Wie steht es um Europas Verteidigungskapazität? Wie viele Einheiten stehen bereit?
UID: eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe
Pubdate: 3/31/2025
Revision: vayy4sxnkb5garl757vd4wnn2je - 4/2/2025
Language Details: {"OriginalLangauges":1,"ContentItemLangauges":3,"ContentItemTranslations":21}
{"language_codes":["en"]}
Links: {"de":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/de/?post_type=post&p=2623536","fromContentUrl":true},"en":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromContentUrl":true,"firstLanguage":true},"it":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/it/?post_type=post&p=2623538","fromContentUrl":true},"bg":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"cs":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"el":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"es":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"fi":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"fr":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"hr":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"hu":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"nl":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"pl":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"pt":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"ro":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"ru":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"sk":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"sr":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"sv":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"tr":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"},"uk":{"value":"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893","fromLang":"en"}}
Welche Länder geben am meisten für Verteidigung aus?
Die Länder mit den höchsten Verteidigungsausgaben der letzten Jahre sind die Vereinigten Staaten, China, Russland, Indien und Saudi-Arabien. Das europäische Wachstum wird von Russlands steigenden Militärausgaben übertroffen, die sich gegenüber dem Stand vor dem Einmarsch in die Ukraine im Jahr 2022 mehr als verdoppelt haben.
Wie viel geben die Nato-Mitglieder für Verteidigung aus?
US-Präsident Donald Trump hat die Verbündeten wiederholt dafür kritisiert, dass sie das 2014 vereinbarte Ziel von zwei Prozent des BIP für Verteidigungsausgaben nicht erreichen. Selbst jetzt haben Kroatien, Portugal, Italien, Kanada, Belgien, Luxemburg, Slowenien und Spanien diese Vorgabe nicht erfüllt.
Die Verteidigungsausgaben der 23 EU-Länder, die auch Nato-Mitglieder sind, beliefen sich im Jahr 2024 auf 1,99 Prozent ihres gemeinsamen BIP und werden 2025 voraussichtlich 2,04 Prozent erreichen.
You can unsubscribe at anytime *
Subscribe
Trump schlug jedoch vor, dass die Nato-Mitglieder ihre Mindestverteidigungsausgaben auf fünf Prozent des BIP erhöhen sollten - eine Idee, die von der EU-Außenbeauftragten Kaja Kallas im Januar unterstützt wurde. Frankreichs Präsident Macron hat vorgeschlagen, die Verteidigungsausgaben der EU um drei auf 3,5 Prozent des BIP zu erhöhen. Bei den derzeitigen Raten würde es jedoch noch Jahre dauern, bis dies erreicht werden könnte.
Bei der Verteidigungsindustrie handelt es sich um eine technologiegetriebene Branche, die massive Investitionen in Forschung und Innovation erfordert. Laut Eurostat wurden 2022 in der EU 3,9 Mrd. EUR für Forschung und Entwicklung im Verteidigungsbereich ausgegeben. Dem Dragi-Bericht zufolge werden die Verteidigungssysteme der nächsten Generation jedoch massive FuE-Investitionen erfordern. Seit 2014 haben die USA den FuE-Ausgaben Vorrang vor allen anderen militärischen Ausgabenkategorien eingeräumt. Frankreich, Deutschland und Schweden stehen an der Spitze der EU-Länder, die in FuE für die Verteidigung investieren.
Welche europäischen Länder erhöhen ihre Verteidigungsbudgets am stärksten?
Seit 2014 haben Länder wie Ungarn, die Tschechische Republik, Polen, Dänemark, Nordmazedonien, die Slowakei und Schweden ihre Verteidigungsausgaben verdoppelt, während Luxemburg, Lettland und Litauen ihre Ausgaben verdreifacht haben. Auch Deutschland, die Niederlande, Estland, Rumänien, Bulgarien und Finnland haben ihren Verteidigungshaushalt nahezu verdoppelt.
Wie viele Soldaten haben die europäischen Länder?
Die Gesamtzahl der aktiven Militärangehörigen in Europa, einschließlich des Vereinigten Königreichs, wird auf etwa 1,5 Millionen geschätzt. Die Effizienz der Streitkräfte wird jedoch durch das Fehlen einer gemeinsamen Kommandostruktur und militärischer Systeme beeinträchtigt.
Ende 2024 betrug die Zahl der russischen Truppen in der Ukraine etwa 700.000. Es wird jedoch geschätzt, dass Russland über etwa 1,3 Millionen aktive Militärangehörige und zwei Millionen Reservisten verfügt.
Offiziellen Angaben zufolge sind rund 80.000 amerikanische Militärs in Europa aktiv. Die Gesamtzahl schwankt jedoch aufgrund von Übungen und routinemäßigen Truppenrotationen, wie der Council on Foreign Relations festgestellt hat. Experten schätzen, dass Europa ohne US-Truppen zusätzlich 300.000 Soldaten oder etwa 50 Brigaden benötigen würde, um sich zu verteidigen.
Ist Europa auf dem Weg zu einer gemeinsamen Armee?
Nein. Einige Länder wie Frankreich haben sich traditionell für eine stärkere militärische Autonomie der EU eingesetzt, während andere wie Polen und die baltischen Staaten der Nato den Vorrang geben. Doch anstatt sich auf eine einzige europäische Armee zuzubewegen, konzentriert die EU ihre Bemühungen auf eine engere militärische Zusammenarbeit, gemeinsame Beschaffung und schnellere Reaktionskräfte, wie im Strategiekompass 2022 zu sehen ist. Dessen Ziel es war, bis 2025 über eine 5.000 Mann starke schnelle Eingreiftruppe zu verfügen. Die militärische Mobilität ist auch heute noch eine der Prioritäten der EU-Verteidigungsstrategie, da es keine harmonisierten Regeln für die Verlegung von Truppen oder Ausrüstung zwischen Ländern in Notfällen gibt.
Warum und wie plant die EU, ihre Rüstungsproduktion zu steigern?
Die Invasion der Krim im Jahr 2014 und der anschließende Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine im Jahr 2022 haben die Sicherheitspolitik der EU verändert und die EU und die Nato gezwungen, ihre Verteidigungsstrategien zu überdenken und die Militärausgaben zu erhöhen. Der Krieg in der Ukraine und die offensichtliche Hinwendung der Trump-Administration zu Moskau haben auch die Diskussionen über die strategische Autonomie der EU wiederbelebt, wobei Frankreich (und jetzt auch Deutschland) auf eine größere Unabhängigkeit von den US-geführten Sicherheitsstrukturen drängen.
In den vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten hat die EU verschiedene Verteidigungsinitiativen auf den Weg gebracht.
Zu den wichtigsten Schritten zur Verbesserung der militärischen Zusammenarbeit gehören die Einrichtung der Europäischen Verteidigungsagentur (2004), ihr jährlicher Plan zur Entwicklung der Verteidungsfähigkeiten (2008) und PESCO (2017). Vorschriften für den Transfer von Verteidigungsgütern und die Ausfuhr von Gütern mit doppeltem Verwendungszweck haben auch die Rüstungskontrolle gestärkt, während Russlands Invasion der Ukraine im Jahr 2022 die Verteidigungsanstrengungen der EU beschleunigte und zur Schaffung der Europäischen Friedensfazilität (2021), EDIRPA, ASAP (2023) und EDIS (2024) führte.
Mit ihrem Plan ReArm Europe will die Europäische Kommission 800 Mrd. EUR mobilisieren, um die Verteidigungsausgaben der EU zu erhöhen, die Ukraine zu unterstützen und die industrielle Basis Europas auszubauen.
Der Plan umfasst ein neues Instrument in Höhe von 150 Mrd. EUR für neue gemeinsame EU-Anleihen, eine Lockerung der Steuervorschriften für Verteidigung (die in den nächsten vier Jahren 650 Mrd. EUR freisetzen könnte), die (freiwillige) Nutzung von Kohäsionsfonds, eine Änderung der Investitionsregeln für die EIB und die Erschließung privater Investitionen im Rahmen der seit langem blockierten Kapitalmarktunion (CMU).
Wie groß ist die Verteidigungsindustrie in der EU?
Der Verteidigungssektor der EU erwirtschaftet einen geschätzten Jahresumsatz von fast 84 Mrd. EUR. Nach Angaben der Europäischen Kommission sichert er direkt über 196 000 hochqualifizierte Arbeitsplätze und schafft indirekt mehr als 315 000 zusätzliche Arbeitsplätze. Die europäische Verteidigungsindustrie benötigt jedoch mehr qualifizierte Arbeitskräfte, da sie die Produktion und Innovation ankurbelt, um den wachsenden Sicherheitsherausforderungen zu begegnen.
Die Marktwerte der europäischen Verteidigungsunternehmen sind in die Höhe geschossen und die meisten haben ihre Aktiengewinne seit dem Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine verdoppelt. Die Einnahmen sind jedoch immer noch recht gering, was zeigt, dass ihre Fähigkeit zur Expansion durch die Größe der nationalen Märkte und durch Exportbeschränkungen behindert wird. Dies hat eine Debatte darüber ausgelöst, ob es eine europäische Präferenz für gemeinsame EU-Verteidigungsausgaben geben sollte. „Eine solche 'europäische Präferenz' ist ein notwendiger Beitrag, um die derzeitige Vorherrschaft nichteuropäischer Anbieter auf den europäischen Verteidigungsmärkten umzukehren“, argumentiert die Industrie. Doch die EU-Länder sind weiterhin uneins.
Welche Waffensysteme haben für Europa Priorität?
Europa investiert in mehrschichtige Luft- und Raketenabwehrarchitekturen, denn wie Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, polnischer Staatssekretär für nationale Verteidigung, letztes Jahr sagte: „Ein Vorteil in der Luft entscheidet über den Krieg“.
Die im Oktober 2022 ins Leben gerufene European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) zielt beispielsweise darauf ab, ein allumfassendes Verteidigungssystem zu schaffen, das Fähigkeiten von der Kurzstrecken- bis zur exoatmosphärischen Ebene integriert.
Darüber hinaus wurden Drohnen, Raketen, Artillerie, strategische Fähigkeiten, militärische Mobilität, Cyberfähigkeiten und künstliche Intelligenz als vorrangige Bereiche genannt. Drohnen sind im Krieg in der Ukraine zu einem entscheidenden Instrument geworden, was sowohl Kiew als auch Moskau dazu veranlasst hat, rasch eine eigene Industrie aufzubauen. Die wichtigsten Exporteure von Militärdrohnen sind heute China und die Türkei.
Vor welchen Herausforderungen steht die EU bei der Stärkung ihrer militärischen Fähigkeiten?
Zwar wird eine Erhöhung der Verteidigungsinvestitionen begrüßt, doch strebt die Industrie langfristige oder mehrjährige Beschaffungsverträge an, um Stabilität, nachhaltige Innovation und technologische Entwicklung zu gewährleisten. Das für Friedenszeiten typische „Built-to-Order“-System, auf dem die EU-Verteidigungsindustrie basiert, hat zu langen Wartezeiten für moderne Verteidigungsfähigkeiten geführt.
Die Zusammenarbeit im Verteidigungsbereich, einschließlich Joint Ventures und gemeinsamer Beschaffung, nimmt zu, bleibt aber begrenzt. Es wurden besondere Anstrengungen unternommen, um die Produktion von Artilleriemunition anzukurbeln, ein Bereich, in dem die Ukraine einen hohen Bedarf hat. Die Zusage der EU, zwischen März 2023 und 2024 eine Million Artilleriegranaten des Kalibers 155 mm zu liefern, konnte jedoch nicht rechtzeitig erfüllt werden, was die künftigen Herausforderungen verdeutlicht. Die EU-Kommission schätzte im Jahr 2022, dass die mangelnde Zusammenarbeit zu jährlichen Kosten von 25 bis 100 Milliarden Euro führt.
Ein weiteres zentrales Problem für die EU-Verteidigungsindustrie ist die Fragmentierung, insbesondere außerhalb des Luftfahrt- und Raketensektors. Diese Zersplitterung führt nicht nur zu Doppelarbeit und höheren Produktionskosten, sondern auch zu Interoperabilitätsproblemen, die den Umfang und die operative Effizienz der Industrie vor Ort einschränken. Dem Draghi-Bericht zufolge haben die EU-Mitgliedstaaten der Ukraine zehn verschiedene Arten von Haubitzen zur Verfügung gestellt. Darüber hinaus betreibt die EU 12 verschiedene Kampfpanzertypen, während die USA nur einen (den M1 Abrams) herstellen.
Inzwischen spielen auch externe Abhängigkeiten eine Rolle. Zwischen 2007 und 2016 wurden mehr als 60 Prozent des europäischen Beschaffungsbudgets für Verteidigungsgüter für Importe aus Nicht-EU-Ländern ausgegeben, was zu Kontrollen und Beschränkungen der Ausrüstung durch Drittländer führte. Eine „europäische Präferenz“ bei der Beschaffung von Verteidigungsgütern, die vor allem von Frankreich vorangetrieben wurde, fand bei den informellen Gesprächen der EU-Staats- und Regierungschefs im Februar keinen Konsens - und angesichts der Notwendigkeit einer schnellen Aufstockung fordern viele Länder ein möglichst offenes System.
Haben europäische Länder Atomwaffen?
Im Januar 2022 verfügte Frankreich über 290 Sprengköpfe mit 98 Trägersystemen, einschließlich U-Boot-Raketen und luftgestützter Raketen. Das Vereinigte Königreich verfügte nach Angaben der Arms Control Association über 225 Sprengköpfe, von denen 120 einsatzbereit und auf fünf U-Booten stationiert sind, während 105 Sprengköpfe im Lager liegen.
Auch Belgien, Deutschland, Italien, die Niederlande und die Türkei sollen über US-Atomwaffen verfügen. Polen hat Washington kürzlich aufgefordert, Atomwaffen in seinem Land zu stationieren, und zugegeben, dass es Jahrzehnte dauern würde, bis es über eigene Kapazitäten verfügt.
👉 Originalartikel auf euobserver
In Zusammenarbeit mit Display Europe, kofinanziert von der Europäischen Union. Die geäußerten Ansichten und Meinungen sind jedoch ausschließlich die des Autors/der Autoren und spiegeln nicht unbedingt die der Europäischen Union oder der Generaldirektion Kommunikationsnetze, Inhalte und Technologie wider. Weder die Europäische Union noch die Bewilligungsbehörde können für sie verantwortlich gemacht werden.
| # | MediaType | Title | FileWidgets |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | image | Screenshot 2025-03-24 alle 14.37.35 | |
| 2 | image | Alex Falcó Chang voxeurop |
DUMP Item Data via GQL
{
key:"uid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"title": {
key:"de": {
key:"value": string:"Wie steht es um Europas Verteidigungskapazität? Wie viele Einheiten stehen bereit?"
},
key:"en": {
key:"value": string:"How many divisions does Europe have? A look at the state of the continent’s defence"
},
key:"it": {
key:"value": string:"Quante divisioni ha l’Europa? Il punto sulle sue capacità di difesa"
}
},
key:"subtitle": {
key:"de": {
key:"value": string:""
},
key:"en": {
key:"value": string:""
},
key:"it": {
key:"value": string:""
}
},
key:"summary": {
key:"de": {
key:"value": string:"Der russische Einmarsch in die Ukraine im Februar 2022 hat das Verteidigungskonzept der EU erschüttert und zu einer raschen Neubewertung der militärischen Lage geführt. Der angekündigte Rückzug der USA aus der europäischen Verteidigung hat die Frage nach der Aufrüstung des Kontinents wieder auf den Tisch gebracht. EUobserver untersucht den Stand der Dinge."
},
key:"en": {
key:"value": string:"Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shook the EU's approach to defence, prompting a rapid reassessment of its military landscape. The announced US withdrawal from Europe’s defence has put the question of the continent's rearmament back on the table. EUobserver looks at the state of play."
},
key:"it": {
key:"value": string:"Se l’invasione su larga scala dell’Ucraina da parte della Russia, nel febbraio 2022, aveva già scosso l’approccio dell’Ue alla difesa; l’annunciato disimpegno degli Stati Uniti ha riportato al centro del dibattito la questione del riarmo del continente. EUobserver analizza la situazione, dati alla mano."
}
},
key:"content": {
key:"de": {
key:"value": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Welche Länder geben am meisten für Verteidigung aus?</strong></h2>\n<p>Die Länder mit den höchsten <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/category/politics-de/defence-and-security-de/\">Verteidigungsausgaben</a> der letzten Jahre sind die <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/united-states-de/\">Vereinigten Staaten</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/china-de/\">China</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/russia-de/\">Russland</a>, Indien und Saudi-Arabien. Das europäische Wachstum wird von Russlands steigenden Militärausgaben übertroffen, die sich gegenüber dem Stand vor dem <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/tag/war-in-ukraine-de/\">Einmarsch in die Ukraine</a> im Jahr 2022 mehr als verdoppelt haben.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22402206\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22402206/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Wie viel geben die Nato-Mitglieder für Verteidigung aus?</strong></h2>\n<p>US-Präsident <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/tag/donald-trump/\">Donald Trump</a> hat die Verbündeten wiederholt dafür kritisiert, dass sie das 2014 vereinbarte Ziel von zwei Prozent des BIP für Verteidigungsausgaben nicht erreichen. Selbst jetzt haben <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/croatia-de/\">Kroatien</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/portugal-de/\">Portugal</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/italy-de/\">Italien</a>, Kanada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/belgium-de/\">Belgien</a>, Luxemburg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/slovenia-de/\">Slowenien</a> und <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/spain-de/\">Spanien</a> diese Vorgabe nicht erfüllt.</p>\n<p>Die Verteidigungsausgaben der 23 EU-Länder, die auch <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/tag/nato-4-de/\">Nato</a>-Mitglieder sind, beliefen sich im Jahr 2024 auf 1,99 Prozent ihres gemeinsamen BIP und werden 2025 voraussichtlich 2,04 Prozent erreichen.</p>\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"/>\n<div class=\"optin-form\" data-double-optin=\"0\" data-list=\"8\">\n<div class=\"optin-form__wrapper\">\n <input type=\"email\" placeholder=\"Email\" class=\"optin-form__email\"/></p>\n<div class=\"newsletter_note\">\n You can unsubscribe at anytime *\n </div>\n<p> <button type=\"button\" class=\"optin-form__button\"><br />\n Subscribe </button>\n </div>\n</div>\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"/>\n<p>Trump schlug jedoch vor, dass die Nato-Mitglieder ihre Mindestverteidigungsausgaben auf fünf Prozent des BIP erhöhen sollten - eine Idee, die von der EU-Außenbeauftragten <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/tag/kaja-kallas-de/\">Kaja Kallas</a> im Januar unterstützt wurde. Frankreichs Präsident <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/tag/emmanuel-macron-de/\">Macron</a> hat vorgeschlagen, die Verteidigungsausgaben der EU um drei auf 3,5 Prozent des BIP zu erhöhen. Bei den derzeitigen Raten würde es jedoch noch Jahre dauern, bis dies erreicht werden könnte.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22402315\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22402315/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Bei der Verteidigungsindustrie handelt es sich um eine technologiegetriebene Branche, die massive Investitionen in Forschung und Innovation erfordert. Laut Eurostat wurden 2022 in der EU 3,9 Mrd. EUR für Forschung und Entwicklung im Verteidigungsbereich ausgegeben. Dem <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">Dragi-Bericht</a> zufolge werden die Verteidigungssysteme der nächsten Generation jedoch massive FuE-Investitionen erfordern. Seit 2014 haben die USA den FuE-Ausgaben Vorrang vor allen anderen militärischen Ausgabenkategorien eingeräumt. Frankreich, Deutschland und Schweden stehen an der Spitze der EU-Länder, die in FuE für die Verteidigung investieren.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:894px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-FosYj\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/FosYj/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-FosYj\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/FosYj/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Welche europäischen Länder erhöhen ihre Verteidigungsbudgets am stärksten?</strong></h2>\n<p>Seit 2014 haben Länder wie <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/hungary-de/\">Ungarn</a>, die <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/czech-republic-de/\">Tschechische Republik</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/poland-de/\">Polen</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/denmark-de/\">Dänemark</a>, Nordmazedonien, die <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/slovakia-de/\">Slowakei</a> und <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/sweden-de/\">Schweden</a> ihre Verteidigungsausgaben verdoppelt, während Luxemburg, Lettland und Litauen ihre Ausgaben verdreifacht haben. Auch <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/germany-de/\">Deutschland</a>, die <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/netherlands-de/\">Niederlande</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/estonia-de/\">Estland</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/romania-de/\">Rumänien</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/bulgaria-de/\">Bulgarien</a> und <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/finland-de/\">Finnland</a> haben ihren Verteidigungshaushalt nahezu verdoppelt.</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-scatter\" data-src=\"visualisation/22402524\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22402524/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"scatter visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>More :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n A shaken Europe closes ranks to face the Trumpo-Putinist new order </a>\n </div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Wie viele Soldaten haben die europäischen Länder? </strong></h2>\n<p>Die Gesamtzahl der aktiven Militärangehörigen in Europa, einschließlich des Vereinigten Königreichs, wird auf etwa 1,5 Millionen geschätzt. Die Effizienz der Streitkräfte wird jedoch durch das Fehlen einer gemeinsamen Kommandostruktur und militärischer Systeme beeinträchtigt.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22402451\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22402451/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Ende 2024 betrug die Zahl der russischen Truppen in der <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/ukraine-de/\">Ukraine</a> etwa 700.000. Es wird jedoch <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">geschätzt</a>, dass Russland über etwa 1,3 Millionen aktive Militärangehörige und zwei Millionen Reservisten verfügt.</p>\n<p>Offiziellen Angaben <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">zufolge</a> sind rund 80.000 amerikanische Militärs in Europa aktiv. Die Gesamtzahl schwankt jedoch aufgrund von Übungen und routinemäßigen Truppenrotationen, wie der Council on Foreign Relations <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">festgestellt</a> hat. Experten schätzen, dass Europa ohne US-Truppen <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">zusätzlich 300.000 Soldaten</a> oder etwa 50 Brigaden benötigen würde, um sich zu verteidigen.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22402743\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22402743/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ist Europa auf dem Weg zu einer gemeinsamen Armee?</strong></h2>\n<p>Nein. Einige Länder wie <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/france-de/\">Frankreich</a> haben sich traditionell für eine stärkere militärische Autonomie der EU eingesetzt, während andere wie Polen und die baltischen Staaten der Nato den Vorrang geben. Doch anstatt sich auf eine einzige europäische Armee zuzubewegen, konzentriert die EU ihre Bemühungen auf eine engere militärische Zusammenarbeit, gemeinsame Beschaffung und schnellere Reaktionskräfte, wie im <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Strategiekompass 2022</a> zu sehen ist. Dessen Ziel es war, bis 2025 über eine 5.000 Mann starke schnelle Eingreiftruppe zu verfügen. Die militärische Mobilität ist auch heute noch eine der Prioritäten der EU-Verteidigungsstrategie, da es keine harmonisierten Regeln für die Verlegung von Truppen oder Ausrüstung zwischen Ländern in Notfällen gibt.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Warum und wie plant die EU, ihre Rüstungsproduktion zu steigern?</strong></h2>\n<p>Die Invasion der Krim im Jahr 2014 und der anschließende Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine im Jahr 2022 haben die Sicherheitspolitik der EU verändert und die EU und die Nato gezwungen, ihre Verteidigungsstrategien zu überdenken und die Militärausgaben zu erhöhen. Der Krieg in der Ukraine und die offensichtliche Hinwendung der Trump-Administration zu Moskau haben auch die Diskussionen über die strategische Autonomie der EU wiederbelebt, wobei Frankreich (und jetzt auch Deutschland) auf eine größere Unabhängigkeit von den US-geführten Sicherheitsstrukturen drängen.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>More :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Who’s going to pay for Europe’s rearmament? It’s time to tax the rich </a>\n </div>\n<p>In den vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten hat die EU verschiedene Verteidigungsinitiativen auf den Weg gebracht.</p>\n<p>Zu den wichtigsten Schritten zur Verbesserung der militärischen Zusammenarbeit gehören die Einrichtung der <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Europäischen Verteidigungsagentur</a> (2004), ihr jährlicher <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Plan zur Entwicklung der Verteidungsfähigkeiten</a> (2008) und <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017). Vorschriften für den Transfer von Verteidigungsgütern und die Ausfuhr von Gütern mit doppeltem Verwendungszweck haben auch die Rüstungskontrolle gestärkt, während Russlands Invasion der Ukraine im Jahr 2022 die Verteidigungsanstrengungen der EU beschleunigte und zur Schaffung der <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Europäischen Friedensfazilität</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) und <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024) führte.</p>\n<p>Mit ihrem Plan <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/kurswechsel-ukraine-verteidigung-europa/\">ReArm Europe</a> will die Europäische Kommission 800 Mrd. EUR mobilisieren, um die Verteidigungsausgaben der EU zu erhöhen, die Ukraine zu unterstützen und die industrielle Basis Europas auszubauen.</p>\n<p>Der Plan umfasst ein neues Instrument in Höhe von 150 Mrd. EUR für neue gemeinsame EU-Anleihen, eine Lockerung der Steuervorschriften für Verteidigung (die in den nächsten vier Jahren 650 Mrd. EUR freisetzen könnte), die (freiwillige) Nutzung von <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">Kohäsionsfonds</a>, eine Änderung der Investitionsregeln für die EIB und die Erschließung privater Investitionen im Rahmen der seit langem blockierten <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Kapitalmarktunion</a> (CMU).</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Wie groß ist die Verteidigungsindustrie in der EU?</strong></h2>\n<p>Der Verteidigungssektor der EU erwirtschaftet einen geschätzten Jahresumsatz von fast 84 Mrd. EUR. <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">Nach Angaben der Europäischen Kommission</a> sichert er direkt über 196 000 hochqualifizierte Arbeitsplätze und schafft indirekt mehr als 315 000 zusätzliche Arbeitsplätze. Die europäische Verteidigungsindustrie benötigt jedoch mehr <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">qualifizierte Arbeitskräfte</a>, da sie die Produktion und Innovation ankurbelt, um den wachsenden Sicherheitsherausforderungen zu begegnen.</p>\n<p>Die Marktwerte der europäischen Verteidigungsunternehmen sind in die Höhe geschossen und die meisten haben ihre Aktiengewinne seit dem Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">verdoppelt</a>. Die Einnahmen sind jedoch immer noch recht gering, was zeigt, dass ihre Fähigkeit zur Expansion durch die Größe der nationalen Märkte und durch Exportbeschränkungen behindert wird. Dies hat eine Debatte darüber ausgelöst, ob es eine europäische Präferenz für gemeinsame EU-Verteidigungsausgaben geben sollte.&nbsp; „Eine solche 'europäische Präferenz' ist ein notwendiger Beitrag, um die derzeitige Vorherrschaft nichteuropäischer Anbieter auf den europäischen Verteidigungsmärkten umzukehren“, <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">argumentiert</a> die Industrie. Doch die EU-Länder sind weiterhin uneins.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22402823\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22402823/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Welche Waffensysteme haben für Europa Priorität?</strong></h2>\n<p>Europa investiert in mehrschichtige Luft- und Raketenabwehrarchitekturen, denn wie Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, polnischer Staatssekretär für nationale Verteidigung, letztes Jahr sagte: „Ein Vorteil in der Luft entscheidet über den Krieg“.</p>\n<p>Die im Oktober 2022 ins Leben gerufene <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">European Sky Shield Initiative</a> (ESSI) zielt beispielsweise darauf ab, ein allumfassendes Verteidigungssystem zu schaffen, das Fähigkeiten von der Kurzstrecken- bis zur exoatmosphärischen Ebene integriert.</p>\n<p>Darüber hinaus wurden Drohnen, Raketen, Artillerie, strategische Fähigkeiten, militärische Mobilität, Cyberfähigkeiten und künstliche Intelligenz als vorrangige Bereiche genannt. <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">Drohnen sind im Krieg in der Ukraine zu einem entscheidenden Instrument</a> geworden, was sowohl Kiew als auch Moskau dazu veranlasst hat, rasch eine eigene Industrie aufzubauen. Die wichtigsten Exporteure von Militärdrohnen sind heute China und die Türkei.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Source: European Defence Agency</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Vor welchen Herausforderungen steht die EU bei der Stärkung ihrer militärischen Fähigkeiten?</strong></h2>\n<p>Zwar wird eine Erhöhung der Verteidigungsinvestitionen begrüßt, doch strebt die Industrie langfristige oder mehrjährige Beschaffungsverträge an, um Stabilität, nachhaltige Innovation und technologische Entwicklung zu gewährleisten. Das für Friedenszeiten typische „Built-to-Order“-System, auf dem die EU-Verteidigungsindustrie basiert, hat zu langen Wartezeiten für moderne Verteidigungsfähigkeiten geführt.</p>\n<p>Die Zusammenarbeit im Verteidigungsbereich, einschließlich Joint Ventures und gemeinsamer Beschaffung, nimmt zu, bleibt aber begrenzt. Es wurden besondere Anstrengungen unternommen, um die Produktion von Artilleriemunition anzukurbeln, ein Bereich, in dem die Ukraine einen hohen Bedarf hat. Die Zusage der EU, zwischen März 2023 und 2024 eine Million Artilleriegranaten des Kalibers 155 mm zu liefern, konnte jedoch nicht rechtzeitig erfüllt werden, was die künftigen Herausforderungen verdeutlicht. Die EU-Kommission schätzte im Jahr 2022, dass die mangelnde Zusammenarbeit zu jährlichen Kosten von 25 bis 100 Milliarden Euro führt.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>More :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Conscription returns to Europe? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Ein weiteres zentrales Problem für die EU-Verteidigungsindustrie ist die Fragmentierung, insbesondere außerhalb des Luftfahrt- und Raketensektors. Diese Zersplitterung führt nicht nur zu Doppelarbeit und höheren Produktionskosten, sondern auch zu Interoperabilitätsproblemen, die den Umfang und die operative Effizienz der Industrie vor Ort einschränken. Dem Draghi-Bericht zufolge haben die EU-Mitgliedstaaten der Ukraine zehn verschiedene Arten von Haubitzen zur Verfügung gestellt. Darüber hinaus betreibt die EU 12 verschiedene Kampfpanzertypen, während die USA nur einen (den M1 Abrams) herstellen.</p>\n<p>Inzwischen spielen auch externe Abhängigkeiten eine Rolle. Zwischen 2007 und 2016 wurden mehr als 60 Prozent des europäischen Beschaffungsbudgets für Verteidigungsgüter für Importe aus Nicht-EU-Ländern ausgegeben, was zu Kontrollen und Beschränkungen der Ausrüstung durch Drittländer führte. Eine „europäische Präferenz“ bei der Beschaffung von Verteidigungsgütern, die vor allem von Frankreich vorangetrieben wurde, fand bei den informellen Gesprächen der EU-Staats- und Regierungschefs im Februar keinen Konsens - und angesichts der Notwendigkeit einer schnellen Aufstockung fordern viele Länder ein möglichst offenes System.</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-chart\" data-src=\"visualisation/22403150\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22403150/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"chart visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Haben europäische Länder Atomwaffen?</strong></h2>\n<p>Im Januar 2022 verfügte Frankreich über 290 Sprengköpfe mit 98 Trägersystemen, einschließlich U-Boot-Raketen und luftgestützter Raketen. Das Vereinigte Königreich verfügte nach <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">Angaben der Arms Control Association</a> über 225 Sprengköpfe, von denen 120 einsatzbereit und auf fünf U-Booten stationiert sind, während 105 Sprengköpfe im Lager liegen.</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22403725\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22403725/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Auch Belgien, Deutschland, Italien, die Niederlande und die Türkei sollen über US-Atomwaffen verfügen. Polen hat Washington kürzlich aufgefordert, Atomwaffen in seinem Land zu stationieren, und zugegeben, dass es Jahrzehnte dauern würde, bis es über eigene Kapazitäten verfügt.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"> Originalartikel</a><strong> auf euobserver</strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">In Zusammenarbeit mit <a href=\"http://www.displayeurope.eu\" data-type=\"URL\" data-id=\"www.displayeurope.eu\">Display </a><a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Europe</a>, kofinanziert von der Europäischen Union. Die geäußerten Ansichten und Meinungen sind jedoch ausschließlich die des Autors/der Autoren und spiegeln nicht unbedingt die der Europäischen Union oder der Generaldirektion Kommunikationsnetze, Inhalte und Technologie wider. Weder die Europäische Union noch die Bewilligungsbehörde können für sie verantwortlich gemacht werden.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-2-1024x115.png\" alt=\"ECF, Display Europe, European Union\" class=\"wp-image-2464119\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>\n"
},
key:"en": {
key:"value": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Which are the countries spending most on defence?</strong></h2>\n<p>The countries with the highest <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">defence</a> spending in recent years are the <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">United States</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">China</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Russia</a>, India, and Saudi Arabia. European growth is outpaced by Russia's rising military spending, which has more than doubled the levels before its <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">2022 invasion of Ukraine</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How much do Nato members spend on defence?</strong></h2>\n<p>US president <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> has repeatedly criticised allies for not meeting the alliance’s defence spending target of two percent of GDP (agreed upon back in 2014). Even now, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Croatia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugal</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Italy</a>, Canada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belgium</a>, Luxembourg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Slovenia</a>, and <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Spain</a> have not hit the target.</p>\n<p>The defence spending of the 23 EU countries that are <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">Nato</a> members amounted to 1.99 percent of their combined GDP in 2024 and is projected to reach 2.04 percent in 2025.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>More :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n A shaken Europe closes ranks to face the Trumpo-Putinist new order </a>\n </div>\n<p>But Trump suggested that Nato members should increase their minimum defence spending to five percent of GDP — an idea backed by EU foreign affairs chief <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> in January. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> has proposed raising the EU's defence spending by three to 3.5 percent of GDP. Yet, this would take years to materialise based on current rates.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Defence is a tech-driven industry that calls for massive investment in research and innovation. Defence R&amp;D funding in the EU reached €3.9bn in 2022, according to Eurostat. However, according to the<a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\"> Dragi report</a>, next-generation defence systems will require massive R&amp;D investment. Since 2014, the US has prioritised R&amp;D spending above all other military expenditure categories. France, Germany and Sweden are at the top of EU countries investing in R&amp;D for defence.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Which European countries are increasing defence budgets the most?</strong></h2>\n<p>Since 2014, countries such as <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Hungary</a>, the <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Czech Republic</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Poland</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Denmark</a>, North Macedonia, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Slovakia</a>, and <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Sweden</a> have doubled their defence expenditures, while Luxembourg, Latvia, and Lithuania have tripled their spending. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Germany</a>, the <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Netherlands</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estonia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Romania</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulgaria</a>, and <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finland</a> have also nearly doubled their defence budgets.</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-scatter\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242025\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242025/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"scatter visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How many soldiers do European countries have?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>The total number of active military personnel in Europe, including the UK, is estimated to be around 1.5 million. However, its efficiency is undermined by the lack of a common command structure and military systems.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>By the end of 2024, the number of Russian troops in <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukraine</a> was approximately 700,000. However, it is<a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\"> estimated</a> that Russia has about 1.3 million active military personnel and two million reservists.</p>\n<p>According to<a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\"> official figures</a>, around 80,000 American military forces are active in Europe. However, the total number fluctuates due to exercises and routine troop rotations, as<a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\"> noted</a> by the Council on Foreign Relations. Meanwhile, experts estimate Europe would need an<a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\"> additional 300,000 servicemen</a> or around 50 brigades to defend itself, without US troops.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Is Europe moving towards a joint army?</strong></h2>\n<p>No. Some countries, like <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">France</a>, have traditionally supported stronger EU military autonomy, while others, such as Poland and the Baltics, prioritise Nato. But rather than moving toward a single European army, the EU is focusing efforts on closer military cooperation, joint procurement, and faster response forces, as seen in the <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">2022 Strategic Compass</a>, whose goal was to have a 5,000-strong rapid deployment force by 2025. Military mobility is still today one of the priorities of the EU’s defence strategy since no harmonised rules to move troops or equipment between countries in a situation of emergency.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Why and how does the EU plan to boost its arms production?</strong></h2>\n<p>The invasion of Crimea in 2014, followed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has reshaped EU security policy, forcing the EU and Nato to rethink defence strategies and increase military spending to boost capabilities. The war in Ukraine and the Trump administration's apparent pivot towards Moscow has also revived discussions on EU strategic autonomy, with France (and now even Germany) pushing for more independence from US-led security structures.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>More :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Who’s going to pay for Europe’s rearmament? It’s time to tax the rich </a>\n </div>\n<p>Over the past two decades, the EU has come up with different defence initiatives.</p>\n<p>Key steps to enhance military collaboration include the set up of the<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\"> European Defence Agency</a> (2004), its annual<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\"> Capability Development Plan</a> (2008), and<a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\"> PESCO</a> (2017). Regulations for defence transfers and dual-use exports have also strengthened arms control, while Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine accelerated EU defence efforts, leading to the creation of the<a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\"> European Peace Facility</a> (2021),<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\"> EDIRPA</a>,<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\"> ASAP</a> (2023), and<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\"> EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>With its<a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\"> ReArm Europe plan</a>, the European Commission aims to mobilise €800bn to boost EU defence spending, support Ukraine, and expand Europe’s industrial base.</p>\n<p>The plan includes a new instrument of €150bn in new joint EU borrowing, loosening the bloc’s fiscal rules for defence (which could be freed up €650bn over the next four years), using<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\"> cohesion</a> funds (voluntarily), changing investment rules for EIB and “unlocking private” investment throughout the long-stalled<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\"> Capital Market Union</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How big is the EU’s defence industry?</strong></h2>\n<p>The EU defence sector has an estimated annual turnover of nearly €84bn, directly supporting over 196,000 high-skilled jobs and indirectly creating more than 315,000 additional jobs, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">according to</a> the European Commission. But the European defence industry<a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\"> needs more skilled workers</a> as it boosts production and innovation to tackle growing security challenges.</p>\n<p>European defence companies' market values have soared, with most<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\"> doubling their share prices</a> since Russia invaded Ukraine. But revenues are still pretty small, showing that their capacity to scale up is held back by the size of national markets and export restrictions. This has prompted a debate about whether there should be a European preference for common EU defence spending. “Such ‘European preference’ is a necessary contribution to reverse the current predominance of non-European suppliers on European defence markets,”<a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\"> argues</a> the industry.&nbsp; But EU countries remain divided.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Which weapons systems are seen as a priority for Europe?</strong></h2>\n<p>Europe is investing in multi-layered air and missile defence architectures because as Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, Polish secretary of state for national defence, said last year: “Having an advantage in the air defines the war\".</p>\n<p>For example,<a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\"> the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI)</a>, launched in October 2022, seeks to create an all-encompassing defence system that integrates capabilities ranging from short-range to exoatmospheric levels.</p>\n<p>In addition, drones, missiles, artillery, strategic enablers, military mobility, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence have been listed as priority areas. Namely,<a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\"> drones have become a crucial tool in the war in Ukraine</a>, prompting both Kyiv and Moscow to quickly develop their own industry. And today, the main exporters of military drones are China and Turkey.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Source: European Defence Agency</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What challenges does the EU face in strengthening its military capabilities?</strong></h2>\n<p>While increased defence investment is welcomed, the industry seeks long-term or multi-year procurement contracts for stability, sustained innovation, and tech development. The ‘built-to-order’ system typical of peacetime, which the EU defence industry is based on, has resulted in long waiting times for advanced defence capabilities.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Defence cooperation, including joint ventures and shared procurement, is growing, but it remains limited. There have been specific efforts to boost artillery ammunition production, an area where Ukraine has a high demand. But the EU’s pledge to deliver one million 155-mm-calibre artillery shells between March 2023 and 2024 was impossible to fulfil in time, showing the challenges ahead. The EU Commission estimated in 2022 that the lack of cooperation leads to annual costs ranging from €25bn to €100bn.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>More :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Conscription returns to Europe? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Another of the key issues for the EU’s defence industry is fragmentation, especially outside the aeronautics and missile sectors.&nbsp; Fragmentation not only triggers duplication and higher production costs but also interoperability problems, limiting its scale and operational effectiveness in the field. As an indication, EU member states have provided ten different types of howitzers to Ukraine, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">according to</a> the Draghi report. In addition, the EU operates 12 different types of battle tanks, whereas the US manufactures just one (the M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Meanwhile, external dependencies also factor in. Between 2007 and 2016, over 60 percent of Europe's defence procurement budget was spent on non-EU military imports, leading to third-country controls and restrictions on the equipment. A 'European preference' in defence procurement, pushed mainly by France, did not find consensus during informal talks of EU leaders in February – and given the need to scale up quickly, many countries are calling for a system to be as open as possible.</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-chart\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273218\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273218/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"chart visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Do European countries have nuclear weapons?</strong></h2>\n<p>As of January 2022, France had 290 warheads, with 98 delivery systems, including submarine missiles and air-launched missiles. The UK had 225 warheads, 120 operational, deployed on five submarines, with 105 in storage, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">according to</a> the Arms Control Association.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Meanwhile, it is reported that Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey all host US nuclear weapons. Poland has recently called on Washington to deploy nuclear weapons in the country, admitting that having its own capacity would take decades.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Original article</strong></a><strong> on <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">In partnership with <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, cofunded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the Directorate‑General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>\n"
},
key:"it": {
key:"value": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quali paesi spendono di più per la difesa?</strong></h2>\n<p>Ad oggi, i paesi con i più alti investimenti in materia di <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/category/politics-it/defence-and-security-it/\">difesa</a> sono <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/country/united-states-it/\">Stati Uniti</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/country/china-it/\">Cina</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/country/russia-it/\">Russia</a>, India e Arabia Saudita. La crescita europea è stata superata dall’aumento della spesa militare della Russia, che ha più che raddoppiato i propri stanziamenti rispetto ai livelli precedenti all’invasione dell’<a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/tag/war-in-ukraine-it/\">Ucraina</a> nel 2022.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22424004\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22424004/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong><strong>Quanto spendono i membri della Nato per la difesa?</strong></strong></h2>\n<p>Il presidente statunitense,<a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/tag/donald-trump-it/\"> Donald Trump</a>, ha più volte criticato gli alleati per non aver raggiunto l’obiettivo di spesa, pari al 2 per cento del Pil (fissato nel 2014), per la difesa dell’Alleanza. Ancora oggi, Croazia, Portogallo, Italia, Canada, Belgio, Lussemburgo, Slovenia e Spagna non hanno raggiunto questo obiettivo.</p>\n<p>Nel 2024, la spesa per la difesa dei 23 paesi dell’Ue membri della <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/tag/nato-4-it/\">Nato</a> ha raggiunto l’1,99 per cento del Pil aggregato, e si prevede che raggiunga il 2,04 nel 2025.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>More :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n A shaken Europe closes ranks to face the Trumpo-Putinist new order </a>\n </div>\n<p>Tuttavia, Trump ha avanzato la proposta che i membri della Nato portino la soglia minima di spesa per la difesa al 5 per cento del Pil: una posizione sostenuta anche dall’Alto Rappresentante per gli Affari Esteri dell’Ue, Kaja Kallas, nel gennaio scorso. Il presidente francese <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/tag/emmanuel-macron-it/\">Macron</a> ha invece suggerito un aumento della spesa europea per la difesa del 3 per cento.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>La difesa è un’industria che necessita ingenti investimenti in ricerca e innovazione. Secondo Eurostat, nel 2022 i finanziamenti dell’Ue per ricerca e sviluppo (R&amp;S) nel settore della difesa hanno raggiunto i 3,9 miliardi di euro. Tuttavia, secondo il <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">rapporto Draghi</a>, i sistemi di difesa di prossima generazione richiederanno investimenti molto più consistenti.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22424112\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22424112/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Dal 2014, gli Stati Uniti hanno dato priorità alla spesa in R&amp;S rispetto ad altre categorie di spesa militare. Francia, Germania e Svezia sono tra i primi paesi europei a investire in R&amp;S per la difesa.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:844px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-BkJRZ\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/BkJRZ/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-BkJRZ\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/BkJRZ/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong><strong>Quali paesi europei stanno aumentando di più il loro budget per la difesa?</strong></strong></h2>\n<p>Dal 2014, alcuni paesi membri dell’Ue, come Ungheria, Repubblica Ceca, Polonia, Danimarca, Macedonia del Nord, Slovacchia e Svezia hanno raddoppiato le spese per la difesa; Lussemburgo, Lettonia e Lituania le hanno triplicate. Anche Germania, Paesi Bassi, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria e Finlandia hanno quasi raddoppiato i propri stanziamenti militari.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong><strong>Quanti militari ci sono nei paesi Ue?</strong></strong></h2>\n<p>Si stima che il numero totale di militari in servizio attivo in Europa, Regno Unito incluso, sia di circa 1,5 milioni di persone. Tuttavia, l’efficienza delle forze armate europee è ostacolata dalla mancanza di una struttura di comando e di sistemi militari comuni.</p>\n<p>Alla fine del 2024, il numero di truppe russe in Ucraina era di circa 700 mila. Si stima che la Russia <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">disponga</a> complessivamente di 1,3 milioni di militari in servizio e 2 milioni di riservisti.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22424635\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22424635/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">Secondo</a> fonti ufficiali, circa 80 mila militari statunitensi sono in servizio attivo in Europa. Il numero totale, però, varia a seconda delle esercitazioni e delle rotazioni periodiche delle truppe, come <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">evidenziato</a> dal <em>Council on Foreign Relations</em> (Consiglio sulle relazioni estere). Mentre secondo gli <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">esperti</a>, l’Europa avrebbe bisogno di altri 300 mila militari in servizio attivo, pari a circa 50 brigate, per difendersi senza il supporto degli Stati Uniti.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22428763\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22428763/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong><strong>L’Europa va verso un esercito comune?</strong></strong></h2>\n<p>No. Alcuni paesi, come la Francia, sostengono da sempre una maggiore autonomia militare dell’Ue, mentre altri, come la Polonia e i Paesi baltici, continuano a privilegiare il ruolo della Nato. Piuttosto che muoversi verso un esercito europeo unico, l’Ue sta puntando i suoi sforzi su una cooperazione militare più stretta, con appalti congiunti e forze di risposta più rapide, come previsto dallo <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\"><em>Strategic Compass</em> del 2022</a>, che punta a creare una forza di dispiegamento rapido di 5 mila unità entro il 2025.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>La mobilità militare resta tuttora una delle priorità della strategia difensiva dell’Unione, perché non esistono regole armonizzate per lo spostamento di truppe ed equipaggiamenti tra gli stati membri in caso di emergenza.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong><strong>Perché e come l’Ue vuole potenziare la sua produzione di armamenti?</strong></strong></h2>\n<p>L’annessione russa della Crimea nel 2014, seguita dall’invasione su larga scala dell’Ucraina nel 2022, ha ridisegnato la politica di sicurezza dell’Ue, costringendo sia l’Unione che la Nato a ripensare le proprie strategie di difesa e ad aumentare la spesa militare per rafforzare le proprie capacità operative. La guerra in Ucraina e il presunto avvicinamento dell’amministrazione Trump a Mosca hanno riacceso il dibattito sull’autonomia strategica dell’Ue. Francia, e ora anche Germania, insistono per una maggiore indipendenza dalle strutture di sicurezza guidate dagli Stati Uniti.</p>\n<p>Negli ultimi vent’anni, l’Ue ha introdotto diverse iniziative nel settore della difesa.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>More :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Who’s going to pay for Europe’s rearmament? It’s time to tax the rich </a>\n </div>\n<p>Per rafforzare la collaborazione militare sono stati fatti passi importanti, tra cui la creazione dell<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">’Agenzia europea per la difesa</a> (2004), il suo <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Piano annuale di sviluppo delle capacità </a>(2008) e la <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">Pesco</a> (Permanent Structured Cooperation, 2017).&nbsp;</p>\n<p>L’invasione russa dell’Ucraina nel 2022 ha accelerato ulteriormente gli sforzi di difesa dell’Ue, portando alla creazione dell’<a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">European Peace Facility</a> (2021),<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\"> EDIRPA</a> (Procuring together defence capabilities),<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\"> ASAP</a> (Boosting defence production, 2023), e<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\"> EDIS</a> (Our common defence industrial strategy, 2024).</p>\n<p>Attraverso il piano ReArm Europe, la Commissione europea punta a mobilitare 800 miliardi di euro per aumentare la spesa per la difesa, sostenere l’Ucraina e ampliare la base industriale europea.</p>\n<p>Il piano prevede un nuovo strumento di 150 miliardi di euro in prestiti congiunti dell’Ue, l’allentamento temporaneo delle regole fiscali per le spese di difesa (che potrebbero liberare fino a 650 miliardi di euro nei prossimi quattro anni), l’uso volontario dei fondi di coesione e la modifica delle regole di investimento della Banca europea per gli investimenti (Bei), oltre allo “sblocco degli investimenti privati” attraverso il rilancio dell’Unione dei mercati dei capitali (<a href=\"https://finance.ec.europa.eu/capital-markets-union-and-financial-markets/capital-markets-union_it\">Cmu</a>), da tempo in fase di stallo.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong><strong>Quanto è grande l’industria della difesa dell’Ue?</strong></strong></h2>\n<p>Il settore della difesa dell'Ue ha un fatturato annuo stimato di quasi 84 miliardi di euro, sostenendo direttamente oltre 196 mila posti di lavoro altamente qualificati e creando indirettamente più di 315 mila posti di lavoro aggiuntivi,<a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\"> secondo la</a> Commissione. Ma l'industria europea della difesa<a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\"> ha bisogno di più lavoratori qualificati</a>.</p>\n<p>Il valore di mercato delle aziende europee del settore della difesa è aumentato vertiginosamente: la maggior parte di esse che ha<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\"> raddoppiato il prezzo delle proprie azioni</a> dall'invasione dell'Ucraina da parte della Russia. Tuttavia, i ricavi sono ancora piuttosto esigui, a dimostrazione del fatto che la loro capacità di espansione è frenata dalle dimensioni dei mercati nazionali e dalle restrizioni alle esportazioni. Ciò ha dato il via a un dibattito sull'opportunità di una preferenza europea per la spesa comune dell'Ue in materia di difesa. “Tale ‘preferenza europea’ è un contributo necessario per invertire l'attuale predominanza dei fornitori non europei sui mercati europei della difesa”,<a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\"> sostiene il</a> settore. Ma i paesi dell'UE rimangono divisi.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22428802\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22428802/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quali sistemi d’arma sono considerati prioritari per l’Europa?</strong></h2>\n<p>L'Europa sta investendo in architetture di difesa aerea e missilistica multilivello perché, come ha detto l'anno scorso Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, segretario di Stato polacco per la difesa nazionale: “Avere un vantaggio nell'aria definisce la guerra”. Ad esempio, l<a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">'European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI)</a>, lanciata nell'ottobre 2022, cerca di creare un sistema di difesa onnicomprensivo che integri capacità che vanno dal corto raggio ai livelli esoatmosferici.</p>\n<p>Inoltre, droni, missili, artiglieria, strumenti strategici, mobilità militare, capacità informatiche e intelligenza artificiale sono stati elencati come aree prioritarie. In particolare, i<a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\"> droni sono diventati uno strumento cruciale nella guerra in Ucraina</a>, spingendo sia Kiev che Mosca a sviluppare rapidamente la propria industria. Oggi, i principali esportatori di droni militari sono Cina e Turchia.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Fonte: European Defence Agency</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>In che modo l’Ue può rafforzare le sue capacità militari?</strong></h2>\n<p>Sebbene un aumento degli investimenti nella difesa sia ben accetto, l'industria cerca contratti di approvvigionamento a lungo termine o pluriennali per garantire stabilità, innovazione sostenuta e sviluppo tecnologico. Il sistema “built-to-order” tipico del tempo di pace, su cui si basa l'industria della difesa dell'Ue, ha comportato lunghi tempi di attesa per le capacità di difesa avanzate.</p>\n<p>La cooperazione in materia di difesa, comprese le joint venture e gli appalti condivisi, è in crescita, ma rimane limitata. Ci sono stati sforzi specifici per aumentare la produzione di munizioni di artiglieria, un settore in cui l'Ucraina ha una forte domanda. Ma l'impegno dell'Ue di consegnare un milione di proiettili di artiglieria calibro 155 mm tra marzo 2023 e 2024 è stato impossibile da rispettare in tempo, per esempio. La Commissione europea ha stimato nel 2022 che la mancanza di cooperazione comporta costi annuali che vanno da 25 a 100 miliardi di euro.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>More :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Conscription returns to Europe? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Un altro dei problemi chiave per l'industria della difesa dell'Ue è la frammentazione, soprattutto al di fuori dei settori aeronautico e missilistico. La frammentazione non solo causa duplicazioni e costi di produzione più elevati, ma anche problemi di interoperabilità, limitandone la portata e l'efficacia operativa sul campo. A titolo indicativo, gli Stati membri dell'Ue hanno fornito all'Ucraina dieci diversi tipi di obici,<a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\"> secondo la</a> relazione Draghi. Inoltre, l'Ue utilizza 12 diversi tipi di carri armati, mentre gli Stati Uniti ne producono solo uno (l'M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Nel frattempo, entrano in gioco anche le dipendenze esterne. Tra il 2007 e il 2016, oltre il 60 per cento del budget europeo per gli appalti della difesa è stato speso in importazioni militari non Ue, il che ha portato a controlli e restrizioni sulle attrezzature da parte di paesi terzi. Una “preferenza europea” negli appalti della difesa, spinta principalmente dalla Francia, non ha trovato consenso durante i colloqui informali dei leader dell'Ue a febbraio e, data la necessità di aumentare rapidamente le dimensioni, molti paesi chiedono che il sistema sia il più aperto possibile.</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-chart\" data-src=\"visualisation/22434120\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22434120/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"chart visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>I paesi europei hanno armi atomiche?</strong></h2>\n<p>A gennaio 2022, la Francia aveva 290 testate, con 98 sistemi di lancio, inclusi missili sottomarini e missili lanciati dall'aria. Il Regno Unito 225 testate, 120 operative, schierate su cinque sottomarini, con 105 in deposito,<a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\"> secondo l'</a>Arms Control Association.</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22428860\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22428860/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:49px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Nel frattempo, è stato riferito che Belgio, Germania, Italia, Paesi Bassi e Turchia ospitano tutti armi nucleari statunitensi. La Polonia ha recentemente chiesto a Washington di schierare armi nucleari nel paese, ammettendo che avere una propria capacità richiederebbe decenni.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉L'<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\">articolo originale</a> su EUobserver</strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">In collaborazione con <a href=\"http://www.displayeurope.eu\">Display Europe</a>, cofinanziato dall'Unione europea. I punti di vista e le opinioni espressi sono esclusivamente quelli dell'autore o degli autori e non riflettono necessariamente quelli dell'Ue o della Direzione Generale per le Reti di Comunicazione, i Contenuti e la Tecnologia. Né l'Unione europea né l'autorità che ha concesso il finanziamento possono essere ritenute responsabili.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-3-1024x115.png\" alt=\"ECF, Display Europe, European Union\" class=\"wp-image-2464123\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>\n"
}
},
key:"titleTranslations": {
key:"bg": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"cs": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"de": {
key:"value": string:"Wie steht es um Europas Verteidigungskapazität? Wie viele Einheiten stehen bereit?\n",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"el": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"en": {
key:"value": string:"How many divisions does Europe have? A look at the state of the continent’s defence\n",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"es": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"fi": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"fr": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"hr": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"hu": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"it": {
key:"value": string:"Quante divisioni ha l’Europa? Il punto sulle sue capacità di difesa\n",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"nl": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"pl": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"pt": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"ro": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"ru": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"sk": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"sv": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"tr": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"uk": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
}
},
key:"subtitleTranslations": {
key:"bg": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"cs": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"de": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"el": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"en": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"es": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"fi": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"fr": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"hr": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"hu": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"it": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"nl": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"pl": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"pt": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"ro": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"ru": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"sk": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"sv": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"tr": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"uk": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
}
},
key:"summaryTranslations": {
key:"bg": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"cs": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"de": {
key:"value": string:"<span class=\"para\">Der russische Einmarsch in die Ukraine im Februar 2022 hat das Verteidigungskonzept der EU erschüttert und zu einer raschen Neubewertung der militärischen Lage geführt. Der angekündigte Rückzug der USA aus der europäischen Verteidigung hat die Frage nach der Aufrüstung des Kontinents wieder auf den Tisch gebracht. EUobserver untersucht den Stand der Dinge.</span>\n",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"el": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"en": {
key:"value": string:"<span class=\"para\">Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shook the EU's approach to defence, prompting a rapid reassessment of its military landscape. The announced US withdrawal from Europe’s defence has put the question of the continent's rearmament back on the table. EUobserver looks at the state of play.</span>\n",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"es": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"fi": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"fr": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"hr": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"hu": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"it": {
key:"value": string:"<span class=\"para\">Se l’invasione su larga scala dell’Ucraina da parte della Russia, nel febbraio 2022, aveva già scosso l’approccio dell’Ue alla difesa; l’annunciato disimpegno degli Stati Uniti ha riportato al centro del dibattito la questione del riarmo del continente. EUobserver analizza la situazione, dati alla mano.</span>\n",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"nl": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"pl": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"pt": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"ro": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"ru": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"sk": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"sv": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"tr": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"uk": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
}
},
key:"contentTranslations": {
key:"bg": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"cs": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"de": {
key:"value": string:"<h2><strong>Welche Länder geben am meisten für Verteidigung aus?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Die Länder mit den höchsten <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/category/politics-de/defence-and-security-de/\">Verteidigungsausgaben</a> der letzten Jahre sind die <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/united-states-de/\">Vereinigten Staaten</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/china-de/\">China</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/russia-de/\">Russland</a>, Indien und Saudi-Arabien. Das europäische Wachstum wird von Russlands steigenden Militärausgaben übertroffen, die sich gegenüber dem Stand vor dem <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/tag/war-in-ukraine-de/\">Einmarsch in die Ukraine</a> im Jahr 2022 mehr als verdoppelt haben.</span>\n\n\n\n\n<h2><strong>Wie viel geben die Nato-Mitglieder für Verteidigung aus?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">US-Präsident <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/tag/donald-trump/\">Donald Trump</a> hat die Verbündeten wiederholt dafür kritisiert, dass sie das 2014 vereinbarte Ziel von zwei Prozent des BIP für Verteidigungsausgaben nicht erreichen. Selbst jetzt haben <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/croatia-de/\">Kroatien</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/portugal-de/\">Portugal</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/italy-de/\">Italien</a>, Kanada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/belgium-de/\">Belgien</a>, Luxemburg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/slovenia-de/\">Slowenien</a> und <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/spain-de/\">Spanien</a> diese Vorgabe nicht erfüllt.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Die Verteidigungsausgaben der 23 EU-Länder, die auch <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/tag/nato-4-de/\">Nato</a>-Mitglieder sind, beliefen sich im Jahr 2024 auf 1,99 Prozent ihres gemeinsamen BIP und werden 2025 voraussichtlich 2,04 Prozent erreichen.</span>\n\n\n\n <span class=\"para\"></span>\n\n You can unsubscribe at anytime *\n \n<span class=\"para\"> \n Subscribe \n </span>\n\n\n<span class=\"para\">Trump schlug jedoch vor, dass die Nato-Mitglieder ihre Mindestverteidigungsausgaben auf fünf Prozent des BIP erhöhen sollten - eine Idee, die von der EU-Außenbeauftragten <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/tag/kaja-kallas-de/\">Kaja Kallas</a> im Januar unterstützt wurde. Frankreichs Präsident <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/tag/emmanuel-macron-de/\">Macron</a> hat vorgeschlagen, die Verteidigungsausgaben der EU um drei auf 3,5 Prozent des BIP zu erhöhen. Bei den derzeitigen Raten würde es jedoch noch Jahre dauern, bis dies erreicht werden könnte.</span>\n\n\n\n<span class=\"para\">Bei der Verteidigungsindustrie handelt es sich um eine technologiegetriebene Branche, die massive Investitionen in Forschung und Innovation erfordert. Laut Eurostat wurden 2022 in der EU 3,9 Mrd. EUR für Forschung und Entwicklung im Verteidigungsbereich ausgegeben. Dem <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">Dragi-Bericht</a> zufolge werden die Verteidigungssysteme der nächsten Generation jedoch massive FuE-Investitionen erfordern. Seit 2014 haben die USA den FuE-Ausgaben Vorrang vor allen anderen militärischen Ausgabenkategorien eingeräumt. Frankreich, Deutschland und Schweden stehen an der Spitze der EU-Länder, die in FuE für die Verteidigung investieren.</span>\n\n\n\n<h2><strong>Welche europäischen Länder erhöhen ihre Verteidigungsbudgets am stärksten?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Seit 2014 haben Länder wie <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/hungary-de/\">Ungarn</a>, die <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/czech-republic-de/\">Tschechische Republik</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/poland-de/\">Polen</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/denmark-de/\">Dänemark</a>, Nordmazedonien, die <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/slovakia-de/\">Slowakei</a> und <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/sweden-de/\">Schweden</a> ihre Verteidigungsausgaben verdoppelt, während Luxemburg, Lettland und Litauen ihre Ausgaben verdreifacht haben. Auch <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/germany-de/\">Deutschland</a>, die <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/netherlands-de/\">Niederlande</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/estonia-de/\">Estland</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/romania-de/\">Rumänien</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/bulgaria-de/\">Bulgarien</a> und <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/finland-de/\">Finnland</a> haben ihren Verteidigungshaushalt nahezu verdoppelt.</span>\n\n\n <span>More :</span>\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" target=\"_blank\">\n A shaken Europe closes ranks to face the Trumpo-Putinist new order </a>\n \n<h2><strong>Wie viele Soldaten haben die europäischen Länder? </strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Die Gesamtzahl der aktiven Militärangehörigen in Europa, einschließlich des Vereinigten Königreichs, wird auf etwa 1,5 Millionen geschätzt. Die Effizienz der Streitkräfte wird jedoch durch das Fehlen einer gemeinsamen Kommandostruktur und militärischer Systeme beeinträchtigt.</span>\n\n\n\n<span class=\"para\">Ende 2024 betrug die Zahl der russischen Truppen in der <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/ukraine-de/\">Ukraine</a> etwa 700.000. Es wird jedoch <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">geschätzt</a>, dass Russland über etwa 1,3 Millionen aktive Militärangehörige und zwei Millionen Reservisten verfügt.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Offiziellen Angaben <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">zufolge</a> sind rund 80.000 amerikanische Militärs in Europa aktiv. Die Gesamtzahl schwankt jedoch aufgrund von Übungen und routinemäßigen Truppenrotationen, wie der Council on Foreign Relations <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">festgestellt</a> hat. Experten schätzen, dass Europa ohne US-Truppen <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">zusätzlich 300.000 Soldaten</a> oder etwa 50 Brigaden benötigen würde, um sich zu verteidigen.</span>\n\n\n\n<h2><strong>Ist Europa auf dem Weg zu einer gemeinsamen Armee?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Nein. Einige Länder wie <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/country/france-de/\">Frankreich</a> haben sich traditionell für eine stärkere militärische Autonomie der EU eingesetzt, während andere wie Polen und die baltischen Staaten der Nato den Vorrang geben. Doch anstatt sich auf eine einzige europäische Armee zuzubewegen, konzentriert die EU ihre Bemühungen auf eine engere militärische Zusammenarbeit, gemeinsame Beschaffung und schnellere Reaktionskräfte, wie im <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Strategiekompass 2022</a> zu sehen ist. Dessen Ziel es war, bis 2025 über eine 5.000 Mann starke schnelle Eingreiftruppe zu verfügen. Die militärische Mobilität ist auch heute noch eine der Prioritäten der EU-Verteidigungsstrategie, da es keine harmonisierten Regeln für die Verlegung von Truppen oder Ausrüstung zwischen Ländern in Notfällen gibt.</span>\n<h2><strong>Warum und wie plant die EU, ihre Rüstungsproduktion zu steigern?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Die Invasion der Krim im Jahr 2014 und der anschließende Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine im Jahr 2022 haben die Sicherheitspolitik der EU verändert und die EU und die Nato gezwungen, ihre Verteidigungsstrategien zu überdenken und die Militärausgaben zu erhöhen. Der Krieg in der Ukraine und die offensichtliche Hinwendung der Trump-Administration zu Moskau haben auch die Diskussionen über die strategische Autonomie der EU wiederbelebt, wobei Frankreich (und jetzt auch Deutschland) auf eine größere Unabhängigkeit von den US-geführten Sicherheitsstrukturen drängen.</span>\n\n <span>More :</span>\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" target=\"_blank\">\n Who’s going to pay for Europe’s rearmament? It’s time to tax the rich </a>\n \n<span class=\"para\">In den vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten hat die EU verschiedene Verteidigungsinitiativen auf den Weg gebracht.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Zu den wichtigsten Schritten zur Verbesserung der militärischen Zusammenarbeit gehören die Einrichtung der <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Europäischen Verteidigungsagentur</a> (2004), ihr jährlicher <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Plan zur Entwicklung der Verteidungsfähigkeiten</a> (2008) und <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017). Vorschriften für den Transfer von Verteidigungsgütern und die Ausfuhr von Gütern mit doppeltem Verwendungszweck haben auch die Rüstungskontrolle gestärkt, während Russlands Invasion der Ukraine im Jahr 2022 die Verteidigungsanstrengungen der EU beschleunigte und zur Schaffung der <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Europäischen Friedensfazilität</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) und <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024) führte.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Mit ihrem Plan <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/de/kurswechsel-ukraine-verteidigung-europa/\">ReArm Europe</a> will die Europäische Kommission 800 Mrd. EUR mobilisieren, um die Verteidigungsausgaben der EU zu erhöhen, die Ukraine zu unterstützen und die industrielle Basis Europas auszubauen.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Der Plan umfasst ein neues Instrument in Höhe von 150 Mrd. EUR für neue gemeinsame EU-Anleihen, eine Lockerung der Steuervorschriften für Verteidigung (die in den nächsten vier Jahren 650 Mrd. EUR freisetzen könnte), die (freiwillige) Nutzung von <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">Kohäsionsfonds</a>, eine Änderung der Investitionsregeln für die EIB und die Erschließung privater Investitionen im Rahmen der seit langem blockierten <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Kapitalmarktunion</a> (CMU).</span>\n<h2><strong>Wie groß ist die Verteidigungsindustrie in der EU?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Der Verteidigungssektor der EU erwirtschaftet einen geschätzten Jahresumsatz von fast 84 Mrd. EUR. <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">Nach Angaben der Europäischen Kommission</a> sichert er direkt über 196 000 hochqualifizierte Arbeitsplätze und schafft indirekt mehr als 315 000 zusätzliche Arbeitsplätze. Die europäische Verteidigungsindustrie benötigt jedoch mehr <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">qualifizierte Arbeitskräfte</a>, da sie die Produktion und Innovation ankurbelt, um den wachsenden Sicherheitsherausforderungen zu begegnen.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Die Marktwerte der europäischen Verteidigungsunternehmen sind in die Höhe geschossen und die meisten haben ihre Aktiengewinne seit dem Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">verdoppelt</a>. Die Einnahmen sind jedoch immer noch recht gering, was zeigt, dass ihre Fähigkeit zur Expansion durch die Größe der nationalen Märkte und durch Exportbeschränkungen behindert wird. Dies hat eine Debatte darüber ausgelöst, ob es eine europäische Präferenz für gemeinsame EU-Verteidigungsausgaben geben sollte. „Eine solche 'europäische Präferenz' ist ein notwendiger Beitrag, um die derzeitige Vorherrschaft nichteuropäischer Anbieter auf den europäischen Verteidigungsmärkten umzukehren“, <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">argumentiert</a> die Industrie. Doch die EU-Länder sind weiterhin uneins.</span>\n\n\n\n<h2><strong>Welche Waffensysteme haben für Europa Priorität?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Europa investiert in mehrschichtige Luft- und Raketenabwehrarchitekturen, denn wie Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, polnischer Staatssekretär für nationale Verteidigung, letztes Jahr sagte: „Ein Vorteil in der Luft entscheidet über den Krieg“.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Die im Oktober 2022 ins Leben gerufene <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">European Sky Shield Initiative</a> (ESSI) zielt beispielsweise darauf ab, ein allumfassendes Verteidigungssystem zu schaffen, das Fähigkeiten von der Kurzstrecken- bis zur exoatmosphärischen Ebene integriert.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Darüber hinaus wurden Drohnen, Raketen, Artillerie, strategische Fähigkeiten, militärische Mobilität, Cyberfähigkeiten und künstliche Intelligenz als vorrangige Bereiche genannt. <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">Drohnen sind im Krieg in der Ukraine zu einem entscheidenden Instrument</a> geworden, was sowohl Kiew als auch Moskau dazu veranlasst hat, rasch eine eigene Industrie aufzubauen. Die wichtigsten Exporteure von Militärdrohnen sind heute China und die Türkei.</span>\n\nSource: European Defence Agency\n\n<h2><strong>Vor welchen Herausforderungen steht die EU bei der Stärkung ihrer militärischen Fähigkeiten?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Zwar wird eine Erhöhung der Verteidigungsinvestitionen begrüßt, doch strebt die Industrie langfristige oder mehrjährige Beschaffungsverträge an, um Stabilität, nachhaltige Innovation und technologische Entwicklung zu gewährleisten. Das für Friedenszeiten typische „Built-to-Order“-System, auf dem die EU-Verteidigungsindustrie basiert, hat zu langen Wartezeiten für moderne Verteidigungsfähigkeiten geführt.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Die Zusammenarbeit im Verteidigungsbereich, einschließlich Joint Ventures und gemeinsamer Beschaffung, nimmt zu, bleibt aber begrenzt. Es wurden besondere Anstrengungen unternommen, um die Produktion von Artilleriemunition anzukurbeln, ein Bereich, in dem die Ukraine einen hohen Bedarf hat. Die Zusage der EU, zwischen März 2023 und 2024 eine Million Artilleriegranaten des Kalibers 155 mm zu liefern, konnte jedoch nicht rechtzeitig erfüllt werden, was die künftigen Herausforderungen verdeutlicht. Die EU-Kommission schätzte im Jahr 2022, dass die mangelnde Zusammenarbeit zu jährlichen Kosten von 25 bis 100 Milliarden Euro führt.</span>\n\n <span>More :</span>\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" target=\"_blank\">\n Conscription returns to Europe? </a>\n \n<span class=\"para\">Ein weiteres zentrales Problem für die EU-Verteidigungsindustrie ist die Fragmentierung, insbesondere außerhalb des Luftfahrt- und Raketensektors. Diese Zersplitterung führt nicht nur zu Doppelarbeit und höheren Produktionskosten, sondern auch zu Interoperabilitätsproblemen, die den Umfang und die operative Effizienz der Industrie vor Ort einschränken. Dem Draghi-Bericht zufolge haben die EU-Mitgliedstaaten der Ukraine zehn verschiedene Arten von Haubitzen zur Verfügung gestellt. Darüber hinaus betreibt die EU 12 verschiedene Kampfpanzertypen, während die USA nur einen (den M1 Abrams) herstellen.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Inzwischen spielen auch externe Abhängigkeiten eine Rolle. Zwischen 2007 und 2016 wurden mehr als 60 Prozent des europäischen Beschaffungsbudgets für Verteidigungsgüter für Importe aus Nicht-EU-Ländern ausgegeben, was zu Kontrollen und Beschränkungen der Ausrüstung durch Drittländer führte. Eine „europäische Präferenz“ bei der Beschaffung von Verteidigungsgütern, die vor allem von Frankreich vorangetrieben wurde, fand bei den informellen Gesprächen der EU-Staats- und Regierungschefs im Februar keinen Konsens - und angesichts der Notwendigkeit einer schnellen Aufstockung fordern viele Länder ein möglichst offenes System.</span>\n\n<h2><strong>Haben europäische Länder Atomwaffen?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Im Januar 2022 verfügte Frankreich über 290 Sprengköpfe mit 98 Trägersystemen, einschließlich U-Boot-Raketen und luftgestützter Raketen. Das Vereinigte Königreich verfügte nach <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">Angaben der Arms Control Association</a> über 225 Sprengköpfe, von denen 120 einsatzbereit und auf fünf U-Booten stationiert sind, während 105 Sprengköpfe im Lager liegen.</span>\n\n<span class=\"para\">Auch Belgien, Deutschland, Italien, die Niederlande und die Türkei sollen über US-Atomwaffen verfügen. Polen hat Washington kürzlich aufgefordert, Atomwaffen in seinem Land zu stationieren, und zugegeben, dass es Jahrzehnte dauern würde, bis es über eigene Kapazitäten verfügt.</span>\n<h6><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"> Originalartikel</a><strong> auf euobserver</strong></h6>\n\n\n\n<h6>In Zusammenarbeit mit <a href=\"http://www.displayeurope.eu\">Display </a><a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Europe</a>, kofinanziert von der Europäischen Union. Die geäußerten Ansichten und Meinungen sind jedoch ausschließlich die des Autors/der Autoren und spiegeln nicht unbedingt die der Europäischen Union oder der Generaldirektion Kommunikationsnetze, Inhalte und Technologie wider. Weder die Europäische Union noch die Bewilligungsbehörde können für sie verantwortlich gemacht werden.</h6>\n\n\n\n",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"el": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"en": {
key:"value": string:"<h2><strong>Which are the countries spending most on defence?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">The countries with the highest <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">defence</a> spending in recent years are the <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">United States</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">China</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Russia</a>, India, and Saudi Arabia. European growth is outpaced by Russia's rising military spending, which has more than doubled the levels before its <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">2022 invasion of Ukraine</a>.</span>\n\n\n\n\n<h2><strong>How much do Nato members spend on defence?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">US president <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> has repeatedly criticised allies for not meeting the alliance’s defence spending target of two percent of GDP (agreed upon back in 2014). Even now, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Croatia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugal</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Italy</a>, Canada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belgium</a>, Luxembourg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Slovenia</a>, and <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Spain</a> have not hit the target.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">The defence spending of the 23 EU countries that are <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">Nato</a> members amounted to 1.99 percent of their combined GDP in 2024 and is projected to reach 2.04 percent in 2025. </span>\n\n <span>More :</span>\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" target=\"_blank\">\n A shaken Europe closes ranks to face the Trumpo-Putinist new order </a>\n \n<span class=\"para\">But Trump suggested that Nato members should increase their minimum defence spending to five percent of GDP — an idea backed by EU foreign affairs chief <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> in January. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> has proposed raising the EU's defence spending by three to 3.5 percent of GDP. Yet, this would take years to materialise based on current rates.</span>\n\n\n\n<span class=\"para\">Defence is a tech-driven industry that calls for massive investment in research and innovation. Defence R&amp;D funding in the EU reached €3.9bn in 2022, according to Eurostat. However, according to the<a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\"> Dragi report</a>, next-generation defence systems will require massive R&amp;D investment. Since 2014, the US has prioritised R&amp;D spending above all other military expenditure categories. France, Germany and Sweden are at the top of EU countries investing in R&amp;D for defence.</span>\n\n\n\n<h2><strong>Which European countries are increasing defence budgets the most?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Since 2014, countries such as <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Hungary</a>, the <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Czech Republic</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Poland</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Denmark</a>, North Macedonia, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Slovakia</a>, and <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Sweden</a> have doubled their defence expenditures, while Luxembourg, Latvia, and Lithuania have tripled their spending. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Germany</a>, the <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Netherlands</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estonia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Romania</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulgaria</a>, and <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finland</a> have also nearly doubled their defence budgets.</span>\n\n<h2><strong>How many soldiers do European countries have? </strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">The total number of active military personnel in Europe, including the UK, is estimated to be around 1.5 million. However, its efficiency is undermined by the lack of a common command structure and military systems.</span>\n\n\n\n<span class=\"para\">By the end of 2024, the number of Russian troops in <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukraine</a> was approximately 700,000. However, it is<a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\"> estimated</a> that Russia has about 1.3 million active military personnel and two million reservists.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">According to<a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\"> official figures</a>, around 80,000 American military forces are active in Europe. However, the total number fluctuates due to exercises and routine troop rotations, as<a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\"> noted</a> by the Council on Foreign Relations. Meanwhile, experts estimate Europe would need an<a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\"> additional 300,000 servicemen</a> or around 50 brigades to defend itself, without US troops. </span>\n\n\n\n<h2><strong>Is Europe moving towards a joint army?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">No. Some countries, like <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">France</a>, have traditionally supported stronger EU military autonomy, while others, such as Poland and the Baltics, prioritise Nato. But rather than moving toward a single European army, the EU is focusing efforts on closer military cooperation, joint procurement, and faster response forces, as seen in the <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">2022 Strategic Compass</a>, whose goal was to have a 5,000-strong rapid deployment force by 2025. Military mobility is still today one of the priorities of the EU’s defence strategy since no harmonised rules to move troops or equipment between countries in a situation of emergency.</span>\n<h2><strong>Why and how does the EU plan to boost its arms production?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">The invasion of Crimea in 2014, followed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has reshaped EU security policy, forcing the EU and Nato to rethink defence strategies and increase military spending to boost capabilities. The war in Ukraine and the Trump administration's apparent pivot towards Moscow has also revived discussions on EU strategic autonomy, with France (and now even Germany) pushing for more independence from US-led security structures.</span>\n\n <span>More :</span>\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" target=\"_blank\">\n Who’s going to pay for Europe’s rearmament? It’s time to tax the rich </a>\n \n<span class=\"para\">Over the past two decades, the EU has come up with different defence initiatives.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Key steps to enhance military collaboration include the set up of the<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\"> European Defence Agency</a> (2004), its annual<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\"> Capability Development Plan</a> (2008), and<a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\"> PESCO</a> (2017). Regulations for defence transfers and dual-use exports have also strengthened arms control, while Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine accelerated EU defence efforts, leading to the creation of the<a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\"> European Peace Facility</a> (2021),<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\"> EDIRPA</a>,<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\"> ASAP</a> (2023), and<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\"> EDIS</a> (2024).</span>\n<span class=\"para\">With its<a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\"> ReArm Europe plan</a>, the European Commission aims to mobilise €800bn to boost EU defence spending, support Ukraine, and expand Europe’s industrial base.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">The plan includes a new instrument of €150bn in new joint EU borrowing, loosening the bloc’s fiscal rules for defence (which could be freed up €650bn over the next four years), using<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\"> cohesion</a> funds (voluntarily), changing investment rules for EIB and “unlocking private” investment throughout the long-stalled<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\"> Capital Market Union</a> (CMU). </span>\n<h2><strong>How big is the EU’s defence industry?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">The EU defence sector has an estimated annual turnover of nearly €84bn, directly supporting over 196,000 high-skilled jobs and indirectly creating more than 315,000 additional jobs, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">according to</a> the European Commission. But the European defence industry<a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\"> needs more skilled workers</a> as it boosts production and innovation to tackle growing security challenges.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">European defence companies' market values have soared, with most<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\"> doubling their share prices</a> since Russia invaded Ukraine. But revenues are still pretty small, showing that their capacity to scale up is held back by the size of national markets and export restrictions. This has prompted a debate about whether there should be a European preference for common EU defence spending. “Such ‘European preference’ is a necessary contribution to reverse the current predominance of non-European suppliers on European defence markets,”<a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\"> argues</a> the industry. But EU countries remain divided.</span>\n\n\n\n<h2><strong>Which weapons systems are seen as a priority for Europe?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Europe is investing in multi-layered air and missile defence architectures because as Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, Polish secretary of state for national defence, said last year: “Having an advantage in the air defines the war\".</span>\n<span class=\"para\">For example,<a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\"> the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI)</a>, launched in October 2022, seeks to create an all-encompassing defence system that integrates capabilities ranging from short-range to exoatmospheric levels.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">In addition, drones, missiles, artillery, strategic enablers, military mobility, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence have been listed as priority areas. Namely,<a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\"> drones have become a crucial tool in the war in Ukraine</a>, prompting both Kyiv and Moscow to quickly develop their own industry. And today, the main exporters of military drones are China and Turkey.</span>\n\nSource: European Defence Agency\n\n<h2><strong>What challenges does the EU face in strengthening its military capabilities?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">While increased defence investment is welcomed, the industry seeks long-term or multi-year procurement contracts for stability, sustained innovation, and tech development. The ‘built-to-order’ system typical of peacetime, which the EU defence industry is based on, has resulted in long waiting times for advanced defence capabilities. </span>\n<span class=\"para\">Defence cooperation, including joint ventures and shared procurement, is growing, but it remains limited. There have been specific efforts to boost artillery ammunition production, an area where Ukraine has a high demand. But the EU’s pledge to deliver one million 155-mm-calibre artillery shells between March 2023 and 2024 was impossible to fulfil in time, showing the challenges ahead. The EU Commission estimated in 2022 that the lack of cooperation leads to annual costs ranging from €25bn to €100bn.</span>\n\n <span>More :</span>\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" target=\"_blank\">\n Conscription returns to Europe? </a>\n \n<span class=\"para\">Another of the key issues for the EU’s defence industry is fragmentation, especially outside the aeronautics and missile sectors. Fragmentation not only triggers duplication and higher production costs but also interoperability problems, limiting its scale and operational effectiveness in the field. As an indication, EU member states have provided ten different types of howitzers to Ukraine, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">according to</a> the Draghi report. In addition, the EU operates 12 different types of battle tanks, whereas the US manufactures just one (the M1 Abrams).</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Meanwhile, external dependencies also factor in. Between 2007 and 2016, over 60 percent of Europe's defence procurement budget was spent on non-EU military imports, leading to third-country controls and restrictions on the equipment. A 'European preference' in defence procurement, pushed mainly by France, did not find consensus during informal talks of EU leaders in February – and given the need to scale up quickly, many countries are calling for a system to be as open as possible.</span>\n\n<h2><strong>Do European countries have nuclear weapons?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">As of January 2022, France had 290 warheads, with 98 delivery systems, including submarine missiles and air-launched missiles. The UK had 225 warheads, 120 operational, deployed on five submarines, with 105 in storage, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">according to</a> the Arms Control Association. </span>\n\n<span class=\"para\">Meanwhile, it is reported that Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey all host US nuclear weapons. Poland has recently called on Washington to deploy nuclear weapons in the country, admitting that having its own capacity would take decades.</span>\n<h6><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Original article</strong></a><strong> on <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n\n\n\n<h6>In partnership with <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, cofunded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the Directorate‑General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.</h6>\n\n\n\n",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"es": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"fi": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"fr": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"hr": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"hu": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"it": {
key:"value": string:"<h2><strong>Quali paesi spendono di più per la difesa?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Ad oggi, i paesi con i più alti investimenti in materia di <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/category/politics-it/defence-and-security-it/\">difesa</a> sono <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/country/united-states-it/\">Stati Uniti</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/country/china-it/\">Cina</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/country/russia-it/\">Russia</a>, India e Arabia Saudita. La crescita europea è stata superata dall’aumento della spesa militare della Russia, che ha più che raddoppiato i propri stanziamenti rispetto ai livelli precedenti all’invasione dell’<a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/tag/war-in-ukraine-it/\">Ucraina</a> nel 2022.</span>\n\n\n\n\n<h2><strong><strong>Quanto spendono i membri della Nato per la difesa?</strong></strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Il presidente statunitense,<a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/tag/donald-trump-it/\"> Donald Trump</a>, ha più volte criticato gli alleati per non aver raggiunto l’obiettivo di spesa, pari al 2 per cento del Pil (fissato nel 2014), per la difesa dell’Alleanza. Ancora oggi, Croazia, Portogallo, Italia, Canada, Belgio, Lussemburgo, Slovenia e Spagna non hanno raggiunto questo obiettivo.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Nel 2024, la spesa per la difesa dei 23 paesi dell’Ue membri della <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/tag/nato-4-it/\">Nato</a> ha raggiunto l’1,99 per cento del Pil aggregato, e si prevede che raggiunga il 2,04 nel 2025.</span>\n\n <span>More :</span>\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" target=\"_blank\">\n A shaken Europe closes ranks to face the Trumpo-Putinist new order </a>\n \n<span class=\"para\">Tuttavia, Trump ha avanzato la proposta che i membri della Nato portino la soglia minima di spesa per la difesa al 5 per cento del Pil: una posizione sostenuta anche dall’Alto Rappresentante per gli Affari Esteri dell’Ue, Kaja Kallas, nel gennaio scorso. Il presidente francese <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/it/tag/emmanuel-macron-it/\">Macron</a> ha invece suggerito un aumento della spesa europea per la difesa del 3 per cento. </span>\n<span class=\"para\">La difesa è un’industria che necessita ingenti investimenti in ricerca e innovazione. Secondo Eurostat, nel 2022 i finanziamenti dell’Ue per ricerca e sviluppo (R&amp;S) nel settore della difesa hanno raggiunto i 3,9 miliardi di euro. Tuttavia, secondo il <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">rapporto Draghi</a>, i sistemi di difesa di prossima generazione richiederanno investimenti molto più consistenti. </span>\n\n\n\n<span class=\"para\">Dal 2014, gli Stati Uniti hanno dato priorità alla spesa in R&amp;S rispetto ad altre categorie di spesa militare. Francia, Germania e Svezia sono tra i primi paesi europei a investire in R&amp;S per la difesa.</span>\n\n\n\n<h2><strong><strong>Quali paesi europei stanno aumentando di più il loro budget per la difesa?</strong></strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Dal 2014, alcuni paesi membri dell’Ue, come Ungheria, Repubblica Ceca, Polonia, Danimarca, Macedonia del Nord, Slovacchia e Svezia hanno raddoppiato le spese per la difesa; Lussemburgo, Lettonia e Lituania le hanno triplicate. Anche Germania, Paesi Bassi, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria e Finlandia hanno quasi raddoppiato i propri stanziamenti militari.</span>\n<h2><strong><strong>Quanti militari ci sono nei paesi Ue?</strong></strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Si stima che il numero totale di militari in servizio attivo in Europa, Regno Unito incluso, sia di circa 1,5 milioni di persone. Tuttavia, l’efficienza delle forze armate europee è ostacolata dalla mancanza di una struttura di comando e di sistemi militari comuni.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Alla fine del 2024, il numero di truppe russe in Ucraina era di circa 700 mila. Si stima che la Russia <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">disponga</a> complessivamente di 1,3 milioni di militari in servizio e 2 milioni di riservisti.</span>\n\n\n\n<span class=\"para\"><a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">Secondo</a> fonti ufficiali, circa 80 mila militari statunitensi sono in servizio attivo in Europa. Il numero totale, però, varia a seconda delle esercitazioni e delle rotazioni periodiche delle truppe, come <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">evidenziato</a> dal <em>Council on Foreign Relations</em> (Consiglio sulle relazioni estere). Mentre secondo gli <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">esperti</a>, l’Europa avrebbe bisogno di altri 300 mila militari in servizio attivo, pari a circa 50 brigate, per difendersi senza il supporto degli Stati Uniti. </span>\n\n\n\n<h2><strong><strong>L’Europa va verso un esercito comune?</strong></strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">No. Alcuni paesi, come la Francia, sostengono da sempre una maggiore autonomia militare dell’Ue, mentre altri, come la Polonia e i Paesi baltici, continuano a privilegiare il ruolo della Nato. Piuttosto che muoversi verso un esercito europeo unico, l’Ue sta puntando i suoi sforzi su una cooperazione militare più stretta, con appalti congiunti e forze di risposta più rapide, come previsto dallo <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\"><em>Strategic Compass</em> del 2022</a>, che punta a creare una forza di dispiegamento rapido di 5 mila unità entro il 2025. </span>\n<span class=\"para\">La mobilità militare resta tuttora una delle priorità della strategia difensiva dell’Unione, perché non esistono regole armonizzate per lo spostamento di truppe ed equipaggiamenti tra gli stati membri in caso di emergenza.</span>\n<h2><strong><strong>Perché e come l’Ue vuole potenziare la sua produzione di armamenti?</strong></strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">L’annessione russa della Crimea nel 2014, seguita dall’invasione su larga scala dell’Ucraina nel 2022, ha ridisegnato la politica di sicurezza dell’Ue, costringendo sia l’Unione che la Nato a ripensare le proprie strategie di difesa e ad aumentare la spesa militare per rafforzare le proprie capacità operative. La guerra in Ucraina e il presunto avvicinamento dell’amministrazione Trump a Mosca hanno riacceso il dibattito sull’autonomia strategica dell’Ue. Francia, e ora anche Germania, insistono per una maggiore indipendenza dalle strutture di sicurezza guidate dagli Stati Uniti.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Negli ultimi vent’anni, l’Ue ha introdotto diverse iniziative nel settore della difesa.</span>\n\n <span>More :</span>\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" target=\"_blank\">\n Who’s going to pay for Europe’s rearmament? It’s time to tax the rich </a>\n \n<span class=\"para\">Per rafforzare la collaborazione militare sono stati fatti passi importanti, tra cui la creazione dell<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">’Agenzia europea per la difesa</a> (2004), il suo <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Piano annuale di sviluppo delle capacità </a>(2008) e la <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">Pesco</a> (Permanent Structured Cooperation, 2017). </span>\n<span class=\"para\">L’invasione russa dell’Ucraina nel 2022 ha accelerato ulteriormente gli sforzi di difesa dell’Ue, portando alla creazione dell’<a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">European Peace Facility</a> (2021),<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\"> EDIRPA</a> (Procuring together defence capabilities),<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\"> ASAP</a> (Boosting defence production, 2023), e<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\"> EDIS</a> (Our common defence industrial strategy, 2024).</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Attraverso il piano ReArm Europe, la Commissione europea punta a mobilitare 800 miliardi di euro per aumentare la spesa per la difesa, sostenere l’Ucraina e ampliare la base industriale europea.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Il piano prevede un nuovo strumento di 150 miliardi di euro in prestiti congiunti dell’Ue, l’allentamento temporaneo delle regole fiscali per le spese di difesa (che potrebbero liberare fino a 650 miliardi di euro nei prossimi quattro anni), l’uso volontario dei fondi di coesione e la modifica delle regole di investimento della Banca europea per gli investimenti (Bei), oltre allo “sblocco degli investimenti privati” attraverso il rilancio dell’Unione dei mercati dei capitali (<a href=\"https://finance.ec.europa.eu/capital-markets-union-and-financial-markets/capital-markets-union_it\">Cmu</a>), da tempo in fase di stallo.</span>\n<h2><strong><strong>Quanto è grande l’industria della difesa dell’Ue?</strong></strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Il settore della difesa dell'Ue ha un fatturato annuo stimato di quasi 84 miliardi di euro, sostenendo direttamente oltre 196 mila posti di lavoro altamente qualificati e creando indirettamente più di 315 mila posti di lavoro aggiuntivi,<a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\"> secondo la</a> Commissione. Ma l'industria europea della difesa<a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\"> ha bisogno di più lavoratori qualificati</a>.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Il valore di mercato delle aziende europee del settore della difesa è aumentato vertiginosamente: la maggior parte di esse che ha<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\"> raddoppiato il prezzo delle proprie azioni</a> dall'invasione dell'Ucraina da parte della Russia. Tuttavia, i ricavi sono ancora piuttosto esigui, a dimostrazione del fatto che la loro capacità di espansione è frenata dalle dimensioni dei mercati nazionali e dalle restrizioni alle esportazioni. Ciò ha dato il via a un dibattito sull'opportunità di una preferenza europea per la spesa comune dell'Ue in materia di difesa. “Tale ‘preferenza europea’ è un contributo necessario per invertire l'attuale predominanza dei fornitori non europei sui mercati europei della difesa”,<a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\"> sostiene il</a> settore. Ma i paesi dell'UE rimangono divisi.</span>\n\n\n\n<h2><strong>Quali sistemi d’arma sono considerati prioritari per l’Europa?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">L'Europa sta investendo in architetture di difesa aerea e missilistica multilivello perché, come ha detto l'anno scorso Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, segretario di Stato polacco per la difesa nazionale: “Avere un vantaggio nell'aria definisce la guerra”. Ad esempio, l<a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">'European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI)</a>, lanciata nell'ottobre 2022, cerca di creare un sistema di difesa onnicomprensivo che integri capacità che vanno dal corto raggio ai livelli esoatmosferici.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Inoltre, droni, missili, artiglieria, strumenti strategici, mobilità militare, capacità informatiche e intelligenza artificiale sono stati elencati come aree prioritarie. In particolare, i<a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\"> droni sono diventati uno strumento cruciale nella guerra in Ucraina</a>, spingendo sia Kiev che Mosca a sviluppare rapidamente la propria industria. Oggi, i principali esportatori di droni militari sono Cina e Turchia.</span>\n\nFonte: European Defence Agency\n\n\n<h2><strong>In che modo l’Ue può rafforzare le sue capacità militari?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">Sebbene un aumento degli investimenti nella difesa sia ben accetto, l'industria cerca contratti di approvvigionamento a lungo termine o pluriennali per garantire stabilità, innovazione sostenuta e sviluppo tecnologico. Il sistema “built-to-order” tipico del tempo di pace, su cui si basa l'industria della difesa dell'Ue, ha comportato lunghi tempi di attesa per le capacità di difesa avanzate.</span>\n<span class=\"para\">La cooperazione in materia di difesa, comprese le joint venture e gli appalti condivisi, è in crescita, ma rimane limitata. Ci sono stati sforzi specifici per aumentare la produzione di munizioni di artiglieria, un settore in cui l'Ucraina ha una forte domanda. Ma l'impegno dell'Ue di consegnare un milione di proiettili di artiglieria calibro 155 mm tra marzo 2023 e 2024 è stato impossibile da rispettare in tempo, per esempio. La Commissione europea ha stimato nel 2022 che la mancanza di cooperazione comporta costi annuali che vanno da 25 a 100 miliardi di euro.</span>\n\n <span>More :</span>\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" target=\"_blank\">\n Conscription returns to Europe? </a>\n \n<span class=\"para\">Un altro dei problemi chiave per l'industria della difesa dell'Ue è la frammentazione, soprattutto al di fuori dei settori aeronautico e missilistico. La frammentazione non solo causa duplicazioni e costi di produzione più elevati, ma anche problemi di interoperabilità, limitandone la portata e l'efficacia operativa sul campo. A titolo indicativo, gli Stati membri dell'Ue hanno fornito all'Ucraina dieci diversi tipi di obici,<a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\"> secondo la</a> relazione Draghi. Inoltre, l'Ue utilizza 12 diversi tipi di carri armati, mentre gli Stati Uniti ne producono solo uno (l'M1 Abrams).</span>\n<span class=\"para\">Nel frattempo, entrano in gioco anche le dipendenze esterne. Tra il 2007 e il 2016, oltre il 60 per cento del budget europeo per gli appalti della difesa è stato speso in importazioni militari non Ue, il che ha portato a controlli e restrizioni sulle attrezzature da parte di paesi terzi. Una “preferenza europea” negli appalti della difesa, spinta principalmente dalla Francia, non ha trovato consenso durante i colloqui informali dei leader dell'Ue a febbraio e, data la necessità di aumentare rapidamente le dimensioni, molti paesi chiedono che il sistema sia il più aperto possibile.</span>\n\n\n<h2><strong>I paesi europei hanno armi atomiche?</strong></h2>\n<span class=\"para\">A gennaio 2022, la Francia aveva 290 testate, con 98 sistemi di lancio, inclusi missili sottomarini e missili lanciati dall'aria. Il Regno Unito 225 testate, 120 operative, schierate su cinque sottomarini, con 105 in deposito,<a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\"> secondo l'</a>Arms Control Association.</span>\n\n\n<span class=\"para\">Nel frattempo, è stato riferito che Belgio, Germania, Italia, Paesi Bassi e Turchia ospitano tutti armi nucleari statunitensi. La Polonia ha recentemente chiesto a Washington di schierare armi nucleari nel paese, ammettendo che avere una propria capacità richiederebbe decenni.</span>\n<h6><strong>👉L'<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\">articolo originale</a> su EUobserver</strong></h6>\n\n\n\n<h6>In collaborazione con <a href=\"http://www.displayeurope.eu\">Display Europe</a>, cofinanziato dall'Unione europea. I punti di vista e le opinioni espressi sono esclusivamente quelli dell'autore o degli autori e non riflettono necessariamente quelli dell'Ue o della Direzione Generale per le Reti di Comunicazione, i Contenuti e la Tecnologia. Né l'Unione europea né l'autorità che ha concesso il finanziamento possono essere ritenute responsabili.</h6>\n\n\n\n",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"nl": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"pl": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"pt": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"ro": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"ru": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"sk": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"sv": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"tr": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
},
key:"uk": {
key:"value": string:"",
key:"engine": null:null
}
},
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy4sxnkb5garl757vd4wnn2je",
key:"pubDate": string:"2025-03-31T17:16:30",
key:"contentUrl": {
key:"de": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/de/?post_type=post&p=2623536",
key:"fromContentUrl": boolean:true
},
key:"en": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromContentUrl": boolean:true,
key:"firstLanguage": boolean:true
},
key:"it": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/it/?post_type=post&p=2623538",
key:"fromContentUrl": boolean:true
},
key:"bg": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"cs": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"el": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"es": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"fi": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"fr": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"hr": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"hu": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"nl": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"pl": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"pt": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"ro": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"ru": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"sk": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"sr": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"sv": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"tr": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
},
key:"uk": {
key:"value": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/en/?post_type=post&p=2622893",
key:"fromLang": string:"en"
}
},
key:"languageDetails": {
key:"OriginalLangauges": number:1,
key:"ContentItemLangauges": number:3,
key:"ContentItemTranslations": number:21
},
key:"originalLanguages": {
key:"language_codes": [
string:"en"
]
},
key:"revision": {
key:"dateModified": string:"2025-04-02T10:46:29.836",
key:"__typename": string:"Revision"
},
key:"mediaAssets": {
key:"nodes": [
{
key:"uid": string:"eayy2lireevgarimuvx3spggjfa",
key:"mediaType": string:"image",
key:"title": {
key:"en": {
key:"value": string:"Screenshot 2025-03-24 alle 14.37.35"
}
},
key:"duration": null:null,
key:"files": {
key:"nodes": [
{
key:"contentUrl": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35.png",
key:"mimeType": string:"image/png",
key:"__typename": string:"File"
},
{
key:"contentUrl": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-300x168.png",
key:"mimeType": string:"image/png",
key:"__typename": string:"File"
},
{
key:"contentUrl": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png",
key:"mimeType": string:"image/png",
key:"__typename": string:"File"
},
{
key:"contentUrl": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-150x150.png",
key:"mimeType": string:"image/png",
key:"__typename": string:"File"
},
{
key:"contentUrl": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-768x430.png",
key:"mimeType": string:"image/png",
key:"__typename": string:"File"
},
{
key:"contentUrl": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-395x252.png",
key:"mimeType": string:"image/png",
key:"__typename": string:"File"
}
],
key:"__typename": string:"MediaAssetFilesByFileToMediaAssetBAndAManyToManyConnection"
},
key:"__typename": string:"MediaAsset"
},
{
key:"uid": string:"eayy2lireevjqrzjhsysl5eqa6i",
key:"mediaType": string:"image",
key:"title": {
key:"en": {
key:"value": string:"Alex Falcó Chang voxeurop"
}
},
key:"duration": null:null,
key:"files": {
key:"nodes": [
{
key:"contentUrl": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/alex-falco-voxeurop.png",
key:"mimeType": string:"image/png",
key:"__typename": string:"File"
},
{
key:"contentUrl": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/alex-falco-voxeurop-300x163.png",
key:"mimeType": string:"image/png",
key:"__typename": string:"File"
},
{
key:"contentUrl": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/alex-falco-voxeurop-150x150.png",
key:"mimeType": string:"image/png",
key:"__typename": string:"File"
},
{
key:"contentUrl": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/alex-falco-voxeurop-768x417.png",
key:"mimeType": string:"image/png",
key:"__typename": string:"File"
},
{
key:"contentUrl": string:"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/alex-falco-voxeurop-395x252.png",
key:"mimeType": string:"image/png",
key:"__typename": string:"File"
}
],
key:"__typename": string:"MediaAssetFilesByFileToMediaAssetBAndAManyToManyConnection"
},
key:"__typename": string:"MediaAsset"
}
],
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemMediaAssetsByContentItemToMediaAssetAAndBManyToManyConnection"
},
key:"contentItemTranslations": {
key:"nodes": [
{
key:"title": string:"Combien de divisions l'Europe a-t-elle ? Un aperçu de l'état de la défense en Europe",
key:"uid": string:"08b38cf1-9645-47fe-9670-0605db35a63a",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Points Clés\n\n1. **Principaux Dépensiers en Défense** : Les États-Unis, la Chine, la Russie, l'Inde et l'Arabie Saoudite dominent les dépenses mondiales en défense, le budget militaire de la Russie ayant plus que doublé depuis son invasion de l'Ukraine en 2022, suscitant des inquiétudes concernant les dynamiques de sécurité en Europe.\n \n2. **Objectifs de Dépenses de l'OTAN** : Malgré l'objectif de l'OTAN de 2 % du PIB pour les dépenses de défense, plusieurs pays membres, dont la Croatie et le Portugal, n'ont pas encore atteint cet objectif. Des discussions sont en cours pour augmenter cet objectif à 5 %, reflétant des besoins de sécurité accrus.\n\n3. **Défis de l'Industrie de Défense de l'UE** : Le secteur de la défense de l'UE, évalué à près de 84 milliards d'euros, fait face à des défis significatifs, notamment la fragmentation, la dépendance aux importations non-UE et la nécessité de contrats d'approvisionnement à long terme pour améliorer les capacités militaires et l'innovation.\n\n### Teaser\n\n```markdown\nAlors que les tensions mondiales augmentent, les dépenses de défense explosent, avec les États-Unis, la Chine et la Russie en première ligne. En Europe, les membres de l'OTAN luttent pour atteindre les objectifs de dépenses, tandis que l'UE cherche à renforcer ses capacités militaires au milieu de la fragmentation et des dépendances externes. Avec des appels à des budgets accrus et une poussée pour l'autonomie stratégique, comment l'Europe naviguera-t-elle dans son paysage de défense face à des menaces évolutives ? Explorez les complexités des dépenses militaires et l'avenir de la sécurité européenne dans cette analyse approfondie.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Les dépenses militaires mondiales sont en hausse, les États-Unis, la Chine et la Russie menant la charge. Alors que l'Europe fait face à des défis en matière de sécurité, les nations augmentent leurs budgets de défense et explorent des initiatives militaires conjointes. Découvrez les dernières tendances et implications pour la sécurité mondiale.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quels sont les pays qui dépensent le plus en défense ?</strong></h2>\n<p>Les pays ayant les plus hauts <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">dépenses de défense</a> ces dernières années sont les <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">États-Unis</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Chine</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Russie</a>, Inde et Arabie Saoudite. La croissance européenne est dépassée par l'augmentation des dépenses militaires de la Russie, qui ont plus que doublé par rapport aux niveaux d'avant son <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">invasion de l'Ukraine en 2022</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"visualisation de la hiérarchie\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Combien dépensent les membres de l'OTAN en défense ?</strong></h2>\n<p>Le président américain <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> a critiqué à plusieurs reprises ses alliés pour ne pas respecter l'objectif de dépenses de défense de l'alliance, fixé à deux pour cent du PIB (convenu en 2014). Même maintenant, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">la Croatie</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">le Portugal</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">l'Italie</a>, le Canada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">la Belgique</a>, le Luxembourg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">la Slovénie</a> et <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">l'Espagne</a> n'ont pas atteint cet objectif.</p>\n<p>Les dépenses de défense des 23 pays de l'UE qui sont membres de l'<a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">OTAN</a> s'élevaient à 1,99 pour cent de leur PIB combiné en 2024 et devraient atteindre 2,04 pour cent en 2025.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Plus :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Une Europe secouée se regroupe pour faire face au nouvel ordre Trumpo-Poutiniste </a>\n </div>\n<p>Mais Trump a suggéré que les membres de l'OTAN devraient augmenter leurs dépenses minimales de défense à cinq pour cent du PIB — une idée soutenue par la cheffe de la politique étrangère de l'UE <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> en janvier. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> a proposé d'augmenter les dépenses de défense de l'UE de trois à 3,5 pour cent du PIB. Pourtant, cela prendrait des années à se concrétiser en fonction des taux actuels.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"visualisation de la hiérarchie\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>La défense est une industrie axée sur la technologie qui nécessite des investissements massifs en recherche et innovation. Le financement de la R&amp;D en défense dans l'UE a atteint 3,9 milliards d'euros en 2022, selon Eurostat. Cependant, selon le<a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\"> rapport Dragi</a>, les systèmes de défense de nouvelle génération nécessiteront des investissements massifs en R&amp;D. Depuis 2014, les États-Unis ont priorisé les dépenses de R&amp;D par rapport à toutes les autres catégories de dépenses militaires. La France, l'Allemagne et la Suède sont en tête des pays de l'UE investissant dans la R&amp;D pour la défense.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quels pays européens augmentent le plus leurs budgets de défense ?</strong></h2>\n<p>Depuis 2014, des pays comme <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">la Hongrie</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">la République tchèque</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">la Pologne</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">le Danemark</a>, la Macédoine du Nord, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">la Slovaquie</a> et <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">la Suède</a> ont doublé leurs dépenses de défense, tandis que le Luxembourg, la Lettonie et la Lituanie ont triplé leurs dépenses. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">L'Allemagne</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">les Pays-Bas</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">l'Estonie</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">la Roumanie</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">la Bulgarie</a> et <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">la Finlande</a> ont également presque doublé leurs budgets de défense.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Combien de soldats ont les pays européens ?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Le nombre total de militaires actifs en Europe, y compris le Royaume-Uni, est estimé à environ 1,5 million. Cependant, son efficacité est compromise par l'absence d'une structure de commandement et de systèmes militaires communs.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"visualisation de la carte\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>À la fin de 2024, le nombre de troupes russes en <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukraine</a> était d'environ 700 000. Cependant, il est<a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\"> estimé</a> que la Russie compte environ 1,3 million de militaires actifs et deux millions de réservistes.</p>\n<p>Selon<a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\"> des chiffres officiels</a>, environ 80 000 militaires américains sont actifs en Europe. Cependant, le nombre total fluctue en raison des exercices et des rotations de troupes de routine, comme<a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\"> noté</a> par le Council on Foreign Relations. Pendant ce temps, des experts estiment que l'Europe aurait besoin d'<a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\"> 300 000 militaires supplémentaires</a> ou environ 50 brigades pour se défendre, sans les troupes américaines.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"visualisation de la carte\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>L'Europe se dirige-t-elle vers une armée commune ?</strong></h2>\n<p>Non. Certains pays, comme <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">la France</a>, ont traditionnellement soutenu une plus grande autonomie militaire de l'UE, tandis que d'autres, comme la Pologne et les pays baltes, privilégient l'OTAN. Mais plutôt que de se diriger vers une armée européenne unique, l'UE concentre ses efforts sur une coopération militaire plus étroite, des achats communs et des forces d'intervention rapide, comme le montre le <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Boussole stratégique de 2022</a>, dont l'objectif était d'avoir une force de déploiement rapide de 5 000 hommes d'ici 2025. La mobilité militaire reste aujourd'hui l'une des priorités de la stratégie de défense de l'UE, car il n'existe pas de règles harmonisées pour déplacer des troupes ou du matériel entre les pays en situation d'urgence.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Pourquoi et comment l'UE prévoit-elle d'augmenter sa production d'armements ?</strong></h2>\n<p>L'invasion de la Crimée en 2014, suivie de l'invasion à grande échelle de l'Ukraine par la Russie en 2022, a redéfini la politique de sécurité de l'UE, forçant l'UE et l'OTAN à repenser les stratégies de défense et à augmenter les dépenses militaires pour renforcer les capacités. La guerre en Ukraine et le pivot apparent de l'administration Trump vers Moscou ont également ravivé les discussions sur l'autonomie stratégique de l'UE, la France (et maintenant même l'Allemagne) plaidant pour plus d'indépendance vis-à-vis des structures de sécurité dirigées par les États-Unis.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Plus :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Qui va payer pour le réarmement de l'Europe ? Il est temps de taxer les riches </a>\n </div>\n<p>Au cours des deux dernières décennies, l'UE a proposé différentes initiatives en matière de défense.</p>\n<p>Les étapes clés pour renforcer la collaboration militaire incluent la création de l'<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\"> Agence européenne de défense</a> (2004), son <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\"> Plan de développement des capacités</a> annuel (2008) et <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\"> PESCO</a> (2017). Les réglementations sur les transferts de défense et les exportations à double usage ont également renforcé le contrôle des armements, tandis que l'invasion à grande échelle de l'Ukraine par la Russie en 2022 a accéléré les efforts de défense de l'UE, conduisant à la création de la <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\"> Facilité européenne de paix</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\"> EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\"> ASAP</a> (2023) et <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\"> EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>Avec son <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\"> plan ReArm Europe</a>, la Commission européenne vise à mobiliser 800 milliards d'euros pour augmenter les dépenses de défense de l'UE, soutenir l'Ukraine et élargir la base industrielle de l'Europe.</p>\n<p>Le plan comprend un nouvel instrument de 150 milliards d'euros en nouveaux emprunts communs de l'UE, assouplissant les règles fiscales du bloc pour la défense (ce qui pourrait libérer 650 milliards d'euros au cours des quatre prochaines années), utilisant des<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\"> fonds de cohésion</a> (volontairement), modifiant les règles d'investissement pour la BEI et « débloquant des » investissements privés tout au long de la <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\"> Union des marchés de capitaux</a> (UMC) qui est restée en panne pendant longtemps.&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quelle est la taille de l'industrie de la défense de l'UE ?</strong></h2>\n<p>Le secteur de la défense de l'UE a un chiffre d'affaires annuel estimé à près de 84 milliards d'euros, soutenant directement plus de 196 000 emplois hautement qualifiés et créant indirectement plus de 315 000 emplois supplémentaires, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">selon</a> la Commission européenne. Mais l'industrie de la défense européenne<a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\"> a besoin de plus de travailleurs qualifiés</a> alors qu'elle augmente sa production et son innovation pour faire face aux défis de sécurité croissants.</p>\n<p>Les valeurs boursières des entreprises de défense européennes ont explosé, la plupart<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\"> ayant doublé leurs prix d'actions</a> depuis l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie. Mais les revenus restent encore assez faibles, montrant que leur capacité à se développer est freinée par la taille des marchés nationaux et les restrictions à l'exportation. Cela a suscité un débat sur la nécessité d'une préférence européenne pour les dépenses de défense communes de l'UE. « Une telle 'préférence européenne' est une contribution nécessaire pour inverser la prédominance actuelle des fournisseurs non européens sur les marchés de défense européens », <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\"> soutient</a> l'industrie.&nbsp; Mais les pays de l'UE restent divisés.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"visualisation de la table\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quels systèmes d'armement sont considérés comme prioritaires pour l'Europe ?</strong></h2>\n<p>L'Europe investit dans des architectures de défense aérienne et antimissile multi-couches car, comme l'a dit l'année dernière Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, secrétaire d'État polonais à la défense nationale : « Avoir un avantage dans les airs définit la guerre ». </p>\n<p>Par exemple, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\"> l'Initiative européenne de bouclier aérien (ESSI)</a>, lancée en octobre 2022, vise à créer un système de défense englobant qui intègre des capacités allant des niveaux à courte portée aux niveaux exo-atmosphériques.</p>\n<p>De plus, les drones, les missiles, l'artillerie, les facilitateurs stratégiques, la mobilité militaire, les capacités cybernétiques et l'intelligence artificielle ont été listés comme des domaines prioritaires. En effet, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\"> les drones sont devenus un outil crucial dans la guerre en Ukraine</a>, incitant à la fois Kyiv et Moscou à développer rapidement leur propre industrie. Et aujourd'hui, les principaux exportateurs de drones militaires sont la Chine et la Turquie.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Priorités de développement des capacités de l'UE. Source : Agence européenne de défense\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Source : Agence européenne de défense</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quels défis l'UE doit-elle relever pour renforcer ses capacités militaires ?</strong></h2>\n<p>Bien que l'augmentation des investissements en défense soit bienvenue, l'industrie recherche des contrats d'approvisionnement à long terme ou pluriannuels pour la stabilité, l'innovation soutenue et le développement technologique. Le système 'construit sur commande', typique des temps de paix, sur lequel repose l'industrie de la défense de l'UE, a entraîné de longs délais d'attente pour des capacités de défense avancées.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>La coopération en matière de défense, y compris les coentreprises et les achats partagés, est en croissance, mais elle reste limitée. Des efforts spécifiques ont été déployés pour augmenter la production de munitions d'artillerie, un domaine où l'Ukraine a une forte demande. Mais l'engagement de l'UE de livrer un million d'obus d'artillerie de 155 mm entre mars 2023 et 2024 était impossible à respecter dans les délais, montrant les défis à venir. La Commission européenne a estimé en 2022 que le manque de coopération entraîne des coûts annuels allant de 25 à 100 milliards d'euros.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Plus :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n La conscription revient-elle en Europe ? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Un autre des enjeux clés pour l'industrie de la défense de l'UE est la fragmentation, en particulier en dehors des secteurs aéronautique et missile.&nbsp; La fragmentation déclenche non seulement des duplications et des coûts de production plus élevés, mais aussi des problèmes d'interopérabilité, limitant son échelle et son efficacité opérationnelle sur le terrain. À titre d'indication, les États membres de l'UE ont fourni dix types différents de canons à l'Ukraine, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">selon</a> le rapport Dragi. De plus, l'UE exploite 12 types différents de chars de combat, tandis que les États-Unis n'en fabriquent qu'un (le M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Pendant ce temps, les dépendances externes entrent également en jeu. Entre 2007 et 2016, plus de 60 % du budget d'approvisionnement en défense de l'Europe a été dépensé pour des importations militaires non-UE, entraînant des contrôles et des restrictions de pays tiers sur l'équipement. Une 'préférence européenne' en matière d'approvisionnement en défense, principalement poussée par la France, n'a pas trouvé de consensus lors des discussions informelles des dirigeants de l'UE en février – et étant donné la nécessité de se développer rapidement, de nombreux pays appellent à un système aussi ouvert que possible.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Les pays européens ont-ils des armes nucléaires ?</strong></h2>\n<p>En janvier 2022, la France avait 290 ogives, avec 98 systèmes de livraison, y compris des missiles sous-marins et des missiles aéroportés. Le Royaume-Uni avait 225 ogives, dont 120 opérationnelles, déployées sur cinq sous-marins, avec 105 en stockage, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">selon</a> l'Association de contrôle des armements.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"visualisation de la carte\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Pendant ce temps, il est rapporté que la Belgique, l'Allemagne, l'Italie, les Pays-Bas et la Turquie accueillent tous des armes nucléaires américaines. La Pologne a récemment appelé Washington à déployer des armes nucléaires dans le pays, admettant que disposer de sa propre capacité prendrait des décennies.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Article original</strong></a><strong> sur <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">En partenariat avec <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, cofinancé par l'Union européenne. Les points de vue et opinions exprimés sont cependant ceux de l'auteur ou des auteurs uniquement et ne reflètent pas nécessairement ceux de l'Union européenne ou de la Direction générale des réseaux de communication, du contenu et de la technologie. Ni l'Union européenne ni l'autorité de financement ne peuvent en être tenues responsables.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:29.722",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"L'invasion à grande échelle de l'Ukraine par la Russie en février 2022 a ébranlé l'approche de l'UE en matière de défense, incitant à une réévaluation rapide de son paysage militaire. Le retrait annoncé des États-Unis de la défense européenne a remis la question du réarmement du continent sur la table. EUobserver examine l'état des lieux.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"fr",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:17:44.583",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Сколько дивизий у Европы? Взгляд на состояние обороны Европы",
key:"uid": string:"16dc659c-c9c2-4012-8edb-c5e705d24305",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Ключевые моменты\n\n1. **Крупнейшие расходы на оборону**: Соединенные Штаты, Китай, Россия, Индия и Саудовская Аравия возглавляют мировые расходы на оборону, при этом военный бюджет России более чем удвоился с момента ее вторжения в Украину в 2022 году, что вызывает опасения по поводу динамики безопасности в Европе.\n \n2. **Цели расходов НАТО**: Несмотря на цель НАТО в 2% от ВВП на расходы на оборону, несколько стран-членов, включая Хорватию и Португалию, еще не достигли этой цели. Обсуждения о повышении этой цели до 5% продолжаются, отражая возросшие потребности в безопасности.\n\n3. **Проблемы оборонной промышленности ЕС**: Оборонный сектор ЕС, стоимость которого составляет почти 84 миллиарда евро, сталкивается с серьезными проблемами, включая фрагментацию, зависимость от импорта из стран, не входящих в ЕС, и необходимость долгосрочных контрактов на закупку для повышения военных возможностей и инноваций.\n\n### Анонс\n\n```markdown\nС ростом глобальной напряженности расходы на оборону стремительно увеличиваются, при этом Соединенные Штаты, Китай и Россия находятся на переднем плане. В Европе страны-члены НАТО сталкиваются с трудностями в достижении целевых показателей расходов, в то время как ЕС стремится укрепить свои военные возможности на фоне фрагментации и внешних зависимостей. С призывами к увеличению бюджетов и стремлением к стратегической автономии, как Европа будет ориентироваться в своем оборонном ландшафте перед лицом развивающихся угроз? Изучите сложности военных расходов и будущее европейской безопасности в этом углубленном анализе.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Глобальные военные расходы растут, при этом США, Китай и Россия ведут в этом направлении. Поскольку Европа сталкивается с проблемами безопасности, страны увеличивают свои оборонные бюджеты и исследуют совместные военные инициативы. Узнайте о последних тенденциях и последствиях для глобальной безопасности.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Какие страны тратят больше всего на оборону?</strong></h2>\n<p>Страны с наибольшими <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">расходами на оборону</a> в последние годы — это <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Соединенные Штаты</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Китай</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Россия</a>, Индия и Саудовская Аравия. Европейский рост отстает от растущих военных расходов России, которые более чем удвоились по сравнению с уровнями до <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">вторжения в Украину в 2022 году</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Сколько тратят на оборону страны НАТО?</strong></h2>\n<p>Президент США <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Дональд Трамп</a> неоднократно критиковал союзников за то, что они не достигают целевого уровня расходов на оборону альянса в два процента от ВВП (согласованного еще в 2014 году). Даже сейчас <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Хорватия</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Португалия</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Италия</a>, Канада, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Бельгия</a>, Люксембург, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Словения</a> и <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Испания</a> не достигли этой цели.</p>\n<p>Расходы на оборону 23 стран ЕС, являющихся <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">членами НАТО</a>, составили 1,99 процента от их совокупного ВВП в 2024 году и, как ожидается, достигнут 2,04 процента в 2025 году.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Подробнее :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Потрясенная Европа объединяется, чтобы противостоять новому порядку Трампо-Путинизма </a>\n </div>\n<p>Но Трамп предложил, чтобы страны НАТО увеличили свои минимальные расходы на оборону до пяти процентов от ВВП — идея, поддержанная главой внешнеполитического ведомства ЕС <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Кайей Каллас</a> в январе. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Макрон</a> предложил увеличить расходы ЕС на оборону на три до 3,5 процента от ВВП. Однако это займет годы, чтобы реализовать, исходя из текущих темпов.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Оборона — это технологически ориентированная отрасль, требующая значительных инвестиций в исследования и инновации. Финансирование НИОКР в области обороны в ЕС достигло 3,9 миллиарда евро в 2022 году, согласно данным Eurostat. Однако, согласно <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">отчету Драги</a>, системы обороны следующего поколения потребуют значительных инвестиций в НИОКР. С 2014 года США приоритизировали расходы на НИОКР выше всех других категорий военных расходов. Франция, Германия и Швеция находятся на вершине списка стран ЕС, инвестирующих в НИОКР для обороны.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Какие европейские страны увеличивают бюджеты на оборону больше всего?</strong></h2>\n<p>С 2014 года такие страны, как <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Венгрия</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Чехия</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Польша</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Дания</a>, Северная Македония, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Словакия</a> и <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Швеция</a> удвоили свои расходы на оборону, в то время как Люксембург, Латвия и Литва утроили свои расходы. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Германия</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Нидерланды</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Эстония</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Румыния</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Болгария</a> и <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Финляндия</a> также почти удвоили свои бюджеты на оборону.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Сколько солдат в европейских странах?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Общее количество активного военного персонала в Европе, включая Великобританию, оценивается примерно в 1,5 миллиона. Однако его эффективность подрывается отсутствием единой командной структуры и военных систем.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>К концу 2024 года количество российских войск в <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Украине</a> составляло примерно 700 000. Однако <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">оценивается</a>, что в России около 1,3 миллиона активного военного персонала и два миллиона резервистов.</p>\n<p>Согласно <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">официальным данным</a>, около 80 000 американских военных находятся в Европе. Однако общее количество колеблется из-за учений и ротации войск, как <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">отмечает</a> Совет по международным отношениям. Тем временем эксперты оценивают, что Европе потребуется <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">дополнительные 300 000 военнослужащих</a> или около 50 бригад для самообороны без американских войск.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Двигается ли Европа к созданию совместной армии?</strong></h2>\n<p>Нет. Некоторые страны, такие как <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Франция</a>, традиционно поддерживают более сильную военную автономию ЕС, в то время как другие, такие как Польша и страны Балтии, отдают приоритет НАТО. Но вместо того, чтобы двигаться к единой европейской армии, ЕС сосредоточивает усилия на более тесном военном сотрудничестве, совместных закупках и более быстрых силах реагирования, как видно в <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Стратегическом компасе 2022 года</a>, целью которого было создание сил быстрого развертывания численностью 5000 человек к 2025 году. Военная мобильность по-прежнему является одним из приоритетов оборонной стратегии ЕС, поскольку нет согласованных правил для перемещения войск или оборудования между странами в экстренной ситуации.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Почему и как ЕС планирует увеличить производство оружия?</strong></h2>\n<p>Вторжение в Крым в 2014 году, за которым последовало полномасштабное вторжение России в Украину в 2022 году, изменило политику безопасности ЕС, заставив ЕС и НАТО пересмотреть стратегии обороны и увеличить военные расходы для повышения возможностей. Война в Украине и очевидный поворот администрации Трампа к Москве также возобновили обсуждения о стратегической автономии ЕС, при этом Франция (а теперь даже Германия) выступает за большую независимость от структур безопасности, возглавляемых США.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Подробнее :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Кто будет платить за перевооружение Европы? Пора обложить налогом богатых </a>\n </div>\n<p>За последние два десятилетия ЕС предложил различные инициативы в области обороны.</p>\n<p>Ключевые шаги для повышения военного сотрудничества включают создание <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Европейского оборонного агентства</a> (2004), его ежегодный <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">План развития возможностей</a> (2008) и <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017). Регулирование оборонных поставок и экспорта двойного назначения также укрепило контроль за вооружениями, в то время как полномасштабное вторжение России в Украину в 2022 году ускорило усилия ЕС в области обороны, что привело к созданию <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Европейского миротворческого фонда</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) и <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>С помощью своего <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">плана ReArm Europe</a> Европейская комиссия намерена мобилизовать 800 миллиардов евро для увеличения расходов на оборону ЕС, поддержки Украины и расширения промышленной базы Европы.</p>\n<p>План включает новый инструмент в размере 150 миллиардов евро для новых совместных заимствований ЕС, ослабление фискальных правил блока для обороны (что может освободить 650 миллиардов евро в течение следующих четырех лет), использование <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">фондов сплоченности</a> (добровольно), изменение инвестиционных правил для ЕИБ и «разблокировку частных» инвестиций в рамках давно замороженного <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Союза капитальных рынков</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Насколько велика оборонная промышленность ЕС?</strong></h2>\n<p>Оборонный сектор ЕС имеет оценочный годовой оборот почти 84 миллиарда евро, непосредственно поддерживая более 196 000 высококвалифицированных рабочих мест и косвенно создавая более 315 000 дополнительных рабочих мест, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">согласно</a> данным Европейской комиссии. Однако европейская оборонная промышленность <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">нуждается в более квалифицированных работниках</a>, так как она увеличивает производство и инновации для решения растущих проблем безопасности.</p>\n<p>Рыночные стоимости европейских оборонных компаний резко возросли, при этом большинство <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">удвоили свои акции</a> с тех пор, как Россия вторглась в Украину. Однако доходы все еще довольно малы, что показывает, что их способность масштабироваться сдерживается размером национальных рынков и экспортными ограничениями. Это вызвало дебаты о том, следует ли вводить европейские предпочтения для общих расходов на оборону ЕС. «Такое 'европейское предпочтение' является необходимым вкладом для того, чтобы обратить текущее преобладание неевропейских поставщиков на европейских оборонных рынках», <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">утверждает</a> промышленность.&nbsp; Но страны ЕС остаются разделенными.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Какие системы оружия считаются приоритетными для Европы?</strong></h2>\n<p>Европа инвестирует в многоуровневые архитектуры противовоздушной и противоракетной обороны, потому что, как сказал Павел Ксаверий Залевский, польский государственный секретарь по национальной обороне, в прошлом году: «Наличие преимущества в воздухе определяет войну». </p>\n<p>Например, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">Инициатива Европейского небесного щита (ESSI)</a>, запущенная в октябре 2022 года, стремится создать всеобъемлющую систему обороны, которая интегрирует возможности от короткоствольных до экзоатмосферных уровней.</p>\n<p>Кроме того, дроны, ракеты, артиллерия, стратегические средства, военная мобильность, киберспособности и искусственный интеллект были перечислены как приоритетные области. В частности, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">дроны стали важным инструментом в войне в Украине</a>, побуждая как Киев, так и Москву быстро развивать собственную промышленность. И сегодня основными экспортерами военных дронов являются Китай и Турция.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Приоритеты развития возможностей ЕС. Источник: Европейское оборонное агентство\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Источник: Европейское оборонное агентство</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>С какими проблемами сталкивается ЕС в укреплении своих военных возможностей?</strong></h2>\n<p>Хотя увеличение инвестиций в оборону приветствуется, промышленность требует долгосрочных или многолетних контрактов на закупку для стабильности, устойчивых инноваций и технологического развития. Система «построенная под заказ», типичная для мирного времени, на которой основана оборонная промышленность ЕС, привела к длительным срокам ожидания для получения современных оборонных возможностей.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Военное сотрудничество, включая совместные предприятия и совместные закупки, растет, но остается ограниченным. Были предприняты конкретные усилия для увеличения производства артиллерийских боеприпасов, в которых Украина испытывает высокий спрос. Но обязательство ЕС поставить один миллион артиллерийских снарядов калибра 155 мм между мартом 2023 года и 2024 годом оказалось невозможным для выполнения в срок, что показывает предстоящие проблемы. Европейская комиссия оценила в 2022 году, что отсутствие сотрудничества приводит к ежегодным затратам от 25 до 100 миллиардов евро.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Подробнее :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Возвращение призыва в Европу? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Еще одной ключевой проблемой для оборонной промышленности ЕС является фрагментация, особенно вне аэрокосмического и ракетного секторов.&nbsp; Фрагментация не только вызывает дублирование и повышенные производственные затраты, но и проблемы совместимости, ограничивая масштаб и оперативную эффективность в поле. В качестве примера, государства-члены ЕС предоставили Украине десять различных типов гаубиц, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">согласно</a> отчету Драги. Кроме того, ЕС использует 12 различных типов боевых танков, в то время как США производят только один (M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Тем временем внешние зависимости также имеют значение. С 2007 по 2016 год более 60 процентов бюджета на закупки обороны Европы было потрачено на военные импорты из стран, не входящих в ЕС, что привело к контролю и ограничениям со стороны третьих стран на оборудование. «Европейское предпочтение» в оборонных закупках, продвигаемое в основном Францией, не нашло консенсуса во время неформальных переговоров лидеров ЕС в феврале — и учитывая необходимость быстрого масштабирования, многие страны призывают к системе, которая была бы как можно более открытой.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Есть ли у европейских стран ядерное оружие?</strong></h2>\n<p>По состоянию на январь 2022 года у Франции было 290 боеголовок с 98 системами доставки, включая подводные ракеты и ракеты воздушного базирования. У Великобритании было 225 боеголовок, 120 из которых были оперативными, размещенными на пяти подводных лодках, с 105 в запасе, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">согласно</a> данным Ассоциации по контролю за вооружениями.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Тем временем сообщается, что Бельгия, Германия, Италия, Нидерланды и Турция все принимают на своей территории американское ядерное оружие. Польша недавно призвала Вашингтон разместить ядерное оружие в стране, признав, что наличие собственного потенциала займет десятилетия.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Оригинальная статья</strong></a><strong> на <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">В партнерстве с <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, софинансируемым Европейским Союзом. Мнения и взгляды, выраженные, однако, принадлежат только автору(ам) и не обязательно отражают мнение Европейского Союза или Генерального директорату по коммуникационным сетям, контенту и технологиям. Ни Европейский Союз, ни предоставляющий орган не могут нести за них ответственность.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:30.354",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Полномасштабное вторжение России в Украину в феврале 2022 года потрясло подход ЕС к обороне, что привело к быстрой переоценке его военного ландшафта. Объявленный вывод США из обороны Европы вновь поставил вопрос о перевооружении континента на повестку дня. EUobserver рассматривает текущее состояние дел.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"ru",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:19:17.08",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Avrupa'nın kaç bölümü var? Avrupa'nın savunma durumuna bir bakış",
key:"uid": string:"18309968-7a54-4105-81f6-038182ea6996",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Anahtar Noktalar\n\n1. **En Yüksek Savunma Harcamaları**: Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Çin, Rusya, Hindistan ve Suudi Arabistan, küresel savunma harcamalarında lider konumda; Rusya'nın askeri bütçesi, 2022'deki Ukrayna işgalinden bu yana iki katından fazla artarak Avrupa güvenlik dinamikleri hakkında endişeleri artırıyor.\n \n2. **NATO Harcama Hedefleri**: NATO'nun savunma harcamaları için belirlediği %2'lik GSYİH hedefine rağmen, Hırvatistan ve Portekiz gibi bazı üye ülkeler bu hedefe henüz ulaşamadı. Bu hedefin %5'e çıkarılması yönünde tartışmalar devam ediyor ve bu, artan güvenlik ihtiyaçlarını yansıtıyor.\n\n3. **AB Savunma Sanayi Zorlukları**: Yaklaşık 84 milyar € değerindeki AB savunma sektörü, parçalanma, AB dışı ithalatlara bağımlılık ve askeri yetenekleri ve yeniliği artırmak için uzun vadeli tedarik sözleşmelerine ihtiyaç gibi önemli zorluklarla karşı karşıya.\n\n### Tanıtım\n\n```markdown\nKüresel gerginlikler arttıkça, savunma harcamaları yükseliyor; Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Çin ve Rusya ön planda. Avrupa'da, NATO üyeleri harcama hedeflerini karşılama konusunda zorluk yaşıyor, AB ise parçalanma ve dışa bağımlılıklar arasında askeri yeteneklerini güçlendirmeye çalışıyor. Artan bütçeler ve stratejik özerklik çağrıları ile Avrupa, gelişen tehditler karşısında savunma manzarasını nasıl yönetecek? Askeri harcamaların karmaşıklıklarını ve Avrupa güvenliğinin geleceğini bu derinlemesine analizde keşfedin.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Küresel askeri harcamalar artış gösteriyor, ABD, Çin ve Rusya bu konuda öncülük ediyor. Avrupa güvenlik zorluklarıyla boğuşurken, ülkeler savunma bütçelerini artırıyor ve ortak askeri girişimleri araştırıyor. Küresel güvenlik için en son trendleri ve etkileri keşfedin.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>En fazla savunma harcaması yapan ülkeler hangileri?</strong></h2>\n<p>Son yıllarda en yüksek <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">savunma</a> harcamasına sahip ülkeler <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Amerika Birleşik Devletleri</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Çin</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Rusya</a>, Hindistan ve Suudi Arabistan'dır. Avrupa'daki büyüme, Rusya'nın artan askeri harcamaları tarafından geride bırakılmakta, bu harcamalar 2022'deki <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">Ukrayna'ya saldırısından</a> önceki seviyelerin iki katından fazlasına çıkmıştır.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Nato üyeleri savunmaya ne kadar harcıyor?</strong></h2>\n<p>ABD Başkanı <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a>, müttefikleri, 2014'te üzerinde anlaşılan gayri safi yurtiçi hasılanın (GSYİH) yüzde iki oranındaki savunma harcaması hedefini karşılamadıkları için defalarca eleştirdi. Hâlâ, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Hırvatistan</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portekiz</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">İtalya</a>, Kanada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belçika</a>, Lüksemburg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Slovenya</a> ve <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">İspanya</a> bu hedefe ulaşamadı.</p>\n<p>23 AB ülkesinin <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">Nato</a> üyesi olanlarının savunma harcaması, 2024'te toplam GSYİH'lerinin yüzde 1.99'una ulaşmış ve 2025'te yüzde 2.04'e ulaşması beklenmektedir.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Daha fazla :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Sarsılan Avrupa, Trumpo-Putinist yeni düzene karşı kenetleniyor </a>\n </div>\n<p>Ancak Trump, Nato üyelerinin minimum savunma harcamalarını GSYİH'nın yüzde beşine çıkarmalarını önerdi — bu fikir, Ocak ayında AB dış politika şefi <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> tarafından desteklendi. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a>, AB'nin savunma harcamasını GSYİH'nın yüzde üç ile 3.5 arasında artırmayı önerdi. Ancak, mevcut oranlara dayanarak bunun gerçekleşmesi yıllar alacaktır.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Savunma, araştırma ve yenilik için büyük yatırımlar gerektiren teknoloji odaklı bir sektördür. Eurostat'a göre, AB'deki savunma Ar-Ge finansmanı 2022'de 3.9 milyar €'ya ulaştı. Ancak, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">Dragi raporuna</a> göre, yeni nesil savunma sistemleri büyük Ar-Ge yatırımları gerektirecektir. 2014'ten bu yana, ABD, Ar-Ge harcamalarını diğer tüm askeri harcama kategorilerinin önünde önceliklendirmiştir. Fransa, Almanya ve İsveç, savunma için Ar-Ge'ye yatırım yapan AB ülkeleri arasında en üst sıralardadır.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Hangi Avrupa ülkeleri savunma bütçelerini en çok artırıyor?</strong></h2>\n<p>2014'ten bu yana, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Macaristan</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Çek Cumhuriyeti</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Polonya</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Danimarka</a>, Kuzey Makedonya, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Slovakya</a> ve <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">İsveç</a> savunma harcamalarını iki katına çıkardılar, oysa Lüksemburg, Letonya ve Litvanya harcamalarını üç katına çıkardılar. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Almanya</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Hollanda</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estonya</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Romanya</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulgaristan</a> ve <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finlandiya</a> da savunma bütçelerini neredeyse iki katına çıkardılar.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Avrupa ülkelerinin kaç askeri var?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Avrupa'daki aktif askeri personel sayısının, Birleşik Krallık dahil, yaklaşık 1.5 milyon olduğu tahmin edilmektedir. Ancak, etkinliği, ortak bir komuta yapısı ve askeri sistemlerin eksikliği nedeniyle zayıflamaktadır.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>2024'ün sonuna kadar, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukrayna'daki</a> Rus askerlerinin sayısı yaklaşık 700,000'dir. Ancak, <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">Rusya'nın</a> yaklaşık 1.3 milyon aktif askeri personeli ve iki milyon yedek askeri olduğu tahmin edilmektedir.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">Resmi rakamlara</a> göre, Avrupa'da yaklaşık 80,000 Amerikan askeri bulunmaktadır. Ancak, toplam sayı, tatbikatlar ve rutin asker rotasyonları nedeniyle dalgalanmaktadır, <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">Dış İlişkiler Konseyi'nin</a> belirttiği gibi. Bu arada, uzmanlar, Avrupa'nın kendini savunmak için <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">ek olarak 300,000 asker</a> veya yaklaşık 50 tugaya ihtiyaç duyacağını tahmin ediyorlar, ABD askerleri olmadan.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Avrupa ortak bir orduya mı yöneliyor?</strong></h2>\n<p>Hayır. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Fransa</a> gibi bazı ülkeler, geleneksel olarak daha güçlü bir AB askeri özerkliğini desteklerken, Polonya ve Baltık ülkeleri gibi diğerleri Nato'yu önceliklendiriyor. Ancak, tek bir Avrupa ordusuna doğru gitmek yerine, AB, <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">2022 Stratejik Pusula</a>da görüldüğü gibi, daha yakın askeri işbirliği, ortak alım ve daha hızlı müdahale güçlerine odaklanmaktadır; bu pusulanın hedefi 2025 yılına kadar 5,000 kişilik bir hızlı konuşlandırma gücü oluşturmaktı. Askeri hareketlilik, hala AB'nin savunma stratejisinin önceliklerinden biridir çünkü acil bir durumda ülkeler arasında asker veya ekipman hareket ettirmek için uyumlu kurallar yoktur.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>AB, silah üretimini artırmayı nasıl planlıyor ve neden?</strong></h2>\n<p>2014'teki Kırım'ın işgali ve ardından 2022'de Rusya'nın tam ölçekli Ukrayna işgali, AB güvenlik politikasını yeniden şekillendirdi ve AB ile Nato'yu savunma stratejilerini gözden geçirmeye ve askeri harcamaları artırmaya zorladı. Ukrayna'daki savaş ve Trump yönetiminin Moskova'ya doğru belirgin bir kayması, AB stratejik özerkliği konusundaki tartışmaları da canlandırdı; Fransa (ve şimdi hatta Almanya) ABD liderliğindeki güvenlik yapılarından daha fazla bağımsızlık talep ediyor.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Daha fazla :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Avrupa'nın yeniden silahlanmasını kim finanse edecek? Zenginleri vergilendirme zamanı </a>\n </div>\n<p>Son yirmi yılda, AB farklı savunma girişimleri geliştirdi.</p>\n<p>Askeri işbirliğini artırmak için atılan önemli adımlar arasında <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Avrupa Savunma Ajansı</a>'nın (2004) kurulması, yıllık <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Kapasite Geliştirme Planı</a> (2008) ve <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017) bulunmaktadır. Savunma transferleri ve çift kullanımlı ihracatlar için düzenlemeler de silah kontrolünü güçlendirmiştir; Rusya'nın 2022'deki tam ölçekli Ukrayna işgali, AB savunma çabalarını hızlandırmış ve <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Avrupa Barış Tesisi</a>'nin (2021) oluşturulmasına, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) ve <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a>'nin (2024) oluşturulmasına yol açmıştır.</p>\n<p>Avrupa Komisyonu, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">ReArm Europe planı</a> ile AB savunma harcamasını artırmak, Ukrayna'yı desteklemek ve Avrupa'nın sanayi tabanını genişletmek için 800 milyar € mobilize etmeyi hedefliyor.</p>\n<p>Plan, AB'nin savunma için mali kurallarını gevşeterek 150 milyar € yeni ortak AB borçlanma aracı içermekte (bu, önümüzdeki dört yıl içinde 650 milyar €'ya kadar serbest bırakılabilir), <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">kohezyon</a> fonlarını (isteğe bağlı olarak) kullanarak, EIB için yatırım kurallarını değiştirerek ve uzun süredir bekleyen <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Sermaye Pazarları Birliği</a> (CMU) boyunca \"özel\" yatırımları açığa çıkararak gerçekleştirilmesi planlanmaktadır.&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>AB'nin savunma sanayisi ne kadar büyük?</strong></h2>\n<p>AB savunma sektörünün yıllık cirosunun yaklaşık 84 milyar € olduğu, doğrudan 196,000'den fazla yüksek nitelikli istihdamı desteklediği ve dolaylı olarak 315,000'den fazla ek iş yarattığı tahmin edilmektedir, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">Avrupa Komisyonu'na</a> göre. Ancak Avrupa savunma sanayisi, <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">daha fazla nitelikli işgücüne ihtiyaç duymaktadır</a> çünkü üretimi ve yeniliği artırarak artan güvenlik zorluklarıyla başa çıkmaktadır.</p>\n<p>Avrupa savunma şirketlerinin piyasa değerleri yükselmiş, çoğu <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">Rusya'nın Ukrayna'yı işgalinden bu yana hisse fiyatlarını iki katına çıkarmıştır</a>. Ancak gelirler hala oldukça düşük olup, ölçeklenme kapasitelerinin ulusal pazarların büyüklüğü ve ihracat kısıtlamaları tarafından engellendiğini göstermektedir. Bu, ortak AB savunma harcaması için bir Avrupa tercihi olup olmayacağı konusunda bir tartışma başlatmıştır. “Böyle bir ‘Avrupa tercihi’, Avrupa savunma pazarlarında Avrupa dışı tedarikçilerin mevcut baskınlığını tersine çevirmek için gerekli bir katkıdır,” <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">savunma sanayisi savunmaktadır</a>. Ancak AB ülkeleri hâlâ bölünmüş durumdadır.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Hangi silah sistemleri Avrupa için öncelikli olarak görülüyor?</strong></h2>\n<p>Avrupa, çok katmanlı hava ve füze savunma mimarilerine yatırım yapmaktadır çünkü Polonya Ulusal Savunma Bakanı Paweł Ksawery Zalewski geçen yıl şöyle demiştir: “Havada bir avantaja sahip olmak, savaşı tanımlar.”</p>\n<p>Örneğin, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">Avrupa Gökyüzü Kalkanı İnisiyatifi (ESSI)</a>, Ekim 2022'de başlatılmış olup, kısa menzilli seviyelerden dış atmosfer seviyelerine kadar olan yetenekleri entegre eden kapsamlı bir savunma sistemi oluşturmayı hedeflemektedir.</p>\n<p>Ayrıca, insansız hava araçları, füzeler, topçu, stratejik destekleyiciler, askeri hareketlilik, siber yetenekler ve yapay zeka öncelikli alanlar olarak listelenmiştir. Özellikle, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">insansız hava araçları, Ukrayna'daki savaşta kritik bir araç haline gelmiştir</a> ve hem Kiev hem de Moskova kendi endüstrilerini hızla geliştirmiştir. Bugün, askeri insansız hava araçlarının en büyük ihracatçıları Çin ve Türkiye'dir.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Kaynak: Avrupa Savunma Ajansı</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>AB, askeri yeteneklerini güçlendirmede hangi zorluklarla karşılaşıyor?</strong></h2>\n<p>Artan savunma yatırımları memnuniyetle karşılansa da, sanayi, istikrar, sürdürülebilir yenilik ve teknoloji geliştirme için uzun vadeli veya çok yıllı alım sözleşmeleri talep etmektedir. AB savunma sanayisinin dayandığı barış zamanına özgü ‘sipariş üzerine üretim’ sistemi, gelişmiş savunma yetenekleri için uzun bekleme sürelerine yol açmıştır.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Ortak girişimler ve paylaşılan alımlar da dahil olmak üzere savunma işbirliği artmakta, ancak sınırlı kalmaktadır. Ukrayna'nın yüksek talep gösterdiği bir alan olan topçu mühimmatı üretimini artırmak için özel çabalar olmuştur. Ancak, AB'nin Mart 2023 ile 2024 arasında bir milyon 155 mm kalibre top mermisi teslim etme taahhüdü zamanında yerine getirilememiştir ve bu, önümüzdeki zorlukları göstermektedir. AB Komisyonu, 2022'de işbirliği eksikliğinin yıllık maliyetlerin 25 milyar € ile 100 milyar € arasında değişmesine yol açtığını tahmin etmiştir.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Daha fazla :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Zorunlu askerlik Avrupa'ya mı geri dönüyor? </a>\n </div>\n<p>AB savunma sanayisinin bir diğer önemli sorunu, özellikle havacılık ve füze sektörleri dışında parçalanmadır.&nbsp; Parçalanma, yalnızca tekrarları ve daha yüksek üretim maliyetlerini tetiklemekle kalmaz, aynı zamanda operasyonel etkinliği sınırlayan birlikte çalışabilirlik sorunlarına da yol açar. Bir gösterge olarak, AB üye devletleri, Ukrayna'ya on farklı tip obüs sağlamıştır, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">Dragi raporuna</a> göre. Ayrıca, AB 12 farklı tip muharebe tankı işletirken, ABD yalnızca bir tane (M1 Abrams) üretmektedir.</p>\n<p>Bu arada, dış bağımlılıklar da etkili olmaktadır. 2007 ile 2016 yılları arasında, Avrupa'nın savunma alım bütçesinin yüzde 60'ından fazlası AB dışı askeri ithalatlara harcanmış, bu da üçüncü ülke kontrolleri ve ekipman üzerindeki kısıtlamalara yol açmıştır. Fransa'nın öncülüğünde savunma alımında 'Avrupa tercihi' sağlanması, Şubat ayında AB liderlerinin gayri resmi görüşmelerinde uzlaşma bulamamıştır - ve hızlı bir şekilde ölçeklenme ihtiyacı göz önüne alındığında, birçok ülke mümkün olduğunca açık bir sistem talep etmektedir.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Avrupa ülkelerinin nükleer silahları var mı?</strong></h2>\n<p>Ocak 2022 itibarıyla, Fransa'nın 290 savaş başlığı, 98 teslimat sistemi, denizaltı füzeleri ve hava fırlatılan füzeler dahil olmak üzere bulunmaktadır. Birleşik Krallık'ın 225 savaş başlığı, 120'si operasyonel, beş denizaltıda konuşlandırılmış, 105'i depoda bulunmaktadır, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">Silah Kontrol Derneği'ne</a> göre.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Bu arada, Belçika, Almanya, İtalya, Hollanda ve Türkiye'nin hepsinin ABD nükleer silahlarına ev sahipliği yaptığı bildirilmektedir. Polonya, Washington'dan ülkede nükleer silah konuşlandırmasını talep etti ve kendi kapasitesine sahip olmanın on yıllar alacağını kabul etti.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Orijinal makale</strong></a><strong> <em>euobserver</em>'da</strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">Avrupa Birliği tarafından ortaklaşa finanse edilen <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a> ile işbirliği içinde. Ancak, ifade edilen görüş ve düşünceler yalnızca yazar(lar)ın görüşleridir ve Avrupa Birliği'nin veya İletişim Ağları, İçerik ve Teknoloji Genel Müdürlüğü'nün görüşlerini yansıtmayabilir. Ne Avrupa Birliği ne de bağış yapan otorite bunlardan sorumlu tutulamaz.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:30.421",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Rusya'nın Şubat 2022'de Ukrayna'ya yönelik tam ölçekli işgali, AB'nin savunma yaklaşımını sarstı ve askeri manzarasını hızlı bir şekilde yeniden değerlendirmeye yöneltti. ABD'nin Avrupa'nın savunmasından çekileceğini açıklaması, kıtanın yeniden silahlanma meselesini yeniden gündeme getirdi. EUobserver, mevcut durumu inceliyor.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"tr",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:19:26.009",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Колко дивизии има Европа? Поглед към състоянието на отбраната на Европа",
key:"uid": string:"195c111b-dd25-4656-9e1d-e0c0b59b4137",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Ключови точки\n\n1. **Най-големи разходи за отбрана**: Съединените щати, Китай, Русия, Индия и Саудитска Арабия водят глобалните разходи за отбрана, като военният бюджет на Русия се е удвоил от 2022 г. насам след инвазията в Украйна, което повдига притеснения относно динамиката на европейската сигурност.\n \n2. **Цели за разходи на НАТО**: Въпреки целта на НАТО от 2% от БВП за разходи за отбрана, няколко държави членки, включително Хърватия и Португалия, все още не са постигнали тази цел. Текат дискусии за увеличаване на тази цел до 5%, отразявайки повишените нужди от сигурност.\n\n3. **Предизвикателства пред отбранителната индустрия на ЕС**: Отбранителният сектор на ЕС, оценяван на почти 84 милиарда евро, се сблъсква със значителни предизвикателства, включително фрагментация, зависимост от внос извън ЕС и необходимост от дългосрочни договори за доставки, за да се подобрят военните способности и иновациите.\n\n### Анонс\n\n```markdown\nС нарастващите глобални напрежения, разходите за отбрана нарастват, като Съединените щати, Китай и Русия са на преден план. В Европа, членовете на НАТО се борят да постигнат целите за разходи, докато ЕС се стреми да укрепи военните си способности на фона на фрагментация и външни зависимости. С призиви за увеличаване на бюджетите и натиск за стратегическа автономия, как Европа ще навигира в своята отбранителна среда пред лицето на развиващите се заплахи? Изследвайте сложността на военните разходи и бъдещето на европейската сигурност в този задълбочен анализ.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Глобалните военни разходи нарастват, като САЩ, Китай и Русия водят в тази посока. Докато Европа се бори с предизвикателствата за сигурност, нациите увеличават своите бюджети за отбрана и проучват съвместни военни инициативи. Открийте последните тенденции и последици за глобалната сигурност.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Кои са страните, които харчат най-много за отбрана?</strong></h2>\n<p>Страните с най-високи <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">разходи за отбрана</a> в последните години са <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Съединените щати</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Китай</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Русия</a>, Индия и Саудитска Арабия. Европейският растеж изостава от нарастващите военни разходи на Русия, които са се удвоили в сравнение с нивата преди <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">инвазията в Украйна през 2022 г.</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Колко харчат членовете на НАТО за отбрана?</strong></h2>\n<p>Президентът на САЩ <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Доналд Тръмп</a> многократно е критикувал съюзниците за това, че не изпълняват целта на алианса за разходи за отбрана от два процента от БВП (съгласувана още през 2014 г.). Дори сега, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Хърватия</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Португалия</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Италия</a>, Канада, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Белгия</a>, Люксембург, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Словения</a> и <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Испания</a> не са достигнали целта.</p>\n<p>Разходите за отбрана на 23-те държави от ЕС, които са <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">членове на НАТО</a>, възлизат на 1.99 процента от комбинирания им БВП през 2024 г. и се очаква да достигнат 2.04 процента през 2025 г.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Повече :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Разтърсена Европа затваря редиците си, за да се изправи пред новия ред на Тръмпо-Путин </a>\n </div>\n<p>Но Тръмп предложи членовете на НАТО да увеличат минималните си разходи за отбрана на пет процента от БВП — идея, подкрепена от ръководителя на външните работи на ЕС <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Кая Калас</a> през януари. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Макрон</a> предложи увеличаване на разходите за отбрана на ЕС с три до 3.5 процента от БВП. Въпреки това, това ще отнеме години, за да се реализира на базата на текущите темпове.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Отбраната е индустрия, движена от технологии, която изисква масивни инвестиции в изследвания и иновации. Финансирането на изследвания и разработки в областта на отбраната в ЕС достигна 3.9 милиарда евро през 2022 г., според Евростат. Въпреки това, според <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">доклада на Драги</a>, системите за отбрана от следващо поколение ще изискват масивни инвестиции в изследвания и разработки. От 2014 г. насам САЩ приоритизират разходите за изследвания и разработки над всички останали категории военни разходи. Франция, Германия и Швеция са на върха на страните от ЕС, които инвестират в изследвания и разработки за отбрана.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Кои европейски страни увеличават най-много бюджетите за отбрана?</strong></h2>\n<p>От 2014 г. насам, страни като <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Унгария</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Чехия</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Полша</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Дания</a>, Северна Македония, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Словакия</a> и <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Швеция</a> са удвоили разходите си за отбрана, докато Люксембург, Латвия и Литва са утроили разходите си. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Германия</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Нидерландия</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Естония</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Румъния</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">България</a> и <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Финландия</a> също почти удвоиха бюджетите си за отбрана.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Колко войници имат европейските страни?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Общият брой на активния военен персонал в Европа, включително Великобритания, се оценява на около 1.5 милиона. Въпреки това, ефективността му е подкопана от липсата на обща командна структура и военни системи.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>До края на 2024 г. броят на руските войски в <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Украйна</a> е приблизително 700,000. Въпреки това, се <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">оценява</a>, че Русия има около 1.3 милиона активен военен персонал и два милиона резервисти.</p>\n<p>Според <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">официални данни</a>, около 80,000 американски военни сили са активни в Европа. Въпреки това, общият брой варира поради учения и рутинни ротации на войски, както <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">отбелязва</a> Съветът по външни отношения. Междувременно, експерти оценяват, че Европа ще се нуждае от <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">допълнителни 300,000 военнослужещи</a> или около 50 бригади, за да се защити, без американски войски.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Дали Европа се движи към обща армия?</strong></h2>\n<p>Не. Някои страни, като <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Франция</a>, традиционно подкрепят по-силна военна автономия на ЕС, докато други, като Полша и балтийските държави, приоритизират НАТО. Но вместо да се движи към единна европейска армия, ЕС фокусира усилията си върху по-близко военно сътрудничество, съвместни поръчки и по-бързи сили за реагиране, както е видно в <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Стратегическата компас</a> от 2022 г., чиято цел беше да има бърза разгръщаща се сила от 5,000 души до 2025 г. Военната мобилност все още е един от приоритетите на отбранителната стратегия на ЕС, тъй като няма хомогенни правила за преместване на войски или оборудване между страните в ситуация на извънредно положение.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Защо и как ЕС планира да увеличи производството на оръжия?</strong></h2>\n<p>Инвазията в Крим през 2014 г., последвана от пълномащабната инвазия на Русия в Украйна през 2022 г., промениха политиката за сигурност на ЕС, принуждавайки ЕС и НАТО да преосмислят стратегиите за отбрана и да увеличат военните разходи, за да увеличат способностите. Войната в Украйна и очевидният завой на администрацията на Тръмп към Москва също възобновиха дискусиите за стратегическата автономия на ЕС, като Франция (а сега дори и Германия) настояват за повече независимост от водените от САЩ структури за сигурност.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Повече :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Кой ще плати за преоръжаването на Европа? Време е да се облага богатите </a>\n </div>\n<p>През последните две десетилетия ЕС е предложил различни инициативи за отбрана.</p>\n<p>Ключовите стъпки за подобряване на военното сътрудничество включват създаването на <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Европейската агенция за отбрана</a> (2004), нейния годишен <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">План за развитие на способностите</a> (2008) и <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">ПЕСКО</a> (2017). Регулациите за трансфери на отбрана и износи с двойно предназначение също укрепиха контрола върху оръжията, докато пълномащабната инвазия на Русия в Украйна през 2022 г. ускори усилията на ЕС в областта на отбраната, водещи до създаването на <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Европейския мирен фонд</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">ЕДИРПА</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">АСАП</a> (2023) и <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">ЕДИС</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>С плана си <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">ReArm Europe</a>, Европейската комисия цели да мобилизира 800 милиарда евро, за да увеличи разходите за отбрана на ЕС, да подкрепи Украйна и да разшири индустриалната база на Европа.</p>\n<p>Планът включва нов инструмент от 150 милиарда евро за ново съвместно заимстване на ЕС, облекчавайки фискалните правила на блока за отбрана (което може да освободи 650 милиарда евро през следващите четири години), използвайки <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">фондове за кохезия</a> (доброволно), променяйки правилата за инвестиции за ЕИБ и „освобождавайки частни“ инвестиции в дълго забавената <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Съюз на капиталовите пазари</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Колко голяма е отбранителната индустрия на ЕС?</strong></h2>\n<p>Отбранителният сектор на ЕС има оценен годишен оборот от почти 84 милиарда евро, директно подкрепяйки над 196,000 висококвалифицирани работни места и индиректно създавайки повече от 315,000 допълнителни работни места, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">според</a> Европейската комисия. Но европейската отбранителна индустрия <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">нуждае се от повече квалифицирани работници</a>, тъй като увеличава производството и иновациите, за да се справи с нарастващите предизвикателства за сигурността.</p>\n<p>Пазарните стойности на европейските отбранителни компании са се увеличили, като повечето <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">удвоиха цените на акциите си</a> откакто Русия нахлу в Украйна. Но приходите все още са доста малки, което показва, че способността им да се разширяват е ограничена от размера на националните пазари и ограниченията за износ. Това предизвика дебат относно това дали трябва да има европейска предимство за общите разходи за отбрана на ЕС. „Такова 'европейско предимство' е необходимо, за да се обърне текущото преобладаване на неевропейски доставчици на европейските отбранителни пазари“, <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">аргументира</a> индустрията.&nbsp; Но страните от ЕС остават разделени.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Кои оръжейни системи се считат за приоритет за Европа?</strong></h2>\n<p>Европа инвестира в многостепенни архитектури за въздушна и ракетна отбрана, защото, както каза Павел Ксавери Залевски, полският държавен секретар по националната отбрана, миналата година: „Да имаш предимство във въздуха определя войната\".</p>\n<p>Например, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">Инициативата за европейския небесен щит (ESSI)</a>, стартирала през октомври 2022 г., цели да създаде всеобхватна система за отбрана, която интегрира способности, вариращи от къс радиус до екзосферата.</p>\n<p>В допълнение, дронове, ракети, артилерия, стратегически активатори, военна мобилност, кибер способности и изкуствен интелект са изброени като приоритетни области. А именно, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">дроновете са станали ключов инструмент във войната в Украйна</a>, принуждавайки както Киев, така и Москва бързо да развият собствената си индустрия. И днес основните износители на военни дронове са Китай и Турция.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Източник: Европейската агенция за отбрана</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>С какви предизвикателства се сблъсква ЕС в укрепването на военните си способности?</strong></h2>\n<p>Докато увеличените инвестиции в отбраната са добре дошли, индустрията търси дългосрочни или многогодишни договори за поръчки за стабилност, устойчиви иновации и технологично развитие. Системата „построена по поръчка“, типична за мирно време, на която се основава отбранителната индустрия на ЕС, е довела до дълги времена на чакане за напреднали способности за отбрана.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Военното сътрудничество, включително съвместни предприятия и споделени поръчки, нараства, но остава ограничено. Имало е конкретни усилия за увеличаване на производството на артилерийски боеприпаси, област, в която Украйна има високо търсене. Но ангажиментът на ЕС да достави един милион артилерийски снаряди с калибър 155 мм между март 2023 г. и 2024 г. беше невъзможен за изпълнение навреме, показвайки предизвикателствата напред. Европейската комисия оцени през 2022 г., че липсата на сътрудничество води до годишни разходи в диапазона от 25 милиарда до 100 милиарда евро.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Повече :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Връщането на наборната служба в Европа? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Друго от ключовите предизвикателства за отбранителната индустрия на ЕС е фрагментацията, особено извън секторите на аеронавтиката и ракетите.&nbsp; Фрагментацията не само предизвиква дублиране и по-високи производствени разходи, но също така и проблеми с интероперативността, ограничавайки мащаба и оперативната ефективност на терен. Като индикация, държавите членки на ЕС са предоставили десет различни типа гаубици на Украйна, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">според</a> доклада на Драги. Освен това, ЕС оперира с 12 различни типа бойни танкове, докато САЩ произвеждат само един (M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Междувременно, външните зависимости също играят роля. Между 2007 и 2016 г. над 60 процента от бюджета за поръчки за отбрана на Европа е бил изразходван за неевропейски военни вноски, водещи до контрол и ограничения от трети страни върху оборудването. „Европейското предимство“ в поръчките за отбрана, което основно се настоява от Франция, не намери консенсус по време на неформалните разговори на лидерите на ЕС през февруари – и предвид необходимостта от бързо разширяване, много страни призовават за система, която да бъде възможно най-отворена.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Имат ли европейските страни ядрени оръжия?</strong></h2>\n<p>Към януари 2022 г. Франция разполага с 290 бойни глави, с 98 системи за доставка, включително подводни ракети и ракети, изстрелвани от въздуха. Великобритания разполага с 225 бойни глави, 120 от които са оперативни, разположени на пет подводници, с 105 в склад, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">според</a> Асоциацията за контрол на оръжията.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Междувременно, съобщава се, че Белгия, Германия, Италия, Нидерландия и Турция всички хостват американски ядрени оръжия. Полша наскоро призова Вашингтон да разположи ядрени оръжия в страната, признавайки, че притежаването на собствен капацитет ще отнеме десетилетия.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Оригинална статия</strong></a><strong> в <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">В партньорство с <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, съфинансирано от Европейския съюз. Изразените възгледи и мнения обаче са само на автора(ите) и не отразяват непременно тези на Европейския съюз или Генерална дирекция „Комуникационни мрежи, съдържание и технологии“. Нито Европейският съюз, нито предоставящият орган могат да бъдат държани отговорни за тях.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:30.578",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Пълномащабната инвазия на Русия в Украйна през февруари 2022 г. разтърси подхода на ЕС към отбраната, провокирайки бърза преоценка на военния му ландшафт. Обявеното изтегляне на САЩ от отбраната на Европа постави въпроса за преоръжаването на континента отново на масата. EUobserver разглежда състоянието на играта.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"bg",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:19:48.396",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"How many divisions does Europe have? A look at the state of Europe’s defence",
key:"uid": string:"1a5fca12-1680-48b3-8b57-8e6b3044e1c2",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Key Points\n\n1. **Top Defence Spenders**: The United States, China, Russia, India, and Saudi Arabia lead global defence spending, with Russia's military budget more than doubling since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, raising concerns about European security dynamics.\n \n2. **NATO Spending Targets**: Despite NATO's target of 2% of GDP for defence spending, several member countries, including Croatia and Portugal, have yet to meet this goal. Discussions are ongoing about increasing this target to 5%, reflecting heightened security needs.\n\n3. **EU Defence Industry Challenges**: The EU's defence sector, valued at nearly €84 billion, faces significant challenges, including fragmentation, reliance on non-EU imports, and the need for long-term procurement contracts to enhance military capabilities and innovation.\n\n### Teaser\n\n```markdown\nAs global tensions rise, defence spending is surging, with the United States, China, and Russia at the forefront. In Europe, NATO members grapple with meeting spending targets, while the EU seeks to bolster its military capabilities amid fragmentation and external dependencies. With calls for increased budgets and a push for strategic autonomy, how will Europe navigate its defence landscape in the face of evolving threats? Explore the complexities of military spending and the future of European security in this in-depth analysis.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Global military spending is on the rise, with the US, China, and Russia leading the charge. As Europe grapples with security challenges, nations are ramping up their defence budgets and exploring joint military initiatives. Discover the latest trends and implications for global security.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Which are the countries spending most on defence?</strong></h2>\n<p>The countries with the highest <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">defence</a> spending in recent years are the <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">United States</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">China</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Russia</a>, India, and Saudi Arabia. European growth is outpaced by Russia's rising military spending, which has more than doubled the levels before its <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">2022 invasion of Ukraine</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How much do Nato members spend on defence?</strong></h2>\n<p>US president <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> has repeatedly criticised allies for not meeting the alliance’s defence spending target of two percent of GDP (agreed upon back in 2014). Even now, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Croatia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugal</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Italy</a>, Canada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belgium</a>, Luxembourg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Slovenia</a>, and <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Spain</a> have not hit the target.</p>\n<p>The defence spending of the 23 EU countries that are <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">Nato</a> members amounted to 1.99 percent of their combined GDP in 2024 and is projected to reach 2.04 percent in 2025.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>More :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n A shaken Europe closes ranks to face the Trumpo-Putinist new order </a>\n </div>\n<p>But Trump suggested that Nato members should increase their minimum defence spending to five percent of GDP — an idea backed by EU foreign affairs chief <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> in January. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> has proposed raising the EU's defence spending by three to 3.5 percent of GDP. Yet, this would take years to materialise based on current rates.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Defence is a tech-driven industry that calls for massive investment in research and innovation. Defence R&amp;D funding in the EU reached €3.9bn in 2022, according to Eurostat. However, according to the<a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\"> Dragi report</a>, next-generation defence systems will require massive R&amp;D investment. Since 2014, the US has prioritised R&amp;D spending above all other military expenditure categories. France, Germany and Sweden are at the top of EU countries investing in R&amp;D for defence.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Which European countries are increasing defence budgets the most?</strong></h2>\n<p>Since 2014, countries such as <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Hungary</a>, the <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Czech Republic</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Poland</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Denmark</a>, North Macedonia, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Slovakia</a>, and <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Sweden</a> have doubled their defence expenditures, while Luxembourg, Latvia, and Lithuania have tripled their spending. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Germany</a>, the <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Netherlands</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estonia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Romania</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulgaria</a>, and <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finland</a> have also nearly doubled their defence budgets.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How many soldiers do European countries have?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>The total number of active military personnel in Europe, including the UK, is estimated to be around 1.5 million. However, its efficiency is undermined by the lack of a common command structure and military systems.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>By the end of 2024, the number of Russian troops in <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukraine</a> was approximately 700,000. However, it is<a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\"> estimated</a> that Russia has about 1.3 million active military personnel and two million reservists.</p>\n<p>According to<a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\"> official figures</a>, around 80,000 American military forces are active in Europe. However, the total number fluctuates due to exercises and routine troop rotations, as<a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\"> noted</a> by the Council on Foreign Relations. Meanwhile, experts estimate Europe would need an<a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\"> additional 300,000 servicemen</a> or around 50 brigades to defend itself, without US troops.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Is Europe moving towards a joint army?</strong></h2>\n<p>No. Some countries, like <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">France</a>, have traditionally supported stronger EU military autonomy, while others, such as Poland and the Baltics, prioritise Nato. But rather than moving toward a single European army, the EU is focusing efforts on closer military cooperation, joint procurement, and faster response forces, as seen in the <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">2022 Strategic Compass</a>, whose goal was to have a 5,000-strong rapid deployment force by 2025. Military mobility is still today one of the priorities of the EU’s defence strategy since no harmonised rules to move troops or equipment between countries in a situation of emergency.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Why and how does the EU plan to boost its arms production?</strong></h2>\n<p>The invasion of Crimea in 2014, followed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has reshaped EU security policy, forcing the EU and Nato to rethink defence strategies and increase military spending to boost capabilities. The war in Ukraine and the Trump administration's apparent pivot towards Moscow has also revived discussions on EU strategic autonomy, with France (and now even Germany) pushing for more independence from US-led security structures.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>More :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Who’s going to pay for Europe’s rearmament? It’s time to tax the rich </a>\n </div>\n<p>Over the past two decades, the EU has come up with different defence initiatives.</p>\n<p>Key steps to enhance military collaboration include the set up of the<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\"> European Defence Agency</a> (2004), its annual<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\"> Capability Development Plan</a> (2008), and<a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\"> PESCO</a> (2017). Regulations for defence transfers and dual-use exports have also strengthened arms control, while Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine accelerated EU defence efforts, leading to the creation of the<a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\"> European Peace Facility</a> (2021),<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\"> EDIRPA</a>,<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\"> ASAP</a> (2023), and<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\"> EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>With its<a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\"> ReArm Europe plan</a>, the European Commission aims to mobilise €800bn to boost EU defence spending, support Ukraine, and expand Europe’s industrial base.</p>\n<p>The plan includes a new instrument of €150bn in new joint EU borrowing, loosening the bloc’s fiscal rules for defence (which could be freed up €650bn over the next four years), using<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\"> cohesion</a> funds (voluntarily), changing investment rules for EIB and “unlocking private” investment throughout the long-stalled<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\"> Capital Market Union</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How big is the EU’s defence industry?</strong></h2>\n<p>The EU defence sector has an estimated annual turnover of nearly €84bn, directly supporting over 196,000 high-skilled jobs and indirectly creating more than 315,000 additional jobs, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">according to</a> the European Commission. But the European defence industry<a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\"> needs more skilled workers</a> as it boosts production and innovation to tackle growing security challenges.</p>\n<p>European defence companies' market values have soared, with most<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\"> doubling their share prices</a> since Russia invaded Ukraine. But revenues are still pretty small, showing that their capacity to scale up is held back by the size of national markets and export restrictions. This has prompted a debate about whether there should be a European preference for common EU defence spending. “Such ‘European preference’ is a necessary contribution to reverse the current predominance of non-European suppliers on European defence markets,”<a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\"> argues</a> the industry.&nbsp; But EU countries remain divided.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Which weapons systems are seen as a priority for Europe?</strong></h2>\n<p>Europe is investing in multi-layered air and missile defence architectures because as Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, Polish secretary of state for national defence, said last year: “Having an advantage in the air defines the war\".</p>\n<p>For example,<a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\"> the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI)</a>, launched in October 2022, seeks to create an all-encompassing defence system that integrates capabilities ranging from short-range to exoatmospheric levels.</p>\n<p>In addition, drones, missiles, artillery, strategic enablers, military mobility, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence have been listed as priority areas. Namely,<a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\"> drones have become a crucial tool in the war in Ukraine</a>, prompting both Kyiv and Moscow to quickly develop their own industry. And today, the main exporters of military drones are China and Turkey.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Source: European Defence Agency</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What challenges does the EU face in strengthening its military capabilities?</strong></h2>\n<p>While increased defence investment is welcomed, the industry seeks long-term or multi-year procurement contracts for stability, sustained innovation, and tech development. The ‘built-to-order’ system typical of peacetime, which the EU defence industry is based on, has resulted in long waiting times for advanced defence capabilities.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Defence cooperation, including joint ventures and shared procurement, is growing, but it remains limited. There have been specific efforts to boost artillery ammunition production, an area where Ukraine has a high demand. But the EU’s pledge to deliver one million 155-mm-calibre artillery shells between March 2023 and 2024 was impossible to fulfil in time, showing the challenges ahead. The EU Commission estimated in 2022 that the lack of cooperation leads to annual costs ranging from €25bn to €100bn.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>More :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Conscription returns to Europe? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Another of the key issues for the EU’s defence industry is fragmentation, especially outside the aeronautics and missile sectors.&nbsp; Fragmentation not only triggers duplication and higher production costs but also interoperability problems, limiting its scale and operational effectiveness in the field. As an indication, EU member states have provided ten different types of howitzers to Ukraine, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">according to</a> the Draghi report. In addition, the EU operates 12 different types of battle tanks, whereas the US manufactures just one (the M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Meanwhile, external dependencies also factor in. Between 2007 and 2016, over 60 percent of Europe's defence procurement budget was spent on non-EU military imports, leading to third-country controls and restrictions on the equipment. A 'European preference' in defence procurement, pushed mainly by France, did not find consensus during informal talks of EU leaders in February – and given the need to scale up quickly, many countries are calling for a system to be as open as possible.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Do European countries have nuclear weapons?</strong></h2>\n<p>As of January 2022, France had 290 warheads, with 98 delivery systems, including submarine missiles and air-launched missiles. The UK had 225 warheads, 120 operational, deployed on five submarines, with 105 in storage, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">according to</a> the Arms Control Association.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Meanwhile, it is reported that Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey all host US nuclear weapons. Poland has recently called on Washington to deploy nuclear weapons in the country, admitting that having its own capacity would take decades.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Original article</strong></a><strong> on <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">In partnership with <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, cofunded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the Directorate‑General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:29.292",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shook the EU's approach to defence, prompting a rapid reassessment of its military landscape. The announced US withdrawal from Europe’s defence has put the question of the continent's rearmament back on the table. EUobserver looks at the state of play.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"en",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:16:34.742",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Koľko divízií má Európa? Pohľad na stav obrany Európy",
key:"uid": string:"27dc770b-28ef-47fb-810f-e0c35ddd6cbe",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Kľúčové body\n\n1. **Najväčší výdavkoví obranníci**: Spojené štáty, Čína, Rusko, India a Saudská Arábia vedú globálne výdavky na obranu, pričom ruský vojenský rozpočet sa od jeho invázie na Ukrajinu v roku 2022 viac ako zdvojnásobil, čo vyvoláva obavy o dynamiku európskej bezpečnosti.\n \n2. **Ciele výdavkov NATO**: Napriek cieľu NATO vo výške 2% HDP na výdavky na obranu niekoľko členských krajín, vrátane Chorvátska a Portugalska, tento cieľ ešte nedosiahlo. Diskusie prebiehajú o zvýšení tohto cieľa na 5%, čo odráža zvýšené bezpečnostné potreby.\n\n3. **Výzvy obranného priemyslu EÚ**: Obranný sektor EÚ, ktorý má hodnotu takmer 84 miliárd €, čelí významným výzvam, vrátane fragmentácie, závislosti od dovozu z krajín mimo EÚ a potreby dlhodobých zmlúv o obstarávaní na zlepšenie vojenských schopností a inovácií.\n\n### Teaser\n\n```markdown\nAko globálne napätie narastá, výdavky na obranu sa zvyšujú, pričom Spojené štáty, Čína a Rusko sú v popredí. V Európe sa členské štáty NATO snažia splniť výdavkové ciele, zatiaľ čo EÚ sa snaží posilniť svoje vojenské schopnosti uprostred fragmentácie a vonkajších závislostí. S požiadavkami na zvýšenie rozpočtov a snahou o strategickú autonómiu, ako sa Európa vyrovná so svojou obrannou krajinou v čele s vyvíjajúcimi sa hrozbami? Preskúmajte zložitosti vojenských výdavkov a budúcnosť európskej bezpečnosti v tejto hĺbkovej analýze.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Globálne vojenské výdavky rastú, pričom USA, Čína a Rusko vedú v tejto oblasti. Keď sa Európa vyrovnáva s bezpečnostnými výzvami, krajiny zvyšujú svoje obranné rozpočty a skúmajú spoločné vojenské iniciatívy. Objavte najnovšie trendy a dôsledky pre globálnu bezpečnosť.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ktoré krajiny najviac investujú do obrany?</strong></h2>\n<p>Krajiny s najvyššími <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">výdavkami na obranu</a> v posledných rokoch sú <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Spojené štáty</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Čína</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Rusko</a>, India a Saudská Arábia. Európsky rast zaostáva za rastúcimi vojenskými výdavkami Ruska, ktoré sa viac ako zdvojnásobili v porovnaní s úrovňami pred jeho <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">inváziou na Ukrajinu v roku 2022</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koľko investujú členovia NATO do obrany?</strong></h2>\n<p>Prezident USA <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> opakovane kritizoval spojencov za to, že nesplnili cieľ výdavkov na obranu aliancie vo výške dvoch percent HDP (dohodnutý už v roku 2014). Ešte aj teraz <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Chorvátsko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugalsko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Taliansko</a>, Kanada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belgicko</a>, Luxembursko, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Slovinsko</a> a <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Španielsko</a> nedosiahli tento cieľ.</p>\n<p>Výdavky na obranu 23 krajín EÚ, ktoré sú <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">členmi NATO</a>, dosiahli v roku 2024 1,99 percenta ich kombinovaného HDP a predpokladá sa, že v roku 2025 dosiahnu 2,04 percenta.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Viac :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Otřesená Európa sa uzatvára, aby čelila novému poriadku Trumpo-Putinist </a>\n </div>\n<p>Ale Trump navrhol, aby členovia NATO zvýšili svoje minimálne výdavky na obranu na päť percent HDP — myšlienku, ktorú podporila šéfka zahraničných vecí EÚ <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> v januári. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> navrhol zvýšiť výdavky EÚ na obranu o tri až 3,5 percenta HDP. Napriek tomu by to trvalo roky, kým by sa to na základe súčasných sadzieb realizovalo.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Obrana je technologicky orientovaný priemysel, ktorý si vyžaduje masívne investície do výskumu a inovácií. Financovanie výskumu a vývoja v oblasti obrany v EÚ dosiahlo v roku 2022 3,9 miliardy eur, podľa Eurostatu. Avšak podľa <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">správy Dragi</a> budú systémy obrany novej generácie vyžadovať masívne investície do výskumu a vývoja. Od roku 2014 USA uprednostnili výdavky na výskum a vývoj pred všetkými ostatnými kategóriami vojenských výdavkov. Francúzsko, Nemecko a Švédsko sú na vrchole krajín EÚ investujúcich do výskumu a vývoja v oblasti obrany.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ktoré európske krajiny najviac zvyšujú rozpočty na obranu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Od roku 2014 krajiny ako <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Maďarsko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Česká republika</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Poľsko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Dánsko</a>, Severné Makedónia, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Slovensko</a> a <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Švédsko</a> zdvojnásobili svoje výdavky na obranu, zatiaľ čo Luxembursko, Lotyšsko a Litva trojnásobili svoje výdavky. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Nemecko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Holandsko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estónia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Rumunsko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulharsko</a> a <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Fínsko</a> taktiež takmer zdvojnásobili svoje rozpočty na obranu.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koľko vojakov má Európa?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Celkový počet aktívnych vojenských osôb v Európe, vrátane Spojeného kráľovstva, sa odhaduje na približne 1,5 milióna. Avšak jeho efektivita je oslabená nedostatkom spoločnej veliteľskej štruktúry a vojenských systémov.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Na konci roku 2024 bol počet ruských vojakov na <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukrajine</a> približne 700 000. Avšak <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">odhadujú</a>, že Rusko má približne 1,3 milióna aktívnych vojenských osôb a dva milióny rezervistov.</p>\n<p>Podľa <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">oficiálnych údajov</a> je v Európe aktívnych približne 80 000 amerických vojenských síl. Avšak celkový počet sa mení v dôsledku cvičení a rutinných rotácií jednotiek, ako <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">uvádza</a> Rada pre zahraničné vzťahy. Medzitým odborníci odhadujú, že Európa by potrebovala <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">ďalších 300 000 vojakov</a> alebo približne 50 brigád na obranu bez amerických jednotiek.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Posúva sa Európa smerom k spoločnej armáde?</strong></h2>\n<p>Nie. Niektoré krajiny, ako <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Francúzsko</a>, tradične podporujú silnejšiu vojenskú autonómiu EÚ, zatiaľ čo iné, ako Poľsko a pobaltské krajiny, uprednostňujú NATO. Ale namiesto toho, aby sa posúvali smerom k jednej európskej armáde, EÚ sústreďuje úsilie na bližšiu vojenskú spoluprácu, spoločné obstarávanie a rýchlejšie reakčné sily, ako je vidieť v <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Strategickej kompasu z roku 2022</a>, ktorého cieľom bolo mať 5 000-člennú rýchlu nasadzovaciu silu do roku 2025. Vojenská mobilita je dodnes jednou z priorít obranné stratégie EÚ, pretože neexistujú harmonizované pravidlá na presun vojsk alebo vybavenia medzi krajinami v prípade núdze.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Prečo a ako plánuje EÚ zvýšiť svoju výrobu zbraní?</strong></h2>\n<p>Invázia na Krym v roku 2014, nasledovaná plnohodnotnou inváziou Ruska na Ukrajinu v roku 2022, preformulovala bezpečnostnú politiku EÚ, nútiac EÚ a NATO prehodnotiť obranné stratégie a zvýšiť vojenské výdavky na posilnenie kapacít. Vojna na Ukrajine a zjavný obrat administratívy Trumpa smerom k Moskve tiež oživili diskusie o strategickej autonómii EÚ, pričom Francúzsko (a teraz dokonca aj Nemecko) tlačí na väčšiu nezávislosť od bezpečnostných štruktúr vedených USA.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Viac :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Kto zaplatí za prezbrojenie Európy? Je čas zdaňovať bohatých </a>\n </div>\n<p>V priebehu posledných dvoch desaťročí EÚ prišla s rôznymi iniciatívami v oblasti obrany.</p>\n<p>Kľúčové kroky na posilnenie vojenskej spolupráce zahŕňajú zriadenie <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Európskej obranné agentúry</a> (2004), jej ročný <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Plán rozvoja kapacít</a> (2008) a <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017). Predpisy pre prevody obranných prostriedkov a vývozy s dvojitým použitím tiež posilnili kontrolu zbraní, zatiaľ čo plnohodnotná invázia Ruska na Ukrajinu v roku 2022 urýchlila úsilie EÚ v oblasti obrany, čo viedlo k vytvoreniu <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Európskej mierovej facility</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) a <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>So svojím <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">plánom ReArm Europe</a> sa Európska komisia snaží mobilizovať 800 miliárd eur na zvýšenie výdavkov EÚ na obranu, podporu Ukrajiny a rozšírenie priemyselnej základne Európy.</p>\n<p>Plán zahŕňa nový nástroj vo výške 150 miliárd eur v nových spoločných pôžičkách EÚ, uvoľnenie fiškálnych pravidiel bloku pre obranu (čo by mohlo uvoľniť 650 miliárd eur v priebehu nasledujúcich štyroch rokov), využitie <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">fondov súdržnosti</a> (dobrovoľne), zmenu investičných pravidiel pre EIB a „odblokovanie súkromných“ investícií v rámci dlhodobo pozastavenej <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Únie kapitálových trhov</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Aká veľká je obranný priemysel EÚ?</strong></h2>\n<p>Obranný sektor EÚ má odhadovaný ročný obrat takmer 84 miliárd eur, priamo podporujúci viac ako 196 000 vysoko kvalifikovaných pracovných miest a nepriamo vytvárajúci viac ako 315 000 ďalších pracovných miest, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">podľa</a> Európskej komisie. Ale európsky obranný priemysel <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">potrebuje viac kvalifikovaných pracovníkov</a>, keď zvyšuje výrobu a inováciu na riešenie rastúcich bezpečnostných výziev.</p>\n<p>Trhové hodnoty európskych obranných spoločností vzrástli, pričom väčšina <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">zdvojnásobila svoje akciové ceny</a> od invázie Ruska na Ukrajinu. Avšak príjmy sú stále pomerne malé, čo ukazuje, že ich kapacita na rozšírenie je obmedzená veľkosťou národných trhov a obmedzeniami vývozu. To vyvolalo debatu o tom, či by mala existovať európska preferencia pre spoločné výdavky na obranu EÚ. „Takáto 'európska preferencia' je nevyhnutným príspevkom na zvrátenie súčasnej prevahy neeurópskych dodávateľov na európskych obranných trhoch,“ <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">tvrdí</a> priemysel.&nbsp; Ale krajiny EÚ zostávajú rozdelené.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ktoré zbraňové systémy sú považované za prioritu pre Európu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Európa investuje do viacúrovňových architektúr vzdušnej a raketovej obrany, pretože, ako povedal Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, poľský štátny tajomník pre národnú obranu, minulý rok: „Mať výhodu vo vzduchu definuje vojnu\".</p>\n<p>Napríklad, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">Európska iniciatíva Sky Shield (ESSI)</a>, spustená v októbri 2022, sa snaží vytvoriť komplexný obranný systém, ktorý integruje schopnosti od krátkeho dosahu po exoatmosférické úrovne.</p>\n<p>Navyše, drony, rakety, delostrelectvo, strategické posilňovače, vojenská mobilita, kybernetické schopnosti a umelá inteligencia boli uvedené ako prioritné oblasti. Menovite, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">drony sa stali kľúčovým nástrojom vo vojne na Ukrajine</a>, čo podnietilo Kyjev aj Moskvu, aby rýchlo vyvinuli svoj vlastný priemysel. A dnes sú hlavnými exportérmi vojenských dronov Čína a Turecko.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Zdroj: Európska obranná agentúra</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Aké výzvy čelí EÚ pri posilňovaní svojich vojenských schopností?</strong></h2>\n<p>Aj keď je zvýšenie investícií do obrany vítané, priemysel požaduje dlhodobé alebo viacročné zmluvy na obstarávanie pre stabilitu, udržateľnú inováciu a technologický rozvoj. Systém „vyrobené na objednávku“, typický pre mierové obdobie, na ktorom je založený obranný priemysel EÚ, viedol k dlhým čakacím dobám na pokročilé obranné schopnosti.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Spolupráca v oblasti obrany, vrátane spoločných podnikov a zdieľaného obstarávania, rastie, ale zostáva obmedzená. Boli podniknuté konkrétne kroky na zvýšenie výroby delostreleckej munície, v oblasti, kde má Ukrajina vysoký dopyt. Ale záväzok EÚ dodať milión 155-mm delostreleckých granátov medzi marcom 2023 a 2024 bolo nemožné splniť včas, čo ukazuje na výzvy, ktoré sú pred nami. EÚ odhadla v roku 2022, že nedostatok spolupráce vedie k ročným nákladom od 25 miliárd do 100 miliárd eur.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Viac :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Návrat povinnej vojenskej služby do Európy? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Ďalším z kľúčových problémov obranného priemyslu EÚ je fragmentácia, najmä mimo sektorov letectva a rakiet.&nbsp; Fragmentácia nielenže vyvoláva duplicitu a vyššie výrobné náklady, ale tiež problémy s interoperabilitou, čo obmedzuje jeho rozsah a operačnú efektívnosť v teréne. Ako indikácia, členské štáty EÚ poskytli Ukrajine desať rôznych typov húfnic, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">podľa</a> správy Dragi. Okrem toho EÚ prevádzkuje 12 rôznych typov bojových tankov, zatiaľ čo USA vyrábajú len jeden (M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Medzitým zohráva úlohu aj vonkajšia závislosť. Medzi rokmi 2007 a 2016 bolo viac ako 60 percent rozpočtu na obstarávanie obrany Európy vynaložených na vojenské dovozy mimo EÚ, čo viedlo k kontrolám a obmedzeniam tretích krajín na vybavenie. „Európska preferencia“ v obstarávaní obrany, ktorú hlavne presadzuje Francúzsko, nenašla konsenzus počas neformálnych rokovaní lídrov EÚ vo februári – a vzhľadom na potrebu rýchlo sa rozšíriť, mnohé krajiny volajú po systéme, ktorý by bol čo najotvorenejší.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Majú európske krajiny jadrové zbrane?</strong></h2>\n<p>K januáru 2022 malo Francúzsko 290 hlavíc, s 98 systémami na ich dodanie, vrátane ponorkových rakiet a rakiet vypúšťaných zo vzduchu. Spojené kráľovstvo malo 225 hlavíc, 120 operačných, nasadených na piatich ponorkách, s 105 v sklade, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">podľa</a> Asociácie pre kontrolu zbraní.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Medzitým sa uvádza, že Belgicko, Nemecko, Taliansko, Holandsko a Turecko hostia americké jadrové zbrane. Poľsko nedávno vyzvalo Washington, aby nasadil jadrové zbrane v krajine, pričom priznalo, že mať vlastnú kapacitu by trvalo desaťročia.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Pôvodný článok</strong></a><strong> na <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">V spolupráci s <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, spolufinancované Európskou úniou. Názory a názory vyjadrené sú však len názory autora(ov) a neodrážajú nevyhnutne názory Európskej únie alebo Generálneho riaditeľstva pre komunikačné siete, obsah a technológie. Ani Európska únia, ani grantová autorita nemôžu byť za ne zodpovedné.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:29.643",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Ruská plná invázia na Ukrajinu vo februári 2022 otrasila prístupom EÚ k obrane, čo viedlo k rýchlej prehodnoteniu jej vojenského prostredia. Ohlásené stiahnutie USA z obrany Európy vrátilo otázku prezbrojenia kontinentu späť na stôl. EUobserver sa pozrie na aktuálny stav.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"sk",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:17:32.893",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Скільки дивізій має Європа? Погляд на стан оборони Європи",
key:"uid": string:"3fe41683-2271-4840-9c4c-18894c61198e",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Ключові моменти\n\n1. **Найбільші витратники на оборону**: Сполучені Штати, Китай, Росія, Індія та Саудівська Аравія очолюють світові витрати на оборону, причому військовий бюджет Росії більше ніж подвоївся з моменту її вторгнення в Україну у 2022 році, що викликало занепокоєння щодо динаміки безпеки в Європі.\n \n2. **Цілі витрат НАТО**: Незважаючи на ціль НАТО у 2% ВВП на витрати на оборону, кілька країн-членів, включаючи Хорватію та Португалію, ще не досягли цієї мети. Тривають обговорення щодо збільшення цієї мети до 5%, що відображає зростаючі потреби в безпеці.\n\n3. **Виклики оборонної промисловості ЄС**: Оборонний сектор ЄС, вартість якого становить майже 84 мільярди євро, стикається з серйозними викликами, включаючи фрагментацію, залежність від імпорту з-за меж ЄС та необхідність довгострокових контрактів на закупівлю для підвищення військових можливостей та інновацій.\n\n### Тізер\n\n```markdown\nОскільки глобальні напруження зростають, витрати на оборону зростають, а Сполучені Штати, Китай і Росія перебувають на передньому плані. У Європі країни-члени НАТО намагаються досягти цілей витрат, тоді як ЄС прагне зміцнити свої військові можливості на фоні фрагментації та зовнішніх залежностей. З закликами до збільшення бюджетів та прагненням до стратегічної автономії, як Європа орієнтуватиметься у своїй оборонній політиці перед обличчям еволюціонуючих загроз? Досліджуйте складнощі військових витрат та майбутнє європейської безпеки в цьому глибокому аналізі.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Глобальні військові витрати зростають, при цьому США, Китай та Росія ведуть цей процес. Оскільки Європа стикається з викликами безпеки, країни збільшують свої оборонні бюджети та досліджують спільні військові ініціативи. Досліджуйте останні тенденції та наслідки для глобальної безпеки.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Які країни витрачають найбільше на оборону?</strong></h2>\n<p>Країни з найвищими <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">витратами на оборону</a> в останні роки - це <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Сполучені Штати</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Китай</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Росія</a>, Індія та Саудівська Аравія. Європейський ріст відстає від зростання військових витрат Росії, які більше ніж подвоїлися в порівнянні з рівнями до її <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">вторгнення в Україну у 2022 році</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Скільки витрачають країни НАТО на оборону?</strong></h2>\n<p>Президент США <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Дональд Трамп</a> неодноразово критикував союзників за те, що вони не досягають цільового показника витрат на оборону альянсу у два відсотки ВВП (узгодженого ще в 2014 році). Навіть зараз <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Хорватія</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Португалія</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Італія</a>, Канада, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Бельгія</a>, Люксембург, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Словенія</a> та <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Іспанія</a> не досягли цієї мети.</p>\n<p>Витрати на оборону 23 країн ЄС, які є <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">членами НАТО</a>, становили 1,99 відсотка їхнього загального ВВП у 2024 році і, за прогнозами, досягнуть 2,04 відсотка у 2025 році.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Більше :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Тривожна Європа об'єднується, щоб протистояти новому порядку Трампо-Путіна </a>\n </div>\n<p>Але Трамп запропонував, щоб країни НАТО збільшили свої мінімальні витрати на оборону до п'яти відсотків ВВП — ідею, яку підтримала голова зовнішньої політики ЄС <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Кая Каллас</a> у січні. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Макрон</a> запропонував підвищити витрати ЄС на оборону на три до 3,5 відсотка ВВП. Проте, це займе роки, щоб реалізувати, виходячи з поточних темпів.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Оборона є технологічно орієнтованою галуззю, яка вимагає величезних інвестицій у дослідження та інновації. Фінансування НДДКР в оборонній сфері в ЄС досягло 3,9 млрд євро у 2022 році, згідно з даними Eurostat. Однак, згідно з<a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\"> доповіддю Драгі</a>, системи оборони наступного покоління вимагатимуть величезних інвестицій у НДДКР. З 2014 року США пріоритетизували витрати на НДДКР вище всіх інших категорій військових витрат. Франція, Німеччина та Швеція є на вершині країн ЄС, які інвестують у НДДКР для оборони.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Які європейські країни найбільше збільшують оборонні бюджети?</strong></h2>\n<p>З 2014 року країни, такі як <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Угорщина</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Чехія</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Польща</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Данія</a>, Північна Македонія, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Словаччина</a> та <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Швеція</a> подвоїли свої витрати на оборону, тоді як Люксембург, Латвія та Литва потроїли свої витрати. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Німеччина</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Нідерланди</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Естонія</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Румунія</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Болгарія</a> та <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Фінляндія</a> також майже подвоїли свої оборонні бюджети.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Скільки солдатів має європейські країни?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Загальна кількість активного військового персоналу в Європі, включаючи Великобританію, оцінюється приблизно в 1,5 мільйона. Однак його ефективність підривається відсутністю спільної командної структури та військових систем.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>До кінця 2024 року кількість російських військ в <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Україні</a> становила приблизно 700 000. Однак, <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">оцінюється</a>, що Росія має близько 1,3 мільйона активного військового персоналу та два мільйони резервістів.</p>\n<p>Згідно з<a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\"> офіційними даними</a>, близько 80 000 американських військових сил активно перебувають в Європі. Однак загальна кількість коливається через навчання та рутинні ротації військ, як <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">зазначено</a> Радою з міжнародних відносин. Тим часом, експерти оцінюють, що Європі потрібно ще <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">300 000 військовослужбовців</a> або близько 50 бригад, щоб захистити себе без американських військ.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Чи рухається Європа до спільної армії?</strong></h2>\n<p>Ні. Деякі країни, такі як <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Франція</a>, традиційно підтримують сильнішу військову автономію ЄС, тоді як інші, такі як Польща та Балтійські країни, пріоритетизують НАТО. Але замість того, щоб рухатися до єдиної європейської армії, ЄС зосереджує зусилля на тіснішій військовій співпраці, спільних закупівлях та швидших силах реагування, як це видно в <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Стратегічному компасі 2022 року</a>, метою якого було створення швидкого підрозділу з 5000 осіб до 2025 року. Військова мобільність досі є одним з пріоритетів оборонної стратегії ЄС, оскільки немає гармонізованих правил для переміщення військ або обладнання між країнами в ситуації надзвичайної ситуації.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Чому і як ЄС планує збільшити виробництво озброєнь?</strong></h2>\n<p>Вторгнення в Крим у 2014 році, за яким послідувало повномасштабне вторгнення Росії в Україну у 2022 році, змінило політику безпеки ЄС, змусивши ЄС та НАТО переосмислити стратегії оборони та збільшити військові витрати для підвищення спроможностей. Війна в Україні та очевидний поворот адміністрації Трампа до Москви також відновили обговорення про стратегічну автономію ЄС, при цьому Франція (а тепер навіть Німеччина) виступає за більшу незалежність від структур безпеки, очолюваних США.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Більше :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Хто заплатить за переозброєння Європи? Час оподаткувати багатих </a>\n </div>\n<p>Протягом останніх двох десятиліть ЄС розробив різні ініціативи в сфері оборони.</p>\n<p>Ключові кроки для посилення військової співпраці включають створення <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Європейського оборонного агентства</a> (2004), його щорічний <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">План розвитку спроможностей</a> (2008) та <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017). Регулювання для оборонних передач і експорту подвійного призначення також зміцнили контроль за озброєннями, тоді як повномасштабне вторгнення Росії в Україну у 2022 році прискорило зусилля ЄС у сфері оборони, що призвело до створення <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Європейського миротворчого фонду</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) та <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>З планом <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">ReArm Europe</a> Європейська комісія має на меті мобілізувати 800 млрд євро для збільшення витрат ЄС на оборону, підтримки України та розширення промислової бази Європи.</p>\n<p>План включає новий інструмент у 150 млрд євро для нових спільних запозичень ЄС, послаблення фіскальних правил блоку для оборони (які можуть бути звільнені на 650 млрд євро протягом наступних чотирьох років), використання <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">кохезійних</a> фондів (добровільно), зміна інвестиційних правил для ЄІБ та \"розблокування приватних\" інвестицій протягом довгоочікуваного <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Союзу капітальних ринків</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Який розмір оборонної промисловості ЄС?</strong></h2>\n<p>Оборонний сектор ЄС має оцінюваний річний оборот майже 84 млрд євро, безпосередньо підтримуючи понад 196 000 висококваліфікованих робочих місць і непрямо створюючи понад 315 000 додаткових робочих місць, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">згідно з</a> даними Європейської комісії. Але європейська оборонна промисловість <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">потребує більше кваліфікованих працівників</a>, оскільки вона збільшує виробництво та інновації для вирішення зростаючих викликів безпеки.</p>\n<p>Ринкові капіталізації європейських оборонних компаній зросли, більшість з яких <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">подвоїли свої акції</a> з моменту вторгнення Росії в Україну. Але доходи все ще досить малі, що показує, що їхня здатність до масштабування стримується розміром національних ринків та експортними обмеженнями. Це викликало дебати про те, чи має бути європейська перевага для спільних витрат на оборону ЄС. \"Така 'європейська перевага' є необхідним внеском для зміни поточної переваги неєвропейських постачальників на європейських оборонних ринках\", <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">аргументує</a> промисловість.&nbsp; Але країни ЄС залишаються розділеними.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Які системи озброєнь вважаються пріоритетними для Європи?</strong></h2>\n<p>Європа інвестує в багатошарові системи протиповітряної та протиракетної оборони, оскільки, як сказав Павел Ксаверій Залевський, польський державний секретар з національної оборони, минулого року: \"Перевага в повітрі визначає війну\".</p>\n<p>Наприклад, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">Європейська ініціатива Sky Shield (ESSI)</a>, запущена в жовтні 2022 року, прагне створити всебічну систему оборони, яка інтегрує можливості від короткострокових до екзоатмосферних рівнів.</p>\n<p>Крім того, дрони, ракети, артилерія, стратегічні засоби, військова мобільність, кіберздатності та штучний інтелект були вказані як пріоритетні області. А саме, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">дрони стали важливим інструментом у війні в Україні</a>, спонукаючи як Київ, так і Москву швидко розвивати власну промисловість. І сьогодні основними експортерами військових дронів є Китай та Туреччина.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Джерело: Європейське оборонне агентство</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Які виклики стоять перед ЄС у зміцненні своїх військових можливостей?</strong></h2>\n<p>Хоча збільшення інвестицій в оборону вітається, промисловість прагне до довгострокових або багаторічних контрактів на закупівлю для стабільності, стійкої інновації та технологічного розвитку. Система \"побудовано на замовлення\", типова для мирного часу, на якій базується оборонна промисловість ЄС, призвела до тривалих термінів очікування для розвинених оборонних можливостей.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Оборонна співпраця, включаючи спільні підприємства та спільні закупівлі, зростає, але залишається обмеженою. Було вжито конкретних заходів для збільшення виробництва артилерійських боєприпасів, в якій Україна має високий попит. Але зобов'язання ЄС поставити один мільйон артилерійських снарядів калібру 155 мм між березнем 2023 року та 2024 роком було неможливо виконати вчасно, що показує виклики, які стоять попереду. Європейська комісія оцінила у 2022 році, що відсутність співпраці призводить до щорічних витрат від 25 до 100 млрд євро.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Більше :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Повернення призову в Європу? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Ще однією з ключових проблем для оборонної промисловості ЄС є фрагментація, особливо поза секторами аеронавтики та ракет. Фрагментація не лише викликає дублювання та підвищення витрат на виробництво, але й проблеми з інтеграцією, обмежуючи її масштаб та оперативну ефективність у полі. Як показник, держави-члени ЄС надали Україні десять різних типів гаубиць, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">згідно з</a> доповіддю Драгі. Крім того, ЄС експлуатує 12 різних типів бойових танків, тоді як США виробляють лише один (M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Тим часом, зовнішні залежності також мають значення. Між 2007 і 2016 роками понад 60 відсотків бюджету на закупівлю оборони Європи витрачалося на військові імпорти з країн, що не входять до ЄС, що призвело до контролю та обмежень з боку третіх країн на обладнання. \"Європейська перевага\" в оборонних закупівлях, яку головним чином просуває Франція, не знайшла консенсусу під час неформальних переговорів лідерів ЄС у лютому — і з огляду на необхідність швидко масштабуватися, багато країн закликають до системи, яка була б якомога більш відкритою.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Чи мають європейські країни ядерну зброю?</strong></h2>\n<p>Станом на січень 2022 року Франція мала 290 ядерних боєголовок, з 98 системами доставки, включаючи підводні ракети та ракети, що запускаються з повітря. Великобританія мала 225 боєголовок, 120 з яких були оперативними, розгорнутими на п'яти підводних човнах, з 105 в резерві, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">згідно з</a> даними Асоціації контролю за озброєннями.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Тим часом повідомляється, що Бельгія, Німеччина, Італія, Нідерланди та Туреччина всі приймають ядерну зброю США. Польща нещодавно закликала Вашингтон розмістити ядерну зброю в країні, визнаючи, що наявність власних можливостей займе десятиліття.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Оригінальна стаття</strong></a><strong> на <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">У партнерстві з <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, спільно профінансованим Європейським Союзом. Висловлені погляди та думки є лише думками автора(ів) і не обов'язково відображають думки Європейського Союзу або Генерального директорату з комунікаційних мереж, контенту та технологій. Ані Європейський Союз, ані орган, що надає фінансування, не можуть нести відповідальність за них.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:30.293",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Повномасштабне вторгнення Росії в Україну в лютому 2022 року потрясло підхід ЄС до оборони, спонукаючи до швидкої переоцінки його військового ландшафту. Оголошене виведення США з оборони Європи поставило питання про переозброєння континенту знову на порядок денний. EUobserver розглядає стан справ.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"uk",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:19:07.862",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Hur många divisioner har Europa? En titt på Europas försvarssituation",
key:"uid": string:"45ee227a-f717-477a-b4d7-f2ebfd09c344",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Nyckelpunkter\n\n1. **Största försvarsutgifterna**: USA, Kina, Ryssland, Indien och Saudiarabien leder det globala försvarsutgifterna, med Rysslands militärbudget som mer än fördubblats sedan invasionen av Ukraina 2022, vilket väcker oro för de europeiska säkerhetsdynamiken.\n \n2. **NATOs utgiftsmål**: Trots NATOs mål på 2% av BNP för försvarsutgifter har flera medlemsländer, inklusive Kroatien och Portugal, ännu inte uppnått detta mål. Diskussioner pågår om att öka detta mål till 5%, vilket återspeglar ökade säkerhetsbehov.\n\n3. **EU:s försvarsindustriutmaningar**: EU:s försvarssektor, värderad till nästan 84 miljarder euro, står inför betydande utmaningar, inklusive fragmentering, beroende av icke-EU-import och behovet av långsiktiga upphandlingskontrakt för att förbättra militära kapabiliteter och innovation.\n\n### Teaser\n\n```markdown\nNär globala spänningar ökar, ökar försvarsutgifterna, med USA, Kina och Ryssland i framkant. I Europa kämpar NATO-medlemmar med att uppfylla utgiftsmålen, medan EU strävar efter att stärka sina militära kapabiliteter mitt i fragmentering och externa beroenden. Med krav på ökade budgetar och en strävan efter strategisk autonomi, hur kommer Europa att navigera i sitt försvarslandskap i ljuset av föränderliga hot? Utforska komplexiteten i militärutgifter och framtiden för europeisk säkerhet i denna djupgående analys.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Global militärutgifter ökar, med USA, Kina och Ryssland i spetsen. När Europa brottas med säkerhetsutmaningar ökar länder sina försvarsbudgetar och utforskar gemensamma militära initiativ. Upptäck de senaste trenderna och konsekvenserna för global säkerhet.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Vilka är de länder som spenderar mest på försvar?</strong></h2>\n<p>Länderna med de högsta <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">försvars</a>utgifterna under de senaste åren är <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">USA</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Kina</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Ryssland</a>, Indien och Saudiarabien. Den europeiska tillväxten överträffas av Rysslands ökande militära utgifter, som mer än har fördubblats jämfört med nivåerna före <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">invasionen av Ukraina 2022</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Hur mycket spenderar Nato-medlemmar på försvar?</strong></h2>\n<p>USA:s president <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> har upprepade gånger kritiserat allierade för att inte uppfylla alliansens försvarsutgiftsmål på två procent av BNP (överenskommet redan 2014). Även nu har <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Kroatien</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugal</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Italien</a>, Kanada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belgien</a>, Luxemburg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Slovenien</a> och <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Spanien</a> har inte nått målet.</p>\n<p>Försvarsutgifterna för de 23 EU-länder som är <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">Nato</a>-medlemmar uppgick till 1,99 procent av deras sammanlagda BNP år 2024 och förväntas nå 2,04 procent år 2025.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Mer :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Ett skakat Europa sluter leden för att möta den Trumpo-putinistiska nya ordningen </a>\n </div>\n<p>Men Trump föreslog att Nato-medlemmar borde öka sina minimala försvarsutgifter till fem procent av BNP — en idé som stöddes av EU:s utrikeschef <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> i januari. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> har föreslagit att EU:s försvarsutgifter ska höjas med tre till 3,5 procent av BNP. Ändå skulle detta ta år att förverkliga baserat på nuvarande nivåer.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Försvar är en teknikdriven industri som kräver massiva investeringar i forskning och innovation. Försvars-FoU-finansieringen i EU nådde 3,9 miljarder euro år 2022, enligt Eurostat. Men enligt <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">Dragi-rapporten</a> kommer nästa generations försvarssystem att kräva massiva FoU-investeringar. Sedan 2014 har USA prioriterat FoU-utgifter framför alla andra militära utgiftskategorier. Frankrike, Tyskland och Sverige ligger i topp bland EU-länder som investerar i FoU för försvar.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Vilka europeiska länder ökar försvarsbudgetarna mest?</strong></h2>\n<p>Sedan 2014 har länder som <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Ungern</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Tjeckien</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Polen</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Danmark</a>, Nordmakedonien, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Slovakien</a> och <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Sverige</a> har fördubblat sina försvarsutgifter, medan Luxemburg, Lettland och Litauen har tredubblat sina utgifter. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Tyskland</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Nederländerna</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estland</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Rumänien</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulgarien</a> och <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finland</a> har också nästan fördubblat sina försvarsbudgetar.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Hur många soldater har europeiska länder?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Det totala antalet aktiva militärpersonal i Europa, inklusive Storbritannien, uppskattas till cirka 1,5 miljoner. Men dess effektivitet undermineras av bristen på en gemensam kommandostruktur och militära system.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Vid slutet av 2024 var antalet ryska trupper i <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukraina</a> cirka 700 000. Men det <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">uppskattas</a> att Ryssland har cirka 1,3 miljoner aktiva militärpersonal och två miljoner reservister.</p>\n<p>Enligt <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">officiella siffror</a> är cirka 80 000 amerikanska militärstyrkor aktiva i Europa. Men det totala antalet fluktuerar på grund av övningar och rutinmässiga trupprotationer, som <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">noterats</a> av Council on Foreign Relations. Under tiden uppskattar experter att Europa skulle behöva <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">ytterligare 300 000 soldater</a> eller cirka 50 brigader för att försvara sig, utan amerikanska trupper.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Rör sig Europa mot en gemensam armé?</strong></h2>\n<p>Nej. Vissa länder, som <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Frankrike</a>, har traditionellt stött en starkare militär autonomi inom EU, medan andra, såsom Polen och de baltiska länderna, prioriterar Nato. Men istället för att röra sig mot en enda europeisk armé fokuserar EU sina insatser på närmare militärt samarbete, gemensamma upphandlingar och snabbare insatsstyrkor, som sett i <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">2022 års strategiska kompass</a>, vars mål var att ha en snabbinsatsstyrka på 5 000 man till 2025. Militär rörlighet är fortfarande en av prioriteringarna i EU:s försvarsstrategi eftersom det inte finns några harmoniserade regler för att flytta trupper eller utrustning mellan länder i en nödsituation.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Varför och hur planerar EU att öka sin vapentillverkning?</strong></h2>\n<p>Invasionen av Krim 2014, följt av Rysslands fullskaliga invasion av Ukraina 2022, har omformat EU:s säkerhetspolitik, vilket tvingar EU och Nato att tänka om kring försvarsstrategier och öka militära utgifter för att stärka kapabiliteter. Kriget i Ukraina och Trump-administrationens uppenbara svängning mot Moskva har också återupplivat diskussioner om EU:s strategiska autonomi, där Frankrike (och nu även Tyskland) trycker på för mer oberoende från USA-ledda säkerhetsstrukturer.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Mer :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Vem ska betala för Europas upprustning? Det är dags att beskatta de rika </a>\n </div>\n<p>Under de senaste två decennierna har EU kommit med olika försvarsinitiativ.</p>\n<p>Nyckelsteg för att förbättra militärt samarbete inkluderar inrättandet av <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Europeiska försvarsbyrån</a> (2004), dess årliga <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">kapabilitetsutvecklingsplan</a> (2008) och <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017). Regler för försvarstransfer och dubbelanvändningsexporter har också stärkt vapenkontrollen, medan Rysslands fullskaliga invasion av Ukraina 2022 accelererade EU:s försvarsinsatser, vilket ledde till skapandet av <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Europeiska fredsanläggningen</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) och <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>Med sin <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">ReArm Europe-plan</a> syftar Europeiska kommissionen till att mobilisera 800 miljarder euro för att öka EU:s försvarsutgifter, stödja Ukraina och expandera Europas industriella bas.</p>\n<p>Planen inkluderar ett nytt instrument på 150 miljarder euro i nya gemensamma EU-lån, som lättas på blockets finansregler för försvar (vilket skulle kunna frigöra 650 miljarder euro under de kommande fyra åren), använda <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">sammanhållnings</a>fonder (frivilligt), ändra investeringsregler för EIB och \"låsa upp privata\" investeringar genom den länge stagnerade <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">kapitalmarknadsunionen</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Hur stor är EU:s försvarsindustri?</strong></h2>\n<p>EU:s försvarssektor har en uppskattad årlig omsättning på nästan 84 miljarder euro, som direkt stödjer över 196 000 högkvalificerade jobb och indirekt skapar mer än 315 000 ytterligare jobb, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">enligt</a> Europeiska kommissionen. Men den europeiska försvarsindustrin <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">behöver fler kvalificerade arbetare</a> när den ökar produktionen och innovationen för att hantera växande säkerhetsutmaningar.</p>\n<p>Marknadsvärdena för europeiska försvarsföretag har skjutit i höjden, med de flesta <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">som har fördubblat sina aktiekurser</a> sedan Ryssland invaderade Ukraina. Men intäkterna är fortfarande ganska små, vilket visar att deras kapacitet att skala upp begränsas av storleken på de nationella marknaderna och exportrestriktioner. Detta har lett till en debatt om huruvida det borde finnas en europeisk preferens för gemensamma EU-försvarsutgifter. \"En sådan 'europeisk preferens' är ett nödvändigt bidrag för att vända den nuvarande dominansen av icke-europeiska leverantörer på europeiska försvarsmarknader,\" <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">hävdar</a> industrin.&nbsp; Men EU-länderna förblir delade.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Vilka vapensystem ses som en prioritet för Europa?</strong></h2>\n<p>Europa investerar i flerlagers luft- och missilförsvarssystem eftersom, som Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, Polens statssekreterare för nationellt försvar, sa förra året: \"Att ha ett övertag i luften definierar kriget\".</p>\n<p>Till exempel, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI)</a>, som lanserades i oktober 2022, syftar till att skapa ett heltäckande försvarssystem som integrerar kapabiliteter som sträcker sig från kortdistans till exoatmosfäriska nivåer.</p>\n<p>Utöver detta har drönare, missiler, artilleri, strategiska möjliggörare, militär rörlighet, cyberkapabiliteter och artificiell intelligens listats som prioriterade områden. Nämligen, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">drönare har blivit ett avgörande verktyg i kriget i Ukraina</a>, vilket har fått både Kyiv och Moskva att snabbt utveckla sin egen industri. Och idag är de främsta exportörerna av militära drönare Kina och Turkiet.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Källa: Europeiska försvarsbyrån</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Vilka utmaningar står EU inför när det gäller att stärka sina militära kapabiliteter?</strong></h2>\n<p>Även om ökade försvarsinvesteringar välkomnas, söker industrin långsiktiga eller fleråriga upphandlingskontrakt för stabilitet, hållbar innovation och teknisk utveckling. Det 'beställningssystem' som är typiskt för fredstid, som den europeiska försvarsindustrin bygger på, har resulterat i långa väntetider för avancerade försvarskapabiliteter.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Försvarssamarbete, inklusive gemensamma företag och delad upphandling, växer, men det förblir begränsat. Det har gjorts specifika insatser för att öka produktionen av artilleriammunition, ett område där Ukraina har en hög efterfrågan. Men EU:s löfte att leverera en miljon 155 mm artillerigranater mellan mars 2023 och 2024 var omöjligt att uppfylla i tid, vilket visar på de utmaningar som ligger framför. EU-kommissionen uppskattade 2022 att bristen på samarbete leder till årliga kostnader som sträcker sig från 25 miljarder euro till 100 miljarder euro.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Mer :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Återvänder värnplikt till Europa? </a>\n </div>\n<p>En annan av de centrala frågorna för EU:s försvarsindustri är fragmentering, särskilt utanför flyg- och missilsektorerna.&nbsp; Fragmentering utlöser inte bara duplicering och högre produktionskostnader utan också interoperabilitetsproblem, vilket begränsar dess skala och operativa effektivitet i fält. Som en indikation har EU:s medlemsstater tillhandahållit tio olika typer av haubitsar till Ukraina, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">enligt</a> Draghi-rapporten. Dessutom driver EU 12 olika typer av stridsvagnar, medan USA tillverkar bara en (M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Under tiden spelar externa beroenden också en roll. Mellan 2007 och 2016 spenderades över 60 procent av Europas försvarsupphandlingsbudget på icke-EU-militära importer, vilket ledde till kontroller och restriktioner från tredje land på utrustningen. En 'europeisk preferens' i försvarsupphandling, som främst drivs av Frankrike, fick ingen konsensus under informella samtal mellan EU:s ledare i februari – och med tanke på behovet av att snabbt skala upp, kräver många länder ett system som ska vara så öppet som möjligt.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Har europeiska länder kärnvapen?</strong></h2>\n<p>Från och med januari 2022 hade Frankrike 290 kärnstridsspetsar, med 98 leveranssystem, inklusive ubåtsmissiler och luftburna missiler. Storbritannien hade 225 kärnstridsspetsar, 120 operativa, utplacerade på fem ubåtar, med 105 i lager, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">enligt</a> Arms Control Association.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Under tiden rapporteras det att Belgien, Tyskland, Italien, Nederländerna och Turkiet alla huserar amerikanska kärnvapen. Polen har nyligen uppmanat Washington att placera kärnvapen i landet, och medger att det skulle ta årtionden att ha sin egen kapacitet.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Originalartikel</strong></a><strong> på <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">I samarbete med <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, medfinansierat av Europeiska unionen. Åsikter och uppfattningar som uttrycks är dock endast författarens och speglar inte nödvändigtvis Europeiska unionens eller generaldirektoratet för kommunikationsnät, innehåll och teknik. Varken Europeiska unionen eller den beviljande myndigheten kan hållas ansvariga för dem.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:30.801",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Rysslands fullskaliga invasion av Ukraina i februari 2022 skakade EU:s syn på försvar, vilket ledde till en snabb omvärdering av dess militära landskap. Den annonserade amerikanska tillbakadragandet från Europas försvar har återigen satt frågan om kontinentens upprustning på agendan. EUobserver ser på läget.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"sv",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:20:29.414",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Ile dywizji ma Europa? Spojrzenie na stan obrony Europy",
key:"uid": string:"5e034e3a-68d5-46c1-80f3-468d51954e2e",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Kluczowe Punkty\n\n1. **Najwięksi Wydawcy na Obronnym**: Stany Zjednoczone, Chiny, Rosja, Indie i Arabia Saudyjska prowadzą globalne wydatki na obronę, przy czym budżet wojskowy Rosji wzrósł ponad dwukrotnie od czasu inwazji na Ukrainę w 2022 roku, co budzi obawy o dynamikę bezpieczeństwa w Europie.\n \n2. **Cele Wydatków NATO**: Pomimo celu NATO wynoszącego 2% PKB na wydatki obronne, kilka krajów członkowskich, w tym Chorwacja i Portugalia, jeszcze nie osiągnęło tego celu. Trwają dyskusje na temat zwiększenia tego celu do 5%, co odzwierciedla wzrastające potrzeby bezpieczeństwa.\n\n3. **Wyzwania Przemysłu Obronnego UE**: Sektor obronny UE, wyceniany na prawie 84 miliardy euro, stoi przed znacznymi wyzwaniami, w tym fragmentacją, zależnością od importu spoza UE oraz potrzebą długoterminowych kontraktów na zakupy, aby zwiększyć zdolności wojskowe i innowacje.\n\n### Zwiastun\n\n```markdown\nW miarę wzrostu napięć globalnych, wydatki na obronę rosną, a Stany Zjednoczone, Chiny i Rosja są na czołowej pozycji. W Europie członkowie NATO zmagają się z osiągnięciem celów wydatków, podczas gdy UE stara się wzmocnić swoje zdolności wojskowe w obliczu fragmentacji i zewnętrznych zależności. W obliczu wezwań do zwiększenia budżetów i dążenia do strategicznej autonomii, jak Europa poradzi sobie z krajobrazem obronnym w obliczu ewoluujących zagrożeń? Zbadaj złożoności wydatków wojskowych i przyszłość bezpieczeństwa europejskiego w tej dogłębnej analizie.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Global military spending is on the rise, with the US, China, and Russia leading the charge. As Europe grapples with security challenges, nations are ramping up their defence budgets and exploring joint military initiatives. Discover the latest trends and implications for global security.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Które kraje wydają najwięcej na obronę?</strong></h2>\n<p>Kraje z najwyższymi <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">wydatkami na obronę</a> w ostatnich latach to <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Stany Zjednoczone</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Chiny</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Rosja</a>, Indie i Arabia Saudyjska. Wzrost wydatków w Europie jest wyprzedzany przez rosnące wydatki wojskowe Rosji, które więcej niż podwoiły się w porównaniu do poziomów sprzed <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">inwazji na Ukrainę w 2022 roku</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ile wydają członkowie NATO na obronę?</strong></h2>\n<p>Prezydent USA <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> wielokrotnie krytykował sojuszników za niewypełnianie celu wydatków na obronę w wysokości dwóch procent PKB (uzgodnionego w 2014 roku). Nawet teraz, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Chorwacja</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugalia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Włochy</a>, Kanada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belgia</a>, Luksemburg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Słowenia</a> i <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Hiszpania</a> nie osiągnęły celu.</p>\n<p>Wydatki na obronę 23 krajów UE, które są <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">członkami NATO</a>, wyniosły 1,99 procent ich łącznego PKB w 2024 roku i przewiduje się, że osiągną 2,04 procent w 2025 roku.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Więcej :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Wstrząśnięta Europa zacieśnia szeregi, aby stawić czoła nowemu porządkowi Trumpo-Putinist </a>\n </div>\n<p>Jednak Trump zasugerował, że członkowie NATO powinni zwiększyć swoje minimalne wydatki na obronę do pięciu procent PKB — pomysł poparty przez szefową spraw zagranicznych UE <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> w styczniu. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> zaproponował zwiększenie wydatków na obronę UE o trzy do 3,5 procent PKB. Jednak zajmie to lata, aby się zrealizować na podstawie obecnych stawek.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Obrona to branża napędzana technologią, która wymaga ogromnych inwestycji w badania i innowacje. Finansowanie B+R w obszarze obrony w UE osiągnęło 3,9 miliarda euro w 2022 roku, według Eurostatu. Jednak według <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">raportu Dragi</a>, systemy obrony nowej generacji będą wymagały ogromnych inwestycji w B+R. Od 2014 roku USA priorytetowo traktują wydatki na B+R ponad wszystkie inne kategorie wydatków wojskowych. Francja, Niemcy i Szwecja są na czołowej pozycji wśród krajów UE inwestujących w B+R na rzecz obrony.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Które europejskie kraje zwiększają budżety obronne najbardziej?</strong></h2>\n<p>Od 2014 roku kraje takie jak <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Węgry</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Czechy</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Polska</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Dania</a>, Macedonia Północna, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Słowacja</a> i <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Szwecja</a> podwoiły swoje wydatki na obronę, podczas gdy Luksemburg, Łotwa i Litwa potroiły swoje wydatki. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Niemcy</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Holandia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estonia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Rumunia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bułgaria</a> i <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finlandia</a> również niemal podwoiły swoje budżety obronne.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ile żołnierzy mają europejskie kraje?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Całkowita liczba aktywnego personelu wojskowego w Europie, w tym w Wielkiej Brytanii, szacowana jest na około 1,5 miliona. Jednak jego efektywność jest osłabiana przez brak wspólnej struktury dowodzenia i systemów wojskowych.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Do końca 2024 roku liczba rosyjskich żołnierzy w <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukrainie</a> wynosiła około 700 000. Jednak szacuje się, że Rosja ma około 1,3 miliona aktywnego personelu wojskowego i dwa miliony rezerwistów.</p>\n<p>Według <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">oficjalnych danych</a>, około 80 000 amerykańskich sił zbrojnych jest aktywnych w Europie. Jednak całkowita liczba waha się z powodu ćwiczeń i rutynowych rotacji wojsk, jak <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">zauważa</a> Rada Stosunków Zagranicznych. Tymczasem eksperci szacują, że Europa potrzebowałaby <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">dodatkowych 300 000 żołnierzy</a> lub około 50 brygad, aby się obronić, bez amerykańskich wojsk.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Czy Europa zmierza w kierunku wspólnej armii?</strong></h2>\n<p>Nie. Niektóre kraje, takie jak <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Francja</a>, tradycyjnie wspierają silniejszą autonomię wojskową UE, podczas gdy inne, takie jak Polska i kraje bałtyckie, priorytetowo traktują NATO. Jednak zamiast zmierzać w kierunku jednej europejskiej armii, UE koncentruje wysiłki na bliższej współpracy wojskowej, wspólnych zamówieniach i szybszych siłach reagowania, co widać w <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Strategic Compass 2022</a>, którego celem było posiadanie sił szybkiego reagowania liczących 5000 żołnierzy do 2025 roku. Mobilność wojskowa jest nadal jednym z priorytetów strategii obrony UE, ponieważ nie ma zharmonizowanych zasad dotyczących przemieszczania wojsk lub sprzętu między krajami w sytuacji kryzysowej.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Dlaczego i jak UE planuje zwiększyć produkcję broni?</strong></h2>\n<p>Inwazja na Krym w 2014 roku, a następnie pełnoskalowa inwazja Rosji na Ukrainę w 2022 roku, przekształciły politykę bezpieczeństwa UE, zmuszając UE i NATO do przemyślenia strategii obronnych i zwiększenia wydatków wojskowych w celu wzmocnienia zdolności. Wojna na Ukrainie i wyraźny zwrot administracji Trumpa w kierunku Moskwy ożywiły również dyskusje na temat strategicznej autonomii UE, przy czym Francja (a teraz nawet Niemcy) domagają się większej niezależności od kierowanych przez USA struktur bezpieczeństwa.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Więcej :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Kto zapłaci za zbrojenie Europy? Czas na opodatkowanie bogatych </a>\n </div>\n<p>W ciągu ostatnich dwóch dekad UE wprowadziła różne inicjatywy obronne.</p>\n<p>Kluczowe kroki w celu wzmocnienia współpracy wojskowej obejmują utworzenie <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Europejskiej Agencji Obrony</a> (2004), jej coroczny <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Plan Rozwoju Zdolności</a> (2008) oraz <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017). Regulacje dotyczące transferów obronnych i eksportu podwójnego zastosowania również wzmocniły kontrolę nad bronią, podczas gdy pełnoskalowa inwazja Rosji na Ukrainę w 2022 roku przyspieszyła wysiłki obronne UE, prowadząc do utworzenia <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Europejskiego Instrumentu na Rzecz Pokoju</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) oraz <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>W ramach swojego <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">planu ReArm Europe</a> Komisja Europejska ma na celu zmobilizowanie 800 miliardów euro na zwiększenie wydatków obronnych UE, wsparcie Ukrainy i rozszerzenie bazy przemysłowej Europy.</p>\n<p>Plan obejmuje nowy instrument w wysokości 150 miliardów euro w nowym wspólnym pożyczaniu UE, luzując zasady fiskalne bloku dotyczące obrony (co mogłoby uwolnić 650 miliardów euro w ciągu następnych czterech lat), wykorzystując <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">fundusze spójności</a> (dobrowolnie), zmieniając zasady inwestycyjne dla EBI i „odblokowując prywatne” inwestycje w ramach długo wstrzymanej <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Unia Rynków Kapitałowych</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Jak duży jest przemysł obronny UE?</strong></h2>\n<p>Sector obronny UE ma szacunkowy roczny obrót wynoszący prawie 84 miliardy euro, bezpośrednio wspierając ponad 196 000 wysoko wykwalifikowanych miejsc pracy i pośrednio tworząc ponad 315 000 dodatkowych miejsc pracy, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">według</a> Komisji Europejskiej. Jednak europejski przemysł obronny <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">potrzebuje więcej wykwalifikowanych pracowników</a>, ponieważ zwiększa produkcję i innowacje, aby stawić czoła rosnącym wyzwaniom bezpieczeństwa.</p>\n<p>Wartości rynkowe europejskich firm obronnych wzrosły, a większość <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">podwoiła swoje ceny akcji</a> od czasu inwazji Rosji na Ukrainę. Jednak przychody są nadal stosunkowo małe, co pokazuje, że ich zdolność do zwiększenia produkcji jest ograniczona przez wielkość rynków krajowych i ograniczenia eksportowe. To wywołało debatę na temat tego, czy powinno istnieć europejskie preferencje dla wspólnych wydatków obronnych UE. „Taka 'europejska preferencja' jest niezbędnym wkładem w odwrócenie obecnej dominacji dostawców spoza Europy na europejskich rynkach obronnych,” <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">argumentuje</a> przemysł.&nbsp; Jednak kraje UE pozostają podzielone.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Jakie systemy uzbrojenia są postrzegane jako priorytet dla Europy?</strong></h2>\n<p>Europa inwestuje w wielowarstwowe architektury obrony powietrznej i przeciwrakietowej, ponieważ jak powiedział w zeszłym roku Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, polski sekretarz stanu ds. obrony narodowej: „Posiadanie przewagi w powietrzu definiuje wojnę\".</p>\n<p>Na przykład, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">Inicjatywa Europejskiego Tarczy Powietrznej (ESSI)</a>, uruchomiona w październiku 2022 roku, ma na celu stworzenie wszechstronnego systemu obrony, który integruje zdolności od krótkiego zasięgu do poziomów egzotermicznych.</p>\n<p>Oprócz tego, drony, rakiety, artyleria, strategiczne ułatwiacze, mobilność wojskowa, zdolności cybernetyczne i sztuczna inteligencja zostały wymienione jako obszary priorytetowe. Mianowicie, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">drony stały się kluczowym narzędziem w wojnie na Ukrainie</a>, co skłoniło zarówno Kijów, jak i Moskwę do szybkiego rozwoju własnego przemysłu. A dzisiaj głównymi eksporterami wojskowych dronów są Chiny i Turcja.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Źródło: Europejska Agencja Obrony</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Jakie wyzwania stają przed UE w zakresie wzmocnienia swoich zdolności wojskowych?</strong></h2>\n<p>Chociaż zwiększone inwestycje w obronę są mile widziane, przemysł poszukuje długoterminowych lub wieloletnich kontraktów na zakupy, aby zapewnić stabilność, ciągłą innowację i rozwój technologii. System 'budowany na zamówienie', typowy dla czasów pokoju, na którym oparty jest przemysł obronny UE, skutkuje długimi czasami oczekiwania na zaawansowane zdolności obronne.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Współpraca w dziedzinie obrony, w tym wspólne przedsięwzięcia i wspólne zakupy, rośnie, ale pozostaje ograniczona. Podjęto konkretne wysiłki w celu zwiększenia produkcji amunicji artyleryjskiej, w obszarze, w którym Ukraina ma wysokie zapotrzebowanie. Jednak zobowiązanie UE do dostarczenia miliona pocisków artyleryjskich kal. 155 mm między marcem 2023 a 2024 rokiem było niemożliwe do zrealizowania w terminie, co pokazuje nadchodzące wyzwania. Komisja UE oszacowała w 2022 roku, że brak współpracy prowadzi do rocznych kosztów w wysokości od 25 miliardów do 100 miliardów euro.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Więcej :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Czy pobór wraca do Europy? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Kolejnym kluczowym problemem dla przemysłu obronnego UE jest fragmentacja, szczególnie poza sektorami lotniczymi i rakietowymi.&nbsp; Fragmentacja nie tylko wywołuje duplikację i wyższe koszty produkcji, ale także problemy z interoperacyjnością, ograniczając jej skalę i efektywność operacyjną w terenie. Jako wskazanie, państwa członkowskie UE dostarczyły dziesięć różnych typów haubic do Ukrainy, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">według</a> raportu Draghi. Ponadto UE operuje 12 różnymi typami czołgów bojowych, podczas gdy USA produkują tylko jeden (M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Tymczasem zewnętrzne zależności również mają znaczenie. W latach 2007-2016 ponad 60 procent budżetu na zakupy obronne Europy wydano na importy wojskowe spoza UE, co prowadziło do kontroli i ograniczeń ze strony krajów trzecich dotyczących sprzętu. 'Europejska preferencja' w zakupach obronnych, głównie promowana przez Francję, nie znalazła konsensusu podczas nieformalnych rozmów liderów UE w lutym – a biorąc pod uwagę potrzebę szybkiego zwiększenia, wiele krajów wzywa do systemu, który byłby jak najbardziej otwarty.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Czy europejskie kraje mają broń jądrową?</strong></h2>\n<p>Na styczeń 2022 roku Francja miała 290 głowic, z 98 systemami dostarczania, w tym rakietami podwodnymi i rakietami wystrzeliwanymi z powietrza. Wielka Brytania miała 225 głowic, 120 operacyjnych, rozmieszczonych na pięciu okrętach podwodnych, z 105 w magazynie, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">według</a> Stowarzyszenia Kontroli Zbrojeń.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Tymczasem donosi się, że Belgia, Niemcy, Włochy, Holandia i Turcja goszczą amerykańskie broń jądrową. Polska niedawno wezwała Waszyngton do rozmieszczenia broni jądrowej w kraju, przyznając, że posiadanie własnych zdolności zajmie dziesięciolecia.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Oryginalny artykuł</strong></a><strong> na <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">W partnerstwie z <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, współfinansowane przez Unię Europejską. Wyrażone poglądy i opinie są jednak wyłącznie autorów i niekoniecznie odzwierciedlają stanowisko Unii Europejskiej ani Dyrekcji Generalnej ds. Sieci Komunikacyjnych, Treści i Technologii. Ani Unia Europejska, ani organ przyznający nie mogą ponosić za nie odpowiedzialności.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:29.996",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Pełnoskalowa inwazja Rosji na Ukrainę w lutym 2022 roku wstrząsnęła podejściem UE do obrony, skłaniając do szybkiej rewizji jej krajobrazu militarnego. Ogłoszone wycofanie USA z obrony Europy postawiło na nowo pytanie o zbrojenie kontynentu. EUobserver przygląda się aktualnej sytuacji.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"pl",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:18:18.386",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Câte divizii are Europa? O privire asupra stării apărării Europei",
key:"uid": string:"61e4f72f-c42d-4e90-8b5a-847d9305b0dc",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Puncte Cheie\n\n1. **Cei mai mari cheltuitori în apărare**: Statele Unite, China, Rusia, India și Arabia Saudită conduc cheltuielile globale pentru apărare, bugetul militar al Rusiei fiind mai mult decât dublat de la invazia sa din 2022 în Ucraina, ridicând îngrijorări cu privire la dinamica securității europene.\n \n2. **Obiectivele de cheltuieli NATO**: În ciuda obiectivului NATO de 2% din PIB pentru cheltuielile de apărare, mai multe țări membre, inclusiv Croația și Portugalia, nu au reușit să atingă acest țel. Discuțiile sunt în curs de desfășurare pentru a crește acest obiectiv la 5%, reflectând nevoile de securitate sporite.\n\n3. **Provocările industriei de apărare a UE**: Sectorul de apărare al UE, evaluat la aproape 84 de miliarde de euro, se confruntă cu provocări semnificative, inclusiv fragmentarea, dependența de importurile din afara UE și necesitatea unor contracte de achiziții pe termen lung pentru a îmbunătăți capabilitățile militare și inovația.\n\n### Teaser\n\n```markdown\nPe măsură ce tensiunile globale cresc, cheltuielile pentru apărare sunt în creștere, cu Statele Unite, China și Rusia în frunte. În Europa, membrii NATO se confruntă cu dificultăți în a atinge obiectivele de cheltuieli, în timp ce UE caută să își consolideze capabilitățile militare în mijlocul fragmentării și dependențelor externe. Cu apeluri pentru bugete mai mari și o presiune pentru autonomie strategică, cum va naviga Europa peisajul său de apărare în fața amenințărilor în evoluție? Explorați complexitățile cheltuielilor militare și viitorul securității europene în această analiză detaliată.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Cheltuielile militare globale sunt în creștere, cu SUA, China și Rusia conducând avansul. Pe măsură ce Europa se confruntă cu provocări de securitate, națiunile își cresc bugetele de apărare și explorează inițiative militare comune. Descoperiți cele mai recente tendințe și implicații pentru securitatea globală.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Care sunt țările care cheltuiesc cel mai mult pentru apărare?</strong></h2>\n<p>Țările cu cele mai mari cheltuieli pentru <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">apărare</a> în ultimii ani sunt <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Statele Unite</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">China</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Rusia</a>, India și Arabia Saudită. Creșterea europeană este depășită de cheltuielile militare în creștere ale Rusiei, care s-au dublat față de nivelurile de dinaintea <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">invaziei din 2022 a Ucrainei</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Cât cheltuiesc membrii NATO pentru apărare?</strong></h2>\n<p>Președintele american <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> a criticat în mod repetat aliații pentru că nu îndeplinesc obiectivul de cheltuieli pentru apărare al alianței de două procente din PIB (agreat în 2014). Chiar și acum, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Croația</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugalia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Italia</a>, Canada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belgia</a>, Luxemburg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Slovenia</a> și <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Spania</a> nu au atins obiectivul.</p>\n<p>Cheltuielile pentru apărare ale celor 23 de țări din UE care sunt <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">membri NATO</a> au reprezentat 1,99% din PIB-ul lor combinat în 2024 și se preconizează că vor ajunge la 2,04% în 2025.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Mai mult :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n O Europă zguduită se unește pentru a face față noului ordin Trumpo-Putinist </a>\n </div>\n<p>Dar Trump a sugerat că membrii NATO ar trebui să își crească cheltuielile minime pentru apărare la cinci procente din PIB — o idee susținută de șefa afacerilor externe a UE <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> în ianuarie. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> a propus creșterea cheltuielilor pentru apărare ale UE cu trei până la 3,5 procente din PIB. Totuși, acest lucru ar dura ani de zile pentru a se materializa pe baza ratelor actuale.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Apărarea este o industrie bazată pe tehnologie care necesită investiții masive în cercetare și inovație. Finanțarea R&amp;D pentru apărare în UE a atins 3,9 miliarde de euro în 2022, conform Eurostat. Cu toate acestea, conform <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">raportului Dragi</a>, sistemele de apărare de generație următoare vor necesita investiții masive în R&amp;D. Din 2014, SUA au prioritizat cheltuielile pentru R&amp;D peste toate celelalte categorii de cheltuieli militare. Franța, Germania și Suedia se află în fruntea țărilor din UE care investesc în R&amp;D pentru apărare.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Care țări europene își cresc cel mai mult bugetele pentru apărare?</strong></h2>\n<p>Din 2014, țări precum <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Ungaria</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Republica Cehă</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Polonia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Danemarca</a>, Macedonia de Nord, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Slovacia</a> și <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Suedia</a> și-au dublat cheltuielile pentru apărare, în timp ce Luxemburg, Letonia și Lituania și-au triplat cheltuielile. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Germania</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Olanda</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estonia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">România</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulgaria</a> și <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finlanda</a> și-au dublat, de asemenea, bugetele pentru apărare.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Câți soldați au țările europene?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Numărul total de personal militar activ în Europa, inclusiv Marea Britanie, este estimat la aproximativ 1,5 milioane. Cu toate acestea, eficiența sa este subminată de lipsa unei structuri comune de comandă și a sistemelor militare.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Până la sfârșitul anului 2024, numărul trupelor ruse în <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ucraina</a> era de aproximativ 700.000. Cu toate acestea, se <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">estimează</a> că Rusia are aproximativ 1,3 milioane de personal militar activ și două milioane de rezervi.</p>\n<p>Conform <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\"> cifrelor oficiale</a>, aproximativ 80.000 de forțe militare americane sunt active în Europa. Cu toate acestea, numărul total fluctuează din cauza exercițiilor și rotațiilor de trupe de rutină, așa cum <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">a menționat</a> Consiliul pentru Relații Externe. Între timp, experții estimează că Europa ar avea nevoie de un <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\"> supliment de 300.000 de militari</a> sau aproximativ 50 de brigăzi pentru a se apăra, fără trupele americane.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Se îndreaptă Europa spre o armată comună?</strong></h2>\n<p>Nu. Unele țări, precum <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Franța</a>, au susținut în mod tradițional o autonomie militară mai puternică a UE, în timp ce altele, cum ar fi Polonia și țările baltice, prioritizează NATO. Dar, mai degrabă decât să se îndrepte spre o armată europeană unică, UE își concentrează eforturile pe o cooperare militară mai strânsă, achiziții comune și forțe de reacție mai rapide, așa cum se vede în <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Busola Strategică din 2022</a>, al cărei obiectiv era să aibă o forță de desfășurare rapidă de 5.000 de soldați până în 2025. Mobilitatea militară este și astăzi una dintre prioritățile strategiei de apărare a UE, deoarece nu există reguli armonizate pentru a muta trupe sau echipamente între țări în situații de urgență.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>De ce și cum plănuiește UE să își crească producția de arme?</strong></h2>\n<p>Invazia Crimeei în 2014, urmată de invazia pe scară largă a Ucrainei de către Rusia în 2022, a remodelat politica de securitate a UE, forțând UE și NATO să reconsidere strategiile de apărare și să crească cheltuielile militare pentru a-și îmbunătăți capacitățile. Războiul din Ucraina și aparenta pivotare a administrației Trump către Moscova au revigorat, de asemenea, discuțiile despre autonomia strategică a UE, Franța (și acum chiar și Germania) făcând presiuni pentru mai multă independență față de structurile de securitate conduse de SUA.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Mai mult :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Cine va plăti pentru reînarmarea Europei? E timpul să impozităm bogații </a>\n </div>\n<p>În ultimele două decenii, UE a venit cu diferite inițiative de apărare.</p>\n<p>Pașii cheie pentru a îmbunătăți colaborarea militară includ înființarea <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\"> Agenției Europene de Apărare</a> (2004), planul său anual de <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Dezvoltare a Capacităților</a> (2008) și <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\"> PESCO</a> (2017). Reglementările pentru transferurile de apărare și exporturile cu utilizare duală au întărit, de asemenea, controlul armelor, în timp ce invazia pe scară largă a Ucrainei de către Rusia în 2022 a accelerat eforturile de apărare ale UE, conducând la crearea <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Facilității Europene pentru Pace</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) și <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>Cu planul său <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">ReArm Europe</a>, Comisia Europeană își propune să mobilizeze 800 de miliarde de euro pentru a crește cheltuielile de apărare ale UE, a sprijini Ucraina și a extinde baza industrială a Europei.</p>\n<p>Planul include un nou instrument de 150 de miliarde de euro în noi împrumuturi comune ale UE, relaxând regulile fiscale ale blocului pentru apărare (care ar putea fi eliberate 650 de miliarde de euro în următorii patru ani), folosind fonduri de <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">coeziune</a> (voluntar), schimbând regulile de investiții pentru BEI și „deblocând investițiile private” în cadrul <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Uniunii Piețelor de Capital</a> (CMU) care a stagnat de mult timp.&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Cât de mare este industria de apărare a UE?</strong></h2>\n<p>Sectorul de apărare al UE are un venit anual estimat de aproape 84 de miliarde de euro, susținând direct peste 196.000 de locuri de muncă foarte calificate și creând indirect mai mult de 315.000 de locuri de muncă suplimentare, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">conform</a> Comisiei Europene. Dar industria de apărare europeană <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">are nevoie de mai mulți lucrători calificați</a> pe măsură ce își crește producția și inovația pentru a face față provocărilor de securitate în creștere.</p>\n<p>Valorile de piață ale companiilor europene de apărare au crescut, majoritatea <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">dublându-și prețurile acțiunilor</a> de la invazia Rusiei în Ucraina. Dar veniturile sunt încă destul de mici, arătând că capacitatea lor de a se extinde este restricționată de dimensiunea piețelor naționale și de restricțiile la export. Acest lucru a generat o dezbatere despre dacă ar trebui să existe o preferință europeană pentru cheltuielile comune de apărare ale UE. „O astfel de 'preferință europeană' este o contribuție necesară pentru a inversa predominanța actuală a furnizorilor non-europeni pe piețele de apărare europene,” <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">susține</a> industria.&nbsp; Dar țările UE rămân împărțite.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ce sisteme de arme sunt considerate priorități pentru Europa?</strong></h2>\n<p>Europa investește în arhitecturi de apărare aeriană și de rachete stratificate, deoarece, așa cum a spus Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, secretar de stat polonez pentru apărare națională, anul trecut: „A avea un avantaj în aer definește războiul\".</p>\n<p>De exemplu, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">Inițiativa Europeană pentru Scutul Aerian (ESSI)</a>, lansată în octombrie 2022, urmărește să creeze un sistem de apărare cuprinzător care integrează capacități de la niveluri de scurtă distanță până la exoatmosferice.</p>\n<p>În plus, dronele, rachetele, artileria, facilitățile strategice, mobilitatea militară, capacitățile cibernetice și inteligența artificială au fost listate ca domenii prioritare. Anume, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\"> dronele au devenit un instrument crucial în războiul din Ucraina</a>, determinând atât Kievul, cât și Moscova să își dezvolte rapid propria industrie. Și astăzi, principalii exportatori de drone militare sunt China și Turcia.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Prioritățile dezvoltării capacităților UE. Sursa: Agenția Europeană de Apărare\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Sursa: Agenția Europeană de Apărare</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ce provocări întâmpină UE în întărirea capacităților sale militare?</strong></h2>\n<p>Deși investițiile crescute în apărare sunt binevenite, industria caută contracte de achiziție pe termen lung sau pe mai mulți ani pentru stabilitate, inovație susținută și dezvoltare tehnologică. Sistemul 'construit la comandă', specific timpului de pace, pe care se bazează industria de apărare a UE, a dus la timpi lungi de așteptare pentru capacitățile avansate de apărare.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Cooperarea în domeniul apărării, inclusiv întreprinderile comune și achizițiile partajate, este în creștere, dar rămâne limitată. Au existat eforturi specifice pentru a crește producția de muniție de artilerie, un domeniu în care Ucraina are o cerere mare. Dar angajamentul UE de a livra un milion de obuze de artilerie de 155 mm între martie 2023 și 2024 a fost imposibil de îndeplinit la timp, arătând provocările care stau în față. Comisia UE a estimat în 2022 că lipsa de cooperare duce la costuri anuale cuprinse între 25 de miliarde și 100 de miliarde de euro.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Mai mult :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Se întoarce serviciul militar în Europa? </a>\n </div>\n<p>O altă problemă cheie pentru industria de apărare a UE este fragmentarea, în special în afara sectoarelor aeronautice și de rachete.&nbsp; Fragmentarea nu doar că generează duplicare și costuri de producție mai mari, dar provoacă și probleme de interoperabilitate, limitând scala și eficiența operațională pe teren. Ca o indicație, statele membre ale UE au furnizat zece tipuri diferite de obuziere Ucrainei, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">conform</a> raportului Draghi. În plus, UE operează 12 tipuri diferite de tancuri de luptă, în timp ce SUA fabrică doar unul (M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Între timp, dependențele externe joacă, de asemenea, un rol. Între 2007 și 2016, peste 60% din bugetul de achiziții de apărare al Europei a fost cheltuit pe importuri militare non-UE, ducând la controale și restricții din partea țărilor terțe asupra echipamentului. O 'preferință europeană' în achizițiile de apărare, susținută în principal de Franța, nu a găsit consens în timpul discuțiilor informale ale liderilor UE din februarie – și având în vedere necesitatea de a se extinde rapid, multe țări cer un sistem cât mai deschis posibil.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Au țările europene arme nucleare?</strong></h2>\n<p>Începând cu ianuarie 2022, Franța avea 290 de focoase, cu 98 de sisteme de livrare, inclusiv rachete submarine și rachete lansate din aer. Marea Britanie avea 225 de focoase, 120 operaționale, desfășurate pe cinci submarine, cu 105 în stoc, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">conform</a> Asociației pentru Controlul Armelor.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Între timp, se raportează că Belgia, Germania, Italia, Olanda și Turcia găzduiesc toate arme nucleare americane. Polonia a cerut recent Washingtonului să desfășoare arme nucleare în țară, recunoscând că a avea propria capacitate ar dura decenii.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Articolul original</strong></a><strong> pe <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">În parteneriat cu <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, cofinanțat de Uniunea Europeană. Opiniile și punctele de vedere exprimate sunt însă cele ale autorului (autorilor) și nu reflectă neapărat cele ale Uniunii Europene sau ale Direcției Generale pentru Rețele de Comunicații, Conținut și Tehnologie. Nici Uniunea Europeană, nici autoritatea de acordare nu pot fi făcute responsabile pentru acestea.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:30.498",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Invazia pe scară largă a Rusiei în Ucraina în februarie 2022 a zguduit abordarea UE față de apărare, determinând o reevaluare rapidă a peisajului său militar. Retragerea anunțată a SUA din apărarea Europei a readus în discuție problema reînarmării continentului. EUobserver analizează starea actuală a situației.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"ro",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:19:39.351",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Quante divisioni ha l'Europa? Uno sguardo allo stato della difesa europea",
key:"uid": string:"6910ba60-5f87-4865-9674-f14521052ed8",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Punti Chiave\n\n1. **Principali Spettatori della Difesa**: Gli Stati Uniti, la Cina, la Russia, l'India e l'Arabia Saudita guidano la spesa globale per la difesa, con il budget militare della Russia che è più che raddoppiato dalla sua invasione dell'Ucraina nel 2022, sollevando preoccupazioni sulle dinamiche di sicurezza europee.\n \n2. **Obiettivi di Spesa della NATO**: Nonostante l'obiettivo della NATO del 2% del PIL per la spesa per la difesa, diversi paesi membri, tra cui Croazia e Portogallo, non hanno ancora raggiunto questo traguardo. Sono in corso discussioni per aumentare questo obiettivo al 5%, riflettendo le crescenti esigenze di sicurezza.\n\n3. **Sfide dell'Industria della Difesa dell'UE**: Il settore della difesa dell'UE, valutato quasi 84 miliardi di euro, affronta sfide significative, tra cui la frammentazione, la dipendenza da importazioni non UE e la necessità di contratti di approvvigionamento a lungo termine per migliorare le capacità militari e l'innovazione.\n\n### Teaser\n\n```markdown\nCon l'aumento delle tensioni globali, la spesa per la difesa sta aumentando, con gli Stati Uniti, la Cina e la Russia in prima linea. In Europa, i membri della NATO si confrontano con il raggiungimento degli obiettivi di spesa, mentre l'UE cerca di rafforzare le proprie capacità militari in mezzo a frammentazione e dipendenze esterne. Con richieste di budget aumentati e una spinta per l'autonomia strategica, come navigherà l'Europa nel suo panorama della difesa di fronte a minacce in evoluzione? Esplora le complessità della spesa militare e il futuro della sicurezza europea in questa analisi approfondita.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"La spesa militare globale è in aumento, con gli Stati Uniti, la Cina e la Russia in prima linea. Mentre l'Europa affronta sfide di sicurezza, le nazioni stanno aumentando i loro budget per la difesa ed esplorando iniziative militari congiunte. Scopri le ultime tendenze e le implicazioni per la sicurezza globale.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quali sono i paesi che spendono di più per la difesa?</strong></h2>\n<p>I paesi con la spesa per la <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">difesa</a> più alta negli ultimi anni sono gli <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Stati Uniti</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Cina</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Russia</a>, India e Arabia Saudita. La crescita europea è superata dall'aumento della spesa militare della Russia, che è più che raddoppiata rispetto ai livelli precedenti alla sua <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">invasione dell'Ucraina del 2022</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quanto spendono i membri della Nato per la difesa?</strong></h2>\n<p>Il presidente statunitense <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> ha ripetutamente criticato gli alleati per non aver raggiunto l'obiettivo di spesa per la difesa dell'alleanza del due percento del PIL (concordato nel 2014). Anche ora, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">la Croazia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">il Portogallo</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">l'Italia</a>, il Canada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">il Belgio</a>, il Lussemburgo, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">la Slovenia</a> e <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">la Spagna</a> non hanno raggiunto l'obiettivo.</p>\n<p>La spesa per la difesa dei 23 paesi dell'UE che sono membri della <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">Nato</a> ammontava all'1,99 percento del loro PIL combinato nel 2024 e si prevede che raggiunga il 2,04 percento nel 2025.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Di più :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Un'Europa scossa si unisce per affrontare il nuovo ordine trumpo-putinista </a>\n </div>\n<p>Ma Trump ha suggerito che i membri della Nato dovrebbero aumentare la loro spesa minima per la difesa al cinque percento del PIL — un'idea sostenuta dal capo della politica estera dell'UE <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> a gennaio. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> ha proposto di aumentare la spesa per la difesa dell'UE dal tre al 3,5 percento del PIL. Tuttavia, ciò richiederebbe anni per concretizzarsi in base ai tassi attuali.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>La difesa è un'industria guidata dalla tecnologia che richiede massicci investimenti in ricerca e innovazione. Il finanziamento per la R&amp;D della difesa nell'UE ha raggiunto i 3,9 miliardi di euro nel 2022, secondo Eurostat. Tuttavia, secondo il <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">rapporto Dragi</a>, i sistemi di difesa di nuova generazione richiederanno massicci investimenti in R&amp;D. Dal 2014, gli Stati Uniti hanno dato priorità alla spesa per la R&amp;D rispetto a tutte le altre categorie di spesa militare. Francia, Germania e Svezia sono ai vertici dei paesi dell'UE che investono in R&amp;D per la difesa.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quali paesi europei stanno aumentando di più i budget per la difesa?</strong></h2>\n<p>Dal 2014, paesi come <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">l'Ungheria</a>, la <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Repubblica Ceca</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">la Polonia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">la Danimarca</a>, la Macedonia del Nord, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">la Slovacchia</a> e <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">la Svezia</a> hanno raddoppiato le loro spese per la difesa, mentre il Lussemburgo, la Lettonia e la Lituania hanno triplicato le loro spese. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">La Germania</a>, i <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Paesi Bassi</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">l'Estonia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">la Romania</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">la Bulgaria</a> e <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">la Finlandia</a> hanno anche quasi raddoppiato i loro budget per la difesa.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quanti soldati hanno i paesi europei?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Il numero totale di personale militare attivo in Europa, compreso il Regno Unito, è stimato intorno a 1,5 milioni. Tuttavia, la sua efficienza è compromessa dalla mancanza di una struttura di comando comune e di sistemi militari.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Entro la fine del 2024, il numero di truppe russe in <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ucraina</a> era di circa 700.000. Tuttavia, si stima che la Russia abbia circa 1,3 milioni di personale militare attivo e due milioni di riservisti, <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">secondo</a> le stime.</p>\n<p>Secondo <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">dati ufficiali</a>, circa 80.000 forze militari americane sono attive in Europa. Tuttavia, il numero totale fluttua a causa di esercitazioni e rotazioni di truppe di routine, come <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">notato</a> dal Council on Foreign Relations. Nel frattempo, gli esperti stimano che l'Europa avrebbe bisogno di <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">300.000 soldati in più</a> o circa 50 brigate per difendersi, senza le truppe statunitensi.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Sta l'Europa muovendosi verso un esercito comune?</strong></h2>\n<p>No. Alcuni paesi, come <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">la Francia</a>, hanno tradizionalmente sostenuto una maggiore autonomia militare dell'UE, mentre altri, come la Polonia e i paesi baltici, danno priorità alla Nato. Ma piuttosto che muoversi verso un esercito europeo unico, l'UE sta concentrando gli sforzi su una cooperazione militare più stretta, acquisti congiunti e forze di risposta più rapide, come visto nel <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">2022 Strategic Compass</a>, il cui obiettivo era avere una forza di dispiegamento rapido di 5.000 uomini entro il 2025. La mobilità militare è ancora oggi una delle priorità della strategia di difesa dell'UE poiché non ci sono regole armonizzate per spostare truppe o attrezzature tra i paesi in situazioni di emergenza.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Perché e come l'UE intende aumentare la propria produzione di armi?</strong></h2>\n<p>L'invasione della Crimea nel 2014, seguita dall'invasione su larga scala della Russia in Ucraina nel 2022, ha rimodellato la politica di sicurezza dell'UE, costringendo l'UE e la Nato a ripensare le strategie di difesa e ad aumentare la spesa militare per potenziare le capacità. La guerra in Ucraina e il palese spostamento dell'amministrazione Trump verso Mosca hanno anche riacceso le discussioni sull'autonomia strategica dell'UE, con la Francia (e ora anche la Germania) che spingono per una maggiore indipendenza dalle strutture di sicurezza guidate dagli Stati Uniti.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Di più :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Chi pagherà per il riarmo dell'Europa? È tempo di tassare i ricchi </a>\n </div>\n<p>Negli ultimi due decenni, l'UE ha proposto diverse iniziative per la difesa.</p>\n<p>I passi chiave per migliorare la collaborazione militare includono la creazione dell'<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Agenzia Europea per la Difesa</a> (2004), il suo annuale <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Piano di Sviluppo delle Capacità</a> (2008) e <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017). Le normative per i trasferimenti di difesa e le esportazioni a doppio uso hanno anche rafforzato il controllo delle armi, mentre l'invasione su larga scala della Russia in Ucraina nel 2022 ha accelerato gli sforzi di difesa dell'UE, portando alla creazione della <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">European Peace Facility</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) e <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>Con il suo <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">piano ReArm Europe</a>, la Commissione Europea mira a mobilitare 800 miliardi di euro per aumentare la spesa per la difesa dell'UE, sostenere l'Ucraina e ampliare la base industriale dell'Europa.</p>\n<p>Il piano include un nuovo strumento di 150 miliardi di euro in nuovi prestiti congiunti dell'UE, allentando le regole fiscali del blocco per la difesa (che potrebbero liberare 650 miliardi di euro nei prossimi quattro anni), utilizzando fondi di <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">coesione</a> (volontariamente), modificando le regole di investimento per la BEI e “sbloccando investimenti privati” attraverso la lunga bloccata <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Unione dei Mercati dei Capitali</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quanto è grande l'industria della difesa dell'UE?</strong></h2>\n<p>Il settore della difesa dell'UE ha un fatturato annuale stimato di quasi 84 miliardi di euro, sostenendo direttamente oltre 196.000 posti di lavoro altamente qualificati e creando indirettamente più di 315.000 posti di lavoro aggiuntivi, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">secondo</a> la Commissione Europea. Ma l'industria della difesa europea <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">ha bisogno di più lavoratori qualificati</a> mentre aumenta la produzione e l'innovazione per affrontare le crescenti sfide di sicurezza.</p>\n<p>Le valutazioni di mercato delle aziende di difesa europee sono aumentate, con la maggior parte <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">che ha raddoppiato i propri prezzi delle azioni</a> da quando la Russia ha invaso l'Ucraina. Tuttavia, i ricavi sono ancora piuttosto ridotti, mostrando che la loro capacità di espandersi è ostacolata dalle dimensioni dei mercati nazionali e dalle restrizioni all'esportazione. Questo ha sollevato un dibattito su se debba esserci una preferenza europea per la spesa comune per la difesa dell'UE. “Tale ‘preferenza europea’ è un contributo necessario per invertire l'attuale predominanza di fornitori non europei sui mercati della difesa europei,” <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">sostiene</a> l'industria.&nbsp; Ma i paesi dell'UE rimangono divisi.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quali sistemi d'arma sono considerati una priorità per l'Europa?</strong></h2>\n<p>L'Europa sta investendo in architetture di difesa aerea e missilistica a più livelli perché, come ha detto Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, segretario di stato polacco per la difesa nazionale, l'anno scorso: “Avere un vantaggio nell'aria definisce la guerra\".</p>\n<p>Ad esempio, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">l'Iniziativa Europea Sky Shield (ESSI)</a>, lanciata nell'ottobre 2022, cerca di creare un sistema di difesa onnicomprensivo che integri capacità che vanno da livelli a corto raggio a livelli esoatmosferici.</p>\n<p>Inoltre, droni, missili, artiglieria, abilitatori strategici, mobilità militare, capacità informatiche e intelligenza artificiale sono stati elencati come aree prioritarie. In particolare, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">i droni sono diventati uno strumento cruciale nella guerra in Ucraina</a>, spingendo sia Kiev che Mosca a sviluppare rapidamente la propria industria. E oggi, i principali esportatori di droni militari sono la Cina e la Turchia.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Fonte: Agenzia Europea per la Difesa</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quali sfide affronta l'UE nel rafforzare le proprie capacità militari?</strong></h2>\n<p>Sebbene l'aumento degli investimenti nella difesa sia ben accolto, l'industria cerca contratti di approvvigionamento a lungo termine o pluriennali per stabilità, innovazione sostenuta e sviluppo tecnologico. Il sistema ‘costruito su ordinazione’ tipico dei tempi di pace, su cui si basa l'industria della difesa dell'UE, ha portato a lunghi tempi di attesa per capacità di difesa avanzate.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>La cooperazione nella difesa, comprese le joint venture e gli acquisti condivisi, sta crescendo, ma rimane limitata. Ci sono stati sforzi specifici per aumentare la produzione di munizioni per artiglieria, un'area in cui l'Ucraina ha una domanda elevata. Ma l'impegno dell'UE di consegnare un milione di proiettili di artiglieria da 155 mm tra marzo 2023 e 2024 è stato impossibile da rispettare in tempo, mostrando le sfide future. La Commissione UE ha stimato nel 2022 che la mancanza di cooperazione porta a costi annuali che vanno da 25 miliardi a 100 miliardi di euro.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Di più :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n La coscrizione torna in Europa? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Un'altra delle questioni chiave per l'industria della difesa dell'UE è la frammentazione, specialmente al di fuori dei settori aeronautico e missilistico.&nbsp; La frammentazione non solo provoca duplicazioni e costi di produzione più elevati, ma anche problemi di interoperabilità, limitando la sua scala e l'efficacia operativa sul campo. A titolo indicativo, gli stati membri dell'UE hanno fornito dieci diversi tipi di obici all'Ucraina, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">secondo</a> il rapporto Draghi. Inoltre, l'UE opera 12 diversi tipi di carri armati da battaglia, mentre gli Stati Uniti ne producono solo uno (l'M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Nel frattempo, anche le dipendenze esterne giocano un ruolo. Tra il 2007 e il 2016, oltre il 60 percento del budget di approvvigionamento per la difesa dell'Europa è stato speso per importazioni militari non UE, portando a controlli e restrizioni da parte di paesi terzi sull'attrezzatura. Una 'preferenza europea' negli approvvigionamenti per la difesa, spinta principalmente dalla Francia, non ha trovato consenso durante i colloqui informali dei leader dell'UE a febbraio – e data la necessità di espandersi rapidamente, molti paesi chiedono un sistema il più aperto possibile.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>I paesi europei hanno armi nucleari?</strong></h2>\n<p>Nel gennaio 2022, la Francia aveva 290 testate, con 98 sistemi di consegna, tra cui missili sottomarini e missili lanciati dall'aria. Il Regno Unito aveva 225 testate, 120 operative, dispiegate su cinque sottomarini, con 105 in stoccaggio, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">secondo</a> l'Arms Control Association.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Nel frattempo, si riporta che Belgio, Germania, Italia, Paesi Bassi e Turchia ospitano tutte armi nucleari statunitensi. La Polonia ha recentemente chiesto a Washington di dispiegare armi nucleari nel paese, ammettendo che avere una propria capacità richiederebbe decenni.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Articolo originale</strong></a><strong> su <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">In collaborazione con <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, cofinanziato dall'Unione Europea. Le opinioni espresse sono tuttavia quelle dell'autore o degli autori e non riflettono necessariamente quelle dell'Unione Europea o della Direzione Generale per le Reti di Comunicazione, i Contenuti e la Tecnologia. Né l'Unione Europea né l'autorità concedente possono essere ritenute responsabili per esse.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:29.866",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"L'invasione su larga scala della Russia in Ucraina nel febbraio 2022 ha scosso l'approccio dell'UE alla difesa, portando a una rapida rivalutazione del suo panorama militare. Il ritiro annunciato degli Stati Uniti dalla difesa europea ha rimesso in discussione la questione del riarmo del continente. EUobserver esamina lo stato delle cose.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"it",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:18:04.286",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Wie viele Divisionen hat Europa? Ein Blick auf den Stand der Verteidigung Europas",
key:"uid": string:"6a46c250-0b87-42d9-9161-4716b6cd7015",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Schlüsselthemen\n\n1. **Top-Verteidigungsausgaben**: Die Vereinigten Staaten, China, Russland, Indien und Saudi-Arabien führen die globalen Verteidigungsausgaben an, wobei Russlands Militärbudget sich seit der Invasion in der Ukraine 2022 mehr als verdoppelt hat, was Bedenken hinsichtlich der europäischen Sicherheitsdynamik aufwirft.\n \n2. **NATO-Ausgabenziele**: Trotz des Ziels der NATO von 2% des BIP für Verteidigungsausgaben haben mehrere Mitgliedsländer, darunter Kroatien und Portugal, dieses Ziel noch nicht erreicht. Diskussionen über eine Erhöhung dieses Ziels auf 5% sind im Gange, was die gestiegenen Sicherheitsbedürfnisse widerspiegelt.\n\n3. **Herausforderungen der EU-Verteidigungsindustrie**: Der Verteidigungssektor der EU, der auf fast 84 Milliarden Euro geschätzt wird, steht vor erheblichen Herausforderungen, darunter Fragmentierung, Abhängigkeit von Nicht-EU-Importen und die Notwendigkeit langfristiger Beschaffungsverträge zur Verbesserung der militärischen Fähigkeiten und Innovation.\n\n### Teaser\n\n```markdown\nMit steigenden globalen Spannungen steigen die Verteidigungsausgaben, wobei die Vereinigten Staaten, China und Russland an der Spitze stehen. In Europa kämpfen die NATO-Mitglieder darum, die Ausgabenziele zu erreichen, während die EU versucht, ihre militärischen Fähigkeiten angesichts von Fragmentierung und externen Abhängigkeiten zu stärken. Mit Forderungen nach erhöhten Budgets und einem Vorstoß für strategische Autonomie, wie wird Europa seine Verteidigungslandschaft angesichts sich entwickelnder Bedrohungen navigieren? Erkunden Sie die Komplexität der Militärausgaben und die Zukunft der europäischen Sicherheit in dieser eingehenden Analyse.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Globale Militärausgaben steigen, wobei die USA, China und Russland an der Spitze stehen. Während Europa mit Sicherheitsherausforderungen kämpft, erhöhen die Nationen ihre Verteidigungshaushalte und erkunden gemeinsame militärische Initiativen. Entdecken Sie die neuesten Trends und Auswirkungen auf die globale Sicherheit.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Welche Länder geben am meisten für Verteidigung aus?</strong></h2>\n<p>Die Länder mit den höchsten <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">Verteidigung</a>sausgaben in den letzten Jahren sind die <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Vereinigten Staaten</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">China</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Russland</a>, Indien und Saudi-Arabien. Das europäische Wachstum wird von Russlands steigenden Militärausgaben übertroffen, die sich im Vergleich zu den Niveaus vor der <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">Invasion der Ukraine 2022</a> mehr als verdoppelt haben.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Wie viel geben die Nato-Mitglieder für Verteidigung aus?</strong></h2>\n<p>Der US-Präsident <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> hat wiederholt Verbündete kritisiert, weil sie das Verteidigungsausgaben-Ziel der Allianz von zwei Prozent des BIP (2014 vereinbart) nicht erreichen. Selbst jetzt haben <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Kroatien</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugal</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Italien</a>, Kanada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belgien</a>, Luxemburg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Slowenien</a> und <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Spanien</a> das Ziel nicht erreicht.</p>\n<p>Die Verteidigungsausgaben der 23 EU-Länder, die <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">Nato</a>-Mitglieder sind, beliefen sich 2024 auf 1,99 Prozent ihres kombinierten BIP und sollen 2025 auf 2,04 Prozent steigen.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Mehr :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Ein erschüttertes Europa schließt sich zusammen, um sich der trumpo-putinistischen neuen Ordnung zu stellen </a>\n </div>\n<p>Aber Trump schlug vor, dass die Nato-Mitglieder ihre Mindestverteidigungsausgaben auf fünf Prozent des BIP erhöhen sollten – eine Idee, die von der EU-Außenbeauftragten <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> im Januar unterstützt wurde. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> hat vorgeschlagen, die Verteidigungsausgaben der EU um drei bis 3,5 Prozent des BIP zu erhöhen. Doch dies würde Jahre dauern, um auf der Grundlage der aktuellen Raten Wirklichkeit zu werden.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Die Verteidigung ist eine technologiegetriebene Branche, die massive Investitionen in Forschung und Innovation erfordert. Die Verteidigungsforschung und -entwicklung (F&E) in der EU erreichte 2022 laut Eurostat 3,9 Milliarden Euro. Laut dem <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">Dragi-Bericht</a> werden die nächsten Generationen von Verteidigungssystemen massive F&E-Investitionen erfordern. Seit 2014 hat die US-Regierung die F&E-Ausgaben über alle anderen Kategorien militärischer Ausgaben priorisiert. Frankreich, Deutschland und Schweden stehen an der Spitze der EU-Länder, die in F&E für die Verteidigung investieren.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Welche europäischen Länder erhöhen die Verteidigungsbudgets am meisten?</strong></h2>\n<p>Seit 2014 haben Länder wie <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Ungarn</a>, die <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Tschechische Republik</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Polen</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Dänemark</a>, Nordmazedonien, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Slowakei</a> und <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Schweden</a> ihre Verteidigungsausgaben verdoppelt, während Luxemburg, Lettland und Litauen ihre Ausgaben verdreifacht haben. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Deutschland</a>, die <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Niederlande</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estland</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Rumänien</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulgarien</a> und <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finnland</a> haben ebenfalls ihre Verteidigungsbudgets fast verdoppelt.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Wie viele Soldaten haben die europäischen Länder?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Die Gesamtzahl der aktiven Militärangehörigen in Europa, einschließlich des Vereinigten Königreichs, wird auf etwa 1,5 Millionen geschätzt. Ihre Effizienz wird jedoch durch das Fehlen einer gemeinsamen Kommandostruktur und militärischer Systeme beeinträchtigt.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Bis Ende 2024 betrug die Anzahl der russischen Truppen in <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukrainisch</a> etwa 700.000. Es wird jedoch <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">geschätzt</a>, dass Russland etwa 1,3 Millionen aktive Militärangehörige und zwei Millionen Reservisten hat.</p>\n<p>Laut <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">offiziellen Zahlen</a> sind rund 80.000 amerikanische Militärkräfte in Europa aktiv. Die Gesamtzahl schwankt jedoch aufgrund von Übungen und routinemäßigen Truppenrotationen, wie <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">vom Council on Foreign Relations festgestellt</a>. Experten schätzen, dass Europa ohne US-Truppen <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">zusätzlich 300.000 Soldaten</a> oder etwa 50 Brigaden benötigen würde, um sich selbst zu verteidigen.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Bewegt sich Europa auf eine gemeinsame Armee zu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Nein. Einige Länder, wie <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Frankreich</a>, haben traditionell eine stärkere militärische Autonomie der EU unterstützt, während andere, wie Polen und die baltischen Staaten, die Nato priorisieren. Statt auf eine einzige europäische Armee hinzuarbeiten, konzentriert sich die EU jedoch auf engere militärische Zusammenarbeit, gemeinsame Beschaffung und schnellere Eingreifkräfte, wie im <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Strategischen Kompass 2022</a> zu sehen ist, dessen Ziel es war, bis 2025 eine Eingreiftruppe von 5.000 Mann zu haben. Die militärische Mobilität ist bis heute eine der Prioritäten der Verteidigungsstrategie der EU, da es keine harmonisierten Regeln gibt, um Truppen oder Ausrüstung in einer Notfallsituation zwischen Ländern zu bewegen.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Warum und wie plant die EU, ihre Rüstungsproduktion zu steigern?</strong></h2>\n<p>Die Invasion der Krim im Jahr 2014, gefolgt von Russlands umfassender Invasion der Ukraine im Jahr 2022, hat die Sicherheitsstrategie der EU neu gestaltet und die EU und die Nato gezwungen, Verteidigungsstrategien zu überdenken und die Militärausgaben zu erhöhen, um die Fähigkeiten zu steigern. Der Krieg in der Ukraine und die offensichtliche Wende der Trump-Administration in Richtung Moskau haben auch die Diskussionen über die strategische Autonomie der EU wiederbelebt, wobei Frankreich (und jetzt sogar Deutschland) für mehr Unabhängigkeit von den von den USA geführten Sicherheitsstrukturen plädiert.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Mehr :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Wer wird für die Wiederaufrüstung Europas bezahlen? Es ist Zeit, die Reichen zu besteuern </a>\n </div>\n<p>In den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten hat die EU verschiedene Verteidigungsinitiativen ins Leben gerufen.</p>\n<p>Wichtige Schritte zur Verbesserung der militärischen Zusammenarbeit umfassen die Einrichtung der <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Europäischen Verteidigungsagentur</a> (2004), ihren jährlichen <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Fähigkeitsentwicklungsplan</a> (2008) und <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017). Vorschriften für Verteidigungstransfers und Dual-Use-Exporte haben ebenfalls die Rüstungskontrolle gestärkt, während Russlands umfassende Invasion der Ukraine im Jahr 2022 die Verte efforts der EU beschleunigte, was zur Schaffung der <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Europäischen Friedensfazilität</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) und <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024) führte.</p>\n<p>Mit ihrem <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">ReArm Europe-Plan</a> zielt die Europäische Kommission darauf ab, 800 Milliarden Euro zu mobilisieren, um die Verteidigungsausgaben der EU zu erhöhen, die Ukraine zu unterstützen und die industrielle Basis Europas zu erweitern.</p>\n<p>Der Plan umfasst ein neues Instrument von 150 Milliarden Euro in neuen gemeinsamen EU-Anleihen, die Lockerung der fiskalischen Regeln des Blocks für die Verteidigung (die in den nächsten vier Jahren 650 Milliarden Euro freigeben könnten), die Nutzung von <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">Kohäsions</a>mitteln (freiwillig), die Änderung der Investitionsregeln für die EIB und die „Freigabe privater“ Investitionen im lange stagnierenden <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Kapitalmarktunion</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Wie groß ist die Verteidigungsindustrie der EU?</strong></h2>\n<p>Der Verteidigungssektor der EU hat einen geschätzten Jahresumsatz von fast 84 Milliarden Euro, unterstützt direkt über 196.000 hochqualifizierte Arbeitsplätze und schafft indirekt mehr als 315.000 zusätzliche Arbeitsplätze, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">laut</a> der Europäischen Kommission. Aber die europäische Verteidigungsindustrie <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">braucht mehr Fachkräfte</a>, da sie die Produktion und Innovation steigert, um wachsenden Sicherheitsherausforderungen zu begegnen.</p>\n<p>Die Marktwerte europäischer Rüstungsunternehmen sind in die Höhe geschossen, wobei die meisten <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">ihre Aktienkurse verdoppelt haben</a>, seit Russland die Ukraine überfallen hat. Die Einnahmen sind jedoch immer noch recht gering, was zeigt, dass ihre Fähigkeit zur Skalierung durch die Größe der nationalen Märkte und Exportbeschränkungen eingeschränkt wird. Dies hat eine Debatte darüber ausgelöst, ob es eine europäische Präferenz für gemeinsame EU-Verteidigungsausgaben geben sollte. „Eine solche ‚europäische Präferenz‘ ist ein notwendiger Beitrag, um die derzeitige Vorherrschaft nicht-europäischer Anbieter auf den europäischen Verteidigungsmärkten umzukehren“, <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">argumentiert</a> die Industrie.&nbsp; Aber die EU-Länder bleiben gespalten.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Welche Waffensysteme gelten als Priorität für Europa?</strong></h2>\n<p>Europa investiert in mehrschichtige Luft- und Raketenabwehrarchitekturen, denn wie Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, polnischer Staatssekretär für nationale Verteidigung, letztes Jahr sagte: „Die Überlegenheit in der Luft definiert den Krieg\".</p>\n<p>Zum Beispiel <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">die European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI)</a>, die im Oktober 2022 ins Leben gerufen wurde, zielt darauf ab, ein umfassendes Verteidigungssystem zu schaffen, das Fähigkeiten von Kurzstrecken bis hin zu exoatmosphärischen Ebenen integriert.</p>\n<p>Darüber hinaus wurden Drohnen, Raketen, Artillerie, strategische Ermöglicher, militärische Mobilität, Cyberfähigkeiten und künstliche Intelligenz als Prioritätsbereiche aufgeführt. Namentlich <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">sind Drohnen zu einem entscheidenden Werkzeug im Krieg in der Ukraine geworden</a>, was sowohl Kiew als auch Moskau dazu veranlasst hat, schnell ihre eigene Industrie zu entwickeln. Und heute sind die Hauptexporteure von Militärdrohnen China und die Türkei.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Quelle: Europäische Verteidigungsagentur</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Welche Herausforderungen hat die EU bei der Stärkung ihrer militärischen Fähigkeiten?</strong></h2>\n<p>Während erhöhte Verteidigungsausgaben begrüßt werden, sucht die Industrie langfristige oder mehrjährige Beschaffungsverträge für Stabilität, nachhaltige Innovation und technologische Entwicklung. Das „auf Bestellung gebaute“ System, das typisch für Friedenszeiten ist und auf dem die Verteidigungsindustrie der EU basiert, hat zu langen Wartezeiten für fortschrittliche Verteidigungsfähigkeiten geführt.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Die Verteidigungskooperation, einschließlich Joint Ventures und gemeinsamer Beschaffung, wächst, bleibt jedoch begrenzt. Es gab spezifische Bemühungen, die Produktion von Artilleriemunition zu steigern, einem Bereich, in dem die Ukraine eine hohe Nachfrage hat. Aber das Versprechen der EU, zwischen März 2023 und 2024 eine Million 155-mm-Artilleriegeschosse zu liefern, war nicht rechtzeitig erfüllbar, was die Herausforderungen zeigt, die vor uns liegen. Die EU-Kommission schätzte 2022, dass der Mangel an Zusammenarbeit zu jährlichen Kosten von 25 bis 100 Milliarden Euro führt.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Mehr :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Kommt die Wehrpflicht zurück nach Europa? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Ein weiteres zentrales Problem für die Verteidigungsindustrie der EU ist die Fragmentierung, insbesondere außerhalb der Luftfahrt- und Raketensektoren.&nbsp; Fragmentierung führt nicht nur zu Duplikationen und höheren Produktionskosten, sondern auch zu Interoperabilitätsproblemen, die ihre Skalierung und operative Effektivität im Feld einschränken. Als Hinweis haben die EU-Mitgliedstaaten der Ukraine zehn verschiedene Arten von Haubitzen zur Verfügung gestellt, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">laut</a> dem Draghi-Bericht. Darüber hinaus betreibt die EU 12 verschiedene Arten von Kampfpanzern, während die USA nur einen (den M1 Abrams) herstellen.</p>\n<p>Inzwischen spielen auch externe Abhängigkeiten eine Rolle. Zwischen 2007 und 2016 wurden über 60 Prozent des Verteidigungsbeschaffungsbudgets Europas für militärische Importe außerhalb der EU ausgegeben, was zu Kontrollen und Beschränkungen durch Drittländer bei der Ausrüstung führte. Eine 'europäische Präferenz' bei der Verteidigungsbeschaffung, die hauptsächlich von Frankreich vorangetrieben wird, fand während informeller Gespräche der EU-Führer im Februar keinen Konsens – und angesichts der Notwendigkeit, schnell zu skalieren, fordern viele Länder ein System, das so offen wie möglich ist.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Haben europäische Länder Atomwaffen?</strong></h2>\n<p>Im Januar 2022 hatte Frankreich 290 Sprengköpfe mit 98 Trägersystemen, darunter U-Boot-Raketen und luftgestützte Raketen. Das Vereinigte Königreich hatte 225 Sprengköpfe, 120 davon operational, die auf fünf U-Booten stationiert sind, mit 105 im Lager, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">laut</a> der Arms Control Association.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Inzwischen wird berichtet, dass Belgien, Deutschland, Italien, die Niederlande und die Türkei alle US-Atomwaffen beherbergen. Polen hat kürzlich Washington aufgefordert, Atomwaffen im Land zu stationieren, und eingeräumt, dass es Jahrzehnte dauern würde, eine eigene Kapazität zu haben.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Originalartikel</strong></a><strong> auf <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">In Partnerschaft mit <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, kofinanziert von der Europäischen Union. Die geäußerten Ansichten und Meinungen sind jedoch ausschließlich die des/der Autor(en) und spiegeln nicht unbedingt die der Europäischen Union oder der Generaldirektion Kommunikationsnetze, Inhalte und Technologie wider. Weder die Europäische Union noch die Förderstelle können dafür verantwortlich gemacht werden.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:29.369",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Russlands umfassende Invasion der Ukraine im Februar 2022 erschütterte den Ansatz der EU zur Verteidigung und führte zu einer schnellen Neubewertung ihrer militärischen Landschaft. Der angekündigte Rückzug der USA aus der Verteidigung Europas hat die Frage der Wiederbewaffnung des Kontinents wieder auf die Tagesordnung gesetzt. EUobserver betrachtet den aktuellen Stand der Dinge.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"de",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:16:43.753",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Kuinka monta divisioonaa Euroopalla on? Katsaus Euroopan puolustustilanteeseen",
key:"uid": string:"79485e5d-cfbb-4e2e-a034-bf1c674865a7",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Avainkohdat\n\n1. **Suurimmat puolustusmenot**: Yhdysvallat, Kiina, Venäjä, Intia ja Saudi-Arabia johtavat maailmanlaajuisia puolustusmenoja, Venäjän sotilasbudjetin yli kaksinkertaistuessa vuoden 2022 Ukrainan invasionsa jälkeen, mikä herättää huolta Euroopan turvallisuusdynamiikasta.\n \n2. **NATO:n menotavoitteet**: Huolimatta NATO:n 2 %:n BKT-tavoitteesta puolustusmenoille, useat jäsenmaat, mukaan lukien Kroatia ja Portugali, eivät ole vielä saavuttaneet tätä tavoitetta. Keskustelut tämän tavoitteen nostamisesta 5 %:iin ovat käynnissä, mikä heijastaa lisääntyneitä turvallisuustarpeita.\n\n3. **EU:n puolustusteollisuuden haasteet**: EU:n puolustussektori, jonka arvo on lähes 84 miljardia euroa, kohtaa merkittäviä haasteita, kuten fragmentoitumisen, riippuvuuden EU:n ulkopuolisista tuonnista ja tarpeen pitkäaikaisille hankintasopimuksille sotilaallisten kykyjen ja innovaatioiden parantamiseksi.\n\n### Esittely\n\n```markdown\nKun globaalit jännitteet kasvavat, puolustusmenot nousevat, Yhdysvaltojen, Kiinan ja Venäjän ollessa eturintamassa. Euroopassa NATO:n jäsenet kamppailevat menotavoitteiden saavuttamiseksi, kun taas EU pyrkii vahvistamaan sotilaallisia kykyjään fragmentoitumisen ja ulkoisten riippuvuuksien keskellä. Kun budjettien lisäämistä ja strategista autonomiaa vaaditaan, miten Eurooppa navigoi puolustusmaisemassaan kehittyvien uhkien edessä? Tutustu sotilasmenojen monimutkaisuuteen ja Euroopan turvallisuuden tulevaisuuteen tässä syvällisessä analyysissä.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Maailmanlaajuinen sotilasmenot ovat nousussa, Yhdysvaltojen, Kiinan ja Venäjän ollessa eturintamassa. Kun Eurooppa kamppailee turvallisuushaasteiden kanssa, maat lisäävät puolustusbudjettejaan ja tutkivat yhteisiä sotilaallisia aloitteita. Tutustu viimeisimpiin suuntauksiin ja vaikutuksiin maailmanlaajuiselle turvallisuudelle.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Mitkä ovat maat, jotka käyttävät eniten puolustukseen?</strong></h2>\n<p>Viime vuosina eniten <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">puolustukseen</a> käytettyjä maita ovat <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Yhdysvallat</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Kiina</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Venäjä</a>, Intia ja Saudi-Arabia. Euroopan kasvu jää jälkeen Venäjän kasvavasta sotilasmenosta, joka on yli kaksinkertaistunut ennen sen <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">2022 hyökkäystä Ukrainaan</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Kuinka paljon Naton jäsenet käyttävät puolustukseen?</strong></h2>\n<p>Yhdysvaltain presidentti <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> on toistuvasti kritisoinut liittolaisia siitä, etteivät he saavuta liiton puolustusmenotavoitetta, joka on kaksi prosenttia BKT:stä (josta sovittiin jo vuonna 2014). Vielä nyt <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Kroatia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugali</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Italia</a>, Kanada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belgia</a>, Luxemburg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Slovenia</a> ja <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Espanja</a> eivät ole saavuttaneet tavoitetta.</p>\n<p>Naton jäsenvaltioiden 23 EU-maiden puolustusmenot olivat 1,99 prosenttia niiden yhdisteetusta BKT:stä vuonna 2024, ja niiden arvioidaan nousevan 2,04 prosenttiin vuonna 2025.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Lisää :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Häiriintynyt Eurooppa sulkee rivit kohdatakseen Trumpo-Putinistisen uuden järjestyksen </a>\n </div>\n<p>Mutta Trump ehdotti, että Naton jäsenvaltioiden tulisi nostaa vähimmäispuolustusmenonsa viiteen prosenttiin BKT:stä — ideaa tukee EU:n ulkosuhteista vastaava päällikkö <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> tammikuussa. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> on ehdottanut EU:n puolustusmenojen nostamista kolmeen tai 3,5 prosenttiin BKT:stä. Kuitenkin tämän toteuttaminen kestäisi vuosia nykyisillä tasoilla.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Puolustus on teknologiaan perustuva teollisuus, joka vaatii valtavia investointeja tutkimukseen ja innovaatioihin. Puolustuksen T&amp;K-rahoitus EU:ssa saavutti 3,9 miljardia euroa vuonna 2022 Eurostatin mukaan. Kuitenkin <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">Dragi-raportin</a> mukaan seuraavan sukupolven puolustusjärjestelmät vaativat valtavia T&amp;K-investointeja. Vuodesta 2014 Yhdysvallat on priorisoinut T&amp;K-menot yli muiden sotilasmenoluokkien. Ranska, Saksa ja Ruotsi ovat EU-maiden kärjessä, jotka investoivat T&amp;K:hon puolustuksessa.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Mitkä Euroopan maat lisäävät puolustusbudjettejaan eniten?</strong></h2>\n<p>Vuodesta 2014 lähtien maat kuten <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Unkari</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Tšekki</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Puola</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Tanska</a>, Pohjois-Makedonia, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Slovakia</a> ja <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Ruotsi</a> ovat kaksinkertaistaneet puolustusmenonsa, kun taas Luxemburg, Latvia ja Liettua ovat kolminkertaistaneet menonsa. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Saksa</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Alankomaat</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Viro</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Romania</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulgaria</a> ja <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Suomi</a> ovat myös lähes kaksinkertaistaneet puolustusbudjettinsa.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Kuinka monta sotilasta Euroopan mailla on?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Euroopassa, mukaan lukien Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta, aktiivisten sotilasjoukkojen kokonaismääräksi arvioidaan noin 1,5 miljoonaa. Kuitenkin sen tehokkuutta heikentää yhteisen komentorakenteen ja sotilasjärjestelmien puute.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Vuoden 2024 loppuun mennessä Venäjän joukkojen määrä <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukrainassa</a> oli noin 700 000. Kuitenkin <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">arvioidaan</a>, että Venäjällä on noin 1,3 miljoonaa aktiivista sotilasta ja kaksi miljoonaa reserviläistä.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">Virallisten tietojen</a> mukaan noin 80 000 amerikkalaista sotilasta on aktiivisena Euroopassa. Kuitenkin kokonaismäärä vaihtelee harjoitusten ja rutiininomaisten joukkojen kiertojen vuoksi, kuten <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">Council on Foreign Relations</a> on todennut. Samaan aikaan asiantuntijat arvioivat, että Eurooppa tarvitsisi <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">lisää 300 000 sotilasta</a> tai noin 50 prikaatia puolustaakseen itseään ilman Yhdysvaltojen joukkoja.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Onko Eurooppa siirtymässä kohti yhteistä armeijaa?</strong></h2>\n<p>Ei. Jotkut maat, kuten <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Ranska</a>, ovat perinteisesti tukeneet vahvempaa EU:n sotilaallista autonomiaa, kun taas toiset, kuten Puola ja Baltian maat, priorisoivat Natoa. Mutta sen sijaan, että siirryttäisiin kohti yhtä eurooppalaista armeijaa, EU keskittyy tiiviimpään sotilaalliseen yhteistyöhön, yhteisiin hankintoihin ja nopeampiin reaktiovoimiin, kuten <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">2022 Strategisessa kompassissa</a> on nähty, jonka tavoitteena oli saada 5 000 hengen nopean toiminnan joukot vuoteen 2025 mennessä. Sotilaallinen liikkuvuus on edelleen yksi EU:n puolustusstrategian prioriteeteista, koska ei ole harmonisoituja sääntöjä joukkojen tai kaluston siirtämiseksi maiden välillä hätätilanteessa.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Miksi ja miten EU aikoo lisätä aseiden tuotantoaan?</strong></h2>\n<p>Krimin hyökkäys vuonna 2014, jota seurasi Venäjän täysimittainen hyökkäys Ukrainaan vuonna 2022, on muokannut EU:n turvallisuuspolitiikkaa, pakottaen EU:n ja Naton miettimään puolustusstrategioita ja lisäämään sotilasmenoja kykyjen parantamiseksi. Sota Ukrainassa ja Trumpin hallinnon ilmeinen käännös Moskovaan on myös herättänyt keskustelua EU:n strategisesta autonomiasta, Ranskan (ja nyt jopa Saksan) painostaessa enemmän itsenäisyyttä Yhdysvaltojen johtamista turvallisuusrakenteista.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Lisää :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Kuka maksaa Euroopan uudelleenaseistamisesta? On aika verottaa rikkaita </a>\n </div>\n<p>Viimeisten kahden vuosikymmenen aikana EU on kehittänyt erilaisia puolustusaloitteita.</p>\n<p>Tärkeitä askelia sotilaallisen yhteistyön parantamiseksi ovat olleet <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Euroopan puolustusviraston</a> (2004) perustaminen, sen vuosittainen <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">kyvykkyyksien kehittämissuunnitelma</a> (2008) ja <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017). Säännökset puolustushankinnoista ja kaksikäyttövien vientien osalta ovat myös vahvistaneet asevalvontaa, kun taas Venäjän 2022 täysimittainen hyökkäys Ukrainaan on kiihdyttänyt EU:n puolustusponnisteluja, mikä johti <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Euroopan rauhanturvatoiminnan</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) ja <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024) luomiseen.</p>\n<p>Euroopan komissio aikoo <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">ReArm Europe -suunnitelmansa</a> avulla mobilisoida 800 miljardia euroa EU:n puolustusmenojen lisäämiseksi, Ukrainan tukemiseksi ja Euroopan teollisen perustan laajentamiseksi.</p>\n<p>Suunnitelma sisältää uuden 150 miljardin euron yhteisen EU-lainainstrumentin, joka löysentää lohkon taloussääntöjä puolustuksen osalta (jotka voisivat vapautua 650 miljardia euroa seuraavien neljän vuoden aikana), käyttäen <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">koheesiorahoja</a> (vapaaehtoisesti), muuttamalla investointisääntöjä EIB:lle ja \"avaamalla yksityisiä\" investointeja koko pitkään pysähtyneessä <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">pääomamarkkinoiden unionissa</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Kuinka suuri on EU:n puolustusteollisuus?</strong></h2>\n<p>EU:n puolustussektorin arvioitu vuosittainen liikevaihto on lähes 84 miljardia euroa, suoraan tukea yli 196 000 korkeasti koulutetulle työpaikalle ja epäsuorasti luoden yli 315 000 lisätyöpaikkaa, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">Euroopan komission mukaan</a>. Mutta Euroopan puolustusteollisuus <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">tarvitsee lisää osaavia työntekijöitä</a>, kun se lisää tuotantoa ja innovaatioita vastatakseen kasvaviin turvallisuushaasteisiin.</p>\n<p>Eurooppalaisten puolustusyhtiöiden markkina-arvot ovat nousseet, ja useimmat <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">kaksinkertaistaneet osakehintansa</a> siitä lähtien, kun Venäjä hyökkäsi Ukrainaan. Kuitenkin tulot ovat edelleen melko pieniä, mikä osoittaa, että niiden kyky laajentua on rajoitettu kansallisten markkinoiden koosta ja vientirajoituksista. Tämä on herättänyt keskustelua siitä, tulisiko EU:n puolustusmenoissa olla eurooppalainen etusija. \"Tällainen 'eurooppalainen etusija' on välttämätön panos nykyisen ei-eurooppalaisten toimittajien hallitsevuuden kääntämiseksi Euroopan puolustusmarkkinoilla,\" <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">väittää</a> teollisuus.&nbsp; Mutta EU-maat ovat edelleen jakautuneita.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Mitkä asejärjestelmät nähdään Euroopan prioriteettina?</strong></h2>\n<p>Eurooppa investoi monikerroksisiin ilmapuolustus- ja ohjuspuolustusarkkitehtuureihin, koska kuten Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, Puolan kansallisen puolustuksen valtiosihteeri, sanoi viime vuonna: \"Ilmaetuoikeuden omaaminen määrittelee sodan\".</p>\n<p>Esimerkiksi <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">Euroopan taivaspuolustusaloite (ESSI)</a>, joka käynnistettiin lokakuussa 2022, pyrkii luomaan kattavan puolustusjärjestelmän, joka integroi kykyjä lyhyen kantaman ja eksosfäärin tasoille.</p>\n<p>Lisäksi droneja, ohjuksia, tykistöä, strategisia mahdollistajia, sotilaallista liikkuvuutta, kyberkykyjä ja tekoälyä on lueteltu prioriteettialueina. Nimittäin <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">dronet ovat tulleet tärkeäksi työkaluksi sodassa Ukrainassa</a>, mikä on saanut sekä Kiovan että Moskovan kehittämään nopeasti oman teollisuutensa. Ja tänään pääasialliset sotilasdronien viejät ovat Kiina ja Turkki.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Lähde: Euroopan puolustusvirasto</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Mitkä haasteet EU:lla on sotilaallisten kykyjensä vahvistamisessa?</strong></h2>\n<p>Vaikka lisääntynyt puolustusinvestointi on tervetullutta, teollisuus etsii pitkäaikaisia tai monivuotisia hankintasopimuksia vakauden, jatkuvan innovoinnin ja teknologian kehittämisen varmistamiseksi. \"Tilauksesta valmistettu\" järjestelmä, joka on tyypillinen rauhanaikana ja johon EU:n puolustusteollisuus perustuu, on johtanut pitkään odotusaikaan edistyksellisten puolustuskykyjen osalta.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Puolustusyhteistyö, mukaan lukien yhteiset hankkeet ja jaetut hankinnat, on kasvamassa, mutta se on edelleen rajallista. On ollut erityisiä ponnistuksia tykistön ammuksien tuotannon lisäämiseksi, alueella, jossa Ukrainalla on suuri kysyntä. Mutta EU:n lupaus toimittaa miljoona 155 mm kaliiperin tykistöpommia maaliskuun 2023 ja 2024 välillä oli mahdotonta toteuttaa ajallaan, mikä osoittaa tulevat haasteet. EU:n komissio arvioi vuonna 2022, että yhteistyön puute johtaa vuosittaisiin kustannuksiin, jotka vaihtelevat 25 miljardista 100 miljardiin euroon.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Lisää :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Palvelusvelvollisuus palaa Eurooppaan? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Toinen keskeinen kysymys EU:n puolustusteollisuudelle on fragmentaatio, erityisesti ilmailu- ja ohjusaloilla.&nbsp; Fragmentaatio ei ainoastaan aiheuta päällekkäisyyksiä ja korkeampia tuotantokustannuksia, vaan myös yhteensopivuusongelmia, rajoittaen sen mittakaavaa ja operatiivista tehokkuutta kentällä. Esimerkkinä EU:n jäsenvaltiot ovat toimittaneet kymmenen erilaista howitzeria Ukrainalle, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">Draghi-raportin</a> mukaan. Lisäksi EU:lla on 12 erilaista taistelupanssarivaunua, kun taas Yhdysvallat valmistaa vain yhtä (M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Samaan aikaan ulkoiset riippuvuudet vaikuttavat myös. Vuosina 2007–2016 yli 60 prosenttia Euroopan puolustushankintabudjetista käytettiin ei-EU:n sotilasvienteihin, mikä johti kolmansien maiden valvontaan ja rajoituksiin kaluston osalta. \"Eurooppalainen etusija\" puolustushankinnoissa, jota on pääasiassa ajanut Ranska, ei saanut konsensusta EU:n johtajien epävirallisissa keskusteluissa helmikuussa – ja ottaen huomioon tarpeen laajentua nopeasti, monet maat vaativat järjestelmää, joka olisi mahdollisimman avoin.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Onko Euroopan mailla ydinaseita?</strong></h2>\n<p>Tammikuussa 2022 Ranskalla oli 290 ydinkärkeä, 98 toimitusjärjestelmää, mukaan lukien sukellusveneohjuksia ja ilmalaukaistuja ohjuksia. Yhdistyneellä kuningaskunnalla oli 225 ydinkärkeä, 120 operatiivista, viidellä sukellusveneellä, 105 varastossa, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">Arms Control Associationin mukaan</a>.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Samaan aikaan on raportoitu, että Belgia, Saksa, Italia, Alankomaat ja Turkki isännöivät kaikki Yhdysvaltojen ydinaseita. Puola on äskettäin pyytänyt Washingtonia sijoittamaan ydinaseita maahan, myöntäen, että oman kapasiteetin saaminen kestäisi vuosikymmeniä.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Alkuperäinen artikkeli</strong></a><strong> sivustolla <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">Yhteistyössä <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, Euroopan unionin osarahoittama. Ilmaisut ja mielipiteet ovat kuitenkin vain kirjoittajan ja eivät välttämättä heijasta Euroopan unionin tai viestintäverkkojen, sisällön ja teknologian pääosaston näkemyksiä. Eivät Euroopan unioni eikä myöntävä viranomainen voi olla vastuussa niistä.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:30.66",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Venäjän täysimittainen hyökkäys Ukrainaan helmikuussa 2022 järkytti EU:n puolustuspolitiikkaa, mikä johti nopeaan arviointiin sen sotilaallisesta maisemasta. Ilmoitettu Yhdysvaltojen vetäytyminen Euroopan puolustuksesta on tuonut mantereen uudelleenaseistamisen kysymyksen takaisin pöydälle. EUobserver tarkastelee tilannetta.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"fi",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:20:04.884",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Quantas divisões a Europa tem? Um olhar sobre o estado da defesa da Europa",
key:"uid": string:"80aeb934-299f-4246-bdc0-e4a6bf0b515a",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Pontos Chave\n\n1. **Principais Gastadores em Defesa**: Os Estados Unidos, China, Rússia, Índia e Arábia Saudita lideram os gastos globais em defesa, com o orçamento militar da Rússia mais do que dobrando desde sua invasão da Ucrânia em 2022, levantando preocupações sobre a dinâmica de segurança europeia.\n \n2. **Metas de Gastos da OTAN**: Apesar da meta da OTAN de 2% do PIB para gastos em defesa, vários países membros, incluindo Croácia e Portugal, ainda não atingiram esse objetivo. Discussões estão em andamento sobre o aumento dessa meta para 5%, refletindo necessidades de segurança elevadas.\n\n3. **Desafios da Indústria de Defesa da UE**: O setor de defesa da UE, avaliado em quase €84 bilhões, enfrenta desafios significativos, incluindo fragmentação, dependência de importações não pertencentes à UE e a necessidade de contratos de aquisição de longo prazo para melhorar as capacidades militares e a inovação.\n\n### Teaser\n\n```markdown\nÀ medida que as tensões globais aumentam, os gastos em defesa estão disparando, com os Estados Unidos, China e Rússia na vanguarda. Na Europa, os membros da OTAN lutam para atender às metas de gastos, enquanto a UE busca fortalecer suas capacidades militares em meio à fragmentação e dependências externas. Com apelos por orçamentos aumentados e um impulso por autonomia estratégica, como a Europa navegará em seu cenário de defesa diante de ameaças em evolução? Explore as complexidades dos gastos militares e o futuro da segurança europeia nesta análise aprofundada.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Os gastos militares globais estão em ascensão, com os EUA, China e Rússia liderando a carga. À medida que a Europa enfrenta desafios de segurança, as nações estão aumentando seus orçamentos de defesa e explorando iniciativas militares conjuntas. Descubra as últimas tendências e implicações para a segurança global.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quais são os países que mais gastam em defesa?</strong></h2>\n<p>Os países com os maiores gastos em <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">defesa</a> nos últimos anos são os <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Estados Unidos</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">China</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Rússia</a>, Índia e Arábia Saudita. O crescimento europeu é superado pelo aumento dos gastos militares da Rússia, que mais do que dobrou os níveis anteriores à sua <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">invasão da Ucrânia em 2022</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quanto os membros da Otan gastam em defesa?</strong></h2>\n<p>O presidente dos EUA <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> criticou repetidamente os aliados por não atenderem à meta de gastos em defesa da aliança de dois por cento do PIB (acordada em 2014). Mesmo agora, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">a Croácia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugal</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Itália</a>, Canadá, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Bélgica</a>, Luxemburgo, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Eslovênia</a> e <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Espanha</a> não atingiram a meta.</p>\n<p>Os gastos em defesa dos 23 países da UE que são membros da <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">Otan</a> totalizaram 1,99 por cento do seu PIB combinado em 2024 e devem alcançar 2,04 por cento em 2025.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Mais :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Uma Europa abalada fecha fileiras para enfrentar a nova ordem Trumpo-Putinista </a>\n </div>\n<p>Mas Trump sugeriu que os membros da Otan deveriam aumentar seus gastos mínimos em defesa para cinco por cento do PIB — uma ideia apoiada pela chefe de assuntos externos da UE <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> em janeiro. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> propôs aumentar os gastos em defesa da UE em três a 3,5 por cento do PIB. No entanto, isso levaria anos para se concretizar com base nas taxas atuais.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>A defesa é uma indústria impulsionada pela tecnologia que exige investimentos maciços em pesquisa e inovação. O financiamento de P&D em defesa na UE alcançou €3,9 bilhões em 2022, segundo o Eurostat. No entanto, de acordo com o<a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\"> relatório Dragi</a>, os sistemas de defesa de próxima geração exigirão investimentos massivos em P&D. Desde 2014, os EUA priorizaram os gastos em P&D acima de todas as outras categorias de despesas militares. França, Alemanha e Suécia estão no topo dos países da UE que investem em P&D para defesa.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quais países europeus estão aumentando os orçamentos de defesa mais?</strong></h2>\n<p>Desde 2014, países como <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Hungria</a>, a <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">República Tcheca</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Polônia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Dinamarca</a>, Macedônia do Norte, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Eslováquia</a> e <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Suécia</a> dobraram seus gastos em defesa, enquanto Luxemburgo, Letônia e Lituânia triplicaram seus gastos. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Alemanha</a>, a <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Holanda</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estônia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Romênia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulgária</a> e <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finlândia</a> também quase dobraram seus orçamentos de defesa.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quantos soldados os países europeus têm?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>O número total de pessoal militar ativo na Europa, incluindo o Reino Unido, é estimado em cerca de 1,5 milhão. No entanto, sua eficiência é prejudicada pela falta de uma estrutura de comando comum e sistemas militares.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Até o final de 2024, o número de tropas russas na <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ucrânia</a> era de aproximadamente 700.000. No entanto, é<a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\"> estimado</a> que a Rússia tenha cerca de 1,3 milhão de pessoal militar ativo e dois milhões de reservistas.</p>\n<p>De acordo com<a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\"> números oficiais</a>, cerca de 80.000 forças militares americanas estão ativas na Europa. No entanto, o número total flutua devido a exercícios e rotações de tropas de rotina, como<a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\"> observado</a> pelo Conselho de Relações Exteriores. Enquanto isso, especialistas estimam que a Europa precisaria de um<a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\"> adicional de 300.000 militares</a> ou cerca de 50 brigadas para se defender, sem tropas dos EUA.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>A Europa está se movendo em direção a um exército conjunto?</strong></h2>\n<p>Não. Alguns países, como <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">França</a>, tradicionalmente apoiaram uma maior autonomia militar da UE, enquanto outros, como a Polônia e os Bálticos, priorizam a Otan. Mas, em vez de se mover em direção a um único exército europeu, a UE está concentrando esforços em uma cooperação militar mais próxima, compras conjuntas e forças de resposta mais rápidas, como visto no <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Compasso Estratégico de 2022</a>, cujo objetivo era ter uma força de desdobramento rápido de 5.000 homens até 2025. A mobilidade militar ainda é uma das prioridades da estratégia de defesa da UE, uma vez que não existem regras harmonizadas para mover tropas ou equipamentos entre países em uma situação de emergência.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Por que e como a UE planeja aumentar sua produção de armamentos?</strong></h2>\n<p>A invasão da Crimeia em 2014, seguida pela invasão em grande escala da Ucrânia pela Rússia em 2022, remodelou a política de segurança da UE, forçando a UE e a Otan a repensar estratégias de defesa e aumentar os gastos militares para aumentar as capacidades. A guerra na Ucrânia e a aparente mudança da administração Trump em direção a Moscou também reavivaram discussões sobre a autonomia estratégica da UE, com a França (e agora até a Alemanha) pressionando por mais independência das estruturas de segurança lideradas pelos EUA.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Mais :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Quem vai pagar pelo rearmamento da Europa? É hora de taxar os ricos </a>\n </div>\n<p>Nos últimos vinte anos, a UE apresentou diferentes iniciativas de defesa.</p>\n<p>Os principais passos para melhorar a colaboração militar incluem a criação da<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\"> Agência Europeia de Defesa</a> (2004), seu<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\"> Plano de Desenvolvimento de Capacidades</a> anual (2008) e<a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\"> PESCO</a> (2017). Regulamentações para transferências de defesa e exportações de uso dual também fortaleceram o controle de armas, enquanto a invasão em grande escala da Ucrânia pela Rússia em 2022 acelerou os esforços de defesa da UE, levando à criação da<a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\"> Instalação de Paz Europeia</a> (2021),<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\"> EDIRPA</a>,<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\"> ASAP</a> (2023) e<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\"> EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>Com seu<a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\"> plano ReArm Europe</a>, a Comissão Europeia pretende mobilizar €800 bilhões para aumentar os gastos em defesa da UE, apoiar a Ucrânia e expandir a base industrial da Europa.</p>\n<p>O plano inclui um novo instrumento de €150 bilhões em novos empréstimos conjuntos da UE, flexibilizando as regras fiscais do bloco para defesa (que poderiam liberar €650 bilhões nos próximos quatro anos), utilizando fundos de<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\"> coesão</a> (voluntariamente), mudando as regras de investimento para o BEI e “desbloqueando” investimentos privados ao longo da longamente paralisada<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\"> União do Mercado de Capitais</a> (UMC).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Qual é o tamanho da indústria de defesa da UE?</strong></h2>\n<p>O setor de defesa da UE tem um faturamento anual estimado em quase €84 bilhões, apoiando diretamente mais de 196.000 empregos altamente qualificados e criando indiretamente mais de 315.000 empregos adicionais, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">de acordo com</a> a Comissão Europeia. Mas a indústria de defesa europeia<a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\"> precisa de mais trabalhadores qualificados</a> à medida que aumenta a produção e a inovação para enfrentar os crescentes desafios de segurança.</p>\n<p>Os valores de mercado das empresas de defesa europeias dispararam, com a maioria<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\"> dobrando seus preços das ações</a> desde que a Rússia invadiu a Ucrânia. No entanto, as receitas ainda são bastante pequenas, mostrando que sua capacidade de escalar é limitada pelo tamanho dos mercados nacionais e pelas restrições de exportação. Isso gerou um debate sobre se deveria haver uma preferência europeia para os gastos comuns em defesa da UE. “Tal ‘preferência europeia’ é uma contribuição necessária para reverter a atual predominância de fornecedores não europeus nos mercados de defesa europeus,”<a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\"> argumenta</a> a indústria.&nbsp; Mas os países da UE permanecem divididos.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quais sistemas de armas são vistos como prioridade para a Europa?</strong></h2>\n<p>A Europa está investindo em arquiteturas de defesa aérea e de mísseis em múltiplas camadas porque, como disse Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, secretário de Estado polonês para defesa nacional, no ano passado: “Ter uma vantagem no ar define a guerra\".</p>\n<p>Por exemplo,<a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\"> a Iniciativa do Escudo do Céu Europeu (ESSI)</a>, lançada em outubro de 2022, busca criar um sistema de defesa abrangente que integre capacidades que vão desde níveis de curto alcance até exoatmosféricos.</p>\n<p>Além disso, drones, mísseis, artilharia, habilitadores estratégicos, mobilidade militar, capacidades cibernéticas e inteligência artificial foram listados como áreas prioritárias. Ou seja,<a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\"> drones se tornaram uma ferramenta crucial na guerra na Ucrânia</a>, levando tanto Kyiv quanto Moscou a desenvolver rapidamente sua própria indústria. E hoje, os principais exportadores de drones militares são a China e a Turquia.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Prioridades de desenvolvimento de capacidade da UE. Fonte: Agência Europeia de Defesa\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Fonte: Agência Europeia de Defesa</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Quais desafios a UE enfrenta para fortalecer suas capacidades militares?</strong></h2>\n<p>Embora o aumento do investimento em defesa seja bem-vindo, a indústria busca contratos de aquisição de longo prazo ou de vários anos para estabilidade, inovação sustentada e desenvolvimento tecnológico. O sistema ‘feito sob encomenda’, típico de tempos de paz, no qual a indústria de defesa da UE se baseia, resultou em longos tempos de espera para capacidades de defesa avançadas.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>A cooperação em defesa, incluindo joint ventures e compras compartilhadas, está crescendo, mas ainda é limitada. Houve esforços específicos para aumentar a produção de munições de artilharia, uma área onde a Ucrânia tem alta demanda. Mas a promessa da UE de entregar um milhão de projéteis de artilharia de 155 mm entre março de 2023 e 2024 foi impossível de cumprir a tempo, mostrando os desafios à frente. A Comissão da UE estimou em 2022 que a falta de cooperação leva a custos anuais que variam de €25 bilhões a €100 bilhões.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Mais :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n O serviço militar retorna à Europa? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Outro dos principais problemas para a indústria de defesa da UE é a fragmentação, especialmente fora dos setores de aeronáutica e mísseis.&nbsp; A fragmentação não apenas provoca duplicação e custos de produção mais altos, mas também problemas de interoperabilidade, limitando sua escala e eficácia operacional no campo. Como indicação, os estados membros da UE forneceram dez tipos diferentes de obuseiros à Ucrânia, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">de acordo com</a> o relatório Draghi. Além disso, a UE opera 12 tipos diferentes de tanques de batalha, enquanto os EUA fabricam apenas um (o M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Enquanto isso, as dependências externas também são um fator. Entre 2007 e 2016, mais de 60 por cento do orçamento de aquisição de defesa da Europa foi gasto em importações militares não pertencentes à UE, levando a controles e restrições de terceiros sobre o equipamento. Uma 'preferência europeia' na aquisição de defesa, impulsionada principalmente pela França, não encontrou consenso durante conversas informais de líderes da UE em fevereiro – e dada a necessidade de escalar rapidamente, muitos países estão pedindo um sistema que seja o mais aberto possível.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Os países europeus têm armas nucleares?</strong></h2>\n<p>Em janeiro de 2022, a França tinha 290 ogivas, com 98 sistemas de entrega, incluindo mísseis submarinos e mísseis lançados do ar. O Reino Unido tinha 225 ogivas, 120 operacionais, implantadas em cinco submarinos, com 105 em armazenamento, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">de acordo com</a> a Arms Control Association.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Enquanto isso, é relatado que Bélgica, Alemanha, Itália, Países Baixos e Turquia abrigam armas nucleares dos EUA. A Polônia recentemente pediu a Washington para implantar armas nucleares no país, admitindo que ter sua própria capacidade levaria décadas.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Artigo original</strong></a><strong> em <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">Em parceria com <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, cofinanciado pela União Europeia. As opiniões e visões expressas são, no entanto, apenas dos autores e não refletem necessariamente as da União Europeia ou da Direção-Geral das Redes de Comunicações, Conteúdos e Tecnologia. Nem a União Europeia nem a autoridade concedente podem ser responsabilizadas por elas.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:30.234",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"A invasão em grande escala da Rússia na Ucrânia em fevereiro de 2022 abalou a abordagem da UE em relação à defesa, levando a uma rápida reavaliação de seu cenário militar. A retirada anunciada dos EUA da defesa da Europa colocou a questão do rearmamento do continente de volta à mesa. O EUobserver analisa o estado das coisas.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"pt",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:18:54.187",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Koliko divizija ima Europa? Pogled na stanje europske obrane",
key:"uid": string:"92cf7179-8b7a-45dc-8872-4e31af0076d9",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Ključne točke\n\n1. **Najveći potrošači obrane**: Sjedinjene Američke Države, Kina, Rusija, Indija i Saudijska Arabija prednjače u globalnoj potrošnji na obranu, pri čemu se vojni proračun Rusije više nego udvostručio od njezine invazije na Ukrajinu 2022. godine, što izaziva zabrinutost oko europske sigurnosne dinamike.\n \n2. **Ciljevi potrošnje NATO-a**: Unatoč NATO-ovom cilju od 2% BDP-a za potrošnju na obranu, nekoliko zemalja članica, uključujući Hrvatsku i Portugal, još uvijek nije ispunilo ovaj cilj. Rasprave su u tijeku o povećanju ovog cilja na 5%, što odražava povećane sigurnosne potrebe.\n\n3. **Izazovi obrambene industrije EU**: Obrambeni sektor EU, čija je vrijednost gotovo 84 milijarde eura, suočava se s značajnim izazovima, uključujući fragmentaciju, oslanjanje na uvoze izvan EU i potrebu za dugoročnim ugovorima o nabavi kako bi se poboljšale vojne sposobnosti i inovacije.\n\n### Uvod\n\n```markdown\nKako globalne napetosti rastu, potrošnja na obranu se povećava, pri čemu su Sjedinjene Američke Države, Kina i Rusija na čelu. U Europi, članice NATO-a se bore s ispunjavanjem ciljeva potrošnje, dok EU nastoji ojačati svoje vojne sposobnosti usred fragmentacije i vanjskih ovisnosti. Uz pozive za povećanje proračuna i poticaj za stratešku autonomiju, kako će Europa navigirati svojim obrambenim pejzažem suočena s evoluirajućim prijetnjama? Istražite složenosti vojne potrošnje i budućnost europske sigurnosti u ovoj dubinskoj analizi.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Globalna vojna potrošnja raste, pri čemu SAD, Kina i Rusija prednjače. Dok se Europa suočava s sigurnosnim izazovima, nacije povećavaju svoje obrambene proračune i istražuju zajedničke vojne inicijative. Otkrijte najnovije trendove i implikacije za globalnu sigurnost.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koje su to zemlje koje najviše troše na obranu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Zemlje s najvećim <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">obrambenim</a> troškovima u posljednjim godinama su <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Sjedinjene Američke Države</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Kina</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Rusija</a>, Indija i Saudijska Arabija. Europski rast nadmašuje rast vojnog trošenja Rusije, koje se više nego udvostručilo u odnosu na razine prije njezine <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">invazije na Ukrajinu 2022.</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koliko troše članice NATO-a na obranu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Predsjednik SAD-a <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> više puta je kritizirao saveznike zbog neispunjavanja cilja obrambenog trošenja saveza od dva posto BDP-a (dogovorenog još 2014. godine). Čak i sada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Hrvatska</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugal</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Italija</a>, Kanada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belgija</a>, Luksemburg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Slovenija</a> i <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Španjolska</a> nisu dostigle cilj.</p>\n<p>Troškovi obrane 23 zemlje EU koje su članice <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">NATO-a</a> iznosili su 1,99 posto njihovog kombiniranog BDP-a u 2024. godini i predviđa se da će doseći 2,04 posto u 2025. godini.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Više :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Uznemirena Europa zatvara redove kako bi se suočila s Trumpo-Putinističkim novim poretkom </a>\n </div>\n<p>Ali Trump je sugerirao da bi članice NATO-a trebale povećati svoje minimalne troškove obrane na pet posto BDP-a — ideju koju je podržala šefica vanjskih poslova EU <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> u siječnju. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> je predložio povećanje obrambenih troškova EU za tri do 3,5 posto BDP-a. Ipak, to bi trajalo godinama da se ostvari na temelju trenutnih stopa.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Obrana je industrija vođena tehnologijom koja zahtijeva masovne investicije u istraživanje i inovacije. Financiranje R&amp;D u obrani u EU dostiglo je 3,9 milijardi eura u 2022. godini, prema podacima Eurostata. Međutim, prema <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">Draghi izvješću</a>, sustavi obrane sljedeće generacije zahtijevat će masovne investicije u R&amp;D. Od 2014. godine, SAD je prioritizirao troškove R&amp;D iznad svih drugih kategorija vojne potrošnje. Francuska, Njemačka i Švedska su na vrhu zemalja EU koje ulažu u R&amp;D za obranu.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koje europske zemlje najviše povećavaju proračune za obranu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Od 2014. godine, zemlje poput <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Mađarske</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Češke</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Poljske</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Danske</a>, Sjeverne Makedonije, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Slovačke</a> i <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Švedske</a> udvostručile su svoje troškove obrane, dok su Luksemburg, Latvija i Litvanija utrostručile svoje troškove. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Njemačka</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Nizozemska</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estonija</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Rumunija</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bugarska</a> i <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finska</a> također su gotovo udvostručile svoje proračune za obranu.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koliko vojnika imaju europske zemlje?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Ukupan broj aktivnog vojnog osoblja u Europi, uključujući Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, procjenjuje se na oko 1,5 milijuna. Međutim, njegova učinkovitost je oslabljena nedostatkom zajedničke zapovjedne strukture i vojnih sustava.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Do kraja 2024. godine, broj ruskih trupa u <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukrajini</a> bio je otprilike 700.000. Međutim, <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">procjenjuje se</a> da Rusija ima oko 1,3 milijuna aktivnog vojnog osoblja i dva milijuna rezervista.</p>\n<p>Prema <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\"> službenim podacima</a>, oko 80.000 američkih vojnika aktivno je u Europi. Međutim, ukupan broj varira zbog vježbi i rutinskih rotacija trupa, kao što <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">navodi</a> Vijeće za vanjske odnose. U međuvremenu, stručnjaci procjenjuju da bi Europi trebalo <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">dodatnih 300.000 vojnika</a> ili oko 50 brigada da se obrani, bez američkih trupa.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Je li Europa na putu prema zajedničkoj vojsci?</strong></h2>\n<p>Ne. Neke zemlje, poput <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Francuske</a>, tradicionalno podržavaju jaču vojnu autonomiju EU, dok druge, poput Poljske i baltičkih zemalja, daju prioritet NATO-u. No, umjesto da se kreće prema jednoj europskoj vojsci, EU se fokusira na bližu vojnu suradnju, zajedničku nabavu i brže snage odgovora, što se vidi u <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">2022. godini</a>, čiji je cilj bio imati snagu brze intervencije od 5.000 vojnika do 2025. godine. Vojna mobilnost i dalje je jedan od prioriteta obrambene strategije EU, budući da ne postoje usklađena pravila za premještanje trupa ili opreme između zemalja u situaciji nužde.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Zašto i kako EU planira povećati svoju proizvodnju oružja?</strong></h2>\n<p>Invazija Krima 2014. godine, nakon koje je uslijedila potpuna invazija Ukrajine od strane Rusije 2022. godine, preoblikovala je sigurnosnu politiku EU, prisiljavajući EU i NATO da preispitaju obrambene strategije i povećaju vojne troškove kako bi poboljšali sposobnosti. Rat u Ukrajini i očigledni preokret administracije Trump prema Moskvi također su oživjeli rasprave o strateškoj autonomiji EU, pri čemu Francuska (a sada čak i Njemačka) traži veću neovisnost od sigurnosnih struktura predvođenih SAD-om.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Više :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Tko će platiti za naoružavanje Europe? Vrijeme je da se oporezuju bogati </a>\n </div>\n<p>U posljednja dva desetljeća, EU je došla do različitih inicijativa za obranu.</p>\n<p>Ključni koraci za poboljšanje vojne suradnje uključuju osnivanje <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\"> Europske obrambene agencije</a> (2004), njen godišnji <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Plan razvoja sposobnosti</a> (2008) i <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\"> PESCO</a> (2017). Propisi o prijenosu obrane i izvozima s dvostrukom namjenom također su ojačali kontrolu oružja, dok je potpuna invazija Ukrajine od strane Rusije 2022. ubrzala napore EU u obrani, što je dovelo do stvaranja <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\"> Europskog mirovnog fonda</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\"> EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\"> ASAP</a> (2023) i <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\"> EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>Sa svojim <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\"> planom ReArm Europe</a>, Europska komisija ima za cilj mobilizirati 800 milijardi eura za povećanje troškova obrane EU, podršku Ukrajini i proširenje europske industrijske baze.</p>\n<p>Plan uključuje novi instrument od 150 milijardi eura u novom zajedničkom zaduživanju EU, olakšavajući fiskalna pravila bloka za obranu (što bi moglo osloboditi 650 milijardi eura tijekom sljedeće četiri godine), korištenje <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\"> sredstava kohezije</a> (dobrovoljno), promjenu pravila ulaganja za EIB i “otključavanje privatnog” ulaganja kroz dugo odgađanu <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\"> Uniju kapitalnih tržišta</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Kolika je veličina obrambene industrije EU?</strong></h2>\n<p>Obrambeni sektor EU ima procijenjeni godišnji promet od gotovo 84 milijarde eura, izravno podržavajući više od 196.000 visoko kvalificiranih radnih mjesta i neizravno stvarajući više od 315.000 dodatnih radnih mjesta, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">prema</a> Europskoj komisiji. No, europskoj obrambenoj industriji <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\"> nedostaje više kvalificiranih radnika</a> dok povećava proizvodnju i inovacije kako bi se suočila s rastućim sigurnosnim izazovima.</p>\n<p>Tržišne vrijednosti europskih obrambenih tvrtki su porasle, pri čemu su većina <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\"> udvostručila svoje cijene dionica</a> od kada je Rusija napala Ukrajinu. No, prihodi su i dalje prilično mali, što pokazuje da je njihova sposobnost povećanja ograničena veličinom nacionalnih tržišta i ograničenjima izvoza. To je potaknulo raspravu o tome treba li postojati europska preferencija za zajedničke troškove obrane EU. “Takva ‘europska preferencija’ je nužan doprinos za preokret trenutne dominacije ne-europskih dobavljača na europskim obrambenim tržištima,” <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\"> tvrdi</a> industrija.&nbsp; No, zemlje EU ostaju podijeljene.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koji se sustavi oružja smatraju prioritetom za Europu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Europa ulaže u višeslojne zračne i protuzračne obrambene arhitekture jer, kako je prošle godine rekao Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, poljski državni tajnik za nacionalnu obranu: “Imati prednost u zraku definira rat\".</p>\n<p>Na primjer, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\"> Europska inicijativa za zaštitu neba (ESSI)</a>, pokrenuta u listopadu 2022., nastoji stvoriti sveobuhvatan obrambeni sustav koji integrira sposobnosti od kratkog dometa do egzotermalnih razina.</p>\n<p>Osim toga, dronovi, projektili, artiljerija, strateški omogućitelji, vojna mobilnost, kibernetičke sposobnosti i umjetna inteligencija navedeni su kao prioritetna područja. Naime, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\"> dronovi su postali ključni alat u ratu u Ukrajini</a>, potičući i Kijev i Moskvu da brzo razviju vlastitu industriju. A danas su glavni izvoznici vojnih dronova Kina i Turska.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Izvor: Europska obrambena agencija</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koji su izazovi s kojima se EU suočava u jačanju svojih vojnih sposobnosti?</strong></h2>\n<p>Dok se povećane investicije u obranu pozdravljaju, industrija traži dugoročne ili višegodišnje ugovore o nabavi za stabilnost, održivu inovaciju i razvoj tehnologije. Sustav ‘izgrađen po narudžbi’ tipičan za mirnodopsko vrijeme, na kojem se temelji obrambena industrija EU, rezultirao je dugim vremenima čekanja za napredne obrambene sposobnosti.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Suradnja u obrani, uključujući zajedničke projekte i zajedničku nabavu, raste, ali ostaje ograničena. Bilo je specifičnih napora za povećanje proizvodnje artiljerijskih streljiva, područja gdje Ukrajina ima visoku potražnju. No, obećanje EU da će isporučiti milijun artiljerijskih granata kalibra 155 mm između ožujka 2023. i 2024. bilo je nemoguće ispuniti na vrijeme, pokazujući izazove koji su pred nama. Europska komisija procijenila je 2022. da nedostatak suradnje dovodi do godišnjih troškova u rasponu od 25 milijardi do 100 milijardi eura.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Više :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Vraća li se vojna obaveza u Europu? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Još jedno od ključnih pitanja za obrambenu industriju EU je fragmentacija, posebno izvan sektora aeronautike i projektila.&nbsp; Fragmentacija ne samo da pokreće dupliciranje i više troškove proizvodnje, već također stvara probleme interoperabilnosti, ograničavajući njezinu razmjenu i operativnu učinkovitost na terenu. Kao pokazatelj, države članice EU pružile su deset različitih vrsta haubica Ukrajini, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">prema</a> Draghi izvješću. Osim toga, EU upravlja s 12 različitih vrsta borbenih tenkova, dok SAD proizvodi samo jedan (M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>U međuvremenu, vanjske ovisnosti također igraju ulogu. Između 2007. i 2016. godine, više od 60 posto proračuna za nabavu obrane Europe potrošeno je na vojne uvoze izvan EU, što je dovelo do kontrole i ograničenja opreme iz trećih zemalja. 'Europska preferencija' u nabavi obrane, koju je uglavnom poticala Francuska, nije pronašla konsenzus tijekom neformalnih razgovora vođa EU u veljači – a s obzirom na potrebu za brzim povećanjem, mnoge zemlje pozivaju na sustav koji bi trebao biti što otvoreniji.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Imaju li europske zemlje nuklearno oružje?</strong></h2>\n<p>Od siječnja 2022. godine, Francuska je imala 290 bojevih glava, s 98 sustava isporuke, uključujući podmorske rakete i rakete lansirane iz zraka. Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo imalo je 225 bojevih glava, 120 operativnih, raspoređenih na pet podmornica, s 105 u skladištu, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">prema</a> Udruzi za kontrolu naoružanja.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>U međuvremenu, izvještava se da Belgija, Njemačka, Italija, Nizozemska i Turska sve imaju američko nuklearno oružje. Poljska je nedavno pozvala Washington da rasporedi nuklearno oružje u zemlji, priznajući da bi posjedovanje vlastitih kapaciteta trajalo desetljećima.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Izvorni članak</strong></a><strong> na <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">U partnerstvu s <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, sufinancirano od strane Europske unije. Gledišta i mišljenja izražena su isključivo od strane autora(i) i ne odražavaju nužno stavove Europske unije ili Glavne uprave za komunikacijske mreže, sadržaj i tehnologiju. Ni Europska unija ni dodjeljivač ne mogu biti odgovorni za njih.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:29.445",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Ruska potpuna invazija na Ukrajinu u veljači 2022. potresla je pristup EU-a obrani, potičući brzu reevaluaciju njezinog vojnog krajolika. Najavljeno povlačenje SAD-a iz europske obrane ponovno je stavilo pitanje na stolu o naoružavanju kontinenta. EUobserver proučava stanje stvari.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"hr",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:16:52.617",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Kolik divizí má Evropa? Pohled na stav evropské obrany",
key:"uid": string:"974e633e-7356-4d6b-b8dc-b1586cd3b9e5",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Klíčové body\n\n1. **Největší výdaje na obranu**: Spojené státy, Čína, Rusko, Indie a Saúdská Arábie vedou globální výdaje na obranu, přičemž vojenský rozpočet Ruska se od jeho invaze na Ukrajinu v roce 2022 více než zdvojnásobil, což vyvolává obavy o dynamiku evropské bezpečnosti.\n \n2. **Cíle výdajů NATO**: I přes cíl NATO ve výši 2 % HDP na výdaje na obranu několik členských zemí, včetně Chorvatska a Portugalska, tento cíl dosud nesplnilo. Diskuze o zvýšení tohoto cíle na 5 % pokračují, což odráží zvýšené bezpečnostní potřeby.\n\n3. **Výzvy obranného průmyslu EU**: Obranný sektor EU, jehož hodnota se blíží 84 miliardám eur, čelí významným výzvám, včetně fragmentace, závislosti na dovozech mimo EU a potřeby dlouhodobých kontraktů na nákup, aby se zlepšily vojenské schopnosti a inovace.\n\n### Upoutávka\n\n```markdown\nJak globální napětí roste, výdaje na obranu stoupají, přičemž Spojené státy, Čína a Rusko jsou v čele. V Evropě se členské státy NATO potýkají s plněním výdajových cílů, zatímco EU se snaží posílit své vojenské schopnosti uprostřed fragmentace a vnější závislosti. S výzvami k zvýšení rozpočtů a tlakem na strategickou autonomii, jak se Evropa vyrovná se svou obrannou krajinou tváří v tvář vyvíjejícím se hrozbám? Prozkoumejte složitosti vojenských výdajů a budoucnost evropské bezpečnosti v této podrobné analýze.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Globální vojenské výdaje rostou, přičemž USA, Čína a Rusko vedou v tomto trendu. Jak se Evropa potýká s bezpečnostními výzvami, státy zvyšují své obranné rozpočty a zkoumají společné vojenské iniciativy. Objevte nejnovější trendy a důsledky pro globální bezpečnost.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Které země nejvíce utrácejí na obranu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Země s nejvyššími <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">výdaji na obranu</a> v posledních letech jsou <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Spojené státy</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Čína</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Rusko</a>, Indie a Saúdská Arábie. Evropský růst zaostává za rostoucími vojenskými výdaji Ruska, které se více než zdvojnásobily oproti úrovním před <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">invazí na Ukrajinu v roce 2022</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Kolik utrácejí členové NATO na obranu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Prezident USA <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> opakovaně kritizoval spojence za to, že nesplnili cíl aliance v oblasti výdajů na obranu ve výši dvou procent HDP (dohodnutý již v roce 2014). I nyní <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Chorvatsko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugalsko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Itálie</a>, Kanada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belgie</a>, Lucembursko, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Slovinsko</a> a <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Španělsko</a> nedosáhly cíle.</p>\n<p>Výdaje na obranu 23 zemí EU, které jsou <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">členy NATO</a>, činily v roce 2024 1,99 procenta jejich kombinovaného HDP a očekává se, že v roce 2025 dosáhnou 2,04 procenta.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Více :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Otřesená Evropa se sjednocuje, aby čelila novému pořádku Trumpo-Putinisty </a>\n </div>\n<p>Trump navrhl, aby členové NATO zvýšili své minimální výdaje na obranu na pět procent HDP — myšlenku, kterou podpořila šéfka zahraniční politiky EU <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> v lednu. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> navrhl zvýšení výdajů EU na obranu o tři až 3,5 procenta HDP. Přesto by to na základě současných sazeb trvalo roky, než by se to realizovalo.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Obrana je technologicky orientovaný průmysl, který vyžaduje masivní investice do výzkumu a inovací. Financování výzkumu a vývoje v oblasti obrany v EU dosáhlo v roce 2022 3,9 miliardy eur, podle Eurostatu. Nicméně podle <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\"> zprávy Dragi</a> budou systémy obrany nové generace vyžadovat masivní investice do výzkumu a vývoje. Od roku 2014 USA upřednostnily výdaje na výzkum a vývoj před všemi ostatními kategoriemi vojenských výdajů. Francie, Německo a Švédsko jsou na vrcholu zemí EU investujících do výzkumu a vývoje pro obranu.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Které evropské země nejvíce zvyšují rozpočty na obranu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Od roku 2014 země jako <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Maďarsko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Česká republika</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Polsko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Dánsko</a>, Severní Makedonie, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Slovensko</a> a <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Švédsko</a> zdvojnásobily své výdaje na obranu, zatímco Lucembursko, Lotyšsko a Litva své výdaje ztrojnásobily. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Německo</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Nizozemsko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estonsko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Rumunsko</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulharsko</a> a <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finsko</a> také téměř zdvojnásobily své rozpočty na obranu.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Kolik vojáků mají evropské země?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Celkový počet aktivních vojenských osob v Evropě, včetně Velké Británie, se odhaduje na přibližně 1,5 milionu. Jejich efektivita je však oslabena nedostatkem společné velitelství a vojenských systémů.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Na konci roku 2024 byl počet ruských vojsk na <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukrajině</a> přibližně 700 000. Odhaduje se však, že Rusko má přibližně 1,3 milionu aktivních vojenských osob a dva miliony rezervistů.</p>\n<p>Podle <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">oficiálních údajů</a> je v Evropě aktivních přibližně 80 000 amerických vojenských sil. Celkový počet se však mění v důsledku cvičení a rutinních rotací jednotek, jak <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">uvedl</a> Rada pro zahraniční vztahy. Mezitím odborníci odhadují, že Evropa by potřebovala <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">dalších 300 000 vojáků</a> nebo přibližně 50 brigád, aby se bránila bez amerických jednotek.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Směřuje Evropa k společné armádě?</strong></h2>\n<p>Ne. Některé země, jako <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Francie</a>, tradičně podporují silnější vojenskou autonomii EU, zatímco jiné, jako Polsko a pobaltské státy, upřednostňují NATO. Místo toho, aby se směřovalo k jedné evropské armádě, se EU soustředí na bližší vojenskou spolupráci, společné nákupy a rychlé reakční síly, jak je vidět v <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Strategické kompasu z roku 2022</a>, jehož cílem bylo mít do roku 2025 sílu rychlého nasazení o 5 000 vojáků. Vojenská mobilita je dodnes jednou z priorit obranné strategie EU, protože neexistují harmonizovaná pravidla pro přesun vojsk nebo vybavení mezi zeměmi v případě nouze.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Proč a jak plánuje EU zvýšit svou výrobu zbraní?</strong></h2>\n<p>Invaze na Krym v roce 2014, následovaná plnohodnotnou invazí Ruska na Ukrajinu v roce 2022, přetvořila bezpečnostní politiku EU, což donutilo EU a NATO přehodnotit obranné strategie a zvýšit vojenské výdaje na posílení schopností. Válka na Ukrajině a zjevný obrat administrativy Trumpa směrem k Moskvě také oživily diskuse o strategické autonomii EU, přičemž Francie (a nyní dokonce i Německo) tlačí na větší nezávislost na strukturách bezpečnosti vedených USA.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Více :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Kdo zaplatí za přezbrojení Evropy? Je čas zdanit bohaté </a>\n </div>\n<p>V posledních dvaceti letech EU přišla s různými iniciativami v oblasti obrany.</p>\n<p>Klíčové kroky k posílení vojenské spolupráce zahrnují založení <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Evropské obranné agentury</a> (2004), její každoroční <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Plán rozvoje schopností</a> (2008) a <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017). Regulace pro převody obranných materiálů a vývozy s dvojím použitím také posílily kontrolu zbraní, zatímco plnohodnotná invaze Ruska na Ukrajinu v roce 2022 urychlila úsilí EU v oblasti obrany, což vedlo k vytvoření <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Evropského mírového nástroje</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) a <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>Se svým <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">plánem ReArm Europe</a> se Evropská komise snaží mobilizovat 800 miliard eur na zvýšení výdajů EU na obranu, podporu Ukrajiny a rozšíření průmyslové základny Evropy.</p>\n<p>Plán zahrnuje nový nástroj ve výši 150 miliard eur v novém společném půjčování EU, uvolnění fiskálních pravidel bloku pro obranu (což by mohlo uvolnit 650 miliard eur během příštích čtyř let), využití <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">kohezních</a> fondů (dobrovolně), změnu investičních pravidel pro EIB a „odemknutí soukromých“ investic v dlouho pozastavené <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Unie kapitálových trhů</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Jak velký je obranný průmysl EU?</strong></h2>\n<p>Obranný sektor EU má odhadovaný roční obrat téměř 84 miliard eur, přímo podporující více než 196 000 vysoce kvalifikovaných pracovních míst a nepřímo vytvářející více než 315 000 dalších pracovních míst, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">podle</a> Evropské komise. Ale evropský obranný průmysl <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">potřebuje více kvalifikovaných pracovníků</a>, protože zvyšuje výrobu a inovace, aby čelil rostoucím bezpečnostním výzvám.</p>\n<p>Tržní hodnoty evropských obranných společností vzrostly, přičemž většina <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">zdvojnásobila své akciové ceny</a> od doby, kdy Rusko napadlo Ukrajinu. Ale příjmy jsou stále poměrně malé, což ukazuje, že jejich schopnost zvýšit výrobu je omezena velikostí národních trhů a vývozními omezeními. To vyvolalo debatu o tom, zda by měla existovat evropská preference pro společné výdaje na obranu EU. „Taková 'evropská preference' je nezbytným příspěvkem k obrácení současné převahy neevropských dodavatelů na evropských obranných trzích,“ <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">tvrdí</a> průmysl.&nbsp; Ale země EU zůstávají rozdělené.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Které zbraňové systémy jsou považovány za prioritu pro Evropu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Evropa investuje do vícestupňových architektur vzdušné a raketové obrany, protože jak řekl Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, polský státní tajemník pro národní obranu, minulý rok: „Mít výhodu ve vzduchu určuje válku\".</p>\n<p>Například <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">Iniciativa evropského štítu (ESSI)</a>, zahájená v říjnu 2022, se snaží vytvořit komplexní obranný systém, který integruje schopnosti od krátkého dosahu po exoatmosférické úrovně.</p>\n<p>Kromě toho byly drony, rakety, dělostřelectvo, strategické usnadňovače, vojenská mobilita, kybernetické schopnosti a umělá inteligence uvedeny jako priority. Konkrétně <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">drony se staly klíčovým nástrojem ve válce na Ukrajině</a>, což přimělo jak Kyjev, tak Moskvu rychle vyvinout svůj vlastní průmysl. A dnes jsou hlavními exportéry vojenských dronů Čína a Turecko.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Zdroj: Evropská obranná agentura</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Jaké výzvy čelí EU při posilování svých vojenských schopností?</strong></h2>\n<p>I když je zvýšená investice do obrany vítána, průmysl požaduje dlouhodobé nebo víceleté kontrakty na nákup pro stabilitu, udržitelnou inovaci a technologický rozvoj. Systém „vyrobený na zakázku“, typický pro mírové období, na kterém je evropský obranný průmysl založen, vedl k dlouhým čekacím dobám na pokročilé obranné schopnosti.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Vojenská spolupráce, včetně společných podniků a sdílených nákupů, roste, ale zůstává omezená. Byly učiněny konkrétní snahy o zvýšení výroby dělostřelecké munice, což je oblast, kde Ukrajina má vysokou poptávku. Ale závazek EU dodat jeden milion dělostřeleckých granátů ráže 155 mm mezi březnem 2023 a 2024 nebyl možné splnit včas, což ukazuje na výzvy, které nás čekají. Evropská komise odhadla v roce 2022, že nedostatek spolupráce vede k ročním nákladům v rozmezí 25 miliard až 100 miliard eur.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Více :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Návrat povinné vojenské služby do Evropy? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Dalším klíčovým problémem pro obranný průmysl EU je fragmentace, zejména mimo sektory letectví a raket. Fragmentace nejenže vyvolává duplicitu a vyšší výrobní náklady, ale také problémy s interoperabilitou, což omezuje její rozsah a operační efektivitu v terénu. Jako příklad, členské státy EU poskytly Ukrajině deset různých typů houfnic, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">podle</a> zprávy Dragi. Kromě toho EU provozuje 12 různých typů bojových tanků, zatímco USA vyrábějí pouze jeden (M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Mezitím hrají roli také vnější závislosti. Mezi lety 2007 a 2016 bylo více než 60 procent rozpočtu na obranné zakázky Evropy vynaloženo na vojenské dovozy mimo EU, což vedlo k kontrolám a omezením ze strany třetích zemí na vybavení. „Evropská preference“ v obranných zakázkách, kterou hlavně prosazuje Francie, nenašla konsensus během neformálních jednání lídrů EU v únoru – a vzhledem k potřebě rychlého zvýšení mnohé země volají po systému, který by byl co nejotevřenější.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Mají evropské země jaderné zbraně?</strong></h2>\n<p>V lednu 2022 mělo Francie 290 hlavic, s 98 dodacími systémy, včetně ponorkových raket a raket vypouštěných ze vzduchu. Velká Británie měla 225 hlavic, 120 operačních, rozmístěných na pěti ponorkách, s 105 v úložišti, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">podle</a> Asociace pro kontrolu zbraní.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Mezitím se uvádí, že Belgie, Německo, Itálie, Nizozemsko a Turecko hostí americké jaderné zbraně. Polsko nedávno vyzvalo Washington, aby rozmístil jaderné zbraně v zemi, přičemž přiznalo, že mít vlastní kapacitu by trvalo desetiletí.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Původní článek</strong></a><strong> na <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">Ve spolupráci s <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, spolufinancováno Evropskou unií. Názory a názory vyjádřené jsou však pouze názory autora(ů) a nemusí nutně odrážet názory Evropské unie nebo Generálního ředitelství pro komunikační sítě, obsah a technologie. Ani Evropská unie, ani poskytující orgán nemohou být za ně odpovědní.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:29.577",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Ruská plnohodnotná invaze na Ukrajinu v únoru 2022 otřásla přístupem EU k obraně a vyvolala rychlé přehodnocení jejího vojenského uspořádání. Ohlášený odchod USA z evropské obrany vrátil otázku přezbrojení kontinentu zpět na stůl. EUobserver se podívá na aktuální situaci.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"cs",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:17:19.481",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Hány hadosztálya van Európának? Egy pillantás Európa védelmi helyzetére",
key:"uid": string:"bb5e7e41-7ddd-4e05-903b-037c87b22e2b",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Kulcspontok\n\n1. **Legnagyobb Védelmi Kiadók**: Az Egyesült Államok, Kína, Oroszország, India és Szaúd-Arábia vezetik a globális védelmi kiadásokat, Oroszország katonai költségvetése pedig több mint megduplázódott a 2022-es ukrajnai invázió óta, ami aggodalmakat keltett az európai biztonsági dinamikák miatt.\n \n2. **NATO Kiadási Célok**: A NATO 2%-os GDP arányú védelmi kiadási célja ellenére több tagország, köztük Horvátország és Portugália, még nem érte el ezt a célt. Folyamatban vannak a tárgyalások a cél 5%-ra emeléséről, tükrözve a fokozott biztonsági igényeket.\n\n3. **EU Védelmi Ipar Kihívásai**: Az EU védelmi szektora, amelynek értéke közel 84 milliárd euró, jelentős kihívásokkal néz szembe, beleértve a fragmentációt, a nem EU-s importokra való támaszkodást, és a hosszú távú beszerzési szerződések szükségességét a katonai képességek és innovációk fokozása érdekében.\n\n### Előzetes\n\n```markdown\nAhogy a globális feszültségek növekednek, a védelmi kiadások emelkednek, az Egyesült Államok, Kína és Oroszország állnak a középpontban. Európában a NATO tagjai küzdenek a kiadási célok teljesítésével, míg az EU a katonai képességeinek megerősítésére törekszik a fragmentáció és a külső függőségek közepette. A költségvetések növelésére irányuló felhívásokkal és a stratégiai autonómia iránti nyomással hogyan navigál Európa a védelmi táján a folyamatosan fejlődő fenyegetések fényében? Fedezze fel a katonai kiadások összetettségét és az európai biztonság jövőjét ebben a részletes elemzésben.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"A globális katonai kiadások emelkednek, az Egyesült Államok, Kína és Oroszország vezetésével. Miközben Európa biztonsági kihívásokkal küzd, a nemzetek növelik védelmi költségvetésüket és közös katonai kezdeményezéseket vizsgálnak. Fedezze fel a legújabb trendeket és a globális biztonságra gyakorolt hatásokat.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Mely országok költenek a legtöbbet a védelemre?</strong></h2>\n<p>A legmagasabb <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">védelmi</a> kiadásokkal rendelkező országok az utóbbi években az <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Egyesült Államok</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Kína</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Oroszország</a>, India és Szaúd-Arábia. Az európai növekedést Oroszország növekvő katonai kiadásai felülmúlják, amelyek több mint megduplázták a 2022-es <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">ukrajnai invázió</a> előtti szintet.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Mennyit költenek a NATO tagállamai a védelemre?</strong></h2>\n<p>Az Egyesült Államok elnöke, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> többször is bírálta a szövetségeseket, amiért nem teljesítik a szövetség védelmi kiadási célját, amely a GDP két százaléka (amelyet 2014-ben állapítottak meg). Még most is, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Horvátország</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugália</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Olaszország</a>, Kanada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belgium</a>, Luxemburg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Szlovénia</a> és <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Spanyolország</a> nem érte el a célt.</p>\n<p>A 23 EU-s ország védelmi kiadása, amelyek <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">NATO</a> tagjai, 2024-ben a kombinált GDP-jük 1,99 százalékát tette ki, és várhatóan 2025-re 2,04 százalékra emelkedik.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Több :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n A megrázkódtatott Európa összezár, hogy szembenézzen a Trumpo-Putinista új renddel </a>\n </div>\n<p>De Trump azt javasolta, hogy a NATO tagállamai növeljék a minimális védelmi kiadásaikat a GDP öt százalékára — egy ötlet, amelyet az EU külügyi főnöke, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> is támogatott januárban. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> azt javasolta, hogy az EU védelmi kiadásait háromról 3,5 százalékra emeljék a GDP-ből. Ennek megvalósítása azonban évekbe telik a jelenlegi ütem mellett.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>A védelem egy technológia-vezérelt iparág, amely hatalmas befektetéseket igényel a kutatásra és innovációra. Az EU védelmi K+F finanszírozása 2022-ben 3,9 milliárd euróra nőtt, a Eurostat szerint. Azonban a <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">Dragi jelentés</a> szerint a következő generációs védelmi rendszerek hatalmas K+F befektetéseket igényelnek. 2014 óta az Egyesült Államok a K+F kiadásokat minden más katonai kiadási kategória fölé helyezte. Franciaország, Németország és Svédország az EU országai közül a legnagyobb K+F befektető a védelem terén.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Mely európai országok növelik a legjobban a védelmi költségvetéseket?</strong></h2>\n<p>2014 óta olyan országok, mint <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Magyarország</a>, a <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Cseh Köztársaság</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Lengyelország</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Dánia</a>, Észak-Macedónia, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Szlovákia</a> és <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Svédország</a> megduplázták védelmi kiadásaikat, míg Luxemburg, Lettország és Litvánia megháromszorozták költéseiket. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Németország</a>, a <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Hollandia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Észtország</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Románia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulgária</a> és <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finnország</a> szintén majdnem megduplázták védelmi költségvetésüket.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Hány katona van az európai országokban?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Az aktív katonai személyzet összlétszáma Európában, beleértve az Egyesült Királyságot is, körülbelül 1,5 millióra tehető. Azonban hatékonyságát aláássa a közös parancsnoki struktúra és katonai rendszerek hiánya.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>2024 végére a <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukrán</a> területen lévő orosz csapatok száma körülbelül 700 000 volt. Azonban <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">becslések szerint</a> Oroszországnak körülbelül 1,3 millió aktív katonai személyzete és kétmillió tartalékosa van.</p>\n<p>A <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\">hivatalos adatok</a> szerint körülbelül 80 000 amerikai katonai erő aktív Európában. Azonban a teljes szám ingadozik a gyakorlatok és a rutin katonai rotációk miatt, ahogyan azt <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">a Külügyi Kapcsolatok Tanácsa</a> is megjegyzi. Eközben a szakértők azt becsülik, hogy Európának <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">további 300 000 katonára</a> vagy körülbelül 50 brigádra lenne szüksége ahhoz, hogy megvédje magát, az amerikai csapatok nélkül.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Halad-e Európa egy közös hadsereg felé?</strong></h2>\n<p>Nem. Néhány ország, mint például <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Franciaország</a>, hagyományosan támogatta az EU katonai autonómiájának erősítését, míg mások, mint Lengyelország és a balti államok, a NATO-t helyezik előtérbe. De ahelyett, hogy egyetlen európai hadsereg felé haladnának, az EU a szorosabb katonai együttműködésre, közös beszerzésekre és gyors reagálású erőkre összpontosít, ahogyan azt a <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">2022-es Stratégiai Iránytű</a> is mutatja, amelynek célja egy 5000 fős gyorsan telepíthető erő létrehozása 2025-re. A katonai mobilitás ma is az EU védelmi stratégiájának egyik prioritása, mivel nincs harmonizált szabály a csapatok vagy felszerelések mozgására országok között vészhelyzet esetén.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Miért és hogyan tervezi az EU a fegyvergyártásának növelését?</strong></h2>\n<p>A Krím 2014-es inváziója, majd Oroszország 2022-es teljes körű inváziója átalakította az EU biztonsági politikáját, arra kényszerítve az EU-t és a NATO-t, hogy újragondolják a védelmi stratégiákat és növeljék a katonai kiadásokat a képességek fokozása érdekében. Az ukrajnai háború és a Trump-adminisztráció Moszkva felé tett látszólagos elmozdulása is felélesztette a vitákat az EU stratégiai autonómiájáról, Franciaország (és most már Németország is) a US-vezette biztonsági struktúráktól való nagyobb függetlenségért lobbizik.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Több :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Ki fogja megfizetni Európa újrafelfegyverzését? Itt az ideje, hogy megadóztassuk a gazdagokat </a>\n </div>\n<p>Az elmúlt két évtizedben az EU különböző védelmi kezdeményezéseket dolgozott ki.</p>\n<p>A katonai együttműködés fokozásának kulcsfontosságú lépései közé tartozik az <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Európai Védelmi Ügynökség</a> (2004) létrehozása, éves <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Képességfejlesztési Terv</a> (2008) és <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017). A védelmi átadásokra és kettős felhasználású exportokra vonatkozó szabályozások szintén megerősítették a fegyverek ellenőrzését, míg Oroszország 2022-es teljes körű ukrajnai inváziója felgyorsította az EU védelmi erőfeszítéseit, ami az <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Európai Béke Eszköz</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) és <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024) létrehozásához vezetett.</p>\n<p>A <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">ReArm Europe tervével</a> az Európai Bizottság 800 milliárd eurót kíván mobilizálni az EU védelmi kiadásainak növelésére, Ukrajna támogatására és Európa ipari bázisának bővítésére.</p>\n<p>A terv egy új, 150 milliárd eurós közös EU-kölcsönzési eszközt tartalmaz, amely lazítja a blokk védelmi kiadásokra vonatkozó fiskális szabályait (amelyek a következő négy évben 650 milliárd euróra szabadulhatnak fel), a <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">kohéziós</a> alapok (önkéntes) felhasználásával, a beruházási szabályok megváltoztatásával az EIB számára és a hosszú ideje leállt <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Tőkepiaci Unió</a> (CMU) keretein belül a „magán” befektetések felszabadításával.&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Mekkora az EU védelmi ipara?</strong></h2>\n<p>Az EU védelmi szektorának éves forgalma körülbelül 84 milliárd euróra tehető, közvetlenül több mint 196 000 magasan képzett munkahelyet támogatva, és közvetve több mint 315 000 további munkahelyet teremtve, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">a</a> Európai Bizottság szerint. Azonban az európai védelmi iparnak <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">több szakképzett munkásra van szüksége</a>, mivel növeli a termelést és az innovációt a növekvő biztonsági kihívások kezelésére.</p>\n<p>Az európai védelmi cégek piaci értéke megugrott, a legtöbb <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">megduplázta részvényeinek árát</a> azóta, hogy Oroszország megszállta Ukrajnát. Azonban a bevételek még mindig meglehetősen alacsonyak, ami azt mutatja, hogy a növekedési kapacitásukat a nemzeti piacok mérete és az exportkorlátozások visszafogják. Ez vitát váltott ki arról, hogy kellene-e egy európai preferencia a közös EU védelmi kiadásokra. „Az ilyen 'európai preferencia' szükséges hozzájárulás a nem európai beszállítók jelenlegi dominanciájának megfordításához az európai védelmi piacokon,” <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">érvel</a> az ipar.&nbsp; De az EU országai megosztottak.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Mely fegyverrendszerek számítanak prioritásnak Európa számára?</strong></h2>\n<p>Európa többrétegű légi és rakétavédelmi architektúrákba fektet be, mert ahogyan Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, a lengyel nemzeti védelemért felelős államtitkár tavaly mondta: „A légi fölény birtoklása határozza meg a háborút”.</p>\n<p>Például, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">az Európai Égbolt Pajzs Kezdeményezés (ESSI)</a>, amelyet 2022 októberében indítottak, egy átfogó védelmi rendszer létrehozását célozza, amely integrálja a rövid hatótávolságú és exoatmoszférikus szintű képességeket.</p>\n<p>Ezen kívül drónok, rakéták, tüzérség, stratégiai támogató eszközök, katonai mobilitás, kiberképességek és mesterséges intelligencia szerepelnek prioritási területekként. Nevezetesen, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">a drónok kulcsfontosságú eszközzé váltak az ukrajnai háborúban</a>, ami arra ösztönözte Kijevet és Moszkvát, hogy gyorsan fejlesszék saját iparukat. Ma a katonai drónok fő exportőrei Kína és Törökország.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Forrás: Európai Védelmi Ügynökség</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Milyen kihívásokkal néz szembe az EU a katonai képességeinek megerősítése során?</strong></h2>\n<p>Bár a megnövekedett védelmi befektetéseket üdvözlik, az ipar hosszú távú vagy többéves beszerzési szerződéseket keres a stabilitás, a fenntartott innováció és a technológiai fejlődés érdekében. A békeidőkre jellemző „megrendelésre készült” rendszer, amelyre az EU védelmi ipara épül, hosszú várakozási időket eredményezett a fejlett védelmi képességek esetében.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>A védelmi együttműködés, beleértve a közös vállalkozásokat és a közös beszerzéseket, növekszik, de továbbra is korlátozott. Külön erőfeszítések történtek a tüzérségi lőszerek gyártásának növelésére, amely területen Ukrajnának magas kereslete van. Az EU ígérete, hogy 2023 márciusa és 2024 között egymillió 155 mm-es kaliberű tüzérségi lövedéket szállít, időben teljesíthetetlennek bizonyult, ami a jövőbeli kihívásokat mutatja. Az EU Bizottság 2022-ben azt becsülte, hogy az együttműködés hiánya évente 25 milliárd és 100 milliárd euró közötti költségeket eredményez.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Több :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Visszatér a sorkatonaság Európába? </a>\n </div>\n<p>A másik kulcsfontosságú probléma az EU védelmi ipara számára a fragmentáció, különösen a repüléstechnikai és rakétás szektorokon kívül. A fragmentáció nemcsak a duplikációt és a magasabb termelési költségeket váltja ki, hanem interoperabilitási problémákat is okoz, korlátozva a méretét és a hadműveleti hatékonyságát a terepen. Példaként az EU tagállamai tíz különböző típusú tarackot biztosítottak Ukrajnának, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">a</a> Draghi jelentés szerint. Ezen kívül az EU 12 különböző típusú harckocsit üzemeltet, míg az Egyesült Államok csak egyet gyárt (az M1 Abrams-t).</p>\n<p>Közben a külső függőségek is szerepet játszanak. 2007 és 2016 között az Európa védelmi beszerzési költségvetésének több mint 60 százalékát nem EU-s katonai importokra költötték, ami harmadik országok ellenőrzéséhez és a felszerelések korlátozásához vezetett. A védelmi beszerzésekben a 'európai preferencia', amelyet főként Franciaország szorgalmazott, nem talált konszenzust az EU vezetőinek februári informális tárgyalásain – és mivel gyorsan növekedni kell, sok ország egy olyan rendszert követel, amely a lehető legnyitottabb legyen.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Vannak-e európai országoknak nukleáris fegyvereik?</strong></h2>\n<p>2022 januárjában Franciaországnak 290 robbanófeje volt, 98 indító rendszerrel, beleértve a tengeralattjáróról indítható rakétákat és a légi indítású rakétákat. Az Egyesült Királyságnak 225 robbanófeje volt, 120 működő, öt tengeralattjárón telepítve, 105 pedig tárolás alatt, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">a</a> Fegyverzetellenőrzési Egyesület szerint.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Közben arról számoltak be, hogy Belgium, Németország, Olaszország, Hollandia és Törökország mind az Egyesült Államok nukleáris fegyvereit tárolják. Lengyelország nemrégiben felszólította Washingtont, hogy telepítsen nukleáris fegyvereket az országba, elismerve, hogy saját kapacitásának kiépítése évtizedekbe telne.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Az eredeti cikk</strong></a><strong> a <em>euobserver</em> oldalán</strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">A <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a> partnerségében, az Európai Unió társfinanszírozásával. Az itt kifejtett nézetek és vélemények azonban kizárólag a szerző(k) véleményét tükrözik, és nem feltétlenül tükrözik az Európai Unió vagy a Kommunikációs Hálózatok, Tartalom és Technológia Főigazgatóságának álláspontját. Sem az Európai Unió, sem a támogatást nyújtó hatóság nem vonható felelősségre értük.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:29.801",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Oroszország teljes körű inváziója Ukrajnába 2022 februárjában megrázta az EU védelmi megközelítését, gyors újraértékelésre késztetve a katonai tájat. Az Egyesült Államok bejelentett kivonulása Európa védelméből újra napirendre tette a kontinens újrafelfegyverzésének kérdését. Az EUobserver a helyzetet vizsgálja.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"hu",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:17:55.428",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Koliko divizija ima Evropa? Pogled na stanje odbrane Evrope",
key:"uid": string:"c701de0d-cd91-45e3-8eda-97d5fc9c26bd",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Ključne tačke\n\n1. **Najveći potrošači na odbranu**: Sjedinjene Američke Države, Kina, Rusija, Indija i Saudijska Arabija prednjače u globalnoj potrošnji na odbranu, pri čemu se vojni budžet Rusije više nego udvostručio od njene invazije na Ukrajinu 2022. godine, što izaziva zabrinutost oko bezbednosne dinamike u Evropi.\n \n2. **Ciljevi potrošnje NATO-a**: I pored NATO-ovog cilja od 2% BDP-a za potrošnju na odbranu, nekoliko zemalja članica, uključujući Hrvatsku i Portugal, još uvek nije ispunilo ovaj cilj. Diskusije su u toku o povećanju ovog cilja na 5%, što odražava pojačane bezbednosne potrebe.\n\n3. **Izazovi odbrambene industrije EU**: Odbrambeni sektor EU, čija je vrednost skoro 84 milijarde evra, suočava se sa značajnim izazovima, uključujući fragmentaciju, oslanjanje na uvoz izvan EU i potrebu za dugoročnim ugovorima o nabavci kako bi se poboljšale vojne sposobnosti i inovacije.\n\n### Uvod\n\n```markdown\nKako globalne tenzije rastu, potrošnja na odbranu se povećava, pri čemu su Sjedinjene Američke Države, Kina i Rusija na čelu. U Evropi, članice NATO-a se bore da ispune ciljeve potrošnje, dok EU nastoji da ojača svoje vojne sposobnosti usred fragmentacije i spoljašnjih zavisnosti. Sa pozivima na povećanje budžeta i težnjom ka strateškoj autonomiji, kako će Evropa navigirati svojom odbrambenom scenom u svetlu evoluirajućih pretnji? Istražite složenosti vojne potrošnje i budućnost evropske bezbednosti u ovoj dubinskoj analizi.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Globalna vojna potrošnja raste, pri čemu SAD, Kina i Rusija prednjače. Dok se Evropa suočava sa bezbednosnim izazovima, nacije povećavaju svoje budžete za odbranu i istražuju zajedničke vojne inicijative. Otkrijte najnovije trendove i posledice za globalnu bezbednost.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koje su to zemlje koje najviše troše na odbranu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Zemlje sa najvećim <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">troškovima na odbranu</a> u poslednjim godinama su <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Sjedinjene Američke Države</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Kina</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Rusija</a>, Indija i Saudijska Arabija. Evropski rast zaostaje za rastućim vojnim troškovima Rusije, koji su se više nego udvostručili u odnosu na nivoe pre njene <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">invazije na Ukrajinu 2022.</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koliko troše članice NATO-a na odbranu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Predsednik SAD-a <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> je više puta kritikovao saveznike zbog neispunjavanja cilja NATO-a o troškovima na odbranu od dva procenta BDP-a (dogovorenog još 2014. godine). Čak i sada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Hrvatska</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugal</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Italija</a>, Kanada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Belgija</a>, Luksemburg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Slovenija</a> i <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Španija</a> nisu dostigle cilj.</p>\n<p>Troškovi odbrane 23 zemlje EU koje su <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">članice NATO-a</a> iznosili su 1,99 procenata njihovog kombinovanog BDP-a u 2024. godini i predviđa se da će dostići 2,04 procenata u 2025. godini.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Više :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Uznemirena Evropa se okuplja da se suoči sa Trumpo-Putinističkim novim poretkom </a>\n </div>\n<p>Ali Trump je sugerisao da bi članice NATO-a trebale povećati svoje minimalne troškove na odbranu na pet procenata BDP-a — ideju koju je podržala šefica spoljnih poslova EU <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> u januaru. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Makron</a> je predložio povećanje troškova odbrane EU za tri do 3,5 procenata BDP-a. Ipak, to bi trajalo godinama da se ostvari na osnovu trenutnih stopa.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Odbrana je industrija vođena tehnologijom koja zahteva ogromna ulaganja u istraživanje i inovacije. Finansiranje R&amp;D u oblasti odbrane u EU dostiglo je 3,9 milijardi evra u 2022. godini, prema podacima Eurostata. Međutim, prema <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\">Dragi izveštaju</a>, sistemi odbrane nove generacije će zahtevati ogromna ulaganja u R&amp;D. Od 2014. godine, SAD je prioritizovao troškove R&amp;D iznad svih drugih kategorija vojne potrošnje. Francuska, Nemačka i Švedska su na vrhu zemalja EU koje ulažu u R&amp;D za odbranu.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koje evropske zemlje najviše povećavaju budžete za odbranu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Od 2014. godine, zemlje kao što su <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Mađarska</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Češka</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Poljska</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Danska</a>, Severna Makedonija, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Slovačka</a> i <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Švedska</a> su udvostručile svoje troškove na odbranu, dok su Luksemburg, Letonija i Litvanija utrostručile svoje troškove. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Nemačka</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Holandija</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estonija</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Rumunija</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bugarska</a> i <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finska</a> su takođe skoro udvostručile svoje budžete za odbranu.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koliko vojnika imaju evropske zemlje?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Ukupan broj aktivnog vojnog osoblja u Evropi, uključujući Veliku Britaniju, procenjuje se na oko 1,5 miliona. Međutim, njegova efikasnost je oslabljena nedostatkom zajedničke komande i vojnih sistema.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Do kraja 2024. godine, broj ruskih trupa u <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ukrajini</a> bio je otprilike 700.000. Međutim, <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">procene</a> sugerišu da Rusija ima oko 1,3 miliona aktivnog vojnog osoblja i dva miliona rezervista.</p>\n<p>Prema <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\"> zvaničnim podacima</a>, oko 80.000 američkih vojnika je aktivno u Evropi. Međutim, ukupan broj varira zbog vežbi i rutinskih rotacija trupa, kao što <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">napominje</a> Savet za spoljne odnose. U međuvremenu, stručnjaci procenjuju da bi Evropi bilo potrebno <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">dodatnih 300.000 vojnika</a> ili oko 50 brigada da se odbrani, bez američkih trupa.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Da li Evropa ide ka zajedničkoj vojsci?</strong></h2>\n<p>Ne. Neke zemlje, poput <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Francuske</a>, tradicionalno su podržavale jaču vojnu autonomiju EU, dok druge, kao što su Poljska i baltičke zemlje, prioritet daju NATO-u. Ali umesto da se kreće ka jednoj evropskoj vojsci, EU fokusira napore na bližu vojnu saradnju, zajedničku nabavku i brže snage odgovora, kao što je viđeno u <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">2022. godini</a>, čiji je cilj bio da se do 2025. godine formira snaga brze intervencije od 5.000 vojnika. Vojna mobilnost je i danas jedan od prioriteta strategije odbrane EU, pošto ne postoje usklađena pravila za premeštanje trupa ili opreme između zemalja u situaciji vanrednog stanja.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Zašto i kako EU planira da poveća svoju proizvodnju oružja?</strong></h2>\n<p>Invazija Krima 2014. godine, praćena punom invazijom Rusije na Ukrajinu 2022. godine, preoblikovala je bezbednosnu politiku EU, primoravajući EU i NATO da preispitaju strategije odbrane i povećaju vojne troškove kako bi poboljšali kapacitete. Rat u Ukrajini i očigledni preokret administracije Trampa prema Moskvi takođe su oživeli rasprave o strateškoj autonomiji EU, pri čemu Francuska (a sada čak i Nemačka) traže veću nezavisnost od bezbednosnih struktura predvođenih SAD-om.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Više :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Ko će platiti za naoružavanje Evrope? Vreme je da se oporezuju bogati </a>\n </div>\n<p>Tokom proteklih dvadeset godina, EU je došla do različitih inicijativa za odbranu.</p>\n<p>Ključni koraci za poboljšanje vojne saradnje uključuju osnivanje <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\">Evropske agencije za odbranu</a> (2004), njen godišnji <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\">Plan razvoja kapaciteta</a> (2008) i <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\">PESCO</a> (2017). Propisi o prebacivanju odbrane i izvozima sa dvostrukom namenom takođe su ojačali kontrolu oružja, dok je puna invazija Rusije na Ukrajinu 2022. godine ubrzala napore EU u oblasti odbrane, što je dovelo do stvaranja <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\">Evropskog mirovnog fonda</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\">EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\">ASAP</a> (2023) i <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>Sa svojim <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\">planom ReArm Europe</a>, Evropska komisija ima za cilj da mobilizuje 800 milijardi evra za povećanje troškova odbrane EU, podršku Ukrajini i proširenje industrijske baze Evrope.</p>\n<p>Plan uključuje novi instrument od 150 milijardi evra u novom zajedničkom zaduživanju EU, olakšavajući fiskalna pravila bloka za odbranu (što bi moglo osloboditi 650 milijardi evra tokom naredne četiri godine), koristeći <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\">sredstva kohezije</a> (dobrovoljno), menjajući pravila ulaganja za EIB i “otključavajući privatna” ulaganja kroz dugo zaustavljenu <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\">Uniju tržišta kapitala</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Kolika je veličina odbrambene industrije EU?</strong></h2>\n<p>Odbrambeni sektor EU ima procenjeni godišnji promet od skoro 84 milijarde evra, direktno podržavajući više od 196.000 visoko kvalifikovanih radnih mesta i indirektno stvarajući više od 315.000 dodatnih radnih mesta, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">prema</a> Evropskoj komisiji. Međutim, evropskoj odbrambenoj industriji <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\">nedostaje više kvalifikovanih radnika</a> dok povećava proizvodnju i inovacije kako bi se suočila sa rastućim bezbednosnim izazovima.</p>\n<p>Tržišne vrednosti evropskih odbrambenih kompanija su porasle, pri čemu su većina <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\">udvostručila svoje cene akcija</a> od kada je Rusija napala Ukrajinu. Ipak, prihodi su i dalje prilično mali, što pokazuje da je njihova sposobnost da se prošire ograničena veličinom nacionalnih tržišta i ograničenjima izvoza. To je pokrenulo raspravu o tome da li bi trebalo da postoji evropska preferencija za zajedničke troškove odbrane EU. “Takva ‘evropska preferencija’ je neophodan doprinos da se preokrene trenutna dominacija neevropskih dobavljača na evropskim tržištima odbrane,” <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\">tvrdila</a> je industrija.&nbsp; Ali zemlje EU ostaju podeljene.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koji se sistemi oružja smatraju prioritetom za Evropu?</strong></h2>\n<p>Evropa ulaže u višeslojne arhitekture vazdušne i raketne odbrane jer, kako je prošle godine rekao Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, poljski državni sekretar za nacionalnu odbranu: “Imati prednost u vazduhu definiše rat\".</p>\n<p>Na primer, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\">Evropska inicijativa za zaštitu neba (ESSI)</a>, pokrenuta u oktobru 2022. godine, ima za cilj da stvori sveobuhvatan sistem odbrane koji integriše sposobnosti od kratkog dometa do egzotermalnih nivoa.</p>\n<p>Pored toga, dronovi, rakete, artiljerija, strateški omogućavači, vojna mobilnost, kibernetičke sposobnosti i veštačka inteligencija su navedeni kao prioritetne oblasti. Naime, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\">dronovi su postali ključni alat u ratu u Ukrajini</a>, što je podstaklo i Kijev i Moskvu da brzo razviju svoju industriju. A danas su glavni izvoznici vojnih dronova Kina i Turska.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Izvor: Evropska agencija za odbranu</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Koji su izazovi sa kojima se EU suočava u jačanju svojih vojnih kapaciteta?</strong></h2>\n<p>Dok se povećana ulaganja u odbranu pozdravljaju, industrija traži dugoročne ili višegodišnje ugovore o nabavci za stabilnost, održivu inovaciju i razvoj tehnologije. Sistem ‘prilagođenog naručivanja’ tipičan za vreme mira, na kojem se zasniva odbrambena industrija EU, rezultirao je dugim vremenima čekanja za napredne vojne sposobnosti.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Vojna saradnja, uključujući zajedničke projekte i zajedničku nabavku, raste, ali ostaje ograničena. Bilo je specifičnih napora da se poveća proizvodnja artiljerijskih municija, oblast u kojoj Ukrajina ima veliku potražnju. Međutim, obećanje EU da će isporučiti milion artiljerijskih granata kalibra 155 mm između marta 2023. i 2024. godine bilo je nemoguće ispuniti na vreme, pokazujući izazove koji su pred nama. Evropska komisija je procenila 2022. godine da nedostatak saradnje dovodi do godišnjih troškova u rasponu od 25 milijardi do 100 milijardi evra.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Više :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Da li se vraća vojna obaveza u Evropu? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Još jedan od ključnih problema za odbrambenu industriju EU je fragmentacija, posebno van sektora aeronautike i raketa.&nbsp; Fragmentacija ne samo da pokreće dupliciranje i više troškove proizvodnje, već takođe stvara probleme interoperabilnosti, ograničavajući njenu veličinu i operativnu efikasnost na terenu. Kao pokazatelj, države članice EU su Ukrajini obezbedile deset različitih tipova haubica, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">prema</a> izveštaju Draghi. Pored toga, EU upravlja sa 12 različitih tipova borbenih tenkova, dok SAD proizvodi samo jedan (M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>U međuvremenu, spoljne zavisnosti takođe igraju ulogu. Između 2007. i 2016. godine, više od 60 procenata budžeta za nabavku odbrane Evrope potrošeno je na vojne uvoze izvan EU, što je dovelo do kontrole i ograničenja opreme iz trećih zemalja. 'Evropska preferencija' u nabavci odbrane, koju je uglavnom podržala Francuska, nije našla konsenzus tokom neformalnih razgovora lidera EU u februaru – a s obzirom na potrebu za brzim povećanjem, mnoge zemlje pozivaju na sistem koji bi bio što otvoreniji.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Da li evropske zemlje imaju nuklearno oružje?</strong></h2>\n<p>Od januara 2022. godine, Francuska je imala 290 bojevih glava, sa 98 sistema za isporuku, uključujući podmorske rakete i rakete lansirane iz vazduha. Velika Britanija je imala 225 bojevih glava, 120 operativnih, raspoređenih na pet podmornica, sa 105 u skladištu, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">prema</a> Asocijaciji za kontrolu naoružanja.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>U međuvremenu, izveštava se da Belgija, Nemačka, Italija, Holandija i Turska sve imaju američko nuklearno oružje. Poljska je nedavno pozvala Vašington da rasporedi nuklearno oružje u zemlji, priznajući da bi sticanje sopstvenih kapaciteta trajalo decenijama.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Originalni članak</strong></a><strong> na <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">U partnerstvu sa <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, sufinansirano od strane Evropske unije. Gledišta i mišljenja izražena su, međutim, isključivo su mišljenja autora(i) i ne odražavaju nužno stavove Evropske unije ili Generalnog direktorata za komunikacione mreže, sadržaj i tehnologiju. Ni Evropska unija ni dodeljujući organ ne mogu biti odgovorni za njih.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:29.507",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Ruska potpuna invazija na Ukrajinu u februaru 2022. godine uzdrmala je pristup EU-u odbrani, podstičući brzu reevaluaciju njenog vojnog pejzaža. Najavljeno povlačenje SAD-a iz odbrane Evrope ponovo je postavilo pitanje naoružavanja kontinenta na sto. EUobserver razmatra trenutnu situaciju.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"sr",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:17:05.588",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Hoeveel divisies heeft Europa? Een blik op de staat van de verdediging van Europa",
key:"uid": string:"ebd3b6bf-e386-4381-b37a-a2b24a03a4f0",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Belangrijke Punten\n\n1. **Top Defensie Uitgevers**: De Verenigde Staten, China, Rusland, India en Saoedi-Arabië leiden de wereldwijde defensie-uitgaven, waarbij het militaire budget van Rusland meer dan verdubbeld is sinds de invasie van Oekraïne in 2022, wat zorgen oproept over de Europese veiligheidsdynamiek.\n \n2. **NATO Uitgaven Doelstellingen**: Ondanks het doel van de NATO van 2% van het BBP voor defensie-uitgaven, hebben verschillende lidstaten, waaronder Kroatië en Portugal, dit doel nog niet bereikt. Discussies zijn gaande over het verhogen van dit doel naar 5%, wat de verhoogde veiligheidsbehoeften weerspiegelt.\n\n3. **EU Defensie Industrie Uitdagingen**: De defensiesector van de EU, gewaardeerd op bijna €84 miljard, staat voor aanzienlijke uitdagingen, waaronder fragmentatie, afhankelijkheid van niet-EU-importen en de noodzaak van langetermijn inkoopcontracten om militaire capaciteiten en innovatie te verbeteren.\n\n### Teaser\n\n```markdown\nNaarmate de wereldwijde spanningen toenemen, stijgen de defensie-uitgaven, met de Verenigde Staten, China en Rusland aan de voorhoede. In Europa worstelen NATO-leden met het voldoen aan de uitgaven doelstellingen, terwijl de EU haar militaire capaciteiten probeert te versterken te midden van fragmentatie en externe afhankelijkheden. Met oproepen voor verhoogde budgetten en een drang naar strategische autonomie, hoe zal Europa zijn defensielandschap navigeren in het licht van evoluerende bedreigingen? Verken de complexiteit van militaire uitgaven en de toekomst van de Europese veiligheid in deze diepgaande analyse.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"De wereldwijde militaire uitgaven nemen toe, met de VS, China en Rusland die de leiding nemen. Terwijl Europa worstelt met veiligheidsuitdagingen, verhogen landen hun defensiebudgetten en verkennen ze gezamenlijke militaire initiatieven. Ontdek de laatste trends en implicaties voor de wereldwijde veiligheid.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Welke landen geven het meest uit aan defensie?</strong></h2>\n<p>De landen met de hoogste <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">defensie</a> uitgaven in de afgelopen jaren zijn de <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Verenigde Staten</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">China</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Rusland</a>, India en Saoedi-Arabië. De Europese groei wordt overtroffen door de stijgende militaire uitgaven van Rusland, die meer dan verdubbeld zijn ten opzichte van de niveaus vóór de <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">invasie van Oekraïne in 2022</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Hoeveel geven de NAVO-leden uit aan defensie?</strong></h2>\n<p>De Amerikaanse president <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> heeft herhaaldelijk kritiek geuit op bondgenoten die niet voldoen aan het defensie-uitgaven doel van de alliantie van twee procent van het BBP (afgesproken in 2014). Zelfs nu hebben <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Kroatië</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugal</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Italië</a>, Canada, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">België</a>, Luxemburg, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Slovenië</a> en <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Spanje</a> het doel niet gehaald.</p>\n<p>De defensie-uitgaven van de 23 EU-landen die <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">NAVO</a> leden zijn, bedroegen 1,99 procent van hun gezamenlijke BBP in 2024 en zullen naar verwachting 2,04 procent bereiken in 2025.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Meer :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Een geschokt Europa sluit de rangen om het Trumpo-Poetinistische nieuwe wereldorde te confronteren </a>\n </div>\n<p>Maar Trump stelde voor dat NAVO-leden hun minimale defensie-uitgaven zouden verhogen naar vijf procent van het BBP — een idee dat in januari werd gesteund door de EU-buitenlandchef <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a>. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> heeft voorgesteld de defensie-uitgaven van de EU met drie tot 3,5 procent van het BBP te verhogen. Toch zou het jaren duren voordat dit gerealiseerd kan worden op basis van de huidige tarieven.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Defensie is een technologiegedreven industrie die enorme investeringen in onderzoek en innovatie vereist. De financiering van defensie R&amp;D in de EU bereikte €3,9 miljard in 2022, volgens Eurostat. Volgens het<a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\"> Dragi-rapport</a> zullen defensiesystemen van de volgende generatie enorme R&amp;D-investeringen vereisen. Sinds 2014 heeft de VS R&amp;D-uitgaven boven alle andere militaire uitgavenprioriteiten gesteld. Frankrijk, Duitsland en Zweden staan aan de top van de EU-landen die investeren in R&amp;D voor defensie.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Welke Europese landen verhogen hun defensiebudgetten het meest?</strong></h2>\n<p>Sinds 2014 hebben landen zoals <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Hongarije</a>, de <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Tsjechische Republiek</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Polen</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Denemarken</a>, Noord-Macedonië, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Slovakije</a> en <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Zweden</a> hun defensie-uitgaven verdubbeld, terwijl Luxemburg, Letland en Litouwen hun uitgaven hebben verdrievoudigd. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Duitsland</a>, de <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Nederlanden</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estland</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Roemenië</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulgarije</a> en <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finland</a> hebben ook bijna hun defensiebudgetten verdubbeld.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Hoeveel soldaten hebben Europese landen?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Het totale aantal actieve militaire personeelsleden in Europa, inclusief het VK, wordt geschat op ongeveer 1,5 miljoen. Echter, de efficiëntie wordt ondermijnd door het gebrek aan een gemeenschappelijke commandostructuur en militaire systemen.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p> Eind 2024 was het aantal Russische troepen in <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Oekraïne</a> ongeveer 700.000. Het wordt echter<a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\"> geschat</a> dat Rusland ongeveer 1,3 miljoen actieve militaire personeelsleden en twee miljoen reservisten heeft.</p>\n<p>Volgens<a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\"> officiële cijfers</a> zijn er ongeveer 80.000 Amerikaanse militaire troepen actief in Europa. Het totale aantal fluctueert echter door oefeningen en routinematige troeprotaties, zoals<a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\"> opgemerkt</a> door de Council on Foreign Relations. Ondertussen schatten experts dat Europa een<a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\"> extra 300.000 manschappen</a> of ongeveer 50 brigades nodig zou hebben om zichzelf te verdedigen, zonder Amerikaanse troepen.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Beweegt Europa naar een gezamenlijke leger?</strong></h2>\n<p>Nee. Sommige landen, zoals <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Frankrijk</a>, hebben traditioneel sterkere EU-militaire autonomie ondersteund, terwijl anderen, zoals Polen en de Baltische staten, de NAVO prioriteit geven. Maar in plaats van te bewegen naar een enkel Europees leger, richt de EU zich op nauwere militaire samenwerking, gezamenlijke inkoop en snellere reactiemachten, zoals te zien is in de <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Strategische Kompas 2022</a>, waarvan het doel was om tegen 2025 een snelle inzetmacht van 5.000 man te hebben. Militaire mobiliteit is nog steeds een van de prioriteiten van de defensiestrategie van de EU, aangezien er geen geharmoniseerde regels zijn om troepen of uitrusting tussen landen te verplaatsen in een noodsituatie.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Waarom en hoe is de EU van plan haar wapenproductie te verhogen?</strong></h2>\n<p>De invasie van de Krim in 2014, gevolgd door de grootschalige invasie van Oekraïne door Rusland in 2022, heeft het veiligheidsbeleid van de EU hervormd, waardoor de EU en de NAVO hun defensiestrategieën opnieuw moeten overdenken en de militaire uitgaven moeten verhogen om de capaciteiten te verbeteren. De oorlog in Oekraïne en de schijnbare verschuiving van de Trump-administratie naar Moskou heeft ook de discussies over de strategische autonomie van de EU nieuw leven ingeblazen, waarbij Frankrijk (en nu zelfs Duitsland) pleit voor meer onafhankelijkheid van door de VS geleide veiligheidsstructuren.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Meer :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Wie gaat betalen voor de herbewapening van Europa? Het is tijd om de rijken te belasten </a>\n </div>\n<p>In de afgelopen twee decennia heeft de EU verschillende defensie-initiatieven ontwikkeld.</p>\n<p>Belangrijke stappen om de militaire samenwerking te verbeteren zijn de oprichting van de<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\"> Europese Defensieagentschap</a> (2004), het jaarlijkse<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\"> Capaciteitsontwikkelingsplan</a> (2008) en<a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\"> PESCO</a> (2017). Regels voor defensieoverdrachten en dual-use-exporten hebben ook de wapencontrole versterkt, terwijl de grootschalige invasie van Oekraïne door Rusland in 2022 de defens inspanningen van de EU heeft versneld, wat heeft geleid tot de oprichting van de<a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\"> Europese Vredesfaciliteit</a> (2021),<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\"> EDIRPA</a>,<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\"> ASAP</a> (2023) en<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\"> EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>Met zijn<a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\"> ReArm Europe-plan</a> is de Europese Commissie van plan €800 miljard te mobiliseren om de defensie-uitgaven van de EU te verhogen, Oekraïne te steunen en de industriële basis van Europa uit te breiden.</p>\n<p>Het plan omvat een nieuw instrument van €150 miljard in nieuwe gezamenlijke EU-leningen, het versoepelen van de fiscale regels van de bloc voor defensie (die €650 miljard vrijgemaakt zou kunnen worden in de komende vier jaar), het gebruik van<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\"> cohesiefondsen</a> (vrijwillig), het wijzigen van investeringsregels voor de EIB en het “ontgrendelen van particuliere” investeringen door de lang stilgelegde<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\"> Kapitaalmarktunie</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Hoe groot is de defensie-industrie van de EU?</strong></h2>\n<p>De defensiesector van de EU heeft een geschatte jaarlijkse omzet van bijna €84 miljard, ondersteunt direct meer dan 196.000 hooggeschoolde banen en creëert indirect meer dan 315.000 extra banen, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">volgens</a> de Europese Commissie. Maar de Europese defensie-industrie<a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\"> heeft meer geschoolde arbeiders nodig</a> nu het de productie en innovatie verhoogt om de groeiende veiligheidsuitdagingen aan te pakken.</p>\n<p>De marktwaarden van Europese defensiebedrijven zijn gestegen, waarbij de meeste<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\"> hun aandelenkoersen hebben verdubbeld</a> sinds Rusland Oekraïne binnenviel. Maar de inkomsten zijn nog steeds vrij klein, wat aantoont dat hun capaciteit om op te schalen wordt tegengehouden door de grootte van nationale markten en exportbeperkingen. Dit heeft geleid tot een debat over de vraag of er een Europese voorkeur moet zijn voor gezamenlijke EU-defensie-uitgaven. “Zo'n 'Europese voorkeur' is een noodzakelijke bijdrage om de huidige overheersing van niet-Europese leveranciers op de Europese defensiemarkten om te keren,”<a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\"> stelt</a> de industrie.&nbsp; Maar EU-landen blijven verdeeld.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Welke wapensystemen worden als prioriteit voor Europa gezien?</strong></h2>\n<p>Europa investeert in gelaagde lucht- en raketverdedigingsarchitecturen omdat, zoals Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, de Poolse staatssecretaris voor nationale defensie, vorig jaar zei: “Een voordeel in de lucht definieert de oorlog\".</p>\n<p>Bijvoorbeeld,<a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\"> het Europese Sky Shield-initiatief (ESSI)</a>, gelanceerd in oktober 2022, streeft ernaar een allesomvattend defensiesysteem te creëren dat capaciteiten integreert die variëren van kortere afstanden tot exoatmosferische niveaus.</p>\n<p>Bovendien zijn drones, raketten, artillerie, strategische enablers, militaire mobiliteit, cybercapaciteiten en kunstmatige intelligentie als prioritaire gebieden genoemd. Namelijk,<a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\"> drones zijn een cruciaal hulpmiddel geworden in de oorlog in Oekraïne</a>, wat zowel Kyiv als Moskou heeft aangespoord om snel hun eigen industrie te ontwikkelen. En vandaag zijn de belangrijkste exporteurs van militaire drones China en Turkije.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Bron: Europese Defensieagentschap</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Welke uitdagingen staat de EU voor bij het versterken van haar militaire capaciteiten?</strong></h2>\n<p>Hoewel verhoogde defensie-investeringen welkom zijn, zoekt de industrie naar langetermijn- of meerjarige inkoopcontracten voor stabiliteit, duurzame innovatie en technologische ontwikkeling. Het 'op maat gemaakte' systeem dat typisch is voor vredestijd, waarop de EU-defensie-industrie is gebaseerd, heeft geleid tot lange wachttijden voor geavanceerde defensiecapaciteiten.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Defensiesamenwerking, inclusief joint ventures en gezamenlijke inkoop, groeit, maar blijft beperkt. Er zijn specifieke inspanningen geweest om de productie van artillerie-ammo te verhogen, een gebied waar Oekraïne een hoge vraag naar heeft. Maar de belofte van de EU om tussen maart 2023 en 2024 één miljoen 155-mm-artilleriegranaten te leveren, was onmogelijk op tijd te vervullen, wat de uitdagingen voor de toekomst aantoont. De EU-commissie schatte in 2022 dat het gebrek aan samenwerking leidt tot jaarlijkse kosten variërend van €25 miljard tot €100 miljard.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Meer :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Keuring keert terug naar Europa? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Een ander belangrijk probleem voor de defensie-industrie van de EU is fragmentatie, vooral buiten de luchtvaart- en raketsectoren.&nbsp; Fragmentatie leidt niet alleen tot duplicatie en hogere productiekosten, maar ook tot interoperabiliteitsproblemen, waardoor de schaal en operationele effectiviteit in het veld worden beperkt. Ter indicatie hebben EU-lidstaten tien verschillende soorten houwitsers aan Oekraïne geleverd, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">volgens</a> het Draghi-rapport. Bovendien opereert de EU met 12 verschillende soorten gevechtstanks, terwijl de VS er slechts één produceert (de M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Ondertussen spelen externe afhankelijkheden ook een rol. Tussen 2007 en 2016 werd meer dan 60 procent van het defensie-investeringsbudget van Europa besteed aan militaire importen van buiten de EU, wat leidt tot controles en beperkingen van derde landen op de uitrusting. Een 'Europese voorkeur' in defensie-investeerders, voornamelijk gepromoot door Frankrijk, vond geen consensus tijdens informele gesprekken van EU-leiders in februari – en gezien de noodzaak om snel op te schalen, roepen veel landen op tot een systeem dat zo open mogelijk moet zijn.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Hebben Europese landen nucleaire wapens?</strong></h2>\n<p>Vanaf januari 2022 had Frankrijk 290 kernkoppen, met 98 leveringssystemen, waaronder onderzeebootraketten en luchtgelanceerde raketten. Het VK had 225 kernkoppen, 120 operationeel, ingezet op vijf onderzeeërs, met 105 in opslag, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">volgens</a> de Arms Control Association.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Ondertussen wordt gerapporteerd dat België, Duitsland, Italië, Nederland en Turkije allemaal Amerikaanse nucleaire wapens huisvesten. Polen heeft onlangs Washington gevraagd nucleaire wapens in het land te stationeren, en erkent dat het tientallen jaren zou duren om een eigen capaciteit te hebben.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Origineel artikel</strong></a><strong> op <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">In samenwerking met <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, mede gefinancierd door de Europese Unie. De meningen en standpunten die worden weergegeven, zijn echter die van de auteur(s) alleen en weerspiegelen niet noodzakelijk die van de Europese Unie of de Directoraat-Generaal voor Communicatienetwerken, Inhoud en Technologie. Noch de Europese Unie noch de verlenende autoriteit kan hiervoor verantwoordelijk worden gehouden.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:30.164",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"De grootschalige invasie van Rusland in Oekraïne in februari 2022 schudde de benadering van de EU ten aanzien van defensie op, wat leidde tot een snelle herbeoordeling van het militaire landschap. De aangekondigde Amerikaanse terugtrekking uit de verdediging van Europa heeft de vraag naar de herbewapening van het continent weer op de agenda gezet. EUobserver kijkt naar de stand van zaken.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"nl",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:18:42.193",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"¿Cuántas divisiones tiene Europa? Una mirada al estado de la defensa de Europa",
key:"uid": string:"f7505f2e-ea53-43f7-a4e7-18fe16e595ff",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Puntos Clave\n\n1. **Principales Gastadores en Defensa**: Estados Unidos, China, Rusia, India y Arabia Saudita lideran el gasto global en defensa, con el presupuesto militar de Rusia más que duplicándose desde su invasión de Ucrania en 2022, lo que genera preocupaciones sobre la dinámica de seguridad en Europa.\n \n2. **Objetivos de Gasto de la OTAN**: A pesar del objetivo de la OTAN del 2% del PIB para el gasto en defensa, varios países miembros, incluidos Croacia y Portugal, aún no han alcanzado esta meta. Las discusiones están en curso sobre aumentar este objetivo al 5%, reflejando las crecientes necesidades de seguridad.\n\n3. **Desafíos de la Industria de Defensa de la UE**: El sector de defensa de la UE, valorado en casi 84 mil millones de euros, enfrenta desafíos significativos, incluida la fragmentación, la dependencia de importaciones no pertenecientes a la UE y la necesidad de contratos de adquisición a largo plazo para mejorar las capacidades militares y la innovación.\n\n### Avance\n\n```markdown\nA medida que aumentan las tensiones globales, el gasto en defensa está en aumento, con Estados Unidos, China y Rusia a la vanguardia. En Europa, los miembros de la OTAN luchan por cumplir con los objetivos de gasto, mientras que la UE busca fortalecer sus capacidades militares en medio de la fragmentación y las dependencias externas. Con llamados a presupuestos aumentados y un impulso hacia la autonomía estratégica, ¿cómo navegará Europa su paisaje de defensa ante las amenazas en evolución? Explora las complejidades del gasto militar y el futuro de la seguridad europea en este análisis en profundidad.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"El gasto militar global está en aumento, con EE. UU., China y Rusia liderando la carga. A medida que Europa enfrenta desafíos de seguridad, las naciones están aumentando sus presupuestos de defensa y explorando iniciativas militares conjuntas. Descubre las últimas tendencias e implicaciones para la seguridad global.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>¿Cuáles son los países que más gastan en defensa?</strong></h2>\n<p>Los países con el mayor gasto en <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">defensa</a> en los últimos años son los <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Estados Unidos</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">China</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Rusia</a>, India y Arabia Saudita. El crecimiento europeo es superado por el aumento del gasto militar de Rusia, que se ha más que duplicado en comparación con los niveles anteriores a su <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">invasión de Ucrania en 2022</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"visualización de jerarquía\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>¿Cuánto gastan los miembros de la OTAN en defensa?</strong></h2>\n<p>El presidente de EE. UU. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Donald Trump</a> ha criticado repetidamente a los aliados por no cumplir con el objetivo de gasto en defensa de la alianza del dos por ciento del PIB (acordado en 2014). Incluso ahora, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Croacia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Portugal</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Italia</a>, Canadá, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Bélgica</a>, Luxemburgo, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Eslovenia</a> y <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">España</a> no han alcanzado el objetivo.</p>\n<p>El gasto en defensa de los 23 países de la UE que son miembros de la <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">OTAN</a> ascendió al 1.99 por ciento de su PIB combinado en 2024 y se proyecta que alcanzará el 2.04 por ciento en 2025.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Más :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Una Europa sacudida cierra filas para enfrentar el nuevo orden Trumpo-Putinista </a>\n </div>\n<p>Pero Trump sugirió que los miembros de la OTAN deberían aumentar su gasto mínimo en defensa al cinco por ciento del PIB, una idea respaldada por la jefa de asuntos exteriores de la UE <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Kaja Kallas</a> en enero. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Macron</a> ha propuesto aumentar el gasto en defensa de la UE entre tres y 3.5 por ciento del PIB. Sin embargo, esto tomaría años en materializarse según las tasas actuales.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"visualización de jerarquía\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>La defensa es una industria impulsada por la tecnología que requiere una inversión masiva en investigación e innovación. La financiación de I+D en defensa en la UE alcanzó los 3.9 mil millones de euros en 2022, según Eurostat. Sin embargo, según el<a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\"> informe Dragi</a>, los sistemas de defensa de próxima generación requerirán una inversión masiva en I+D. Desde 2014, EE. UU. ha priorizado el gasto en I+D por encima de todas las demás categorías de gasto militar. Francia, Alemania y Suecia están a la cabeza de los países de la UE que invierten en I+D para la defensa.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>¿Qué países europeos están aumentando más sus presupuestos de defensa?</strong></h2>\n<p>Desde 2014, países como <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Hungría</a>, la <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">República Checa</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Polonia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Dinamarca</a>, Macedonia del Norte, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Eslovaquia</a> y <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Suecia</a> han duplicado sus gastos en defensa, mientras que Luxemburgo, Letonia y Lituania han triplicado su gasto. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Alemania</a>, los <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Países Bajos</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Estonia</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Rumanía</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Bulgaria</a> y <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Finlandia</a> también han casi duplicado sus presupuestos de defensa.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>¿Cuántos soldados tienen los países europeos?&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Se estima que el número total de personal militar activo en Europa, incluyendo el Reino Unido, es de alrededor de 1.5 millones. Sin embargo, su eficiencia se ve socavada por la falta de una estructura de mando común y sistemas militares.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"visualización de mapa\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Para finales de 2024, el número de tropas rusas en <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ucrania</a> era de aproximadamente 700,000. Sin embargo, se <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">estima</a> que Rusia tiene alrededor de 1.3 millones de personal militar activo y dos millones de reservistas.</p>\n<p>Según <a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\"> cifras oficiales</a>, alrededor de 80,000 fuerzas militares estadounidenses están activas en Europa. Sin embargo, el número total fluctúa debido a ejercicios y rotaciones de tropas de rutina, como <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">señala</a> el Consejo de Relaciones Exteriores. Mientras tanto, los expertos estiman que Europa necesitaría un<a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\"> adicional de 300,000 soldados</a> o alrededor de 50 brigadas para defenderse, sin tropas estadounidenses.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"visualización de mapa\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>¿Se está moviendo Europa hacia un ejército conjunto?</strong></h2>\n<p>No. Algunos países, como <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Francia</a>, han apoyado tradicionalmente una mayor autonomía militar de la UE, mientras que otros, como Polonia y los países bálticos, priorizan la OTAN. Pero en lugar de avanzar hacia un único ejército europeo, la UE está enfocando esfuerzos en una cooperación militar más estrecha, adquisiciones conjuntas y fuerzas de respuesta más rápidas, como se vio en el <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Compás Estratégico de 2022</a>, cuyo objetivo era tener una fuerza de despliegue rápido de 5,000 efectivos para 2025. La movilidad militar sigue siendo hoy una de las prioridades de la estrategia de defensa de la UE, ya que no hay reglas armonizadas para mover tropas o equipos entre países en una situación de emergencia.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>¿Por qué y cómo planea la UE aumentar su producción de armas?</strong></h2>\n<p>La invasión de Crimea en 2014, seguida de la invasión a gran escala de Ucrania por parte de Rusia en 2022, ha remodelado la política de seguridad de la UE, obligando a la UE y a la OTAN a repensar las estrategias de defensa y aumentar el gasto militar para mejorar las capacidades. La guerra en Ucrania y el aparente giro de la administración Trump hacia Moscú también han reavivado las discusiones sobre la autonomía estratégica de la UE, con Francia (y ahora incluso Alemania) presionando por más independencia de las estructuras de seguridad lideradas por EE. UU.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Más :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n ¿Quién va a pagar por el rearme de Europa? Es hora de gravar a los ricos </a>\n </div>\n<p>En las últimas dos décadas, la UE ha propuesto diferentes iniciativas de defensa.</p>\n<p>Los pasos clave para mejorar la colaboración militar incluyen la creación de la<a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\"> Agencia Europea de Defensa</a> (2004), su <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\"> Plan de Desarrollo de Capacidades</a> anual (2008) y<a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\"> PESCO</a> (2017). Las regulaciones para transferencias de defensa y exportaciones de doble uso también han fortalecido el control de armas, mientras que la invasión a gran escala de Ucrania por parte de Rusia en 2022 aceleró los esfuerzos de defensa de la UE, llevando a la creación de la<a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\"> Instalación Europea de Paz</a> (2021),<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\"> EDIRPA</a>,<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\"> ASAP</a> (2023) y<a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\"> EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>Con su<a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\"> plan ReArm Europe</a>, la Comisión Europea busca movilizar 800 mil millones de euros para aumentar el gasto en defensa de la UE, apoyar a Ucrania y expandir la base industrial de Europa.</p>\n<p>El plan incluye un nuevo instrumento de 150 mil millones de euros en nuevos préstamos conjuntos de la UE, flexibilizando las reglas fiscales del bloque para la defensa (que podrían liberar 650 mil millones de euros en los próximos cuatro años), utilizando fondos de <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\"> cohesión</a> (voluntariamente), cambiando las reglas de inversión para el BEI y “desbloqueando la inversión privada” a lo largo de la muy estancada<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\"> Unión del Mercado de Capitales</a> (UMC).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>¿Qué tan grande es la industria de defensa de la UE?</strong></h2>\n<p>El sector de defensa de la UE tiene un volumen de negocios anual estimado de casi 84 mil millones de euros, apoyando directamente a más de 196,000 empleos altamente cualificados y creando indirectamente más de 315,000 empleos adicionales, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">según</a> la Comisión Europea. Pero la industria de defensa europea<a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\"> necesita más trabajadores cualificados</a> a medida que aumenta la producción y la innovación para abordar los crecientes desafíos de seguridad.</p>\n<p>Los valores de mercado de las empresas de defensa europeas han aumentado, con la mayoría<a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\"> duplicando sus precios de acciones</a> desde que Rusia invadió Ucrania. Pero los ingresos siguen siendo bastante bajos, lo que muestra que su capacidad para escalar se ve limitada por el tamaño de los mercados nacionales y las restricciones a la exportación. Esto ha provocado un debate sobre si debería haber una preferencia europea para el gasto en defensa común de la UE. “Tal ‘preferencia europea’ es una contribución necesaria para revertir la actual predominancia de proveedores no europeos en los mercados de defensa europeos,”<a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\"> argumenta</a> la industria.&nbsp; Pero los países de la UE siguen divididos.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"visualización de tabla\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>¿Qué sistemas de armas se consideran prioritarios para Europa?</strong></h2>\n<p>Europa está invirtiendo en arquitecturas de defensa aérea y de misiles en múltiples capas porque, como dijo el Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, secretario de estado polaco para la defensa nacional, el año pasado: “Tener una ventaja en el aire define la guerra\".</p>\n<p>Por ejemplo,<a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\"> la Iniciativa del Escudo del Cielo Europeo (ESSI)</a>, lanzada en octubre de 2022, busca crear un sistema de defensa integral que integre capacidades que van desde niveles de corto alcance hasta exoatmosféricos.</p>\n<p>Además, se han listado drones, misiles, artillería, habilitadores estratégicos, movilidad militar, capacidades cibernéticas e inteligencia artificial como áreas prioritarias. En particular,<a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\"> los drones se han convertido en una herramienta crucial en la guerra en Ucrania</a>, lo que ha llevado tanto a Kyiv como a Moscú a desarrollar rápidamente su propia industria. Y hoy, los principales exportadores de drones militares son China y Turquía.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Prioridades de desarrollo de capacidades de la UE. Fuente: Agencia Europea de Defensa\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Fuente: Agencia Europea de Defensa</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>¿Qué desafíos enfrenta la UE para fortalecer sus capacidades militares?</strong></h2>\n<p>Si bien se da la bienvenida al aumento de la inversión en defensa, la industria busca contratos de adquisición a largo plazo o de varios años para estabilidad, innovación sostenida y desarrollo tecnológico. El sistema ‘hecho a medida’ típico de tiempos de paz, en el que se basa la industria de defensa de la UE, ha resultado en largos tiempos de espera para capacidades de defensa avanzadas.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>La cooperación en defensa, incluidas las empresas conjuntas y las adquisiciones compartidas, está creciendo, pero sigue siendo limitada. Ha habido esfuerzos específicos para aumentar la producción de municiones de artillería, un área donde Ucrania tiene una alta demanda. Pero el compromiso de la UE de entregar un millón de proyectiles de artillería de 155 mm entre marzo de 2023 y 2024 fue imposible de cumplir a tiempo, mostrando los desafíos que se avecinan. La Comisión de la UE estimó en 2022 que la falta de cooperación lleva a costos anuales que oscilan entre 25 mil millones y 100 mil millones de euros.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Más :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n ¿Regresa la conscripción a Europa? </a>\n </div>\n<p>Otro de los problemas clave para la industria de defensa de la UE es la fragmentación, especialmente fuera de los sectores de aeronáutica y misiles.&nbsp; La fragmentación no solo provoca duplicación y mayores costos de producción, sino también problemas de interoperabilidad, limitando su escala y efectividad operativa en el campo. Como indicación, los estados miembros de la UE han proporcionado diez tipos diferentes de obuses a Ucrania, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">según</a> el informe Draghi. Además, la UE opera 12 tipos diferentes de tanques de batalla, mientras que EE. UU. fabrica solo uno (el M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Mientras tanto, las dependencias externas también son un factor. Entre 2007 y 2016, más del 60 por ciento del presupuesto de adquisiciones de defensa de Europa se gastó en importaciones militares no pertenecientes a la UE, lo que llevó a controles y restricciones de terceros países sobre el equipo. Una 'preferencia europea' en las adquisiciones de defensa, impulsada principalmente por Francia, no encontró consenso durante las conversaciones informales de los líderes de la UE en febrero, y dado la necesidad de escalar rápidamente, muchos países están pidiendo que el sistema sea lo más abierto posible.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>¿Tienen los países europeos armas nucleares?</strong></h2>\n<p>Hasta enero de 2022, Francia tenía 290 ojivas, con 98 sistemas de entrega, incluidos misiles submarinos y misiles lanzados desde el aire. El Reino Unido tenía 225 ojivas, 120 operativas, desplegadas en cinco submarinos, con 105 en almacenamiento, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">según</a> la Asociación de Control de Armas.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"visualización de mapa\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Mientras tanto, se informa que Bélgica, Alemania, Italia, los Países Bajos y Turquía albergan armas nucleares estadounidenses. Polonia ha llamado recientemente a Washington para desplegar armas nucleares en el país, admitiendo que tener su propia capacidad tomaría décadas.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Artículo original</strong></a><strong> en <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">En asociación con <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, cofinanciado por la Unión Europea. Las opiniones y puntos de vista expresados son, sin embargo, solo de los autores y no reflejan necesariamente los de la Unión Europea o la Dirección General de Redes de Comunicación, Contenido y Tecnología. Ni la Unión Europea ni la autoridad otorgante pueden ser responsables por ellos.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:30.072",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"La invasión a gran escala de Rusia a Ucrania en febrero de 2022 sacudió el enfoque de la UE hacia la defensa, lo que llevó a una rápida reevaluación de su paisaje militar. La retirada anunciada de EE. UU. de la defensa de Europa ha puesto la cuestión del rearme del continente de nuevo sobre la mesa. EUobserver analiza el estado de la situación.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"es",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:18:27.262",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
},
{
key:"title": string:"Πόσες διαιρέσεις έχει η Ευρώπη; Μια ματιά στην κατάσταση της άμυνας της Ευρώπης",
key:"uid": string:"ffc6aff9-1164-41ee-8b4c-c1d27f9f2813",
key:"autoTeaserLong": string:"### Κύρια Σημεία\n\n1. **Κορυφαίοι Δαπανητές Άμυνας**: Οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, η Κίνα, η Ρωσία, η Ινδία και η Σαουδική Αραβία ηγούνται της παγκόσμιας δαπάνης για άμυνα, με τον στρατιωτικό προϋπολογισμό της Ρωσίας να έχει διπλασιαστεί από την εισβολή της το 2022 στην Ουκρανία, προκαλώντας ανησυχίες σχετικά με τη δυναμική ασφάλειας στην Ευρώπη.\n \n2. **Στόχοι Δαπανών του ΝΑΤΟ**: Παρά τον στόχο του ΝΑΤΟ για 2% του ΑΕΠ για δαπάνες άμυνας, αρκετές χώρες μέλη, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της Κροατίας και της Πορτογαλίας, δεν έχουν ακόμη επιτύχει αυτόν τον στόχο. Οι συζητήσεις συνεχίζονται σχετικά με την αύξηση αυτού του στόχου στο 5%, αντανακλώντας τις αυξημένες ανάγκες ασφάλειας.\n\n3. **Προκλήσεις της Βιομηχανίας Άμυνας της ΕΕ**: Ο τομέας άμυνας της ΕΕ, που εκτιμάται σχεδόν στα 84 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ, αντιμετωπίζει σημαντικές προκλήσεις, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της κατακερματισμένης δομής, της εξάρτησης από εισαγωγές εκτός ΕΕ και της ανάγκης για μακροχρόνιες συμβάσεις προμηθειών για την ενίσχυση των στρατιωτικών δυνατοτήτων και της καινοτομίας.\n\n### Προσφορά\n\n```markdown\nΚαθώς οι παγκόσμιες εντάσεις αυξάνονται, οι δαπάνες για άμυνα εκτοξεύονται, με τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, την Κίνα και τη Ρωσία να βρίσκονται στην πρώτη γραμμή. Στην Ευρώπη, τα μέλη του ΝΑΤΟ αγωνίζονται να επιτύχουν τους στόχους δαπανών, ενώ η ΕΕ επιδιώκει να ενισχύσει τις στρατιωτικές της ικανότητες εν μέσω κατακερματισμού και εξωτερικών εξαρτήσεων. Με τις εκκλήσεις για αυξημένους προϋπολογισμούς και μια ώθηση για στρατηγική αυτονομία, πώς θα πλοηγηθεί η Ευρώπη στο τοπίο της άμυνας της μπροστά σε εξελισσόμενες απειλές; Εξερευνήστε τις πολυπλοκότητες των στρατιωτικών δαπανών και το μέλλον της ευρωπαϊκής ασφάλειας σε αυτήν την εις βάθος ανάλυση.\n```",
key:"autoTeaserShort": string:"Η παγκόσμια στρατιωτική δαπάνη είναι σε άνοδο, με τις ΗΠΑ, την Κίνα και τη Ρωσία να ηγούνται της προσπάθειας. Καθώς η Ευρώπη αντιμετωπίζει προκλήσεις ασφάλειας, τα έθνη αυξάνουν τους προϋπολογισμούς άμυνάς τους και εξερευνούν κοινές στρατιωτικές πρωτοβουλίες. Ανακαλύψτε τις τελευταίες τάσεις και τις επιπτώσεις για την παγκόσμια ασφάλεια.",
key:"content": string:"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ποιες είναι οι χώρες που ξοδεύουν τα περισσότερα για την άμυνα;</strong></h2>\n<p>Οι χώρες με τις υψηλότερες <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/category/politics/defence-and-security/\">δαπάνες άμυνας</a> τα τελευταία χρόνια είναι οι <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/united-states/\">Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/china/\">Κίνα</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/russia/\">Ρωσία</a>, Ινδία και Σαουδική Αραβία. Η ευρωπαϊκή ανάπτυξη υστερεί μπροστά στην αυξανόμενη στρατιωτική δαπάνη της Ρωσίας, η οποία έχει διπλασιαστεί σε σχέση με τα επίπεδα πριν από την <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/war-in-ukraine/\">εισβολή της στην Ουκρανία το 2022</a>.</p>\n<div style=\"height:41px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"height:0px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241072\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241072/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:52px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Πόσα ξοδεύουν τα μέλη του ΝΑΤΟ για την άμυνα;</strong></h2>\n<p>Ο πρόεδρος των ΗΠΑ <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/donald-trump-2/\">Ντόναλντ Τραμπ</a> έχει επανειλημμένα επικρίνει τους συμμάχους για το ότι δεν πληρούν τον στόχο δαπανών άμυνας της συμμαχίας, που είναι το δύο τοις εκατό του ΑΕΠ (που συμφωνήθηκε το 2014). Ακόμα και τώρα, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/croatia/\">Κροατία</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/portugal-en/\">Πορτογαλία</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/italy-en/\">Ιταλία</a>, Καναδάς, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/belgium/\">Βέλγιο</a>, Λουξεμβούργο, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovenia-en/\">Σλοβενία</a> και <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/spain-en/\">Ισπανία</a> δεν έχουν φτάσει τον στόχο.</p>\n<p>Η δαπάνη άμυνας των 23 χωρών της ΕΕ που είναι μέλη του <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/nato-4/\">ΝΑΤΟ</a> ανήλθε στο 1,99 τοις εκατό του συνολικού ΑΕΠ τους το 2024 και αναμένεται να φτάσει το 2,04 τοις εκατό το 2025.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Περισσότερα :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-rearm-trumpo-putinist-new-order/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Μια ταραγμένη Ευρώπη κλείνει τις τάξεις της για να αντιμετωπίσει τη νέα τάξη Τραμπο-Πούτιν </a>\n </div>\n<p>Αλλά ο Τραμπ πρότεινε ότι τα μέλη του ΝΑΤΟ θα πρέπει να αυξήσουν τις ελάχιστες δαπάνες άμυνας στο πέντε τοις εκατό του ΑΕΠ — μια ιδέα που υποστηρίχθηκε από την επικεφαλής εξωτερικών υποθέσεων της ΕΕ <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/kaja-kallas/\">Κάγια Κάλλας</a> τον Ιανουάριο. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/tag/emmanuel-macron/\">Ο Μακρόν</a> έχει προτείνει την αύξηση των δαπανών άμυνας της ΕΕ κατά τρία έως 3,5 τοις εκατό του ΑΕΠ. Ωστόσο, αυτό θα χρειαστεί χρόνια για να υλοποιηθεί με βάση τους τρέχοντες ρυθμούς.</p>\n<div style=\"height:43px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-hierarchy\" data-src=\"visualisation/22241215\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22241215/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"hierarchy visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:51px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Η άμυνα είναι μια βιομηχανία που καθοδηγείται από την τεχνολογία και απαιτεί μαζικές επενδύσεις σε έρευνα και καινοτομία. Η χρηματοδότηση R&amp;D για την άμυνα στην ΕΕ ανήλθε σε 3,9 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ το 2022, σύμφωνα με την Eurostat. Ωστόσο, σύμφωνα με την <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf\"> έκθεση Ντράγκι</a>, τα συστήματα άμυνας επόμενης γενιάς θα απαιτήσουν μαζικές επενδύσεις R&amp;D. Από το 2014, οι ΗΠΑ έχουν δώσει προτεραιότητα στις δαπάνες R&amp;D πάνω από όλες τις άλλες κατηγορίες στρατιωτικών δαπανών. Η Γαλλία, η Γερμανία και η Σουηδία είναι στην κορυφή των χωρών της ΕΕ που επενδύουν σε R&amp;D για την άμυνα.</p>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div style=\"min-height:832px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"><script type=\"text/javascript\" defer src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-XJ7mL\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XJ7mL/full.png\" alt=\"\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:45px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ποιες ευρωπαϊκές χώρες αυξάνουν περισσότερο τους προϋπολογισμούς άμυνας;</strong></h2>\n<p>Από το 2014, χώρες όπως <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/hungary-en/\">Ουγγαρία</a>, η <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/czech-republic/\">Τσεχική Δημοκρατία</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/poland/\">Πολωνία</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/denmark-en/\">Δανία</a>, η Βόρεια Μακεδονία, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/slovakia-en/\">Σλοβακία</a> και <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/sweden-en/\">Σουηδία</a> έχουν διπλασιάσει τις δαπάνες άμυνάς τους, ενώ το Λουξεμβούργο, η Λετονία και η Λιθουανία έχουν τριπλασιάσει τις δαπάνες τους. <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/germany-en/\">Η Γερμανία</a>, η <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/netherlands-en/\">Ολλανδία</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/estonia-en/\">Εσθονία</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/romania-en/\">Ρουμανία</a>, <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/bulgaria/\">Βουλγαρία</a> και <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/finland/\">Φινλανδία</a> έχουν επίσης σχεδόν διπλασιάσει τους προϋπολογισμούς άμυνάς τους.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Πόσους στρατιώτες έχουν οι ευρωπαϊκές χώρες;&nbsp;</strong></h2>\n<p>Ο συνολικός αριθμός των ενεργών στρατιωτικών προσωπικού στην Ευρώπη, συμπεριλαμβανομένου του Ηνωμένου Βασιλείου, εκτιμάται ότι είναι περίπου 1,5 εκατομμύριο. Ωστόσο, η αποτελεσματικότητά του υπονομεύεται από την έλλειψη κοινής διοικητικής δομής και στρατιωτικών συστημάτων.</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242214\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242214/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:46px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<p>Μέχρι το τέλος του 2024, ο αριθμός των ρωσικών στρατευμάτων στην <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/ukraine/\">Ουκρανία</a> ήταν περίπου 700.000. Ωστόσο, <a href=\"https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia\">εκτιμάται</a> ότι η Ρωσία έχει περίπου 1,3 εκατομμύρια ενεργούς στρατιωτικούς και δύο εκατομμύρια εφέδρους.</p>\n<p>Σύμφωνα με<a href=\"https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2934989/more-us-troops-deploying-to-europe-guard-leaving-ukraine/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%2080%2C000%20American%20service%20members%20in%20Europe.\"> επίσημα στοιχεία</a>, περίπου 80.000 Αμερικανοί στρατιωτικοί δυνάμεις είναι ενεργές στην Ευρώπη. Ωστόσο, ο συνολικός αριθμός κυμαίνεται λόγω ασκήσεων και τακτικών περιστροφών στρατευμάτων, όπως <a href=\"https://www.cfr.org/article/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">σημειώνεται</a> από το Συμβούλιο Εξωτερικών Σχέσεων. Εν τω μεταξύ, οι ειδικοί εκτιμούν ότι η Ευρώπη θα χρειαστεί <a href=\"https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed\">300.000 επιπλέον στρατιώτες</a> ή περίπου 50 ταξιαρχίες για να υπερασπιστεί τον εαυτό της, χωρίς τις αμερικανικές δυνάμεις.&nbsp;</p>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22242385\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22242385/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Κινείται η Ευρώπη προς μια κοινή στρατιωτική δύναμη;</strong></h2>\n<p>Όχι. Ορισμένες χώρες, όπως η <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/country/france/\">Γαλλία</a>, παραδοσιακά υποστηρίζουν ισχυρότερη στρατιωτική αυτονομία της ΕΕ, ενώ άλλες, όπως η Πολωνία και οι Βαλτικές χώρες, δίνουν προτεραιότητα στο ΝΑΤΟ. Αλλά αντί να κινούνται προς μια ενιαία ευρωπαϊκή στρατιωτική δύναμη, η ΕΕ επικεντρώνει τις προσπάθειές της σε πιο στενή στρατιωτική συνεργασία, κοινές προμήθειες και ταχύτερες δυνάμεις αντίκτυπου, όπως φαίνεται στην <a href=\"https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\">Στρατηγική Πυξίδα του 2022</a>, του οποίου ο στόχος ήταν να έχει μια ταχεία δύναμη ανάπτυξης 5.000 ανδρών μέχρι το 2025. Η στρατιωτική κινητικότητα είναι ακόμα σήμερα μία από τις προτεραιότητες της στρατηγικής άμυνας της ΕΕ, καθώς δεν υπάρχουν εναρμονισμένοι κανόνες για τη μετακίνηση στρατευμάτων ή εξοπλισμού μεταξύ χωρών σε κατάσταση έκτακτης ανάγκης.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Γιατί και πώς σχεδιάζει η ΕΕ να ενισχύσει την παραγωγή όπλων;</strong></h2>\n<p>Η εισβολή στην Κριμαία το 2014, ακολουθούμενη από την πλήρους κλίμακας εισβολή της Ρωσίας στην Ουκρανία το 2022, έχει αναδιαμορφώσει την πολιτική ασφάλειας της ΕΕ, αναγκάζοντας την ΕΕ και το ΝΑΤΟ να επανεξετάσουν τις στρατηγικές άμυνας και να αυξήσουν τις στρατιωτικές δαπάνες για να ενισχύσουν τις ικανότητες. Ο πόλεμος στην Ουκρανία και η προφανής στροφή της διοίκησης Τραμπ προς τη Μόσχα έχουν επίσης αναζωογονήσει τις συζητήσεις για την στρατηγική αυτονομία της ΕΕ, με τη Γαλλία (και τώρα ακόμη και τη Γερμανία) να πιέζουν για περισσότερη ανεξαρτησία από τις δομές ασφάλειας που ηγούνται οι ΗΠΑ.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Περισσότερα :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/who-pay-for-rearm-tax-rich/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Ποιος θα πληρώσει για την επανεξοπλιστική Ευρώπη; Ήρθε η ώρα να φορολογηθούν οι πλούσιοι </a>\n </div>\n<p>Τα τελευταία είκοσι χρόνια, η ΕΕ έχει προτείνει διάφορες πρωτοβουλίες άμυνας.</p>\n<p>Κύρια βήματα για την ενίσχυση της στρατιωτικής συνεργασίας περιλαμβάνουν τη δημιουργία της <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/\"> Ευρωπαϊκής Υπηρεσίας Άμυνας</a> (2004), το ετήσιο <a href=\"https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan#:~:text=Since%202008%2C%20the%20European%20Defence,a%20variety%20of%20potential%20developments.\"> Σχέδιο Ανάπτυξης Ικανοτήτων</a> (2008) και το <a href=\"https://pesco.europa.eu/\"> PESCO</a> (2017). Οι κανονισμοί για τις μεταφορές άμυνας και τις εξαγωγές διπλής χρήσης έχουν επίσης ενισχύσει τον έλεγχο των όπλων, ενώ η πλήρους κλίμακας εισβολή της Ρωσίας στην Ουκρανία το 2022 επιτάχυνε τις προσπάθειες άμυνας της ΕΕ, οδηγώντας στη δημιουργία της <a href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/\"> Ευρωπαϊκής Εγκατάστασης Ειρήνης</a> (2021), <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en\"> EDIRPA</a>, <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en\"> ASAP</a> (2023) και <a href=\"https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\"> EDIS</a> (2024).</p>\n<p>Με το <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/changing-course-ukraine-defence-europe/\"> σχέδιο ReArm Europe</a>, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή στοχεύει να κινητοποιήσει 800 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ για να ενισχύσει τις δαπάνες άμυνας της ΕΕ, να υποστηρίξει την Ουκρανία και να επεκτείνει τη βιομηχανική βάση της Ευρώπης.</p>\n<p>Το σχέδιο περιλαμβάνει ένα νέο εργαλείο 150 δισεκατομμυρίων ευρώ σε νέα κοινή δανειοδότηση της ΕΕ, χαλαρώνοντας τους δημοσιονομικούς κανόνες της Ένωσης για την άμυνα (που θα μπορούσαν να απελευθερωθούν 650 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ τα επόμενα τέσσερα χρόνια), χρησιμοποιώντας <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar389872b1\"> ταμεία συνοχής</a> (εθελοντικά), αλλάζοντας τους κανόνες επενδύσεων για την ΕΤΕπ και «ξεκλειδώνοντας» ιδιωτικές επενδύσεις σε όλη την πολύ καθυστερημένη <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/arca778b32\"> Ένωση Κεφαλαιαγορών</a> (CMU).&nbsp;</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Πόσο μεγάλη είναι η βιομηχανία άμυνας της ΕΕ;</strong></h2>\n<p>Ο τομέας άμυνας της ΕΕ έχει εκτιμώμενο ετήσιο τζίρο σχεδόν 84 δισεκατομμυρίων ευρώ, υποστηρίζοντας άμεσα πάνω από 196.000 υψηλά καταρτισμένες θέσεις εργασίας και δημιουργώντας έμμεσα περισσότερες από 315.000 επιπλέον θέσεις εργασίας, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en?filename=join_2022_24_2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf\">σύμφωνα με</a> την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή. Αλλά η ευρωπαϊκή βιομηχανία άμυνας <a href=\"https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/26/skilled-workers-wanted-the-eus-defence-industry-struggles-to-find-the-right-talent\"> χρειάζεται περισσότερους εξειδικευμένους εργαζόμενους</a> καθώς αυξάνει την παραγωγή και την καινοτομία για να αντιμετωπίσει τις αυξανόμενες προκλήσεις ασφάλειας.</p>\n<p>Οι αγοραίες αξίες των ευρωπαϊκών εταιρειών άμυνας έχουν εκτοξευθεί, με τις περισσότερες <a href=\"https://euobserver.com/*/ar5b1d2b42\"> να διπλασιάζουν τις τιμές των μετοχών τους</a> από τότε που η Ρωσία εισέβαλε στην Ουκρανία. Ωστόσο, τα έσοδα είναι ακόμα αρκετά μικρά, δείχνοντας ότι η ικανότητά τους να επεκταθούν περιορίζεται από το μέγεθος των εθνικών αγορών και τους περιορισμούς εξαγωγών. Αυτό έχει προκαλέσει μια συζήτηση σχετικά με το αν θα πρέπει να υπάρχει μια ευρωπαϊκή προτίμηση για τις κοινές δαπάνες άμυνας της ΕΕ. «Μια τέτοια ‘ευρωπαϊκή προτίμηση’ είναι μια αναγκαία συμβολή για να αντιστραφεί η τρέχουσα επικράτηση μη ευρωπαϊκών προμηθευτών στις ευρωπαϊκές αγορές άμυνας», <a href=\"https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/\"> υποστηρίζει</a> η βιομηχανία.&nbsp; Αλλά οι χώρες της ΕΕ παραμένουν διχασμένες.</p>\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-table\" data-src=\"visualisation/22273155\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22273155/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"table visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<div style=\"height:48px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ποια συστήματα όπλων θεωρούνται προτεραιότητα για την Ευρώπη;</strong></h2>\n<p>Η Ευρώπη επενδύει σε πολυεπίπεδες αρχιτεκτονικές αεροπορικής και πυραυλικής άμυνας, διότι όπως είπε πέρυσι ο Παβέλ Ξαβέρι Ζαλέφσκι, Πολωνός υπουργός Εθνικής Άμυνας: «Η κατοχή πλεονεκτήματος στον αέρα καθορίζει τον πόλεμο». </p>\n<p>Για παράδειγμα, <a href=\"https://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/news_219119.htm\"> η Πρωτοβουλία Ευρωπαϊκής Αεροπορικής Ασπίδας (ESSI)</a>, που ξεκίνησε τον Οκτώβριο του 2022, επιδιώκει να δημιουργήσει ένα ολοκληρωμένο σύστημα άμυνας που ενσωματώνει ικανότητες που κυμαίνονται από βραχέως έως εξωατμοσφαιρικά επίπεδα.</p>\n<p>Επιπλέον, τα drones, οι πύραυλοι, η πυροβολαρχία, οι στρατηγικοί ενισχυτές, η στρατιωτική κινητικότητα, οι κυβερνοικανότητες και η τεχνητή νοημοσύνη έχουν καταγραφεί ως προτεραιότητες. Δηλαδή, <a href=\"https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-four-lessons-for-the-west/\"> τα drones έχουν γίνει ένα κρίσιμο εργαλείο στον πόλεμο στην Ουκρανία</a>, αναγκάζοντας τόσο το Κίεβο όσο και τη Μόσχα να αναπτύξουν γρήγορα τη δική τους βιομηχανία. Και σήμερα, οι κύριοι εξαγωγείς στρατιωτικών drones είναι η Κίνα και η Τουρκία.</p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-2025-03-24-alle-14.37.35-1024x573.png\" alt=\"Eu capability developpement priorities. Source: European Defence Agency\" class=\"wp-image-2623009\"/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Πηγή: Ευρωπαϊκή Υπηρεσία Άμυνας</figcaption></figure>\n</div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ποιες προκλήσεις αντιμετωπίζει η ΕΕ στην ενίσχυση των στρατιωτικών της ικανοτήτων;</strong></h2>\n<p>Ενώ η αυξημένη επένδυση στην άμυνα είναι ευπρόσδεκτη, η βιομηχανία επιδιώκει μακροχρόνιες ή πολυετείς συμβάσεις προμηθειών για σταθερότητα, διαρκή καινοτομία και ανάπτυξη τεχνολογίας. Το σύστημα «κατασκευής κατ' παραγγελία» που είναι τυπικό σε περιόδους ειρήνης, στο οποίο βασίζεται η βιομηχανία άμυνας της ΕΕ, έχει οδηγήσει σε μεγάλες αναμονές για προηγμένες ικανότητες άμυνας.&nbsp;</p>\n<p>Η συνεργασία στον τομέα της άμυνας, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των κοινοπραξιών και των κοινών προμηθειών, αυξάνεται, αλλά παραμένει περιορισμένη. Υπήρξαν συγκεκριμένες προσπάθειες να ενισχυθεί η παραγωγή πυρομαχικών πυροβολικού, μια περιοχή όπου η Ουκρανία έχει υψηλή ζήτηση. Αλλά η δέσμευση της ΕΕ να παραδώσει ένα εκατομμύριο βλήματα πυροβολικού διαμετρήματος 155 χιλιοστών μεταξύ Μαρτίου 2023 και 2024 ήταν αδύνατο να εκπληρωθεί εγκαίρως, δείχνοντας τις προκλήσεις που έρχονται. Η Επιτροπή της ΕΕ εκτίμησε το 2022 ότι η έλλειψη συνεργασίας οδηγεί σε ετήσιες δαπάνες που κυμαίνονται από 25 δισεκατομμύρια έως 100 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ.</p>\n<div class=\"read_more__container\">\n <span>Περισσότερα :</span><br />\n <a href=\"https://voxeurop.eu/en/military-service-conscription-returns-europe/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><br />\n Επιστρέφει η υποχρεωτική στρατιωτική θητεία στην Ευρώπη; </a>\n </div>\n<p>Ένα άλλο από τα κύρια ζητήματα για τη βιομηχανία άμυνας της ΕΕ είναι η κατακερματισμένη κατάσταση, ειδικά εκτός των τομέων αεροναυτικής και πυραύλων.&nbsp; Ο κατακερματισμός όχι μόνο προκαλεί διπλασιασμό και υψηλότερο κόστος παραγωγής, αλλά και προβλήματα διαλειτουργικότητας, περιορίζοντας την κλίμακα και την επιχειρησιακή αποτελεσματικότητα στο πεδίο. Ως ένδειξη, οι χώρες μέλη της ΕΕ έχουν προμηθεύσει δέκα διαφορετικούς τύπους πυροβόλων όπλων στην Ουκρανία, <a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en\">σύμφωνα με</a> την έκθεση Ντράγκι. Επιπλέον, η ΕΕ λειτουργεί 12 διαφορετικούς τύπους μάχης, ενώ οι ΗΠΑ κατασκευάζουν μόνο έναν (τον M1 Abrams).</p>\n<p>Εν τω μεταξύ, οι εξωτερικές εξαρτήσεις παίζουν επίσης ρόλο. Μεταξύ 2007 και 2016, πάνω από το 60 τοις εκατό του προϋπολογισμού προμηθειών άμυνας της Ευρώπης δαπανήθηκε σε στρατιωτικές εισαγωγές εκτός ΕΕ, οδηγώντας σε ελέγχους και περιορισμούς από τρίτες χώρες στον εξοπλισμό. Μια «ευρωπαϊκή προτίμηση» στις προμήθειες άμυνας, που προωθείται κυρίως από τη Γαλλία, δεν βρήκε συναίνεση κατά τις ανεπίσημες συνομιλίες των ηγετών της ΕΕ τον Φεβρουάριο – και δεδομένης της ανάγκης για γρήγορη κλιμάκωση, πολλές χώρες ζητούν ένα σύστημα που να είναι όσο το δυνατόν πιο ανοιχτό.</p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Έχουν οι ευρωπαϊκές χώρες πυρηνικά όπλα;</strong></h2>\n<p>Από τον Ιανουάριο του 2022, η Γαλλία είχε 290 πυρηνικές κεφαλές, με 98 συστήματα παράδοσης, συμπεριλαμβανομένων πυραύλων υποβρυχίων και αεροπορικών πυραύλων. Το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο είχε 225 πυρηνικές κεφαλές, 120 επιχειρησιακές, τοποθετημένες σε πέντε υποβρύχια, με 105 σε αποθήκευση, <a href=\"https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance\">σύμφωνα με</a> την Ένωση Ελέγχου Όπλων.&nbsp;</p>\n<div class=\"flourish-embed flourish-map\" data-src=\"visualisation/22396583\"><script src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js\"></script><noscript><img src=\"https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22396583/thumbnail\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"map visualization\" /></noscript></div>\n<p>Εν τω μεταξύ, αναφέρεται ότι το Βέλγιο, η Γερμανία, η Ιταλία, η Ολλανδία και η Τουρκία φιλοξενούν όλες πυρηνικά όπλα των ΗΠΑ. Η Πολωνία έχει πρόσφατα ζητήσει από την Ουάσινγκτον να αναπτύξει πυρηνικά όπλα στη χώρα, παραδεχόμενη ότι η κατοχή της δικής της ικανότητας θα διαρκέσει δεκαετίες.</p>\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>👉</strong><a href=\"https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0fa3f12f\"><strong>Πρωτότυπο άρθρο</strong></a><strong> στο <em>euobserver</em></strong></h6>\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"></div>\n<div class=\"wp-block-group\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left has-small-font-size\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:100\">Σε συνεργασία με <a href=\"https://displayeurope.eu/\">Display Europe</a>, συγχρηματοδοτούμενη από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Οι απόψεις και οι γνώμες που εκφράζονται είναι ωστόσο αυτές του συγγραφέα(ων) μόνο και δεν αντικατοπτρίζουν απαραίτητα αυτές της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ή της Γενικής Διεύθυνσης Δικτύων Επικοινωνίας, Περιεχομένου και Τεχνολογίας. Ούτε η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση ούτε η χορηγούσα αρχή μπορούν να θεωρηθούν υπεύθυνες γι' αυτές.</h6>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img src=\"https://voxeurop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3-logos-Display-Europe-1024x115.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2464113\"/></figure>\n</div>\n</div>",
key:"contentCleaned": null:null,
key:"contentItemUid": string:"eayy2lireevkarxe5s7xixrbkwe",
key:"createdAt": string:"2025-04-01T09:02:30.727",
key:"engine": string:"gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18",
key:"metadata": string:"batch job batch_67eda874ebc08190ae2a9b1fd02928df",
key:"revisionId": string:"vayy2mifgtp2arxik35k37ztnig",
key:"subtitle": null:null,
key:"summary": string:"Η πλήρης κλίμακας εισβολή της Ρωσίας στην Ουκρανία τον Φεβρουάριο του 2022 αναστάτωσε την προσέγγιση της ΕΕ στην άμυνα, προκαλώντας μια ταχεία επαναξιολόγηση του στρατιωτικού της τοπίου. Η ανακοινωθείσα αποχώρηση των ΗΠΑ από την άμυνα της Ευρώπης έχει θέσει ξανά το ζήτημα του επανεξοπλισμού της ηπείρου στο τραπέζι. Το EUobserver εξετάζει την κατάσταση.",
key:"summaryCleaned": null:null,
key:"targetLanguage": string:"el",
key:"updatedAt": string:"2025-04-03T05:20:15.428",
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslation"
}
],
key:"totalCount": number:21,
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItemTranslationsConnection"
},
key:"__typename": string:"ContentItem"
}