to be ineffective. It requires however a high level of authority, a strong diplomatic corps, significant investment, and a clear and strategic understanding of what the country plans to achieve through being careful, rational and pragmatic when acting to strengthen democracy.

As of now, one must admit that the authority of the new leaders of Lithuanian foreign policy is not very strong in Europe.

Not even the shadow of the president looming in the background is helping. Nausėda, during his first term in office, turned out to be nothing more than a steady looking traveller going to different meetings and repeating opinions from the position of a commentator. It must be said that all of the presidential initiatives were either borrowed or reformatted common European ideas. There was a lack of personal leadership or initiatives that were aimed at uniting leaders in the region or continent over a specific issue. There were no concrete strategies or plans, and there is nothing that tells us this could change now. Lithuania still is a solid participant that listens and agrees. However, it cannot hope to reach its own goals without stepping out by itself.

So, the rational pragmatists promise another approach where the goals become very unclear. What will we look for in the idea of the Eastern Partnership? What if we recognize the illegitimate government and president in Georgia? Will we support the opposition forces? If yes, what mechanisms will be employed to achieve such a result, other than resolutions and projections of indignations?

How will we help Ukraine in its aspirations of EU membership? How will we explain our decisions that allow for commercial entities to earn from military exports to third countries, which leads to different spare parts finding their way to Russia?

What will our position be towards the United States of America if a new Trump administration proposes a peace plan equalling a capitulation with no benefits for Ukraine? Will we condemn it? Or perhaps we would support it, afraid of our own fate in the global game of world powers?

How can we prevent the Hungarian and Slovak sabotage of the sanctions regime against Russia? What would we do if Russia employed a tactic of terrorist attacks on our critical infrastructure and power lines?

The position of the value-based camp in these matters has sometimes been desperately bold, sometimes foolhardy, sometimes unwise, but at least clear cut. What does this new approach entail? Where are the goals and benefits of our pragmatic position?

For now, we can say that the new approach to Lithuanian foreign policy will be calmer, more careful and based on the private deliberations of the president with a few other political leaders in the region. In any case, there will be more of an alignment than a leading role.

Yes, this means taking less risks, with fewer opportunities to get burnt compared to operating above the country’s weight class or facing other unforeseen conditions along the way. But it also means fewer possibilities to influence the opinions of other countries and fewer chances to change the geopolitical environment. It also means fewer options to aid nations which might be late, but still desire to follow the path to democracy.

Many observers almost agree in unison that the last few years have proven important when it comes to the context of geopolitical shakeups and attempts to retain influence. Authoritarian regimes and local radicals are challenging the democracies in our countries. They question the idea of international agreements, human rights and freedom. What then is possible in such a situation – the opportunism of values or rational pragmatism? This is an open question that not only does not unite but leads to even bigger differences in our discussions about foreign policy.

This text was republished through the partnership between New Eastern Europe and LRT English.

Translated from Lithuanian by Nikodem Szczygłowski.

Paulius Gritėnas is a philosopher and commentator at LRT.